VZCZCXRO3190
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKA #0304/01 0890033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300033Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8516
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 2756
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DHAKA 000304 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC BG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA 
 
REF:  (A) 08 STATE 74840 
 
 
----------------------- 
¶A.  COUNTRY CONDITIONS: 
----------------------- 
 
¶1.  Bangladesh is a high fraud post.  In CY 2008, Dhaka's FPU 
investigated 969 cases, not/not counting cases referred for DNA 
analysis.  Infrastructure, especially road infrastructure, is poor 
outside of main cities and towns.  This combined with wide-spread 
seasonal flooding and frequent natural disasters, makes scheduling 
and execution of fraud field investigations challenging. 
 
¶2.  Bangladesh is a developing country of more than 150 million 
people living in an area roughly the size of Wisconsin. The areas 
around the capital city, Dhaka, and around Comilla are the most 
densely populated.  More than a third of the population lives below 
the poverty line, and the current per capita income is about $554. 
More than 60% of the population is involved in agriculture which 
accounts for about 19% of GDP. The national growth rate of about 
five percent for the past decade has not been sufficient to reduce 
the level of poverty for the majority of Bangladeshis.  The global 
economic slowdown is starting to reduce the opportunities for 
Bangladeshis to find employment abroad, and will likely reduce 
Bangladesh's export earnings.  Most notably, Malaysia recently 
revoked the work related visas for over 55,000 Bangladeshis. 
 
¶3.  The vast majority of Bangladeshis are culturally Bengali, 
although there are also non-Bengali ethnic groups among the tribal 
groups.  90 percent of the population is Muslim, 7 percent are 
Hindu, and the remaining 3 percent include Christians, Buddhists, 
and other religions. 
 
¶4.  Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy. On December 29, 2008, 
the Awami league (AL), led by Sheikh Hasina Wazed, won 230 of 299 
parliamentary seats in elections considered by international and 
domestic observers to be both free, fair, and credible.  The 
elections and the peaceful transfer of power that followed ended two 
years of rule by a caretaker government under a state of emergency. 
 
 
-------------- 
¶B.  NIV FRAUD: 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  Although Dhaka is a high-fraud Post, window fraud on the NIV 
line is generally unsophisticated, obvious, and properly frustrated 
with a 214(b) refusal.  Given that almost all documents are 
considered unreliable, officers rely on effective lines of 
questioning during interviews rather than on documentation.  In 
order to cut down on cases referred to FPU, the line officers 
generally refer a case only when it contains traits of a possible 
new fraud trend or indication of visa fraud ring involvement. 
 
¶6.  On several occasions over the last six months, we have seen an 
increase in walk-in individuals who want to verify that their visas 
are genuine.  These applicants have similar stories of being 
contacted by visa agents with stories of visas available for a steep 
price to travel to the U.S. for employment as "fisherman" or 
something similar.  In one instance, an applicant sold his house in 
order to obtain one of these visas.  All of the walk-ins have 
produced what appears to be a computer manipulated color printout of 
a visa foil with mismatched data from a number of posts (i.e., foil 
number from Cairo/issuing post on foil is Cotonou.).  The visa 
classification is either B1/2 or H1B.  Section L of this cable 
contains additional information regarding our coordination of 
efforts with local authorities on these cases. 
 
¶7.  Though Dhaka is a low-volume H1B post, most of our serious NIV 
fraud is found in the H1B category.  We find our applicants are 
generally qualified but the petitioning company is "benching" 
applicants.  We are also encountering fraud with H4 applicants. 
Since Bangladesh has a tradition of arranged marriages, it is not 
uncommon for a wife to apply for an H4 visa, who has literally met 
her husband for the first time on their wedding day.  It is 
difficult to differentiate between culturally legitimate arranged 
marriages and marriages strictly for immigration purposes.  This 
problem is common with IV and DV cases as well and is discussed more 
fully in IV section below. 
 
¶8.  In the past, applicants in the R1 category were chronically 
problematic due to nebulous qualifications and employment histories. 
 The implementation of the petition requirement for R1 applications 
has drastically reduced the total number of applicants under this 
category with no new cases referred to FPU during this period. 
 
------------- 
 
DHAKA 00000304  002 OF 006 
 
 
¶C.  IV FRAUD: 
------------- 
 
¶9.  IV fraud consumes the majority of available FPU resources. 
Petitioners and applicants are well aware of our efforts, including 
our methods and limitations, to combat fraud.  Consequently, we see 
many instances where a petitioner petitions for multiple family 
preference applicants but holds one or more of these cases at NVC by 
not paying fees.  This is done in order to let fraudulent cases 
involving fake spouses or over-aged children clear post first before 
legitimate cases are processed.  Our aggressive investigation policy 
involving all cross-reference cases usually pays dividends. 
Recently, for example, we were able to nail down four cases of F2B 
marital status fraud when an applicant not only admitted she was 
married but also provided information regarding two of her siblings 
in cases that were not at post yet (Being held at NVC through 
non-payment of fees). 
 
 
¶10.  We see a significant amount of age fraud among applicants in 
age dependent visa categories (especially F2A applicants and F4 
derivatives) and marriage fraud in all spouse-related visa 
classifications.  With the almost complete lack of security of most 
Bangladeshi civil documents, it is very easy for applicants to 
obtain legitimate documents with false information to support their 
relationship claims.  FPU investigations have uncovered many 
instances where responsible officials were aware that the documents 
they were issuing contained fraudulent information.  Since birth 
certificates are generally not reliable and most births are 
registered only a few months before a petition is filed, we 
generally rely on secondary documents, such as school certificates, 
to corroborate the applicant's claimed date of birth.  The local 
school system is the most accurate recordkeeping entity in 
Bangladesh with respect to dates of birth.  The FPU is very 
successful on investigations initiated to uncover age fraud, either 
in the form of forged certificates or certificates with fraudulent 
information not supported by the school's records.  Often, a school 
administrator issues an official document with falsified data, 
either as a favor to the applicant, or as a result of heavy pressure 
from an outside entity, e.g. family in the U.S. 
(NOTE - We recently revised our Bone Age Testing (BAT) procedures to 
drastically reduce the number of BAT tests done.  Bat was 
duplicative as a field investigation is required regardless of BAT 
results. Also, BAT findings are controversial in regards to 
accuracy.) 
 
¶11.  In IV cases, marital status fraud is common in F2A and F2B 
cases. Recent numbers indicate a fifty percent fraud rate where an 
applicant hid an existing spouse in order to qualify for an 
alternative visa category with a current priority date. 
Neighborhood investigations are used to verify marital status. 
Although both time and labor intensive, they are very effective at 
uncovering and confirming fraud. 
 
¶12.   The tradition of arranged marriages also poses difficulties 
for adjudicators in CR1 and K visa cases.  Since it is not unusual 
for a spouse, especially a new wife, to know almost nothing about 
her partner, we rely heavily on secondary evidence to establish the 
bona fides of the marriage.  We ask for photos, videos, invitations, 
cards, etc., to prove the relationship is valid.  The lack of 
secondary evidence can be a strong indicator that the applicants are 
perpetrating marriage fraud. 
 
¶13.  The FPM and adjudicating officers are jointly developing 
standardized criteria for referring CR1 and K visa cases to the FPU. 
 This is a difficult task as the case files and documentation of a 
marriage for immigration purposes and a legitimately arranged 
marriage are sometimes very similar. 
 
¶14.  Post receives a number of requests each year from DHS for 
document verification and field investigations, either from 
adjudicators in the various service centers or in CIS field offices. 
 In 2008, we completed five investigations for DHS.  27 DHS cases 
are still pending. 
 
------------- 
¶D.  DV FRAUD: 
------------- 
 
¶15.  Bangladeshis are enthusiastic participants in the DV program. 
Last year, over four million Bangladeshis submitted entries, and 
Bangladesh perennially ranks in the top five for DV winners. 
Corrupt agents and cyber caf operators (hereafter referred to as DV 
agents) are equally enthusiastic about the DV program.  Many 
Bangladeshis do not have access to the Internet or have limited 
English language skills, necessitating the use of cyber cafes and 
agents for online data entry.  DV agents manipulate the entries by 
substituting an address under their control for the applicants and 
 
DHAKA 00000304  003 OF 006 
 
 
change the marital status to single instead of married.  Once the 
address is changed, the applicant is effectively under the control 
of the DV agent.  Once received, winning letters are held for ransom 
by the agent.  The applicant is informed that he/she may receive the 
letter for a very large cash payment or, in lieu of payment, by 
adding a fake spouse to the application.  Every year, post conducts 
outreach to educate potential applicants of the pitfalls of DV 
agents and encourages the applicants to take control of their 
application process as much as possible. 
 
¶16.  As previously discussed, the tradition of arranged marriages 
makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate 
arranged marriages and marriages solely for immigration purposes. 
Again, we rely on the usual array of secondary evidence to establish 
that a genuine marriage exists. 
 
¶17.  Occupational qualification fraud is fairly common and the 
easiest to detect.  Using the O-Net standards, adjudicators ask 
detailed questions about the applicant's usual work and can usually 
quickly separate those who qualify from those with inflated their 
qualifications. 
 
¶18.  Counterfeit, improvidently issued, and/or altered school 
certificates are also commonplace.  Post has extensive exemplar 
files of genuine and fake Secondary School Certificates (SSC) and 
Higher Secondary Certificates (HSC) from all the regional Boards of 
Education.  These are available in both hard copy and electronic 
soft copy to all members of the Consular staff. 
 
¶19.  In October 2005, the Ministry of Education established a 
website for on-line verification of educational certificates.  This 
website allows nationwide verification of certificates issued after 
the computerization of Board records, generally from the mid-1990s. 
This has proved to be an important resource for DV adjudicators. 
 
--------------------------- 
¶E.  ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD: 
--------------------------- 
 
¶20.  We have extremely low incidence of fraud in these areas.  Most 
suspect cases involve Consular Reports of Birth Abroad and are 
investigated through the use of DNA. 
 
 
 
------------------- 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD: 
------------------- 
 
¶21.  Bangladesh civil law makes no provision for adoption. Islamic 
and Hindu practices either forbid or prohibit almost all adoptions. 
The only legal adoption recourse is for Bangladeshi adults to apply 
for an order of guardianship under the 1890 Guards and Wards Act. 
Only Bangladeshi natives and citizens are permitted to become 
guardians in this manner.  In some cases, the guardianship can form 
the basis of an IR-4 petition.  Most of our fraud involves direct 
transfers between family members where a relative in the US seeks to 
adopt a cousin or nephew/niece in order to give the child a better 
life in the US.  The family in Bangladesh generally tries to 
fraudulently conceal their standard of living in order to qualify 
the child as an eligible orphan. 
 
¶22.  There is also a tradition of "social adoptions" in Bangladesh 
where families take in orphans of relatives or foundlings and raise 
them as their own.  The parents never regularize the child's status, 
and the child may not be aware of his or her actual parentage.  This 
often comes to light when DNA testing reveals that one or another 
child may not be eligible to receive a visa in family preference 
cases. 
 
 
----------------------- 
¶G.  Use of DNA Testing: 
----------------------- 
 
¶23.  Post's adjudicating officers allow applicants ample opportunity 
to provide sufficient evidence of relationship (EOR) during an 
initial interview and subsequent return interviews.  However, many 
applicants are unable to provide adequate EOR required to establish 
a petitionable relationship and are requested to complete DNA 
testing.  Post provides a letter that explicitly states any AABB 
certified lab that the petitioner or applicants choose can conduct 
the testing.  The vast majority of genetic relationships are 
affirmed for those applicants that show up for testing. 
Occasionally, a principal applicant advises us that one of the 
derivatives in the case has recently "died" - an indication that the 
derivative was most likely not an immediate family member.  DNA 
no-shows for the last 5 years average 5.5 percent.  In simple terms, 
 
DHAKA 00000304  004 OF 006 
 
 
this means 121 families did not show for DNA testing during this 
period.  Post views DNA testing as a valuable fraud deterrent. 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
¶H.  ASYLUM and other DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶24.  Dhaka handles both VISAS 92 follow-to-join cases and requests 
for investigation in ongoing political asylum cases.  Since the 
arrival of the current FPM in August of 2008, there have been no 
VISAS 92 cases referred to FPU and only two requests from DRL for 
follow-up investigations of asylum cases.    Historically, post has 
had numerous file drawers dedicated to pending asylum and 
follow-to-join case investigations; however, this workload has 
recently abated.  Most likely this reduction is a direct result of 
FPU investigations proving a great number of these claims were 
bogus.  We are concerned about our ability to control an 
investigation backlog if asylum cases reach prior year volumes. 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
¶I.   Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, 
Organized Crime, Terrorist Level: 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶25.  Reports from various sources in 2008 indicating Bangladeshi 
nationals may be probing for paths of lesser resistance into the US 
via South America.  Sources include the Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Center (HSTC) and our British counterparts.  It appears 
Bangladeshis are exploiting lax visa issuances and, in some cases, 
the lack of a visa requirement, to facilitate travel to South 
American countries with a probable final destination of the U.S. or 
Canada. 
 
¶26.  We have not noticed an increase in the amount of Latin American 
travel by our applicants but adjudicating officers are aware of the 
reports. 
 
------------------------------------- 
¶J.  DS Criminal Fraud Investigations: 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶27.  Dhaka's ARSO-I and FPM have a strong working relationship and 
are jointly defining strategies and areas of focus for combating 
visa fraud. The RSO, ARSO-I, FPM, and Consular Section Chief hold 
bi-weekly meetings to discuss active cases, case disposition, and to 
coordinate efforts between the two sections. The ARSO-I also 
actively participates in the weekly adjudicators' meeting which 
serves as a round-table to discuss consular visa case issues, 
including visa fraud, and provides a mechanism for FPM and RSO 
feedback to the adjudicating officers. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶K.  Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, 
and Civil Registry: 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶28.  The lack of secure identity and relationship documentation in 
Bangladesh is one of the biggest contributors to the number of cases 
referred to FPU for investigation.  Neighborhood checks are usually 
the only way for FPU to establish whether or not information 
presented at the window is legitimate. 
 
Passports, birth certificates, driver's licenses, National IDs, 
marriage and divorce certificates, and any other issuable document 
can all be obtained from legitimate sources in Bangladesh by 
non-qualified individuals. The current passport is poorly made and 
easily manipulated.  There is very little control over biographic 
information contained in issued passports.  Genuine passports 
containing totally false identity data are easily obtained.  On a 
recent trip to the local Passport Office, members of the FPU learned 
that Bangladesh hoped to start producing machine readable passports 
in 2010. 
 
¶29.  Due to the inherent poor control of civil documentation, many 
applicants have difficulties providing credible ID.  Many applicants 
provide nothing more than a passport and an old school ID that 
consists of a piece of paper with a stapled photograph.  Many 
documents show signs of mold and severe weathering. 
 
¶30.  Muslim marriage and divorces are required by law to be 
registered at the local "Kazi" office.  The registration books are 
simple, ordinary registry books with hand-written pages.  The 
 
DHAKA 00000304  005 OF 006 
 
 
registry books are usually housed in locked wall lockers with no 
additional physical security.  Civil Government control over the 
Kazis is negligible.  It is not uncommon for FPU investigators to 
find books out of sequence, pages glued in, and marriages added to 
the end of the registration books for any given year.  Needless to 
say, these manipulations are highly reliable indicators of fraud. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶31.  We do receive cooperation from most local government offices 
regarding verification of school certificates, marriage and divorce 
certificates, and passports.  However, the court system and local 
police are usually uninterested in aggressively pursuing legal 
action against visa fraud perpetrators and corrupt visa agents. 
Witnesses generally fear extortion by local police and quickly lose 
interest in pursuing a complaint, especially when a case stagnates 
due to lack of police action.  In one case where the ARSO-I was 
successful in having witnesses make a formal complaint against visa 
brokers, police inaction led to the perpetrators going unpunished. 
 
 
--------------------- 
¶M.  AREAS OF CONCERN: 
--------------------- 
 
¶32.  Due to the steady increase in numbers of IV cases processed at 
post and the continued participation of Bangladesh in the DV 
program, we assume that the number of cases referred to FPU will 
continue at the same rate.  In order to maintain the integrity of 
FPU operations and to protect our LES investigators from accusations 
of malfeasance, Dhaka sends an American FSO or EFM on all field 
investigations.  A majority of the investigations are conducted by 
the FPM or the EFM Consular Assistant with occasional assistance 
from other FSOs from the IV or NIV units.  Staffing levels are 
becoming a major area of concern.  It is likely that our next round 
of funding requests will contain requests for additional positions, 
one FSO and one LES, to bolster FPU resources.  The current FPM has 
overhauled FPU operations to make them more efficient and to 
optimize use of available resources, but the number of cases pending 
investigation continues to outpace the number of cases completed 
despite the fact that our Consular Assistant and FPM are continually 
on the road completing investigations. 
 
¶33.  The Dhaka Anti Fraud Group (AFG) is now defunct. Its demise is 
another area of concern.  Up until last year this organization, 
consisting of various embassies, had met regularly to share 
information on fraud trends in Bangladesh.  The group disbanded 
during the summer rotation last year due to lack of participation 
and lack of perceived value in the information being shared.  The 
core English speaking nations (AFG Group Central) still informally 
share information via e-mail but there have been no meetings since 
early 2008.  The FPM is in preliminary discussions with his 
counterparts at the Canadian and British High Commission to restart 
the regular meetings. 
 
¶34.  Due to the high incidence of fraud in past year DV visa 
issuances, post is seeing a number of cases involving petitioners 
who may have received their immigration status through fraudulent 
circumstances.  The FPM will work with NVC and CA/VO/L/A to increase 
the number of these petitioner statuses reviewed by DHS. 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
--------------------------- 
¶35.  Glenn Miller - FPM 
Fraud Prevention for Managers - FSI 
 
Leonard Kovensky - Consular Assistant 
Retired DHS and INS employee with 29 years of service in 
adjudications, deportation, investigations, and management.  Mr. 
Kovensky also worked in CA/VO/F/P as a Liaison Officer. 
 
 
Syed Reza -    Senior FPU LES 
PC-542  FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop  FSI 
PC-544  Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online 
PC-128  Detecting Imposters    Online 
 
Khan, Jahan - FSN Investigator 
PC-542  FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop  FSI 
PC-544  Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online 
PC-128  Detecting Imposters    Online 
PC-545         Examining US Passports             Online 
 
 
DHAKA 00000304  006 OF 006 
 
 
D' Costa, John - FSN Investigator 
PC-542  FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop  FSI 
PC-544  Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online 
 
Akter, Sheuly - FSN Investigator 
PC-544  Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online 
PC-128  Detecting Imposters    Online 
 
Huda, Nazmul - FSN Investigator 
PC-544  Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online 
PC-128  Detecting Imposters    Online 
PC-545         Examining US Passports             Online 
 
PASI