VZCZCXRO1070
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0388/01 0851719
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261719Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2128
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0931
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000388 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
PARIS FOR DHS/ICE 
DEPT FOR KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC SG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DAKAR 
 
REF: 08 STATE 74840 
 
¶1.  The following is Embassy Dakar's semi-annual fraud reporting 
cable covering September 2008 to March 2009. Responses are keyed to 
Reftel. 
 
¶2.  A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Senegal is a secular republic with a 
strong presidency, weak legislature, a compliant judiciary, and 
multiple weak political parties.  The country is predominantly rural 
with limited natural resources.  Between 60 and 70 percent of the 
Senegalese workforce relies on agriculture, either directly or 
indirectly, to earn a living.  In 2008, Senegal's growth rate fell 
from 4.8 percent to an estimated 2.5 percent, despite a good 
agricultural harvest.  The economy is highly vulnerable to 
variations in rainfall and fluctuations in world commodity prices. 
As a result, increasing numbers of young Senegalese are moving to 
the cities to seek employment.  With a 45 percent unemployment rate 
(and a very high underemployment rate), many Senegalese seek work 
opportunities in the U.S. and Europe.  In 2007, over 30,000 Africans 
- including many Senegalese - attempted to migrate to Europe via 
clandestine fishing boats bound for Spain's Canary Islands. 
 
Senegalese officials are addressing a difficult build-up of arrears 
owed to the private sector, which has contributed to the economy's 
slow-down, and likely even higher unemployment. 
 
The global economic crisis has begun to negatively impact Senegal as 
the cost for government and private financing has increased.  There 
are also strong indications that formal and informal remittances 
from Senegalese living and working overseas have begun to decrease. 
Since a single Senegalese worker in Europe or the U.S. can provide 
significant disposable income for an extended family, or even a 
small village, such a downturn could have very direct and negative 
impacts on poverty levels.  There is growing concern that high 
volumes of illegal narcotics are transiting through West Africa, in 
all likelihood including Senegal.  This dynamic also raises concerns 
about increasing levels and sophistication of corruption, money 
laundering, and other financial crimes which could exacerbate 
consular-related fraud in the region. 
 
Dakar is a high fraud post.  Senegal serves as a regional airline 
hub for West Africa, has daily direct flights to New York, 
Washington, and Atlanta, and is used by many West Africans to 
transit to the U.S.  It is relatively easy to obtain fraudulent 
civil documents, such as false birth and marriage certificates, not 
only in Senegal but also in neighboring countries.  Senegalese and 
other nationalities are also able to obtain genuine documents, 
including Senegalese passports, using false identities.  Imposters 
with authentic travel documents are a recurring problem. 
 
In general, Senegalese place a high value on extended kinship 
networks.  Affluent family members are expected to share their 
wealth, influence, and opportunities with all those who ask.  Many 
Senegalese, including wealthy ones, view travel to the U.S. as an 
opportunity to earn money to send home and/or obtain free medical 
care.  The obligation to family and friends typically trumps all 
other obligations in the Senegalese value system.  Many Senegalese 
genuinely believe that developed countries should (or even have an 
obligation to) accept more immigrants from Africa because of 
poverty.  Moreover, they do not believe that immigration from Africa 
causes any harm to developing countries.  As a result, many 
Senegalese see nothing wrong with submitting a fraudulent visa 
application or with assisting a family member or friend with a 
fraudulent application. 
 
¶B.  NONIMMIGRANT (NIV) FRAUD: The most common type of NIV fraud 
involves applicants submitting fraudulent documents as part of their 
B1/B2 visa applications.  These documents include false bank 
statements, invitation letters, employment letters, hotel 
reservations, and passport stamps.  The quality of the fraudulent 
documents is generally poor and, therefore, relatively easy to 
detect.  Consular officers routinely refuse these cases under INA 
section 214(b) rather than refer them to the Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU). 
 
NIV applicants use two primary tactics to hide past overstays in the 
U.S.: claiming to have lost the passport last used to travel and 
obtaining genuine, but backdated Senegalese immigration entry and 
exit stamps.  As a result, adjudicating officers must carefully 
scrutinize applicants with previously issued NIVs.  Applicants often 
present passports with fake entry and exit stamps from Dubai, 
Morocco, Senegal, and China.  Access to ADIS has dramatically 
improved Post's ability to detect overstays. 
 
Post receives very few H1B applications and thus encounters little 
fraud in this area.  However, in January 2009, Post received an 
application for an H1B visa for a kindergarten teacher who would 
allegedly be teaching a mainstream curriculum, despite the fact that 
 
DAKAR 00000388  002 OF 004 
 
 
he could not speak English.  Research revealed that the applicant's 
claimed salary was higher than that of the school's director.  Upon 
further investigation, Post's Fraud Unit discovered that the school 
was advertising on the web as a source for H1B visas. 
 
¶C.  IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD: Post processes IVs and Fiance Visas 
(K1 Visas) for the following countries: The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.  Embassy 
Freetown will begin processing Sierra Leone IV cases in May 2009. 
Post processes Asylee/Refugee Following-to-Join family members 
(V92/93) for residents of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.  Adjudicating 
officers refer approximately 30 percent of these applications to the 
FPU.  Of the cases referred to the FPU, approximately 40 percent 
involve fraud. 
 
Relationship fraud is rampant in IV and K1 applications.  In all 
seven countries listed above, applicants can easily obtain genuine 
civil documents with false information, and so DNA testing is often 
the only means to confirm a biological relationship.  DNA testing is 
used most often in IR2 or V92/93 cases, less so in IR5 cases. 
 
In addition, FPU has been particularly successful this year using a 
combination of CCD, LexisNexis and Social Security records to reveal 
fraud connecting seemingly unrelated cases. 
 
Some CR1 and K1 applicants attempt to hide previous marriages to 
someone other than the petitioner, either by representing themselves 
as single or by producing false divorce certificates.  Fraud by 
applicants claiming to be single can sometimes be detected when a 
spouse is indicated in a previous NIV application or passport 
application in PIERS.  Those with false divorce documents often fail 
to terminate a marriage with an African spouse before petitioning 
for entry based on a relationship with an American spouse or fiance. 
 This is particularly problematic in this region, where polygamous 
marriages are common. 
 
Post rarely sees fraud by applicants for employment-based IVs. 
 
During the reporting period, Post returned 63 petitions to USCIS 
with the recommendation that they be revoked. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD: DV applicants frequently present forged high school 
degrees or, less frequently, falsified work records to qualify for 
DV status.  Because the issuance of Baccalaureate (college entrance 
exam) certificates is strictly controlled in Senegal, the majority 
of forged and counterfeit documents are easily detected. 
 
Although in the past, it has been difficult to verify WAEC (West 
African Examinations Council) diplomas in the Gambia, currently with 
the help of Embassy Banjul, Post has had greater success in 
identifying fraudulent Gambian DV claims. 
 
Educational documents in Guinea are all certified by a single person 
at the Ministry of Education, which makes these documents 
particularly vulnerable to fraud.  With the help of Embassy Conakry, 
Post has had success submitting "blind verifications" of these 
documents to the Ministry for authentication. 
 
Post also receives numerous DV cases in which the applicant marries 
immediately after being notified of winning the lottery; Post 
scrutinizes these alleged relationships closely. 
 
¶E.  ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  While Post has experienced little 
evidence of fraud over the past six months in CRBA or passport 
applications, we do require DNA exams in a high percentage of our 
first-time, overseas birth cases.  Post has also encountered a few 
cases of suspected passport fraud while mining CCD for information 
on an immigrant visa case; in the cases seen, it appears that an 
imposter has successfully adopted the American citizen's identity in 
applying domestically for a passport. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD:  While post processes IVs for adopted orphans 
from seven West African countries, most of our adoption cases 
originate in Sierra Leone.  Adoptions from The Gambia are also on 
the rise, particularly those in which the petitioner and beneficiary 
are related.  The incidence of fraud in Sierra Leone adoption cases 
has fallen significantly from its high point in 2004 and 2005, 
likely due in part to public awareness of the fact that Post 
requests that the Embassy in Freetown conduct a field investigation 
whenever an orphan adoption case reveals one or more fraud 
indicator. 
 
During the reporting period, one adopting parent was the apparent 
victim of orphan adoption fraud.  She informed Post that, after her 
child had immigrated and gained citizenship, she learned that the 
orphanage director in Sierra Leone had committed fraud in his 
representation of the child's orphan status.  Post is working with 
Embassy Freetown to investigate this case and to strengthen field 
 
DAKAR 00000388  003 OF 004 
 
 
investigation techniques. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING:  Post uses DNA testing most frequently in 
IR2, family preference IVs, V92s, and CRBA cases.    Post also 
receives many DNA tests conducted prior to interview, often at the 
recommendation of USCIS.  Post is forced to discount the majority of 
these tests, given a lack of satisfactory evidence of 
chain-of-custody. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD:  Most of post's V92/93 
cases involve applicants from Mauritania, Sierra Leone and Guinea. 
Relationship fraud is rampant and DNA is often requested to confirm 
the relationship.  These cases are vulnerable to age fraud 
(representing an adult as a child under 21), due to the applicants' 
inability, at times, to acquire either birth certificates or 
passports in their country of origin. 
 
Embassy Dakar sees a steady stream of applicants who claim to have 
lost their I-551s (Green Cards).  Many of these cases involve 
applicants who have abandoned their legal permanent residence status 
by remaining outside of the U.S. for more than one year. 
 
When airport security suspects a passenger of document-related 
fraud, they will deny boarding and report the incident to the 
consular section.  These passengers then appear at Post to request 
that the Embassy authenticate their refugee travel documents or 
green cards. 
 
Post makes use of both ADIS and the DHS Forensic Documents 
Laboratory to request application images with which to verify 
documents, and also to determine whether green card holders have 
departed the U.S. within the past year. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
 Post has seen little hard evidence of alien smuggling or 
trafficking among visa applicants.  While there are terrorist groups 
and organized crime in the region, this does not appear to affect 
our consular operations. 
 
¶J.  DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS:  The Consular Section and RSO 
cooperate actively in fraud cases involving citizenship claims and 
other criminal issues.  The sections cooperated on two major cases 
during this reporting period.  In the first, a European Union (EU) 
Embassy provided Post with two fraudulent U.S. visas placed in 
Senegalese passports for the purpose of applying for Schengen visas. 
 The RSO took the lead in working with the Senegalese police and EU 
Embassies to coordinate a sting, which netted the presumed 
mastermind and his production facility.  In the second case, the two 
sections cooperated with airline security officials to coordinate a 
sting of an American citizen who was attempting to smuggle imposters 
onto a New York-bound flight using a genuine U.S. passport and a 
Refugee Travel Document.  RSO is pursuing the case stateside through 
DS channels, as well as following the criminal case in progress in 
Senegal.  The two offices exchange fraud-related information on a 
regular basis, taking advantage of each other's unique contacts and 
database access. 
 
¶K.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
Senegal issues four types of passports:  regular, diplomatic and 
official (passeport de service), and a special passport that is used 
exclusively for the Hajj (passeport pour le pelerinage).  There are 
at least two iterations of each passport that are currently valid 
and in circulation.  Regular, diplomatic, and official passports all 
contain 32 pages and an image of the Senegalese seal that is only 
visible under ultraviolet light.  All passports have separate book 
numbers and passport numbers.  In addition, at the end of December 
2007, Senegalese authorities began issuing regular passports 
containing an electronic chip. 
 
Diplomatic and official passports are often issued to non-diplomats 
and non-official travelers, such as prominent business owners and 
their families and religious leaders.  Post carefully interviews 
B1/B2 applicants holding these types of passports to determine visa 
eligibility. 
 
¶L.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:  The host 
government in Senegal cooperates well in fraud matters and requests 
for document verifications.  Nevertheless, because of the high 
incidence of fraud, post always submits "blind" verification 
requests, providing authorities with only a minimum of data on the 
document and requesting that the authorities provide the rest. 
 
In Senegal, not all forms of visa fraud are regarded as serious 
offenses, and even government officials are at times willing to use 
their positions to help friends and relatives obtain visas.  While 
the GOS does prosecute serious perpetrators, particularly foreign 
scam artists, it will often drop criminal charges if the perpetrator 
pays restitution to his/her victims. 
 
DAKAR 00000388  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶M.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: K-1, CR-1, and IR-1 visa fraud are 
very common in Senegal.  Almost 80 percent of K1 applicants are 
referred to the FPU for investigation, and approximately 30 percent 
are returned to the Department of Homeland Security with a 
recommendation for revocation.  Advance fee fraud and dating scams 
are common in Senegal and post regularly receives emails or calls 
from Amcits who have fallen victim to the scam. 
 
¶N.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
 
1) James Loveland, Consular Section Chief, part-time Fraud 
Prevention Manager (FPM).  No formal fraud prevention training. 
 
2) Consular Associate, Eric Redd (FPC) arrived December 2008.  No 
formal fraud prevention training. 
 
3) Moussa Sy, Locally Engaged Staff, part-time Local Fraud 
Investigator.  Attended FSI fraud training in Fall 2007. 
 
BERNICAT