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RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 9128
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0162
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 0373
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 2463
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RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 6449
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0997
RUEHVC/AMCONSUL VANCOUVER 0007
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0469
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3679
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 1486
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8481
RUEHHT/AMCONSUL HAMILTON 0001
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 1394
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6711
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0377
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0493
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4829
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0253
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0001
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1259
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0990
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0321
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 5757
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0708

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 12 COLOMBO 000359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; ADRESSEE POSTS FOR FRAUD 
PREVENTION MANAGERS; BANGKOK FOR RCO WILL LAIDLAW; KUWAIT FOR 
WILLIAM DOWERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC CE
 
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - SRI LANKA 
 
REF: COLOMBO 597 
 
------------------------- 
Country Conditions 
------------------------- 
 
¶1.  Political insecurity, economic and population pressures, and the 
lure of earning hard currency put pressure on Sri Lankans of all 
ages and classes of society to migrate legally and illegally to the 
United States.  The violent civil conflict between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) over more 
than two decades has created significant instability.  Severe lags 
in socioeconomic development persist, particularly in the north and 
east of the country.  Throughout the country, economic conditions 
are relatively poor, with high inflation and weak government 
spending on social services.  Large numbers of Sri Lankans 
traditionally migrate for employment to the Middle East, Europe, 
East Asia, and North America, through both legal and illegal means. 
Early indications are that the global economic slowdown will 
strongly impact Sri Lankans working both domestically and abroad. 
 
¶2.  The consular section sees medium to high levels of fraud from 
all three major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, Tamil and 
Muslim. (Many Muslims speak the Tamil language but do not identify 
with ethnic Tamils and are considered a separate ethnic group in Sri 
Lanka.)  Despite the country's relatively small population and lack 
of direct flights to the U.S., Sri Lankans represent the fourth most 
frequently offloaded nationality on U.S.-bound flights, according to 
2008 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) statistics. 
 
¶3.  The largest Sri Lankan diaspora community is located in Toronto, 
Canada, where over 250,000 people of Sri Lankan origin (primarily 
ethnic Tamils) live.  Severe restrictions imposed by the Canadian 
government on Sri Lankan visitor travel results in many mala fide 
travelers applying at Embassy Colombo hoping to reach Canada over 
the land border.  Within the U.S., preferred destinations for both 
legal and illegal immigrants are New York and California.  Human 
smugglers charge as much as $40,000 a person for passage from Sri 
Lanka to North America. 
 
----------------------------------- 
NIV Fraud - General Trends 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Sri Lankan mala fide travelers with an ultimate destination in 
North America typically have family or friends waiting with a job 
and housing. There are a significant number of human smugglers and 
visa fraud facilitators operating in Sri Lanka, charging as much as 
$10,000 for false documentation to submit with a U.S. visa 
application, and up to $25,000 for a "full service" of documents 
plus other facilitation, such as by posing as family members or 
business associates of the buyer. Post sees false family 
relationships; fictitious marriages and divorces; false financial, 
employment and academic documentation; ringers posing as members of 
sports and entertainment groups; fraudulent crew applicants; false 
religious workers; and even visa fraud rings involving high-level 
government officials. 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  002 OF 012 
 
 
¶5.  Post sees significant numbers of seemingly non-qualified host 
government officials and their domestic employees applying for A or 
G visas.  We continue to see problems with the payment of 
appropriate wages to A3/G5 applicants working for Sri Lankan and 
Middle Eastern diplomats in the United States.  Interviews with 
returning applicants indicate that domestics working for Sri Lankan 
diplomats are rarely paid more than $100 per month while in the 
United States.  The Sri Lankan government has tried a number of 
tactics, ranging from claiming these domestics are actually 
government employees (applying for A2 status) to claiming that they 
are paid in cash, to avoid paying U.S. minimum or prevailing wages. 
Another trend has been for Sri Lankans illegally in the United 
States (mostly B2 visa overstays) to adjust to A2 status by 
obtaining clerical jobs at foreign embassies in Washington, D.C.; 
many of these adjustment of status applications are approved despite 
long periods of illegal presence, sometimes more than a decade. 
There are indications that these embassy jobs sometimes do not 
exist, and Post suspects active facilitation of this type on the 
part of certain foreign embassies, particularly African and other 
Asian missions, as well as the Sri Lankan Embassy in Washington, 
D.C. 
 
¶6.  Sri Lankans use a variety of techniques, from naove and obvious 
to complex and convincing, to fraudulently obtain visas.  Small-time 
document vendors provide fake vital records and business documents 
that are relatively easy to spot, while sophisticated human 
smugglers provide more convincing identity and financial documents 
that are difficult to detect.  We have seen several cases where 
genuine Sri Lankan entry stamps were purchased at the airport, 
usually back-dated to hide overstays in the United States.  Post has 
seen several instances in which government ministers and Members of 
Parliament or their Secretaries have sponsored mala fide applicants 
for training or other seemingly legitimate purposes of travel - 
including official delegations - after which members of the party 
have remained as illegal immigrants. As a result, Embassy Colombo 
very carefully interviews all government-related traveling parties 
to the U.S.  Post has documentary evidence of a Second Secretary 
attached to the Sri Lankan mission in the Washington, D.C. who 
provided coaching services for her cousin's nonimmigrant visa 
application to help her join her illegal alien husband in the United 
States. 
 
---------------------------------- 
NIV Fraud - Student Visas 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  Post has seen a new trend of mala fide travelers increasingly 
targeting the F and J visa categories.  Over the past six months, 
the refusal rate for F1 student visas has surged to over 49%, as 
compared to 31% for the same period a year ago and 24% in 2007. 
Although the total number of F1 student visa applications rose by 
46% from 2007 to 2008, the number of F1 applications approved rose 
by only 11%, indicating that the majority of new interest in student 
visas is coming from unqualified applicants.  Post's assessment is 
that most of these students have mala fide immigrant intent, and we 
are currently conducting a validation study of student visas which 
is expected to result in a standalone cable later this year. 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  003 OF 012 
 
 
¶8.  Both bona fide and mala fide student visa applicants often pay 
large sums of money to "agents" or "educational consultants" who 
steer them to particular schools and provide interview coaching. 
These agents often have exclusive contracts with schools in the U.S. 
which pay them based on the number of students recruited, with no 
penalty for those who are no-shows, withdraw, or otherwise violate 
their student status.  Post has also seen examples of Sri Lankan 
students already in the U.S. attempting to facilitate other 
prospective students after gaining student employment jobs in 
college admissions offices. 
 
¶9.  Community colleges and language schools seem to be preferred 
targets of unqualified and mala fide Sri Lankan applicants.  The 
results of an initial validation study showed the rate of SEVIS 
non-compliance to be distressingly high for students issued visas 
for two-year associate degree and standalone language programs. 
Perhaps in response to Post's increased scrutiny of community 
college applicants, an increasing number of students are applying to 
four-year colleges then immediately transferring upon arrival to 
language schools or community colleges where the number of classroom 
hours is lower and less rigorously enforced; this enables students 
to remain nominally enrolled while also working illegally on a full 
time basis.  In just one example, one university in Texas reported 
to the Embassy that a group of 14 Sri Lankan students showed up in 
September 2008 demanding to be issued with social security numbers 
upon enrollment; when the school refused, the students transferred 
en masse to language schools or other community colleges in the New 
York area.  Post has also seen numerous cases in which students were 
clearly not enrolled full-time (based on their transcripts), but 
were nonetheless reported by schools as being SEVIS-compliant.  Such 
instances, which typically involve community colleges or language 
schools, and occasionally very small universities, enable Sri Lankan 
students to work illegally and still appear to comply with their 
student status; these offending institutions are well-known to our 
mala fide applicant pool. 
 
¶10.  Otherwise-qualified Sri Lankan students also appear to target 
schools with generous work-study options.  Post recently learned 
that one reputable midwestern university long favored by Sri Lankan 
applicants ofers students the opportunity to earn academic creits 
while working 40 hours a week over multiple semesters anywhere in 
the U.S., with no requirement that they attend any classes and very 
limited contact with academic faculty.  The parent of a graduating 
student brought us a newspaper article from her U.S. university in 
which her daughter advised prospective international students to 
find "anyone" willing to pose as their sponsoring family member for 
the visa application, with the assurances that the student would be 
able to earn enough money while studying in the U.S. to fully cover 
the $20,000+ per year educational costs.  Post is baffled that such 
liberal work-study arrangements are allowed by SEVP. 
 
¶11.  Other Western missions in Colombo have shared similar concerns 
regarding student visa applications to their countries from Sri 
Lankan nationals.  In September 2008, Australia upgraded Sri Lanka 
to its strictest category for prospective students, highlighting Sri 
Lanka as one of the worst violators of its student visa program 
worldwide.  In order to qualify under the tough new conditions, 
prospective Sri Lankan undergraduate students must now show that 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  004 OF 012 
 
 
they have had three full years of tuition and living expenses 
on-hand in an earmarked savings account for at least six months 
before they can qualify for a student visa.  Anecdotal reports from 
local Fulbright Commission staff and others suggest that interest in 
U.S. student visas from both well- and poorly-qualified students is 
increasing as a result of these strict new Australian requirements, 
which the local media have described as "humiliating." 
 
¶12.  Post has also seen mala fide applicants increasingly targeting 
the J1 visa category, often with the involvement of local agents. 
In one case, an Israeli national B1/B2 visa holder with a business 
card listing his U.S. residential address came to the Embassy to 
complain after Post refused a large group of prospective Sri Lankan 
J1 hospitality industry workers he was attempting to facilitate in 
connivance with a local "agent."  Most of these J1 applicants, who 
earned an average of $50/month in hotels and restaurants in Sri 
Lanka, had borrowed thousands of dollars to pay for flights and the 
$1000 agent fee, in return for the promise of menial hospitality 
industry work in the U.S. 
 
¶13.  Of particular concern across all sections of the Embassy is the 
fact that a number of U.S. Government-sponsored exchange visitors 
have failed to return to Sri Lanka over the past few years.  These 
travelers entered the U.S. as part of the International Visitor 
Program (IVP) or similar USG-funded exchange programs, and made 
successful asylum claims.  Post learns of these cases only when the 
asylum claimant's family members later apply for Visas 92 FTJ 
status.  In order to reach out to ethnic minority Sri Lankans and 
those from less-developed parts of the country, Post attempts to 
allocate many of its visitor slots to individuals from these 
categories.  However, general NIV trends in Sri Lanka show that 
ethnic minorities and those from conflict-affected areas also 
represent the greatest overstay and asylum claim risk.  Efforts are 
being made to address these competing concerns; beginning with this 
year's IVP cycle, Post will work more closely with the nominating 
committee to take into account factors that make nominees not only 
good candidates for an IVP, but also likely to qualify for visas 
under INA 214b in their consular interview. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IV Fraud - General Trends 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  Colombo's IV fraud mostly involves false marriages and family 
relationships. While marriages based on love affairs are increasing, 
arranged marriages are still the norm in Sri Lanka, especially in 
more rural areas.  Even with field visits, verifying the validity of 
relationships is often difficult.  Post is particularly cautious 
with K fiance visas.  On many occasions post has found that a 
relationship is not genuine, especially when the age gap between the 
spouses is significant.  In one case, Post found that an American 
citizen had filed a K1 petition to marry the younger sister of his 
current wife, whom he had not divorced.  In another, Post recently 
detected a twice-divorced U.S. citizen of Sri Lankan origin 
petitioning for her own brother as her newly married husband with a 
fraudulently obtained local marriage certificate.  A surprise 
neighborhood check on a Sri Lankan man who claimed to have divorced 
his wife a few years before to marry an American woman recently 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  005 OF 012 
 
 
revealed that he still lives with his previous wife and four 
children, including the eldest, who has also been petitioned by the 
American.  Post has also encountered several cases in which the 
wives and/or children of Sri Lankans living illegally in the U.S. 
are petitioned under K1, K3 or IR1 categories by American citizens 
they have either never seen, met at internet chat-rooms, or married 
after surprisingly short visits to Sri Lanka.  Although Post returns 
such petitions to USCIS for revocation, the lack of consequences for 
American citizens filing fraudulent immigration petitions means this 
trend will likely continue unabated. 
 
-------------------------- 
Diversity Visa Fraud 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15.  Sri Lanka now ranks as the fourth largest recipient of 
Diversity Visas (DVs) in Asia, with 792 provisional winners notified 
for 2009, a rapid increase from 383 in 2008.  As Sri Lankans have 
discovered the DV, they are also learning the rules and increasingly 
applying well-honed NIV fraud techniques on behalf of DV winners, 
often through certificates with falsified education examination 
results.  To counter this trend, Post obtains examination results 
directly from the Sri Lankan Department of Examinations, and we 
require this official certificate for any DV applicant applying 
under their academic credentials.  This approach has resulted in 
detecting two such fraud cases in DV 2008 program, including 
attempted falsification of the 'One-Day Collection Cards' - a tool 
innovated by the Embassy Colombo and the Sri Lanka Examination 
Department to deter fraud. In late February 2009, post saw its first 
fraud in DV 2009 program with a fraudulent examination results sheet 
from a school.  A significant number of Sri Lankan DV winners are 
resident outside of the country, often as guest workers in the 
Middle East or Europe.  Colombo encourages other posts to contact us 
to assist with verification of all documents related to Sri Lankan 
DV winners.  Two Sri Lankan DV winners working in the Middle East 
were refused visas last year after Post determined that their 
examination results had been forged; Post strongly suspects that 
additional Sri Lankan DV winners have been able to take advantage of 
the fact that U.S. Embassies elsewhere are unfamiliar with standard 
Sri Lankan educational certificates. 
 
------------------------------- 
ACS and Passport Fraud 
------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  Although Post does not see much fraud in passport and 
citizenship applications, Canadian and British Airport Liaison 
Officers, who assist Sri Lankan authorities in identifying mala-fide 
travelers at the airport, occasionally ask for assistance in 
verifying suspect U.S. passport and/or U.S. identity documents. Mala 
fide Sri Lankan, Indian and Chinese travelers are often intercepted 
during screening at the airport and are either in possession of 
photo substituted U.S. passports or are imposters. Several such 
offenders, mostly of Chinese origin, were detained in remand prison 
during 2008 and have since been deported to their countries of 
origin.  A dual American and Canadian citizen of Sri Lanka minority 
origin was detained in November 2008 after Colombo airport 
authorities determined that his U.S. passport had been tampered 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  006 OF 012 
 
 
with.  Diplomatic Security subsequently opened an investigation, 
which is ongoing, after a suspicious travel pattern and his 
employment information suggested that the individual may be involved 
with human smuggling.  This individual has since disappeared, 
abandoning his application for a new U.S. passport. 
 
-------------------- 
Adoption Fraud 
-------------------- 
 
¶17.  The Immigrant Visa Unit issued 2 adoption visas during the 
fiscal year 2008, the same number issued in 2007.  The Sri Lankan 
government does not favor foreign adoptions.  Sri Lanka is a 
signatory to the Hague Convention; adoptions are governed by the 
Department of Child Care and Probation Service. Foreign prospective 
adoptive parents are not allowed to locate children for adoption 
themselves, and adoption by single persons is not permitted.  To 
date Post has not uncovered any fraud in our adoption processing. 
 
-------------------------- 
Use of DNA Testing 
-------------------------- 
 
¶18.  In cases in which Post cannot sufficiently establish a bona 
fide relationship due to a lack of documentary evidence (mostly IV 
and Asylum cases), applicants are given the option of taking a DNA 
test. The process takes 2 - 3 weeks and costs around $1000.  Post 
has not encountered any negative DNA results so far, but on occasion 
applicants will refuse DNA testing and abandon applications, 
indicating that testing acts as a deterrent in applications 
involving false relationships. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Asylum and Other DHS Benefit Fraud 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶19.   Post would welcome the opportunity to work more closely with 
DHS in looking at ways to make the processing and assessment of 
asylum claims more robust.  There is a disturbingly high level of 
fraud seen in Sri Lankan Visas 92 cases.  In most asylum Follow To 
Join (FTJ) cases, establishing relationships to the petitioner is 
very difficult.  Asylum FTJ beneficiaries are typically coached to 
provide as little information as possible, sometimes making it 
difficult to determine whether the beneficiary even knows the 
petitioner, much less is their spouse or child.  Post attempts to 
verify all birth and marriage documents, but occasionally applicants 
have no identity documents available.  In addition to the usual 
problems associated with arranged marriages, we often see applicants 
who present fraudulent identity documents but have positive DNA 
tests results, leaving us to deal with a genuine biological 
relationship but no idea what anyone's true identity is. 
 
¶20.  Of greatest concern is that the overwhelming majority of 
successful asylum claims made by Sri Lankan petitioners appear to be 
based on bogus stories of persecution.  This is particularly 
worrisome given that, according to official statistics from the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of 
asylum applications made by Sri Lankans worldwide rose 24 percent in 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  007 OF 012 
 
 
2008, making it the fifth most rapidly increasing source of new 
asylum claims. 
 
¶21.  Although Post believes that there is persecution in Sri Lanka 
which is significant enough for favorable asylum findings, in our 
experience the vast majority of individuals who are experiencing 
true persecution within Sri Lanka simply do not have the means to 
get out of the country in the first place.  In many cases, local 
government administrative structures prevent truly persecuted 
minorities from obtaining valid international travel documents; the 
alternative of using a human smuggler or document vendor is 
incredibly expensive by Sri Lankan standards, often up to $40,000 to 
convey one person to North America.  A Sri Lankan who is able to 
make it to the U.S. or elsewhere to file an asylum claim typically 
has significant financial and social resources that are simply not 
consistent with their asylum claim.  For example, a large number of 
successful Sri Lankan gem merchants with extensive U.S. and European 
travel to participate in international gem exhibitions recently 
attempted to claim asylum in Canada.  In another case, a well-off 
employee of Sri Lankan Airlines admitted to us that he sent his wife 
and children to the U.S. to make an asylum claim so that they would 
have a better standard of living; he continues to work here, making 
regular trips back and forth for the children's birthdays (although 
his tourist visa was cancelled following this admission). 
 
¶22.  Other gross misstatements range from petitioners claiming to be 
a members of a persecuted ethnic minority when they are not in fact 
of that ethnicity, to stories of harassment that contradict known 
facts.  Unfortunately, the stories of prospective asylum claimants 
seem to be taken at face value when asylum claims are adjudicated in 
the U.S.  Contributing to our doubts about many claims is the fact 
that successful asylum claimants often later return to Sri Lanka to 
wed other Sri Lankans or for regular tourist visits, casting serious 
doubt on any "credible fear" claim.  We also often see asylee 
claimants who have spent many months living in otherwise-safe second 
countries such as Canada, East Asia or the Middle East before 
deciding to make their claim in the U.S., where they felt economic 
opportunities would be greatest. 
 
¶23.  Many occasions of aliens of Sri Lankan origin in possession of 
counterfeit US Legal Permanent Resident Cards (widely known as 
'Green Cards') have been reported in the recent past.  Some of them 
have been caught at the airport and have paid as much as $9000 per 
card.  Two such mala-fide travelers of Sri Lankan origin who tried 
to fly to the US with fake LPR cards were intercepted and deported 
from Singapore in 2008. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶24.  Post experiences a very high level of cooperation from many Sri 
Lankan government agencies.  Post receives positive assistance on 
matters ranging from simple document verification to complex 
cooperation on fraud cases over long time periods.  Good 
relationships are maintained through regular outreach and meetings 
with key officials. Additionally, Post's full-time FSN fraud 
investigator's excellent range of contacts has proven invaluable in 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  008 OF 012 
 
 
advancing our goals in fraud management.  Cooperation with local law 
enforcement has proved essential in maintaining Post's successful 
"zero-tolerance" policy towards false and fraudulent documentation. 
Nearly all applicants turned over to Sri Lankan authorities are 
charged and prosecuted under Sri Lankan law.  Post regularly works 
together with the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and its 
Anti-Human Smuggling Investigation Bureau, as well as the Colombo 
Fraud Investigation Bureau (CFIB). Furthermore, Post cooperates with 
the Immigration & Emigration Department, State Intelligence Service, 
the Registrar General's Department, and the Attorney General's 
Department. 
 
------------------- 
Arrest Protocol 
------------------- 
 
¶25.  Post has implemented an arrest program in cooperation with 
local immigration authorities and police.  When Post encounters 
forged documents in the course of an NIV interview, we contact the 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) or the Colombo Fraud 
Investigations Department (CFIB) of the Sri Lanka Police, and 
applicants are taken into custody, often on the same day as the visa 
interview.  Most are successfully convicted of felony crimes under 
Sri Lankan law.  This policy, and the arrests it generates, has 
proven very effective in combating prospective fraudsters.  The 
program was introduced in late 2002, and the number of arrests 
peaked with 84 in 2004.  Since then, the number of arrests has 
fallen steadily each year, with 37 in 2007 and only 10 in 2008. 
Other Western missions without similar arrest programs anecdotally 
report that they see a much higher level of document fraud, 
demonstrating that this program is a clear deterrent. 
 
¶26.  Post's arrest program has led to a number of high level arrests 
and prosecutions.  In early 2008, the discovery of a page 
substitution intended hide a previous visa refusal by another 
diplomatic mission led to the arrest by the CID of an important 
document forger linked to a terrorism ring of more than fifty 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leaders, cadres and 
supporters (Reftel). In July 2008, a passport fraudster who 
attempted to hide a previous deportation from the U.S. was 
successfully convicted with enhanced punitive jail terms and fines. 
In late 2008, Post determined that the head of a local NGO for the 
handicapped was in fact a visa facilitator who had already assisted 
three individuals in obtaining Canadian visas for $18,000 each; he 
was arrested by the CID along with five clients posing as NGO 
supporters going to the U.S. for training.  In February 2009, Post 
discovered a set of forged Maldivian and Sri Lankan immigration 
entry / exit stamps on the passport of a Sri Lankan claiming that 
his fictitious Maldivian employer was sending him for training to 
the U.S. 
 
¶27.  Though Post sees an increasing level of fraud in its IV cases, 
this typically does not rise to the level of an arrestable offense 
under Sri Lankan law.  Instead, these cases are simply sent back for 
revocation.  In early 2009, a Diversity Visa applicant was arrested 
with fraudulent documents, Post's first DV arrest in over five 
years. 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  009 OF 012 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Applicable Local Laws and Punishments 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶28.  If an applicant submits a forged document as part of their 
application, they are charged with tendering or forging a fraudulent 
document under Sections 452-459 of the Sri Lankan Penal Code. The 
maximum sentence is up to seven years in jail with hard or light 
labor and a Rs. 5,000 fine (USD $50 equivalent).  Depending on the 
seriousness of the fraud attempted, someone who submits fake 
documents can commonly expect a jail term of 6 months to 2 years, 
suspended for 2-5 years, with a $25-$50 fine.  Fraud involving 
passports or visas carries stricter penalties under Section 45 of 
the Sri Lankan Immigration & Emigration Act of 1948, as amended by 
Acts in 1998 and 2006.  The maximum punishment for passport fraud is 
five years in jail and a fine of Rs. 500,000 (nearly USD $5,000). 
Recent amendments to Sri Lankan law have relaxed the bail 
provisions.  Most offenders can now post bail immediately after 
appearing before the courts, whereas in the past such offenders were 
required to spend from a few weeks to several months in remand 
prison before being allowed to post bail.  Local law enforcement 
authorities report that passport and visa fraud have increased as 
result, and they expect such trends to further escalate in 2009. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorist Travel 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶29.  The trend of increased numbers of Sri Lankans and other 
third-country nationals, such as Indians and Chinese, using 
fraudulent or altered documents for travel to Europe and North 
America continues.  Sri Lankan nationals mostly target travel 
documents of third-countries like Malaysia, Singapore, the U.K., 
Germany and Caribbean countries.   The number of Sri Lankan 
deportees from Malaysia, Japan, Singapore and the UAE has increased 
significantly and irregular Malaysian travel documents have become 
the preferred documents of mala fide Sri Lankan passengers, while 
their hub port has shifted from Bangkok to Kuala Lumpur.  Human 
smugglers charge as much as $40,000 a person for passage from Sri 
Lanka to North America. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶30.  Post does not have an ARSO-I.  However, consular officers often 
consult the RSO FSN Investigator during the course of routine 
investigations on visa cases, a partnership which has proven 
fruitful in dealing with Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities. 
During November 2008, the Consular Section worked closely with DS on 
the investigation of a U.S. passport tampering case with suspected 
links to U.S. and Canadian companies. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Host Country Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  010 OF 012 
 
 
¶31.   Fraudulent civil documentation is quite common in Sri Lanka 
and can be easily acquired.  For instance, anyone can fraudulently 
obtain a genuine passport with falsified details by paying about 
$250 to a peddler. Other civil documents, identity documents, court 
documents and counterfeit entry/exit stamps can be easily purchased. 
 A few years ago the country's National Identity issuing 
department's chief was arrested for selling National Identity Cards 
to fraudsters, including terrorism suspects. Civil registry 
functions are inefficient due to a lack of automation; all documents 
are kept on file in countless stacks of paper that must be 
hand-checked and are often missing or incomplete.  Because document 
fraud is rampant, document verification is a routine part of all IV, 
DV and Asylee Follow to Join petition processing.  A staff member 
must physically go to the Registrar's office to check documents, 
making the verification process extremely time consuming.  Other 
Western missions in Sri Lanka require petitioners in suspect cases 
to pay a $500-$1000 "verification fee," then contract with local 
agents to conduct the legwork with the government. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Areas of Particular Concern 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶32.  Post experiences positive and consistent collaboration with 
other Embassis, particularly the Canadian and British High 
Commissions in Colombo. Canada has the largest Sri Lankan Diaspora 
population in world, and our close cooperation with the Canadian and 
British Airline Liaison Officers (ALOs) has proven effective in 
spotting trends and mala-fide applicants. Further, our three 
missions have co-hosted airline and airport staff training seminars 
on our countries' proper travel documents, their basic security 
features, and applicable visa categories. 
 
¶33.  From our close collaboration with the Canadian and British 
ALOs, Post is aware of major security concerns at Sri Lanka's single 
international airport, Bandaranaiyke International Airport, located 
near the capital, Colombo.  The ALOs tell us that, despite extensive 
and repeated training, check-in staff and immigration authorities 
regularly accept obvious forgeries and fraudulent documents. 
Practically no screening is conducted of travelers with non-Sri 
Lankan passports; instead, airline staff assume that a final 
decision will be taken by other airline staff in the hub city once 
the passengers reach their transit point.  Passengers who have 
checked in and gone through immigration regularly disappear once 
they see that an ALO is on duty at their gate; somehow, they are 
secreted out through three layers of airport security.  Very often 
these passengers will return to make successful attempts a few days 
later when no ALO is on duty.  Although the airport has multiple 
closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, the CCTV systems are often 
turned off or critical segments unavailable (or erased) when 
requested.  A lack of separation between arriving and departing 
passengers makes boarding card and identity document swaps simple. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Sri Lankans represent 
the fourth most frequently offloaded nationality on U.S.-bound 
flights worldwide, according to 2008 U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) statistics, despite the lack of direct flights from 
Colombo to the U.S.  The ALOs report that Sri Lanka's poor airport 
controls are well known throughout the region; in addition to Sri 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  011 OF 012 
 
 
Lankans, other nationalities such as Indians, Iranians, Pakistanis, 
Somalis, and Russians have been increasingly taking advantage of 
Bandaranaiyke Airport's weaknesses. 
 
¶34.  The Consular section has also worked closely with ticketing 
agents regarding questionable visa cases, even conducting a 
successful "sting" operation to catch would-be mala fide travelers 
to the U.S.  The trend of unsuspecting applicants falling prey to 
unscrupulous human smugglers and traffickers who promise visas and 
jobs overseas in exchange for thousands of dollars prevails in Sri 
Lanka. Despite several press releases re-iterating the U.S. 
Embassy's role as the sole visa issuing authority in the country and 
warning the public of any claims by other parties to facilitate 
visas, some people continue to pay large sums of  money to them and 
become litigants in lengthy court cases. 
 
¶35.  Post has discovered evidence that relatively large numbers of 
Sri Lankans are entering the United States without inspection across 
the U.S.-Mexico border.  This information has come to light from 
both IDENT hits showing arrests at the border and from information 
provided by the Canadian High Commission in Colombo about Sri 
Lankans making asylum claims at the U.S.-Canada border.  One NIV 
applicant whose IDENT results showed had been apprehended in 
Brownsville, Texas in 2006 told us that connections between Sri 
Lankan smugglers and Mexican coyotes are well established.  In June 
2008, the Canadian mission provided a list of more than 100 Sri 
Lankans who claimed asylum at the U.S.-Canada border who had no 
records in CCD, and we strongly suspect that all of them entered the 
U.S. without inspection from Mexico.  Post expects this trend to 
accelerate as several South American countries have dropped visa 
requirements for Sri Lankans in recent years, making it even easier 
to reach Latin America and enter the smuggling pipeline. 
 
--------------------------- 
Staffing and Training 
--------------------------- 
 
¶36.  Colombo's Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) consists of one part-time 
officer Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM), and one full-time Fraud 
Prevention Foreign Service National (FSN) investigator.  Both of the 
other officers have also completed fraud training at FSI.  A second 
FSN, the NIV supervisor, has completed fraud training but has no 
specific FPU role. 
 
Titles and training history are as follows: 
 
Christopher R. Green (departs 5/09; to be replaced by William 
Dowers, 8/09) 
Consul 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 5/08 
 
Emily Hicks 
Vice Consul and Fraud Prevention Manager (part-time) 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 12/08 
 
Joel T. Wiegert 
Vice Consul 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/08 
 
COLOMBO 00000359  012 OF 012 
 
 
PC-126 Advanced Consular Name Checking, Washington, 8/08 
 
Sanjeeva Gammanpila 
FPU FSN Investigator (full-time) 
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 4/02 
DHS Document Fraud Detection and Recognition, Colombo, 2002 
 
Anusha Fernandez 
FSN NIV Supervisor 
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/05 
 
BLAKE