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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 CHENNAI 000077 
 
CA/FPP FOR JILL NYSTROM 
DS/CR/CFI FOR GALEN NACE 
DS/CR/VPAU FOR TIM LONGANACRE AND YVETTE COLMAN 
Pass to DHS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC IN
SUBJECT: India Semi-Annual Fraud Update 
 
REF: A) 07 State 171211, B) 08 New Delhi 2915, C) 08 Mumbai 17, D) 
07 Chennai 695, E) 08 Chennai 372, F) 07 Chennai 704, G) 08 Chennai 
212, H) 07 Chennai 487, I) 08 Mumbai 367, J) 08 Kolkata 73, K) 08 
Chennai 91, L) 08 Mumbai 111, M) Chennai 13, N) New Delhi 175, O) 08 
Chennai 351, P) 08 Kolkata 291, Q) 08 Chennai 227, R) New Delhi 7 
 
--------------- 
¶A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶1. India-wide consular operations are among the busiest in the 
world.  In FY-2008, Mission India processed more than 756,000 
non-immigrant visa applications and 27,000 immigrant visa 
applications.  The majority of applicants from India are bona fide 
travelers and migrants.  Despite a relatively low per capita 
incidence of fraud, however, India's high demand for consular 
services, even with the recent economic downturn, results in 
thousands of fraud investigations every year.  Some areas of India, 
such as the states of Gujarat and Punjab, are traditional sources of 
migration out of India and fraudulent applications from these areas 
are more common than from other regions of India.  The state of 
Andhra Pradesh, and in particular its capital of Hyderabad, has been 
identified as a large center of documentary fraud which affects all 
India posts. 
 
¶2. The world economic crisis affected the travel environment in 
India in FY-2008.  The domestic civilian aviation industry is 
struggling to manage costs amidst slower traffic and rapid 
expansion, with even the traditionally most successful airlines 
looking for alliances and partnerships.  Discretionary travel - 
including international travel -- is off and has affected Mission 
India NIV demand.  Economic observers in India predict that the 
global slowdown will reduce India's GDP growth from about 9.0 
percent to around 6.5 percent this fiscal year and 5.5-6 percent 
next fiscal year (starting April 1).  While U.S., Indian, and 
multinational businesses with strong ties to the U.S. economy have 
slowed down their expansion plans, they mostly are continuing to 
hire - albeit at a slower pace. 
 
¶3. Despite this difficult economic climate, the demand for visa 
appointments from the intending immigrant population in northern 
India has remained strong.  An opinion poll published in the popular 
Times of India in January 2007 noted that 37 percent of the 1.1 
billion Indians would emigrate if they had the chance.  Many Indians 
have tried to migrate using non-immigrant visas, and a greater 
number of Indian nationals apply for employment-based H and L visas 
than any other nationality worldwide.  Mission India processed 
192,332 H and L visa adjudications in FY-2008 and 190,087 in 
FY-2007.  The worldwide total for work-related visa applications was 
627,950, meaning that Mission India alone processed nearly 31 
percent of all employment visas.  We expect this trend to continue. 
Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have been the three busiest H-1B visa 
processing posts in the world for the past five fiscal years.  The 
new Consulate General in Hyderabad will quickly join that threesoe 
as it ramps up visa operations in the near futue. 
 
¶4. In FY-2008, the non-immigrant visa classe most often targeted 
 
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for fraud were B1/B2 business travelers/tourists, H-1B temporary 
workers, F1 student visas, P3 culturally unique artists and R-1 
religious workers. The most commonly targeted immigrant visa classes 
were IR/CR in Delhi and F-2B and F-2A visas in Mumbai and Chennai. 
During the six month period from September 2008 through February 
2009, Mission India's consular sections identified a total of 3,053 
cases of suspected visa fraud (Chennai - 1,285, Mumbai - 843, New 
Delhi - 816, Kolkata - 109). 
 
¶5. Most of India's fraudulent applicants come from specific and 
easily defined regional areas within each consular district.  These 
states have some of the most mobile populations in India and the 
largest concentrations of expatriate communities overseas, including 
in the United States.  In New Delhi, cases originating from the 
Punjab comprise the majority of its IV and fraud caseloads, while 
the same can be said in Mumbai with Gujarat.  Chennai's NIV and 
documentary fraud comes principally from Andhra Pradesh, while IV 
fraud comes mainly from Kerala. 
--------------- 
¶B. NON-IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶6. Fraudulent NIV applications make up a small portion of the total 
NIV cases but the vast majority of cases referred to FPU.  During 
the reporting period, Mission India noted 2,548 total cases of NIV 
fraud.  Nearly half of those cases resulted in a finding of 
confirmed fraud (Chennai - 1,214 cases , 48 percent confirmed fraud 
rate of completed investigations; Mumbai - 680, 56 percent; New 
Delhi - 545, 35 percent; Kolkata - 109, 49 percent).  The reported 
fraud rate is down dramatically from the 3,996 cases identified 
during the last reporting period, especially in our highest fraud 
categories detailed below. 
 
¶7. B1/B2 visa fraud is the most commonplace.  Regionally-based fraud 
rings throughout the country, but especially in Hyderabad, continue 
to produce fraudulent documents for visa application and travel 
purposes.  Some visa "consultants" and travel agents specialize in 
fraudulent experience letters and fake document packages, which 
include passport copies of false relatives, bogus financial 
documents, and affidavits of support.  In the last six months the 
number of reported B1/B2 fraud cases has dropped throughout the 
Mission from 2,043 to 1,089.  Since the total number of cases 
dropped at every single post in Mission India, the decline may be 
due to the overall lower B1/B2 applicant volume due to the economic 
decline.  In FY-2008, Mumbai confirmed an overstay rate of less than 
one percent for male B1/B2 applicants between ages 20 and 35 (ref 
C). 
 
--------------- 
H-1B Visa Fraud 
--------------- 
 
¶8. H-1B fraud is one of the top two visa categories for fraud 
throughout Mission India.  All posts regularly encounter inflated or 
fabricated educational and employment qualifications.  The vast 
majority of these documents come from Hyderabad.  FPU Chennai has 
investigated 150 companies in Hyderabad over the last 18 months, 77 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  003 OF 016 
 
 
percent of which turned out to be fraudulent or highly suspect (ref 
D).  Most of the cases slated for field investigations were to 
verify the experience letters for H-1B applicants who did not meet 
minimum educational qualifications. 
¶9. The state of Andhra Pradesh, and Hyderabad in particular, has 
long been the hub for fraudulent document vendors in South India. 
Hyderabadi applicants comprised over one-third of Chennai's total 
visa workload in FY-2008, but well over half of the FPU workload. 
FPU Mumbai has identified a Hyderabad-based fraud scheme whereby 
Hyderabadi applicants were claiming to work for fictitious companies 
in Pune in order to apply in Mumbai's consular district and avoid 
Chennai.  During recent field investigations in Bangalore (ref E), 
FPU Chennai encountered several fictitious companies staffed by 
Hyderabadis.  The Hyderabadis claimed that they had opened shell 
companies in Bangalore because "everyone knows Hyderabad has fraud 
and Bangalore is reputable." 
¶10.  Mission India continues to be at the forefront of H and L 
adjudications and training.  Officers from multiple posts have 
visited Mission India for H and L training, and over twenty posts 
communicate regularly with Chennai to seek its expertise in 
adjudicating problematic H and L cases.  At the end of FY-2007, 
Mission India hosted a countrywide H and L fraud conference in New 
Delhi (ref F) and in May 2008 hosted an H and L fraud conference in 
Chennai (ref G) attended by DHS, KCC, CA/VO, CA/FPP, DS and multiple 
posts that adjudicate large numbers of Indian H-1B applicants. 
Presentations from that conference are available on the intranet at 
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/ fraud/resources/niv/hl/20107.aspx. 
 
¶11.  Several posts have started initiatives to combat H and L fraud, 
the most substantial of which is the actual start-up of a new 
consulate general in Hyderabad.  New Delhi utilizes an H and L case 
management system called HERO (H-1B Evaluation Revocation and 
Organization) to manage the work flow of cases under review for 
fraud indicators.  HERO also includes a revocation memo generator 
and archival tool.  A presentation on HERO is available on the 
CA/FPP intranet site.  Kolkata now has an A/RSO-I and doubled the 
size of its FPU with H&L funded staff. 
 
¶12. FPU Mumbai identified a recent trend of "mix-and-match" couples 
where multiple H-4 spouses pretended to be married to the same H-1B 
spouse resident in the United States.  These applicants were to pay 
approximately $70,000 upon issuance to the smuggler that arranged 
their documentation. 
 
--------------- 
Religious Workers 
--------------- 
 
¶13. India detects considerable fraud among applicants for R-1 and 
R-2 visas traveling to the U.S. for religious purposes.  During the 
last two years, most R-1 fraud was detected amongst Tibetan 
refugees, Sikh raagis, and Hindu priests.  Mission R-1 fraud 
includes both fraudulent beneficiaries and fictitious inviting 
parties.  Since DHS began requiring petitions for R-1 applicants in 
November, R-1 fraud referrals have completely dried up as cases are 
still working their way through the petition approval process. 
Since DHS requires a 100 percent on-site verification of 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  004 OF 016 
 
 
petitioners, we expect the volume of R-1 cases will diminish 
greatly.  During the reporting period, Mission India identified 222 
cases of R-1 fraud.  Although that was a nearly 50 percent decrease 
from the previous period, all but fourteen of those cases came in 
the three months prior to the November petition requirement. 
 
¶14. Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata have all recently reported on R-1 
fraud trends (refs H, I and J).  Mumbai noted that following 
numerous FPU investigations in the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra 
in which none of the purported Sikhs were legitimate religious 
workers, CY-2008 R-1 visa refusals have climbed to nearly 70 
percent.  Mumbai and Kolkata noted similar findings that Sikhs and 
Tibetan monks had the highest percentage of confirmed fraud during 
this period. Kolkata confirmed that 85 percent of R-1 Buddhist monks 
from the Northern District of West Bengal did not belong to the 
monasteries as they claimed. Most of these fake priests were from 
Nepal or from the south Indian state of Karnataka.  FPU Kolkata 
observed that Buddhist priests and monks from this region all speak 
Hindi, and Buddhist monks who claim to speak only Tibetan are not 
from West Bengal. 
 
¶15. Coordination between the FPUs throughout Mission India has been 
highly effective in preventing fraud in many R-1 visa cases.  An 
astute catch by the FPM in Kolkata caught several fraudulent R-1 
applicants applying the same week in Mumbai and New Delhi.  Based on 
an A/RSO-I investigation in New Delhi that uncovered fake stamps for 
an organization in Michigan, Chennai arranged the arrest of three 
fake Sikhs, and the astute Kolkata FPM used Watch Phrase to alert 
U.S. Mission New Zealand about its applicants connected to the same 
Michigan organization.  These cases are now under investigation by 
DS.  Technology tools, such as Watch Phrase and Text Search, have 
proven invaluable in combating R-1 fraud. 
 
------------- 
Student Visas 
------------- 
 
¶16. Many student applicants, even legitimate ones, are taken in by 
document vendors.  They present fraudulent packages of bank 
statements and land documents in their interviews, and they are 
guided by advertising and new articles, such as the one in Hyderabad 
which declared, "Study Part-Time, Work Full-Time" on an F-1 student 
visa.  In June 2008, Chennai conducted an open house for local 
journalists to dispel the myths surrounding the visa process and to 
encourage students in particular not to rely on visa facilitators. 
CA/FPP has been instrumental in identifying schools that have a bad 
track record of students not maintaining status once in the U.S. 
Since most students apply in July/August for the fall semester, the 
fraud referral rate was understandably lower during the last six 
months. 
 
--------------- 
Performer Visas 
--------------- 
 
¶17. Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have all been active in combating 
fraud of cultural performers.  The highest rate of fraud is in New 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  005 OF 016 
 
 
Delhi.  FPU New Delhi has developed an active and successful 
prescreening program for all P3 applicants, which in the last 
reporting period exceeded 250 cases. 
 
¶18. An investigation by the Chennai FPU in 2008 uncovered a visa 
fraud racket through which famous Tamil film actors and industry 
associates assisted mala fide applicants to obtain B1/B2 visas, 
purportedly to scout movie locations (ref K).  Over two hundred 
applicants applied for visas under this scheme, and 95 were issued. 
Thirty-eight of those applicants are confirmed overstays who are 
currently illegally present in the United States.  FPU revoked the 
visas of 56 other individuals, mostly Tamil film stars and industry 
associates, for their direct role in this visa scheme.  The case 
generated significant press attention throughout India and appeared 
on all of the major news networks, thereby creating a very 
high-profile anti-fraud awareness campaign. 
 
¶19.  Mumbai also conducted a validation study of P-3 performers (ref 
L) which confirmed a 99 percent return rate of all P-3 applicants. 
Mumbai requests that most P-3 performers present themselves in 
person to the consulate to confirm their return. 
 
--------------- 
¶C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶20. During the reporting period, Mission India identified 505 cases 
of IV fraud (New Delhi - 271, 33 percent confirmed fraud rate; 
Mumbai - 163, 31 percent; Chennai - 71, 28 percent).  Kolkata, which 
does not process IVs, assisted with several field investigations in 
its consular district.  Although all posts face the major abuses 
associated with IV fraud (i.e. fraudulent relationships, fake civil 
documents, etc.), the volume of IV cases in New Delhi and Mumbai is 
significantly larger than that of Chennai. 
 
¶21. The F and CR categories are particularly troublesome throughout 
Mission India, and posts see false family relationships and 
fictitious marriages and divorces every day.  The Indian custom of 
arranged marriages makes adjudicating IR and CR cases particularly 
difficult, as the husband and wife often do not meet until just 
before their marriage.  Many of the IV fraud referrals in Mumbai are 
CR-1 or F-21 cases stemming from "arranged" marriages between U.S. 
citizens or LPRs and Indian nationals. Thus, much of the FPUs' time 
is dedicated to determining the legitimacy of the family 
relationships that sustain the claim to immigrant status. 
 
¶22. New Delhi FPU investigates cases through a combination of 
Lexis-Nexis and PIERS checks on the petitioner side, and CCD checks, 
voters ID checks and pretext calls to the villagers.  Over the past 
year New Delhi FPU has broken numerous cases in which the 
beneficiary provided a false Voter's ID by searching the official 
voter registration on-line at http://www.ceopunjab.nic.in/.  The 
official lists indicate who lives in the house, their ages and 
marital status and/or father's name.  Local police accepted three 
such cases of Voter's ID fraud for investigation.  Pretext calls are 
still the unit's most valuable resource.  Using the online phone 
lists, investigators can locate phone numbers in the area in which 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  006 OF 016 
 
 
the applicant lives and call those neighbors for information about 
the beneficiary and sometimes petitioner.  This is more effective in 
rural areas; city residents are less informed/less willing to talk 
about their neighbors. 
 
¶23. Posts also frequently encounter misrepresentations of marital 
status in order to benefit from earlier "current processing dates" 
(e.g. falsely claiming to be single by denying the applicant has a 
spouse and children in order to qualify for F1 classification) and 
misrepresentations of the age of children in order to qualify as 
part of the family eligible to immigrate.  Chennai has seen the 
largest number of these cases originating from the state of Kerala 
(ref M). 
 
--------------- 
¶D. DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶24.  Although Indians are generally ineligible to participate in the 
Diversity Visa program, Kolkata conducted five DV investigations for 
Nepalese nationals.  All five cases were confirmed fraudulent. 
 
--------------- 
¶E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶25. Although passport and CRBA-related fraud exists, it has been 
very minor.  During the rating period, New Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata 
reported fifteen investigations, eleven of which were DNA checks. 
Only one of these cases resulted in a confirmed fraud finding. 
 
--------------- 
¶F. ADOPTION FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶26.  During the reporting period, only Mumbai referred any adoption 
cases for investigation (eight).  Recent media accounts have focused 
attention on reportedly fraudulent adoptions in India by Australian 
parents.  Other countries have also expressed concerns about cases 
stemming from questionable orphanages in the late 1990s and early 
2000s.  Indian authorities are investigating these claims (Ref N). 
 
--------------- 
¶G. Use of DNA Testing 
--------------- 
 
¶27. Mission India does not have any particular concern with DNA 
testing.  Guidance for all posts is to utilize DNA testing as a last 
resort, and most cases are resolved through interviews and fraud 
investigations.  Each post has a panel physician and affiliated lab, 
and a cleared American is always present when a blood sample is 
taken.  During the rating period, Mission India conducted DNA 
testing in 82 cases (Mumbai - 38, New Delhi - 33, Chennai - 10, 
Kolkata - 1), and in eleven cases fraud was confirmed.  This does 
not include DNA tests in New Delhi and Mumbai on behalf of DHS, or 
cases for which DNA was recommended but the applicant did not submit 
a sample. 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  007 OF 016 
 
 
 
--------------- 
¶H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud 
--------------- 
 
¶28.  All posts now refer FDNS investigation requests to FDNS HQ for 
appropriate dissemination.  Since those cases should be routed to 
the USCIS, ICE and CBP representatives at Embassy New Delhi, the 
number of DHS referrals has decreased significantly in the past six 
months to only 71 cases (New Delhi - 50, Mumbai 20, Chennai - 1). 
Fifty-five of those requests from New Delhi and Mumbai were for DNA 
tests.  Beginning in the next reporting period, DHS will begin 
processing its own DNA cases.  Four investigations for DHS in Mumbai 
were confirmed fraudulent. 
 
--------------- 
¶I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel 
--------------- 
 
¶29. Alien smuggling from and through India using fraudulent travel 
documents is one of the most serious challenges facing posts in the 
region. Smuggling ranges from individual document vendors to 
sophisticated criminal organizations that move hundreds of people to 
the U.S. each year. Delhi and Mumbai have become key transit points 
for illegal migrants proceeding to the U.S. from India.  DS/CR/VPAU, 
in consultation with DRSO/I New Delhi, and the Austrian, Canadian, 
British, and New Zealand High Commissions have noted an upsurge of 
third-country nationals transiting New Delhi with counterfeit 
documents. Individuals of numerous nationalities, including 
Armenians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Georgian, Bangladeshi, Congolese, 
Nepalese, and Sri Lankans have been intercepted attempting to 
transit New Delhi with fraudulent documents.  Other Indian airports 
have also been reporting similar patterns. 
 
¶30. Trafficking in persons (TIP) remains an area of considerable 
concern. India is a source, destination, and transit country for 
men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial 
sexual exploitation and forced labor.  Internal trafficking of women 
and girls for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and 
forced marriage is prevalent.  The GOI estimates 90 percent of 
India's sex trafficking is internal, although estimates on the 
number of trafficking victims vary widely and are generally 
unreliable.  Recent years have seen an increase in trafficking to 
medium-sized cities and satellite towns of large cities.  One NGO 
reports a rising trend of girls coming from single-parent homes and 
from families where fathers have remarried.  India is also a 
destination for women and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh trafficked 
for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. 
 
--------------- 
¶J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations 
--------------- 
 
¶31.  The single greatest development in combating fraud in India has 
been expansion of the RSO-I program and the close relationship 
between A/RSO-Is and FPMs throughout Mission India.  All posts have 
an A/RSO-I, and several are due to receive a second A/RSO-I in 2010. 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  008 OF 016 
 
 
 All of the RSO-Is and FPMs attended the H and L fraud conference at 
the end of FY-2007 and the H and L Conference in Chennai in May 
2008, except for those from Hyderabad which was not open at that 
time.  All RSO-Is and FPMs are included in a common email group that 
is used daily, and the D/RSO-I and Country Coordinator for Fraud 
Prevention Programs plan their quarterly trips to each post in 
consultation with one another. 
 
¶32. As the A/RSO-I/FPU program expands in India to move beyond 
arrest statistics and personnel growth, the program has inevitably 
encountered challenges in another stage of criminal prosecutions; 
court trials.  Permission to testify in foreign courts must be 
sought and obtained according to international treaty standards and 
stringent FAM regulations.  Seeking such permission has been an 
infrequent requirement since most officers are long gone by the time 
cases reach their court dates.  However, these summons are 
anticipated to occur much more frequently now, particularly given 
the high volume of arrests in FY-2008. In a recent case, ARSO/I 
Mumbai obtained such approval after much guidance and consultation 
with D/RSO-I and L/DL and was able to testify in January 2009 in a 
large-scale smuggling case involving H4 visa fraud.  A procedure has 
since been established to facilitate future summons delivery, 
immunity, and testimonial issues. 
 
¶33. A/RSO-Is have also sought to address the "transferred officer" 
syndrome, by encouraging the use of FSNI's as complainants in fraud 
cases brought to local law enforcement for investigation; a practice 
in use by other A/RSO-I/FPU programs in Indonesia and Colombia. 
Based on initiatives by A/RSO-Is in India, L/DL recently made an 
important decision to allow FSNs to sign and file the initial police 
reports with Indian law enforcement.  By the time these cases reach 
the courts, there is a much greater likelihood that the FSNs on the 
report will still be available to act as witnesses than there is for 
the A/RSO-I. This will help ensure that cases generated by A/RSO-I 
and FPU efforts will complete the full cycle of crime detection, 
investigation, and prosecution. 
 
¶34. Finally, as a result of an increasing amount of pressure both 
from the U.S. government and from other diplomatic missions, 
primarily the U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand, 
Indian law enforcement is slowly beginning to address smuggling and 
trafficking issues in India.  Recently, A/RSO-I Mumbai met with the 
Joint Commissioner of Police to discuss alien smuggling schemes. 
The meeting resulted in the creation of a Special Cell for Human 
Trafficking and Smuggling within the Mumbai Crime Branch.  The 
result is that cases referred from the US Consulate will now be 
worked by trained investigators as opposed to local constables who 
do not have the training or experience to deal with complex document 
fraud cases. 
 
--------------- 
¶K. Indian Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry 
--------------- 
 
¶35.  Indian Passport fraud is a significant and continuously 
worrisome fraud challenge. For all of the security features and 
improvements in quality control of current Indian passports, quality 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  009 OF 016 
 
 
and issuance control are lax and penalties are so inadequate that 
virtually anyone can obtain a genuinely issued, but fraudulent 
passport with near impunity. 
 
¶36.  The design of the Indian passport incorporates many good 
security features that would normally lead to a more favorable 
rating of this document's vulnerability.  The problem lies in 
production inconsistency and vulnerable source documents.  Quality 
control is lax at production locations.  Thus, genuine passports 
sometimes are partially or completely missing security features. 
Genuine passports issued on the same day at the same place can look 
entirely different - a different batch but the numbers are 
sequentially close. 
 
¶37.  The only documentation required for a passport is proof of 
birth and proof of residency. Easily reproduced school records can 
suffice for the former, while a bank statement or utility bill can 
be used to "prove" the latter.  Although police are supposed to 
verify the information on each application by visiting the 
applicant's neighborhood and interviewing neighbors, such checks are 
often cursory at best. In most cases, police officials will only 
check warrant records and then hand over a clean record to passport 
authorities.  Notwithstanding these problems, the fact the 
application process requires a police check is positive. 
 
¶38.  Ironically, another positive is the cumbersome Indian 
bureaucracy.  The application process for a passport can be 
extremely time consuming and laborious.  Anyone with an urgent 
desire for a fraudulent Indian passport may thus pursue an 
alternative to acquiring a legitimate passport with fake source 
documents.  Finally, Indian passports are issued through regional 
offices. One benefit of this is that individuals applying outside of 
their 'normal' region would attract additional attention and 
scrutiny. 
 
¶39.  Fraudulent civil documentation is common in India, both in 
terms of documents that have been fabricated outright, and documents 
issued improperly. Posts see a myriad of fraudulent documents, 
including fake civil registry documents, counterfeit entry/exit 
stamps and third-country visas, employment letters, sponsorship and 
financial documents, bogus degrees and entrance examination scores, 
and altered marriage and site photographs.  Visa consultants sell 
such documents to applicants who seek their advice about how to 
qualify for visas. Peddlers of fraudulent documents abound and 
operate quite openly in major Indian cities and even some of the 
smaller towns. Government officials are not above fraudulent 
issuances either. Virtually all birth certificates, death 
certificates, and marriage registration documents can be purchased 
from corrupt local government officials or brokers. 
 
--------------- 
¶L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities 
--------------- 
 
¶40.  All posts have increased efforts to work more closely with 
Indian authorities in a number of areas of common interest, such as 
making Indian documents more secure, establishing fraud prevention 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  010 OF 016 
 
 
strategies, verification of civil registry information, and the 
apprehension of criminals.  Airport police and immigration 
authorities in Mumbai have been aggressive in detaining individuals 
who DHS deported for fraudulent documents.  Law enforcement in New 
Delhi has been actively involved in arresting visa vendors but has 
not taken a general interest in arresting persons denied boarding at 
the airport for presenting fraudulent documents, in part due to the 
absence of a U.S. presence at the airport. 
¶41.  In Mumbai, the consulate established a close relationship with 
the Mumbai Joint Commissioner of Police in combating both U.S. visa 
fraud and Indian passport fraud following a smuggling operation 
connected to Jet Airways.  The arrest of several visa applicants, 
including Jet Airways employees, led to ten other arrests of 
vendors/ facilitators.  More importantly, two of those ten 
facilitators were Passport Office officials, and this has put more 
urgency and attention on cleaning up the corruption in local 
passport offices. 
¶42.  In Chennai, law enforcement officials investigate cases 
involving Chennai applicants but are hesitant to do so with 
applicants from other states.  The opening of Consulate General 
Hyderabad will greatly improve interaction with local government 
officials.  The Chairman of the State Board of Education in Andhra 
Pradesh has been instrumental in developing and maintaining the 
integrity of OLIVE, the Online Verification system for high priority 
educational degrees in the state.  A similar program, MARTINI, has 
been set up in the state of Karnataka. 
 
--------------- 
¶M.  Areas of Particular Concern 
--------------- 
 
¶43.  Mission India appreciates the considerable support it has 
received from the Department in support of combating visa fraud. 
All Mission FPUs are now better equipped, and most will soon have 
appropriate offices from which to operate.  The Chennai and Kolkata 
FPUs have completed their physical expansion, while phase one of the 
New Delhi reconstruction project was completed in March.  All of 
consular section Mumbai eagerly awaits the completion of a new 
consulate compound, currently scheduled for FY2009.  Consulate 
General Hyderabad will officially begin visa processing in March. 
¶44.  The possibility of submitting large validation studies for 
entry/exit checks with the USVISIT program has significantly 
enhanced Mission India validation studies.  In FY-2008, Mission 
India conducted three countrywide validation studies for referrals 
(ref O), the Business Executive Program (ref P), and M-1 flight 
school students (ref Q), in addition to Post-specific studies, such 
as a review of Bhutanese travelers in New Delhi (ref R).  Providing 
ADIS access to posts has been a considerable boon to fraud reporting 
throughout Mission India. 
 
--------------- 
¶N. STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------- 
 
¶45.  Mission India lists below for each post the names, position 
titles and consular-specific training each FPU member has received. 
Each post has a full-time FPM, except for Kolkata where the FPM is a 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  011 OF 016 
 
 
part-time portfolio, and an A/RSO-I.  The FPM in Chennai is also the 
Country Coordinator.  Due to staffing gaps, the FPM positions in New 
Delhi and Mumbai are encumbered by second tour officers until Summer 
2009 and Summer 2011, respectively.  Each post has its own in-house 
training for new FPU staff.  All officers have taken basic consular 
training. 
 
------- 
Chennai 
------- 
 
John A. Ballard 
Country Coordinator for Fraud Prevention Programs/Fraud Prevention 
Manager 
PC-126 Advanced Consular Name Checking, Washington, 8/03 
PC-543 Analytic Interviewing, Washington, 6/04 
PC-108 Consular Leadership Development Conference, Cyprus, 12/04 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/05 
Eurasia Fraud Conference, Istanbul, 3/06 
PC-532 Advanced Consular Course, Washington, 6/07 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
The Future of H and L Processing, KCC, 4/08 
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
 
Kip Francis 
Vice Consul/Back-up Fraud Prevention Manager 
India H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
 
Anthony K. Ramirez 
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations 
DTB50100 - DS Management Operations Course 11/2000 
I2 - Investigative Database Utilization and Management 03/01 
DTB10100 - Basic Special Agent Course 05/02 
PC 538 - Non-Immigrant Visa Training 03/04 
DS Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation Training, 08/04 
DHS - Document Fraud Detection and Recognition 08/04 
OT 101 - DS/RSO Course 05/05 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08 
 
Priya Francis 
Security Investigator (FSN/I) 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 2002 & 2004 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 3/2005 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
 
Ann D'Silva 
Consular Investigations Specialist 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 02/99 
FSN antifraud course (FSNAC), Bangkok, 11/1999 
PA-248 Supervisory Skills Workshop, Dhaka, 07/2003 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training for FSN'S, Washington, 11/2003 
H1B Fraud Conference in Boston, 05/06 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  012 OF 016 
 
 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
PC-106 Regional Workshop for Consular FSNs, Washington, 3/08 
 
Anandan Ramanan 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 02/99 
Supervisory Skills Workshop, New Delhi 04/2000 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 04/2002 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
 
Dipti Peteti 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
 
Rajalakshmi Vasanthakumar 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 05/02 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 9/08 
 
Preethi Nelson 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-123 Workshop for Senior Immigrant Visa LES,Washington D.C. 
04/2008 
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, Chennai, 07/2008 
PC-123 Workshop for Senior Immigrant Visa LES,Washington D.C. 
09/2004 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Chennai, 09/2004 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Chennai, 05/2002 
 
Srinivas Vadagepalli 
Consular Investigations Clerk 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 10/07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai, 
3/08 
 
------- 
Kolkata 
------- 
 
Alan Smith 
Fraud Prevention Manager 
 
Anne Brunne 
FLETC CITP, 11/1998 
DS BSAC, 02/1999 
PC-530, 6/2008 
 
Partha Banerji 
Consular Assistant (also handles small IV workload) 
NEA/SA Consular FSN Workshop (PC-106), FSI Washington, 02/2000 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  013 OF 016 
 
 
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop, Hotel Park-Hyatt, Washington, 04/2002 
 
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 3/2005 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 11/2008 
 
James P Rozario 
H and L Consular Assistant 
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 03/09 
 
------ 
Mumbai 
------ 
 
Dean Tidwell 
Acting Fraud Prevention Manager 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, 02/2009 
 
Meera Doraiswamy 
Vice Consul (FPU Rotation) 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, 12/2008 
PC 126A Adv Consular Name checking March 2008 
H and L and Anti-Fraud Training, Chennai, January 2009 
 
Corynn Stratton 
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations 
FLETC CITP - 03/04 
DS BSAC - 05/04 
Evidence Management, Int'l Assoc for Property and Evidence 04/06 
Basic Con/Gen 07/2007 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08 
 
Mehjabeen Chougle 
Security Investigator (FSN/I) 
Basic FSNI Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia 11/05 
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Course, Washington 11/2005 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi 10/07 
 
Shiraz Mehta 
LES Supervisor 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2003 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations 
PC-128 Detecting Imposters 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent documents 
Business writing- The Fundamentals 
 
Harji Saparia 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2005 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 
PC-106 General NIV training 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent documents 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07 
 
Suma Jogi 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  014 OF 016 
 
 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2007 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 
 
Karishma Kika 
H and L Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 
H and L On-site training, Chennai, 10/07 
PC-128- Detecting Imposters. 
 
Kaushal Worah 
H and L Consular Investigations Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operation at post 
H and L On-site training, Chennai, 10/07 
 
Deepa Chandran 
Consular Investigation Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration laws and Regulations 
 
Issaki Venkat 
Consular Investigations Clerk 
H and L On-site Training, Chennai, 10/07 
 
Jennifer Vajifdar 
Fraud Clerk 
 
--------- 
New Delhi 
--------- 
 
Christene Hendon 
Fraud Prevention Manager 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
 
Jeniffer Fasciglione 
Consular Associate 
Basic Con/Gen- FSI 2000 
Customer Service Training - Bern, Switzerland 2001/2002 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
DAFWG Document Fraud Workshop - New Delhi 12/08 
 
Lalmuongpui (Mai) Landymore 
Consular Assistant 
PC102 - Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Guangzhou 
 
Eric A. Nordstrom 
Deputy Regional Security Officer - Investigations 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Criminal Investigation 
Training Program (CITP), 08/1998; 
Diplomatic Security Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC), 09/1998 
DT 250, DS Criminal Supervisors Course, (24 hrs), 10/2004 
Diplomatic Security Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation 
Training Course (24hrs) - 06/2005 
USDOJ / OCDETF Financial Investigations Seminar (30 hours) 10/2006 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, FSI, 08/2007 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  015 OF 016 
 
 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/2007 
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08 
 
Richard Seipert 
Assistant Regional Security Officer - Investigations 
FLETC, Criminal Investigation Training Program (CITP), 10/03 
Diplomatic Security Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC), 03/04 
DS Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation Training Course, 
11/04 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, Oct 07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08 
 
Jyoti Sapra 
FPU Visa Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 
Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington. 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
PA-248 FSN Supervisory Skills Workshop 
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents 
 
Rajender Marwaha 
FPU Visa Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post, 2007 
Fraud Prevention Training: At post, on-the-job training. 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
PC-542 LES Fraud Prevention Assistants Course, 11/08 
 
Charu Kathuria 
FPU Visa Assistant 
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operation at post 
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post 
Fraud Prevention Training: At post, on-the-job training and briefing 
on passport fraud detection. 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
 
Sanjeev Tyagi 
Security Investigator (FSN/I) 
Basic FSNI Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia 10/04 
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi 10/07 
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New 
Delhi, 3/08 
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 03/09 
 
Ritika Sawhney 
FPU Investigations Assistant 
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post 
 
Megha Singh 
FPU Investigations Clerk 
 
CHENNAI 00000077  016 OF 016 
 
 
 
--------- 
Hyderabad 
--------- 
 
Jason B. Rieff 
Fraud Prevention Manager 
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 7/08 
PC-540 Consular Review and Automation, Washington, 8/08 
PC-127 CA Review for Consular Officers, Washington, 8/08 
PC-137 Automation for NIV, Washington, 8/08 
PC-116 Automated Systems for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/08 
PC-139 Automation for ACS Unit, Washington 8/08 
 
Gregory N. Rankin 
Vice Consul/Backup Fraud Prevention Manager 
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 2/2009 
PC-530 Basic Consular Course, 12/2008 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 2/2009 
 
Nathan M. Kim 
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center - Criminal Investigations 
Training Program, 6/2003 
Diplomatic Security - Basic Special Agent Course, 10/2003 
Asset Forfeiture Training, 2/2005 
PC-530 Basic Consular Course, 10/2008 
International Conference on Asian Organized Crime and Terrorism, 
3/2009 
 
Chadive W. Reddy 
Consular Investigations Specialist 
Fraud Prevention training at FPU, U.S. Con Gen, Chennai, 11/2008 
PC-102 Immigration Law & Visa Operations, 12/2008 
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, 12/2008 
PC-104 Overseas Citizen Services, 12/2008 
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 12/2008 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 01/2009 
PC-545 Examining U.S. Passports, 01/2009 
PC-542 Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSN's, Washington, 03/2009 
 
Chetan K. Bandari 
Consular Investigations Assistant 
Fraud Prevention training at FPU, U.S. Con Gen, Chennai, 11/2008 
PC-102 Immigration Law & Visa Operations, 12/2008 
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, 12/2008 
PC-104 Overseas Citizen Services, 01/2009 
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 12/2008 
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 01/2009 
PC-545 Examining U.S. Passports, 01/2009 
 
SIMKIN