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DE RUEHBS #0391/01 0771741
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181741Z MAR 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 000391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN TU HR CY XH
SUBJECT: INTRODUCING THE EUROPEAN UNION, PART VI: THE ACCESSION 
PROCESS 
 
REF: (A) 2008 BRUSSELS 1825; (B) 2008 BRUSSELS 1790 
     (C) 2008 BRUSSELS 1880 ; (D) BRUSSELS 0108 
     (E) BRUSSELS 276 ; (F) BRUSSELS 134 
 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶1.  The EU has been growing from the founding "Six" to the current 
EU-27.  Enlargement is viewed as one of the EU's most successful 
policies and a powerful foreign policy tool for extending a zone of 
peace and democracy across the European continent.  The tight 
conditions for membership and the various stages of the accession 
process, as outlined below, allow for no flexibility to depart from 
EU standards, rules and practices.  Following the unprecedented 
accession of ten countries on May 1, 2004, the process continued 
with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania at the beginning of 2007. 
 Croatia and Turkey started accession negotiations in October 2005 
and Macedonia was granted candidate status at the end of 2005. 
While Croatia aims to complete its negotiations at the end of 2009, 
Turkey's progress has been much slower and Macedonia has not yet 
been given the green light to start formal talks with the EU.  An 
even wider Union extending to the whole region of Western Balkans is 
already in the cards; however, persisting uncertainties about the 
fate of Lisbon Treaty reforms and a widespread enlargement "fatigue" 
among EU governments and public opinion are casting doubts on the 
pace and the limits of further expansion. 
 
¶2.  This message -- the sixth in a series updating our USEU cables 
-- is meant to help officers in positions requiring a good knowledge 
and understanding of the EU machinery.  Other cables in this series 
discuss the history of the European Union (Ref A); the chief 
political institutions of the EU (Commission, Council and Parliament 
- Ref B), the EU Presidency and the European Council (Ref C); the 
judicial, financial, supervisory and advisory bodies (Ref D); the 
Treaties, structure and legal order (Ref E); and EU-U.S. cooperation 
under the Transatlantic dialogue (SEPTEL).  End Summary and 
Introduction. 
 
FROM SIX TO TWENTY-SEVEN 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  Enlargement is often presented by the EU itself as one of its 
most successful policies and a powerful foreign policy tool, 
extending a zone of peace and democracy across Europe.  The original 
six-member group of 1951 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands) has already undergone six successive 
enlargements (not including the 1991 unification of Germany) to: 
 
-- Denmark, Ireland and the UK (1973); 
-- Greece (1981); 
-- Portugal and Spain (1986); 
-- Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995); 
-- Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (May 1, 2004); and 
--   Bulgaria and Romania (January 1, 2007). 
 
ACCESSION CRITERIA 
------------------ 
 
¶4.  Per the EU Treaty, any European state may apply to become a 
member of the Union.  The Treaty fails to provide any definition of 
what is meant by a "European state," leaving open the issue of the 
EU's final borders. (Note:  an application for membership submitted 
by Morocco in the early 1980s was rejected on the ground that the 
applicant was not a "European state."  End note.)  Nor does the 
Treaty itself lay down detailed political and economic conditions 
for membership.   The first clearly-defined rules for membership 
were established at a June 1993 meeting of the European Council in 
Copenhagen and are referred to as the "Copenhagen criteria": 
 
- Political:  Achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
minorities; 
 
- Economic:  Existence of a functioning market economy and capacity 
to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the 
EU; 
 
- Administrative:  Ability to take on the obligations of 
membership. 
 
¶5.  The 1995 Madrid European Council established a further 
requirement that a candidate country must have created the 
conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its 
administrative structures.  This means that, while it is important 
that the EU body of law (the "acquis") be transposed into national 
legislation, it is even more important that the legislation be 
implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and 
judicial structures. 
 
HOW TO JOIN THE EU 
------------------ 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  002 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶6.  The basic aim of accession negotiations is, indeed, to ensure 
that the candidate country is able to adopt and implement the 
"acquis" by the time of accession.  The implication is that new 
members must abide by the whole EU body of law, including the case 
law of the European Court of Justice.  In some cases, where specific 
difficulties make it impossible for the candidate to apply the 
"acquis" fully from accession date, the EU can accept transition 
measures.  Derogations take the form of transition periods that the 
EU grants to a newcomer to bring its legislation and practices in 
line with the "acquis." 
 
¶7.  In essence, the membership criteria are non-negotiable, a key 
feature for a correct understanding of the enlargement process.  Any 
derogation is strictly limited in scope and duration.  The 
derogations are negotiated with the candidate country as part of the 
accession terms and conditions enshrined in the Accession Treaty. 
Unlike some of the former EU-15, the ten plus two Member States that 
joined in 2004 and 2007 had no recourse to simply "opt out" of any 
EU policies, and are committed to eventually join European Monetary 
Union and Schengen (some of them already did).  The EU itself can 
also seek temporary derogations to the application of EU policies to 
the candidates, such as the free movement of labor into the EU. 
Workers from the new Central and Eastern European countries did not 
get immediate access to all EU labor markets after accession. 
 
¶8.  Though the legal basis for the process of enlarging the Union 
can be found in the EU Treaty, its various stages have been 
determined in a piecemeal fashion: 
 
- An application for membership is addressed to the EU Council (the 
Presidency), which asks the Commission to assess the applicant's 
ability to meet the conditions of membership. 
 
- The Council/European Council unanimously pronounces on the 
Commission's opinion (the "avis").  The Council is not required to 
follow the Commission's opinion.  In the case of Greece, the Council 
decided to overcome an unfavorable "avis" from the Commission. 
 
- If the Commission delivers a positive opinion, and the Council 
unanimously agrees a negotiating mandate, negotiations may be 
formally opened between the candidate and all the Member States. 
 
- As illustrated by the most recent cases of Turkey, Croatia and 
Macedonia, the Council may also grant an applicant country the 
status of EU "candidate" without agreeing to the immediate opening 
of negotiations on accession terms.  The candidate status is a 
political recognition of a closer relationship with the EU, but does 
not automatically mean that the aspirant may hope to join in a near 
future. 
- Moreover, the opening of accession talks requires the definition 
of a negotiating framework for their conduct.  This covers practical 
arrangements for the negotiating sessions, the frequency of 
meetings, chairmanship, etc., but could also address sensitive 
political issues. 
 
- The accession procedure per se starts with a "screening" process, 
a careful and very detailed analysis by the Commission of the 
legislation of the candidate country to identify differences with 
the EU "acquis" that will need to be corrected by the candidate. 
This is best undertaken within the framework of the contractual 
links existing between the EU and the candidate country. 
 
- Negotiations on accession terms take the form of a bilateral 
conference between the EU Member States and the candidate country 
with the Commission acting as the EU negotiating agent.  The 
negotiations take place either at senior official or 
ministerial-level conferences that address one or several of the 
policy chapters forming the EU body of law.  Talks focus on the 
terms under which candidates will adopt, implement and enforce the 
"acquis."  The bilateral negotiations cover all policy areas of EU 
competence (over 80,000 pages of the "acquis"), broken down into 
"chapters."  There are 35 chapters in the ongoing negotiations with 
Turkey and Croatia. 
 
- For each chapter, the Commission makes proposals to the Council 
for a "common position" of the EU.  After submission to the 
Enlargement Working Group of the Council, a draft common position is 
put for consultation among Member States.  All decisions on EU 
common positions must be reached by unanimity in the Council (in 
practice, the EU PermReps, meeting in COREPER (French acronym for 
Council of Permanent Representatives)).  Only then can it be 
formally presented to the candidate country. 
 
- The negotiating position of the candidate country is a 
chapter-specific document adopted by the government that explains 
the state of the country's legislation in that field, the extent to 
which the "acquis" has been transposed into domestic law or the time 
limit within which legislation is to be adopted.  Where for 
political, budgetary, economic or social reasons a given provision 
of the "acquis" cannot become part of domestic legislation before 
accession date, the candidate country may ask for a transition 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  003 OF 007 
 
 
period, specifying its duration and the manner of full 
transposition.  The two sides then come to agreement on each 
chapter. 
 
- The final accession terms are the subject of an agreement between 
the EU countries and the applicant.  The Treaty of Accession 
includes an "Accession Protocol" detailing the conditions and 
arrangements for accession as well as "Accession Act" covering 
adjustments to the EU institutions to make room for the new 
member(s), e.g. voting rights in the Council, number of members in 
the European Parliament, etc.  For those countries that joined in 
2004, a single "Accession Treaty" covered the terms of accession for 
all ten.  The same applied to the accession terms agreed with 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
¶9.  When signed, the Accession Treaty remains subject to a 
ratification procedure by the EU countries and each candidate 
country, in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.  It also requires the assent of the European 
Parliament, which acts by an absolute majority of its members.  The 
completion of such ratification procedures normally takes at least 
12-18 months from the end of negotiations and signing of the treaty. 
 EU Member States generally do not have a tradition of organizing a 
referendum on the accession of new countries.  France, which had 
made an exception (for the UK) in 1972, reformed its Constitution in 
2005 so that its ratification of future EU accession treaties would 
require the organization of a referendum; however, a new amendment 
in 2008 allowed for the French President not to enforce this 
provision.  Although most of the newest EU members had no 
constitutional obligation to organize a referendum, a great majority 
of them put their accession terms to voters. 
 
NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  Given the evolving character of the EU body of law, accession 
negotiations are by no means a static process.  The domestic 
legislation of the candidate country must be further screened to 
check its conformity with the evolving EU "acquis."  The accession 
negotiations are governed by other principles.  One of them is that 
each negotiation with a candidate proceeds on the basis of "its own 
merits".  Another is that as long as the negotiations continue and 
until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed.  In the language of 
the negotiators, agreement on accession terms for a specific chapter 
allows that chapter to be "provisionally closed," implying that 
either side - the EU or the candidate - may come back with questions 
on the chapter concerned and ask for further clarifications or a 
reopening of talks on the issue. 
 
¶11.  The list of "provisionally closed" chapters is therefore an 
easy but superficial way to assess the state of the accession 
negotiations.  Throughout the negotiations and up to accession, the 
Commission (DG Enlargement) monitors the actual progress made by a 
candidate in its preparations for membership.  Comprehensive 
assessments of a candidate's preparations are provided by the 
Commission's annual reports that contain a detailed analysis of the 
fulfillment of accession criteria.  This monitoring is an integral 
part of the accession process, as progress in the negotiations is 
heavily dependent on concrete progress in the candidate's practices. 
 The pace of each negotiation therefore basically depends on the 
degree of preparation by the candidate and on the complexity of the 
issues to be resolved (hence the different pace of the talks with 
Croatia and Turkey).  For this reason, forecasting the duration of 
accession negotiations is imprecise, and often merely a statement of 
political intention. 
 
BIGGEST ENLARGEMENT EVER 
------------------------ 
 
¶12.  With the accession of ten Central and Eastern countries whose 
aggregate level of welfare was well below the EU average, the Union 
had to cope with wide regional disparities, differences in wage 
rates and purchasing power.  The accession terms for the newest 
members provided for gradual access to the EU's system of direct 
payments and common market organizations under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), EU funding under regional and structural 
policy instruments (means of wealth redistribution), as well as 
funds to improve nuclear safety, public administration and border 
protection.  The EU financial framework for 2007-2013 allowed for 
such transfers and the accession terms ensured that new members 
would be "net beneficiaries" in the years following accession; i.e., 
they should get more out of the EU budget than they contribute.  The 
countries that joined in 2004 were not expected to immediately adopt 
the euro (Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus and Slovakia have all now done 
so).  In addition to adapting the EU's legislation to ensure that 
its national central bank is considered independent, a newcomer also 
has to demonstrate that its key economic indicators converge with 
those of the monetary union members. 
 
¶13.  All through the negotiating process with Cyprus (Nicosia), the 
EU refused to make accession of the island contingent on a 
settlement of the intra-community dispute.  In the continued absence 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  004 OF 007 
 
 
of a Cyprus settlement, the application of the "acquis" to the 
Northern part of the island was suspended until the Council decides 
otherwise by unanimous decision. 
 
NEWCOMERS STILL HAVE PROBLEMS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14.  The accession of Bulgaria and Romania had been envisaged from 
the start as part of the big wave of enlargement to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  Both countries, which were lagging 
behind, joined later than the "ten" on January 1, 2007; however, the 
decision was political and accession took place under strict 
conditions and safeguards.  While honoring its long-standing 
commitment, the EU became increasingly determined not to compromise 
on its principle of "conditionality."  Both countries continue to be 
monitored closely for progress in fighting corruption and organized 
crime, ensuring food safety, and making proper use of EU funds.  The 
review has clearly not been satisfactory, especially in the case of 
Bulgaria, whose persistent failure to correct its management 
problems already cost the country more than 200 million EUR in EU 
payments with several hundred million EUR also being frozen.  Some 
EU watchers suggest the strict enforcement of "conditionality" 
reassures EU public opinion and governments that are resisting 
further enlargement, and cautions Turkey and Western Balkan nations 
lobbying for accession.  Nonetheless, others staunchly oppose 
further accession any time in the near future. 
 
EU CANDIDATES: CROATIA, TURKEY AND MACEDONIA 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  On October 3, 2005, the EU agreed to open accession 
negotiations with Croatia and Turkey, ending months of debate on 
whether both countries had fulfilled their respective requirements 
to do so.  Croatia had received candidate status in June 2004, but 
the EU had made the opening of talks subject to Croatia "cooperating 
fully" with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Turkey, which first applied in 1959 and has been 
in association with the (then) European Economic Community since 
1963, obtained candidate status in December 1999.  It took several 
more years, marked by continued EU calls for more Turkish reforms 
and protracted differences over the Cyprus issue, before accession 
talks were opened.  Even so, the EU's negotiating framework 
specifies that the negotiations with Turkey are "an open-ended 
process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed." (Note:  There 
has been no case in EU history where accession negotiations, once 
started, have not led to an offer of full membership.  End note). 
 
¶16.  Since the start of the negotiations in October 2005, Croatia 
managed to open 22 chapters out of the 35 chapters into which the 
negotiations are divided and to provisionally close seven of them 
(status as of March 2009).  The progress of negotiations in 2008 was 
hindered by a dispute between EU member Slovenia and Croatia over an 
unresolved border issue.  Many chapters said to be "technically 
ready" for provisional closure remain on hold, due to Slovenia's 
opposition.  A mediation effort to solve the dispute was recently 
initiated by the Commission. 
¶17.  Croatia is aiming to wrap up its accession negotiations by the 
end of the Barroso Commission's term in November 2009; however, the 
EU only sees the date as part of an indicative and conditional road 
map meant to help Croatia make the outstanding efforts required. 
Croatia's progress toward the final stage of the negotiations 
therefore depends on its completion of the necessary political, 
economic, legislative and administrative reforms.  Taking account of 
the necessary delays for drawing the Accession Treaty, signing and 
completing national ratification procedures in all Member States, 
and persisting uncertainties related to the Treaty of Lisbon (some 
countries, led by France and Germany, making Croatia's accession 
dependent upon entry into force of Lisbon reforms), Croatia cannot 
hope to join before 2010-2011 at the earliest. 
 
¶18.  Turkey, which received candidate status in December 1999, was 
able provisionally to conclude just one chapter (Science and 
Research) and to open ten out of 35 chapters in its EU accession 
talks (status at end of 2008).  Moreover, under a December 2006 
internal decision on the handling of its negotiations with Turkey, 
the EU will not open eight policy chapters seen as related to 
Turkey's persisting restrictions vis-`-vis Cyprus and will not close 
any other chapter until Turkey fulfills its obligations of 
non-discriminatory implementation vis-`-vis Cyprus of the Additional 
Protocol to its Association Agreement with the European Community. 
The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of 
Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services, 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, 
Customs Union and External Relations.   The EU Council noted in 
December 2008 that Turkey has not made progress toward normalization 
of its relations with Cyprus.  The EU also expects Turkey to 
"actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at a fair, 
comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the 
U.N. framework." 
 
¶19.  While recognizing the strategic importance of Turkey and the 
fact that Turkey "is now a viable market economy," the EU 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  005 OF 007 
 
 
governments and the Commission continue to call for a review of 
Turkey's constitutional rules.  They insist that participants in 
Turkish politics work to resolve their differences in a spirit of 
dialogue and compromise, respecting the rule of law and fundamental 
freedoms, while pursuing the reform process.  The EU is calling for 
further "substantial efforts to ensure that Turkey meets the 
Copenhagen criteria" in several fields, such as "continued judicial 
reform, establishing an anti-corruption strategy, effective 
protection of citizens' rights, full implementation of the policy of 
zero tolerance of torture and ill-treatment, ensuring freedom of 
expression and of religion in law and in practice for all religious 
communities, respect for and protection of minorities and 
strengthening trade union and women's rights." 
 
¶20.  EU leaders from the start of the accession negotiations with 
Turkey made it clear that the country's accession could not be 
envisaged before the implementation of the EU financial framework 
starting in 2014.  With the 2007 election as French President of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who repeatedly expressed his opposition to Turkey's 
membership of the EU, further doubts have been raised on the outcome 
and timetable of the process.  In the meantime, EU governments 
accepted the Commission's recommendation to pursue the negotiations 
and to take a final decision on the accession, or not, of Turkey 
once the negotiations are completed. 
 
¶21.  At the end of 2005, the European Council granted Macedonia the 
status of candidate country, based on a Commission's recommendation. 
 As of March 2009, no date has been set yet for the actual start of 
accession negotiations.  This will depend on the country's ability 
to meet its obligations under the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (see below) and to comply sufficiently with the membership 
criteria.  The Commission will continue to assess the progress made 
by Macedonia and report to the member states.  But the decision on 
candidacy status was a political signal to the whole region of 
Western Balkans, giving these countries a clear European 
perspective. 
 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES 
-------------------- 
 
¶22.  A wider EU is already in the cards.  At the November 2000 
Zagreb Summit, leaders from the EU and the Western Balkans countries 
confirmed their commitment to the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP), a strategy explicitly linked to the prospect of EU 
accession and adjusted to the level of development of each of the 
countries concerned.  In return for receiving the accession prospect 
and assistance to achieve it, the countries concerned -- the EU 
candidates Croatia and Macedonia, as well as Serbia-Montenegro (now 
two separate countries), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania -- undertook 
to meet the political and economic requirements set for all 
aspirants.  Though the UN-sponsored status talks on Kosovo resulted 
in no agreement, and the ensuing unilateral declaration of 
independence was not the subject of unanimous recognition by EU 
countries, the Republic of Kosovo remains part of the EU's strategy 
vis-a-vis Western Balkans, formally under UNSCR 1244.  European 
integration is said to be "essential to reinforce the security and 
stability of the region." 
 
¶23.  The SAP proved a success in laying foundations for faster 
reforms.  At their June 2003 Summit in Thessaloniki, EU leaders 
reaffirmed their commitment to the integration of the Western 
Balkans countries and the SAP was enriched to bring these countries 
closer to the EU through new instruments such as the European 
Partnerships, inspired by the Accession Partnerships that had been 
designed for the countries bound to join in 2004.  The Annual Report 
on the Stabilization and Association Process (released by the 
Commission in the fall) is a key instrument to assess the readiness 
of the Western Balkans countries to move closer to the EU.  The 
report takes stock of progress made by the individual countries, 
monitors the development of regional cooperation and assesses the 
impact of the Stabilization and Association instruments. 
 
PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY AND ACCESSION PARTNERSHIPS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶24.  In order to assist a candidate country to carry out reforms to 
fulfill the accession criteria and prepare for managing and 
absorbing EU funds post-accession, the EU provides financial and 
technical assistance.  The pre-accession strategy defines for each 
candidate the short-and medium-term priorities to be met. 
Pre-accession financial support is devoted to meeting these 
priorities.  For the Central and Eastern European countries that 
joined in 2004, pre-accession financial assistance included 
instruments such as PHARE (which essentially supported institution 
building), ISPA (development of environment and transport 
infrastructure) and SAPARD (agricultural and rural development 
support).  For Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, the EU developed other 
pre-accession instruments. 
 
¶25.  Pre-accession assistance to Turkey is being provided under the 
EU's new single instrument for financial cooperation.  Projects 
funded under the program are accession-driven; i.e., targeted to 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  006 OF 007 
 
 
assist Turkey in complying with priorities set out in an Accession 
Partnership.  Turkey carries out these projects with prior approval 
and/or ex-post evaluation by the Commission, an approach applying to 
all candidates.  Like other candidates, Turkey can also obtain loans 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
 
¶26.  For the countries of the Western Balkans, the Commission also 
proposed a road map setting out the stages and conditions attached 
to each stage of their "European perspective."  Establishing a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) covering both 
trade/economic and political dialogue with the EU is a fundamental 
step in this process.  All Western Balkan countries have now 
concluded such SAAs, though ratification of the SAA with Serbia 
remains subject to completion of national ratification procedures. 
Some member States (the Netherlands, in particular), who laid 
particular emphasis on Serbia's full cooperation with the Hague 
tribunal (ICTY), continue to make the entry into force of the SAA 
with Serbia contingent upon the arrest and transfer to the ICTY of 
Serbian war criminal General Mladic.  A country's track record in 
implementing its SAA obligations is a key element for the EU to 
consider any membership application.  Based on a Commission opinion, 
the EU may grant a country the status of candidate.  Croatia and 
Macedonia, which signed SAAs in 2001, have been using this path to 
make headway toward EU integration.  Montenegro formally submitted 
its application in December 2008; as of early March 2009, the 
Council had still not referred the application to the Commission for 
its opinion.  Albania also hinted at the prospect of submitting an 
application in the near future, though EU officials have been wary 
to encourage any hasty move. 
 
ICELAND AND OTHER POTENTIAL MEMBERS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶27.  In Iceland, where the majority of political and labor forces 
and public opinion long believed that the cost of joining would 
outweigh the benefits of EU membership, the terms of the debate 
suddenly changed with the financial turmoil in fall 2008 as the 
country was particularly hard hit by the liquidity crisis.  Key 
players in the political class are now looking to have Iceland join 
the EU.  Enlargement Commissioner Rehn encouraged them by stating 
that negotiations on Iceland's membership terms would definitely be 
"much faster than with other countries that do not have such strong 
ties to the EU."  This is because the country's relations to the EU 
are based on membership to the European Economic Area (EEA), which 
implies participation in the EU single market. 
 
¶28.  Other countries have long been considered as potential EU 
members.  Norway applied twice, in 1967 and 1992, but both times a 
national referendum rejected membership after negotiations were 
completed.  Switzerland applied in 1992 but a referendum the same 
year on joining the European Economic Area (EEA) failed, forcing 
Bern to shelve its application. 
 
EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY 
---------------------------- 
 
¶29.  The EU also has stated its readiness to enhance relations with 
close neighbors.  The so-called European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
was designed in the early 2000s for a wide range of countries, 
including Ukraine, Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well 
as Southern Mediterranean partners.  The aim was to offer these 
neighbors a chance to develop greater political, security, economic 
and cultural cooperation with the EU, but the EU always refrained 
from making any membership commitment vis-`-vis any of these 
countries (and actually rejected Morocco's bid in the 1980's).  A 
clear indication is the fact that ENP is part (in the current 
Barroso Commission) of the portfolio of Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner, who is responsible for the EU's External Relations, 
whereas Enlargement Commissioner Rehn separately handles relations 
with Turkey and the Western Balkans. 
 
¶30.  In 2008, the EU under French pressure established a new Union 
for the Mediterranean (official title: "Barcelona Process: Union for 
the Mediterranean") for developing ties with its Southern neighbors. 
 The EU leaders also agreed to strengthen ties with the EU's Eastern 
partners under the ENP (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Belarus).  Aimed at enhancing cooperation both on 
bilateral and multilateral levels, this "Eastern Partnership" 
initiative will be developed and launched in the first half of 2009, 
based on a differentiated approach with each partner (REF F).  The 
EU would offer new Association Agreements to partner countries 
willing to take on far-reaching commitments such as acquis-like 
legislative and regulatory reforms (e.g. on market access and energy 
security) and that meet the essential requirements of ENP. 
 
WHERE SHOULD THE EU END? 
------------------------ 
 
¶31.  The issue of the final borders, which has always been a 
political taboo, continues to haunt the Union.  The EU leaders 
recently set up an independent "Reflection Group" to advise the EU 
on its long-term future and to "meet challenges more effectively" on 
 
BRUSSELS 00000391  007 OF 007 
 
 
the horizon 2020-2030.  The idea of such a panel, headed by former 
Spanish PM Felipe Gonzalez, originally came from French President 
Sarkozy, who was willing to engage in a discussion of the EU's 
geographical limitations.  Pro-enlargement countries (including the 
UK, the Czech Republic and the Nordics) and the Commission were 
suspicious of a proposal perceived as intended to stop the 
enlargement process and to shift EU policy against Turkish 
membership.  The Portuguese Presidency in the second half of 2007 
then proposed to give the panel a broadly-worded mandate that 
avoided sensitive issues, including any specific reference to the 
EU's future borders.  The establishment of the panel nevertheless 
owed much to the need to enlist French support for the continuation 
of the accession talks with Turkey. 
 
LEAVING THE EU 
-------------- 
¶32.  No country ever stated its intention of leaving the EU and 
there is no "exit clause" in the Treaty order as currently 
effective.  However, with the Treaty of Lisbon (not fully ratified 
and not in force yet) the EU equipped itself for the first time with 
such an exit clause, stating that any Member State may withdraw from 
the EU.  This would be done in accordance with that country's 
constitutional requirements.  More specifically, the Treaty of 
Lisbon sets out a mechanism for negotiation and conclusion of a 
withdrawal agreement with the other Member States.  The Member State 
concerned has to notify the Commission of its intention and then 
negotiate on the terms.  The withdrawal agreement is oncluded on 
behalf of the Union by the Counci, acting by a qualified majority 
after obtaining the consent of the EP.  The EU legal framework then 
ceases to apply to the country concerned, which will be allowed to 
reapply for membership in the future, subject to the accession 
procedure as described in this cable. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶33.  The pull of the EU has been a powerful leverage for 
transforming former Communist countries in Europe.  The EU and its 
Member States can only benefit from having neighbors that are 
democratic and prosperous market economies, but they need to 
communicate better on the objectives and challenges of accession 
processes.  Some leaders in the EU fear that ongoing expansion might 
hinder the Union's ability to function as a coherent whole.  While 
stating its willingness to honor commitments, the EU has therefore 
been increasingly determined to ensure that aspirant countries can 
only proceed from one stage of the rapprochement process to the next 
once they have strictly met the conditions for that stage.  The 
latest enlargement package tabled by the Commission in fall 2008 
reflects this delicate balancing act, for which Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn has proved a deft advocate. 
 
MURRAY