VZCZCXRO9987
PP RUEHGR
DE RUEHWN #0187/01 0842157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 252157Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7255
RUEAHLC/DHS WASH DC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRIDGETOWN 000187 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DHS FOR DIR NATL TARGETING CTR TGOYER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER KCRM CVIS EAIR PREL XL
SUBJECT: JRCC ASSESSMENT, EMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 
 
REF: STATE 26743 
 
¶1. (SBU)  The JRCC has proven to be an incredibly useful tool for 
this mission and in particular for our law enforcement community. 
Originally developed to screen for potential terrorist threats 
attendant to the 2007 Cricket World Cup (CWC), JRCC and the APIS 
system have had the unforeseen benefit of also tracking travel of 
dangerous fugitives, including a number of "most wanted" criminals 
from the U.S. and several INTERPOL targets.  As STATE 26743 notes, 
97 fugitives have been identified by JRCC since its inception in 
April, 2007 (note:  our figures show 99, but may include more recent 
data), along with 894 "ties to terrorism" hits (our data: 1,226 
hits).  We have not had a mechanism to track specific cases to their 
conclusion, as DHS stops tracking once the notification is made and 
LEGAT and RSO at the mission do not have the time or resources to 
keep methodical record on success stories.  However, we are 
confident that some three dozen fugitives have probably been 
extradited as a direct result of JRCC/APIS information. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  JRCC has also been beneficial in bringing together 
security professionals from 10 countries and territories in the 
Caribbean to share security information at a level of intimacy not 
previously achieved.  This information sharing has also extended, in 
a far more limited fashion, to relations between Caribbean JRCC 
staff and DHS staff assigned to the unit, helping broaden our 
security dialogue with these countries and deepen trust among the 
partners. 
There continues to be some tension locally over "ownership" of JRCC, 
with both Trinidad and Tobago (holding the IMPACS seat) and Barbados 
(housing the actual JRCC platform) each desiring to keep "control" 
of the facility.  But aside from that turf battle, all the 
participants have acknowledged and praised the usefulness of the 
JRCC without exception. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  JRCC members also complain, as do our own law enforcement 
agencies, that the limitations on sharing information between the 
USG and local JRCC members is an impediment to better cooperation. 
This may be an insurmountable obstacle in the short term for 
intelligence reasons, but anything that could be done to increase 
the amount of information sharing without compromising sources or 
operational effectiveness would gain substantial political capital. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  While the broad success of the JRCC is acknowledged, two 
main problems impede the overall efficiency of the unit.  The first 
is the fact that many of the airlines that would be of primary 
concern for terrorism purposes, i.e. those flying into Dominica and 
St. Vincent from Venezuela (with connecting travel to Iran and 
Syria), do not submit passenger information to the JRCC.  This is a 
glaring hole in the system - mitigated somewhat by the fact 
traveling out of either St. Vincent or Dominica, provided it is done 
via commercial air, would be entered into the APIS. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The second weakness is not one that comes from JRCC, but 
which hinders JRCC's effectiveness nevertheless:  the judicial 
bureaucracy in the United States cannot at present keep up with the 
pace of information flow coming out of the JRCC.  The process of 
warrant notifications to local jurisdictions, confirmation of intent 
to extradite, notification to DOJ's International Affairs 
department, further notification to host country Justice ministries, 
and determination of eligibility for extradition simply take too 
long to make many of the JRCC findings actionable.  Bridgetown RSO 
estimates that at least 60 percent of the fugitives identified by 
JRCC were ultimately lost or let go because the U.S. side could not 
get the requisite paperwork together or a decision to extradite made 
within the 48 hours that most local security forces will track or 
detain an identified fugitive.  In most of those cases, the U.S. 
prosecutor in the case balked at the cost of the extradition and 
decided not to pursue the case.  We have excellent relationships 
with local law enforcement, and they have generally been responsive 
and cooperative, but they do not have the resources to track or hold 
fugitives indefinitely. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  In addition to these external problems, JRCC's 
effectiveness has been hampered by internal inefficiencies.  The 
current personnel structure for DHS, wherein a series of short-term 
TDY officers staff the JRCC, is untenable.  Those on 45-day 
rotations spend much of their time ascending the learning curve, and 
don't reach full effectiveness until they are due to depart.  Those 
who stay longer are somewhat more effective, but we lose time and 
opportunity costs, especially in our RSO office, in training these 
staff and integrating them into the law enforcement community at the 
mission.  The Embassy has approved NSDD-38 requests to hire four 
full-time DHS staff to man those positions - without permanent 
staffing, the important job of coordinating tracking of fugitives 
and TSDB hits will fall to our already overstretched RSO staff -- 
which is untenable.  We have also learned that DHS is considering 
cutting the staffing at the JRCC from four to two positions - this 
would be disastrous, as the shift work that is necessary to properly 
man the unit would be impossible on a two-person rotation. 
 
BRIDGETOWN 00000187  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU)  In short, JRCC and APIS are excellent law enforcement 
tools that are in some respects under-utilized, that are not 
properly supported in the U.S. by law enforcement agencies to push 
through the needed judicial bureaucratic processes, and that are not 
properly serviced by DHS under the current TDY personnel profile. 
It is essential that CPB staff the approved positions it requested 
through the NSDD-38 process.  Such permanent staffing is vital not 
only to ensure adequate Embassy support for the positions, but also 
to ensure cost effective use of U.S. government resources. 
Permanent staffing would also allow the development of expertise and 
key relationships with local law enforcement officials that will 
strengthen our interactions with the JRCC and allow us to strengthen 
our mission's ability to prevent terrorists and criminals from 
exploiting the borders of Caribbean countries and territories. 
 
HARDT