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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 000391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL KPAL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: GAZA PLEDGE, ARAB SOUTH AMERICAN SUMMIT: 
PLAY FOR MID-EAST CLOUT CONTINUES 
 
REF: A. 09 BRASILIA 00322 
     ¶B. 05 BRASILIA 1252 
     ¶C. 05 BRASILIA 760 
     ¶D. 09 BRASILIA 43 
     ¶E. 08 BRASILIA 1685 
     ¶F. 08 BRASILIA 1543 
     ¶G. 08 BRASILIA 1534 
     ¶H. 08 BRASILIA 1218 
     ¶I. 08 BRASILIA 851 
     ¶J. 08 BRASILIA 756 
     ¶K. 08 BRASILIA 531 
     ¶L. 08 BRASILIA 420 
     ¶M. 08 BRASILIA 304 
     ¶N. 08 BRASILIA 9 
     ¶O. 07 BRASILIA 2262 
     ¶P. 07 BRASILIA 2217 
     ¶Q. 08 BRASILIA 000896 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Lisa Kubiske.  Reason 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: President Lula's trip to Doha to attend the 
March 31 Arab-South American Summit will continue a year of 
intense Middle East diplomacy that kicked off when Amorim 
matched Brazil's largest foreign aid contribution by pledging 
USD 10 million for Gaza reconstruction.  Following the March 
26 reciprocal visit to Brazil by Iranian Foreign Minister 
Mottaki (septel), the Brazilian Middle East agenda for 2009 
includes: a planned Lula visit to Israel, Palestine, and 
Saudi Arabia later in the year; bilateral political talks 
with Syria; continuing negotiations on free trade deals with 
Egypt and Jordan; and continuing involvement in 
Israeli-Palestine peace talks, including a push for an 
Annapolis follow-up conference in Moscow. Brazil's Middle 
East diplomacy is considered within the government an 
important component of Brazil's global leadership 
aspirations, and Brazil's pledge at Sharm al-Sheikh signals 
Brazil's growing understanding it must be prepared to bear 
some of the costs of leadership.  Brazil's views on Middle 
East Peace issues are evolving but still lack depth, which 
leads to positions that are not yet helpful in resolving the 
problem. Arab diplomats with whom we have spoken call 
Brazil's views on the Middle East "nave."  In light Brazil's 
determined inroads into the Middle East arena and Brazilian 
officials' openness to discuss Middle East-related issues on 
a broad basis with us, Post continues to believe that a visit 
by high-level briefer or briefers from NEA (per ref q) to 
discuss various aspect of our Middle East policies would be 
valuable. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Arab-South America Summit Next on Lula's Agenda 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) Following Foreign Minister Amorim's attendance at the 
Sharm al-Sheikh conference and pledge of USD 10 million (ref 
a) to assist in Gaza reconstruction efforts, Counselor 
Claudio Cesar Rodrigues do Nascimento, head of the Ministry 
of External Relations' (MRE, or Itamaraty) Middle East 
Division I, which handles non-Gulf countries, told poloff 
that the next significant item on Brazil's Middle East was 
President Lula's trip to Doha to attend the Second Arab South 
America Summit (ASPA), to be held from March 31 to April 1. 
According to Nascimento, summit preparations have been 
proceeding apace during the past several months, including a 
foreign minister's meeting that took place on March 4 in 
Cairo.  Nascimento added that the ASPA is very nearly at a 
point that it functions as an institutionalized mechanism. 
Since the original summit in 2005, there have been five 
high-level meetings at the undersecretary level, bi-annual 
meetings at the foreign minister level, and multiple meetings 
involving ministers of agriculture, environment, and culture. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00000391  002 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Asked whether Brazil expected a reprise of the 2005, 
when various controversial statements critical of Israel and 
the United States would be part of the declaration of what 
was intended as a primarily economic and cultural event, 
Nascimento indicated that Brazil would try to keep polemical 
statements out but that there is already a baseline and that 
it would be hard to avoid repeating what everyone already 
agreed to once.  (Comment: Doha will almost certainly see a 
repeat of the controversial declaration that was approved 
during the 2005 summit, during which, despite assurances to 
the USG that the Summit declaration would avoid polemical 
topics, Brazil caved to Arab countries on all controversial 
issues. The declaration included language demanding that 
Israel withdraw to its 1967 frontiers, uproot all 
settlements, and comply with the ICC's 2004 decision on 
dismantling the security wall, and criticized the United 
States for imposing unilateral sanctions under the 'Syria 
Accountability Act'.  Virtually identical language was 
included in the declaration of the III Foreign Ministers 
meeting in Buenos Aires in February 2009, as well as the 
meetings of the high-level officials that took place in Doha 
in October 2008 and Santa Cruz, Bolivia in July 2007. On the 
positive side, the declarations also tend to include 
statements supporting debt forgiveness for Iraq and calling 
on all states in both regions to adhere to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.  See refs d and e for additional 
information on the first ASPA summit held in Brasilia in 
¶2005.  End comment.) 
 
¶4. (C) Nascimento noted that while these polemical statements 
are hard to keep out of the declaration, they should not take 
away from the principal focus of the summit, which is to 
increase commercial, educational, cultural, scientific, and 
agricultural cooperation among the countries.  Some 
initiatives in these areas that are already bearing fruit 
include: the creation of an Arab-South American Library in 
Algeria, which has already issued its first book (about the 
nineteenth century travel of Iman al-Baghdadi through 
Brazil), which will be  published in three languages in 
Brazil, Algeria and Venezuela; the creation of a South 
American Research Institute in Morocco; conferences on water 
issues such as irrigation, desertification, management of 
water resources in arid zones; and the establishment of 
Arab-South American Technology University in Venezuela.  In 
the commercial area, Nascimento noted that trade between 
Brazil and the Arab world has increased to USD 20 billion, a 
150 percent increase since the 2005 summit. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Brazil and the Peace Process: Securing a Place at the Table 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (C) Discussing Brazil's role during the recent Sharm 
al-Sheikh donors conference (ref a), Nascimento noted that 
Brazil's USD 10 million pledge-- which, together with a 
donation in the same amount made after the Paris donors 
conference, constitute the largest aid donations made by 
Brazil in its history-- was a deliberate statement on the 
part of Brazil to signal that it is serious about its 
involvement in the peace process and that it understands that 
to be a player it must bear some of the costs.  He further 
added that Amorim's flurry of activity during the recent 
crisis in Gaza was indicative of the level of involvement the 
world should now expect from Brazil.  (see refs d and e for 
Amorim's actions during the fighting in Gaza).  He further 
added that MRE now had an expectation that the dialogue on 
the Middle East that had developed throughout the past couple 
of years during meetings with high-level U.S. officials would 
continue and even be expanded (refs f-p). 
 
¶6. (C) Asked whether Brazil was worried about appearing to 
 
BRASILIA 00000391  003 OF 006 
 
 
take a one-sided view of the conflict in light of Amorim's 
statement during the Sharm al-Sheikh conference placing the 
burden of achieving peace almost squarely on Israel, as well 
as statements made by President Lula's foreign policy advisor 
Marco Aurelio Garcia comparing Israel's actions in Gaza to 
"state terrorism," Nascimento dodged the question by noting 
that Brazil's position has remained consistent.  The keys to 
achieving peace, according to Nascimento, include the 
participation of the relevant players in the peace process, 
to include HAMAS and Syria.  This would require a willingness 
on the part of the United States and Israel to soften the 
view that HAMAS first has to renounce its charter provisions 
as preconditions for talks.  According to Nascimento, the 
Brazilian government feels that HAMAS should have a place at 
the next peace conference, even if it may be necessary to 
invite them to participate as part of the Palestinian 
Authority delegation. 
 
¶7. (C) In addition, Nascimento noted, the proposed Moscow 
conference, as a follow-up to Annapolis, should occur at the 
earliest possible date.  In fact, Nascimento added, during 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's November visit to Brazil, 
Lavrov indicated that Russia expected to host a follow-on 
conference in Moscow.  Nascimento reiterated what has been 
widely reported in press reports and public statements to be 
Brazil's view: that the broadest set of interested parties 
should be invited, including countries within the region such 
as Iran, and others outside, like Brazil, since, as President 
Lula has indicated, the old formula that involved a small 
number of players from the developed word "has failed." 
 
¶8. (C) Asked if President Lula still planned to visit Israel 
and the Palestinian territories--a visit originally supposed 
to take place last year-- Nascimento indicated that the visit 
was still very much a priority.  Acknowledging the earlier 
question on the perception of Brazil's stance, Nascimento 
indicated that Brazil understood that President Lula needs to 
visit both Israel and the Palestinian territories, rather 
than one or the other, if Brazil was to maintain its 
"neutral" posture.  Nascimento added that Saudi Arabia was 
another likely stop on a Middle East trip. 
 
¶9. (C) Nascimento added that it was a good time to be a 
Middle East specialist at Itamaraty, as the region is gaining 
bureaucratic clout within the ministry.  In addition to two 
Middle East divisions, Itamaraty has two special envoy 
positions related to the Middle East: a four person office 
headed by Ambassador Affonso Celso Ouro Preto, and a second 
one headed by Ambassador Gilberto Moura to handle ASPA (Note: 
prior to being appointed Ambassador to North Korea, 
Ambassador Arnaldo Carrilho held the position of Special 
Advisor for ASPA. Ambassador Gilberto Moura has been named to 
that position, although he remains for the moment in charge 
of the Department of Regional Mechanisms.  End note.) 
Although Brazil now embassies in most Arab and Middle Eastern 
countries, plans are in the works to open a post in Oman, 
according to Nascimento. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Syria is Ready to Make Peace 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Poloff also asked Nascimento about the recent accord 
signed between Brazil and Syria in early February in which 
the two countries agreed to hold annual political talks, 
Nascimento noted that the two countries have an improving 
relationship, one that was based mostly on trade, but that, 
as with other countries with which Brazil holds annual 
political talks such as Iran, Lebanon, and Palestine, is 
increasingly focused on broader interests.  He added that 
although trade with Syria is still small, it has increased 
tremendously in recent years.  (Note: Since President Lula 
 
BRASILIA 00000391  004 OF 006 
 
 
took office in 2003, Brazilian exports to Syria have 
increased 420 percent, to USD 281 million in 2008 out of 
total trade volume of USD 313 million. End note) 
 
¶11. (C) He added that Brazil was very curious to see whether 
the new U.S. administration would make overtures with regards 
to Syria.  According to Nascimento, they have indications 
from multiple conversations with Syrian counterparts that 
Damascus would be very receptive to signals from Washington 
suggesting greater openness, and that in fact, it is MRE's 
belief that the Syrian track might stand a better chance of 
being completed before the Israeli-Palestine one.  Although 
he would not elaborate on that point, he indicated that 
Foreign Minister Amorim and others in MRE had held multiple 
conversations with Syrian counterparts and believe they have 
a good line into the Syrian leadership. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Arab Diplomats Express Mixed Feelings about Brazil Involvement 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12. (C) Despite MRE's sense that ASPA was an important 
reflection of Brazil's ability to act as a bridge between 
Latin American countries and other regions of the world and 
their evident pride in participating in Sharm al-Sheikh, 
Egyptian and Jordanian diplomats in Brazil have expressed 
skepticism about the depth of the common interest that bound 
the two regions and frustration with Brazil's simplistic 
vision of the region.  Minister Mahmoud Nayel, of Egyptian 
Embassy in Brasilia, told poloff that the Summit is a nice 
initiative, but mostly symbolic, a comment echoed by 
Counselor Suheil Haddad, from the Jordanian Embassy. 
 
¶13. (C) According to Nayel, ASPA represents an effort to bind 
the two regions in areas of trade, culture, and technical 
cooperation, but that it remains a very superficial as there 
are few natural affinities between the two regions, and the 
distances and lack of travel routes limit commercial 
opportunities.  Brazil, according to Nayel, is the most 
natural partner for the Arab countries because of its large 
Arab population, but even that is largely limited to Lebanon 
and Syria, from which the vast majority of Brazil's Arabs 
came.  By contrast, Nayel and Haddad noted, there may be, at 
most, 500 Egyptians in Brazil and perhaps 200 Jordanians. 
 
¶14. (C) What is apparent, Nayel noted, is that ASPA and 
Brazil's involvement in the peace process are transparent 
attempts on the part of Brazil to gain clout for its ambition 
to be on the UN Security Council.  "It is an obsession," 
noted Nayel, "and frankly, I don't know how to talk to them 
about it anymore, since it colors every one of our 
conversations." Nayel added that although Egypt welcomes 
Brazil, "a responsible and serious country", into the peace 
process, Nayel was at a loss explain what Brazil's 
contribution could amount to and suggested that the Brazilian 
position was very superficial.  Nayel criticized Brazil's 
claim that it has a role to play as a result of the example 
of communities of Jewish and Arab communities who co-exist in 
Brazil in peace, calling it a specious justification.  Nayel 
also noted that their Sharm al-Sheikh pledge was well 
received, but observed that it was "dismal" in proportion to 
the role to which they aspire, and wondered if Brazil had the 
stomach to make the hard choices they would have to make if 
they wanted a substantive role. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Arab Diplomats: Trade, But Not Much Else, Drives Relations 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶15. (C) Asked to react to a comment by Brazil's new 
Ambassador to Egypt, Cesario Melantonio Neto, who in November 
2008 commented that Brazil and Egypt were experiencing the 
 
BRASILIA 00000391  005 OF 006 
 
 
best moment of their relationship, Nayel noted that it was 
just simply "diplomatic talk", and that there is not much 
substance to the relationship beyond trade--an area where 
there had, admittedly, been a deliberate increase in activity 
since President Lula took office-- and a "few common issues 
related to the Non-Aligned Movement agenda".  (Note: In the 6 
years that President Lula has been in office, exports to 
Egypt have tripled from USD 462 million in 2003 to USD 1.4 
billion.  Egyptian imports have quadrupled, but Brazil still 
maintains an overwhelmingly favorable trade balance of USD 
1.2 billion.  By comparison, in the previous six years prior 
to Lula taking office, exports to Egypt had increased but at 
a much lower clip of about 70 percent from USD 224 million in 
1996 to USD 386 million in 2002. End note.) 
 
¶16. (C) Nayel also noted that talks on a Mercosul-Egypt free 
trade agreement had advanced in 2008, with Mercosul in 
October submitting a proposal for negotiations.  Nayel noted, 
however, that Egypt's business community did not seem 
enthusiastic about the agreement, putting in question how 
quickly the two sides could reach agreement. 
 
¶17. (C) Counselor Haddad from the Jordanian Embassy echoed 
Nayel's comments regarding the Brazil-Jordan relationship. 
Haddad noted that trade was the basis for the relationship 
and that Jordan wanted to improve its trade position in 
relation to Brazil, which had been quite aggressive in 
pushing for increased trade between the two countries over 
the last several years. (Note: Brazil's exports to Jordan 
have increased around 800 percent over the last six years, to 
USD 294 million in 2008.  Jordanian imports remain at a 
miniscule USD 24 million, or 13 percent of total trade volume 
between the two countries.  End note.) Negotiations on a 
Mercosul-Jordan free trade agreement have advanced and a 
framework agreement was signed in July 2008. 
 
¶18. (C) Haddad also observed that beyond trade, the bilateral 
relationship was not particularly close, but noted that King 
Abdullah's visit to Brasilia in October of last year and the 
signing of nine accords on tourism, science and technology, 
education, culture, agriculture, as well as law enforcement 
cooperation, should be a breakthrough in the relationship. 
This breakthrough, however will take time, considering MRE's 
problems in staffing up to a level that they can handle their 
ambitious global outreach--at least five years or more, 
according to Haddad. 
 
-------------- 
Comment: 
-------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Brazil continues to build on a vigorous Middle East 
diplomacy that started with President  Lula -- a policy that 
stands on the pillars of increasing trade, burnishing its 
global power credentials through its participation in the 
Middle east peace process, and gaining a permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council.  They have been very successful on 
the first pillar and have made inroads on the second. 
Although still a somewhat superficial mechanism, ASPA is 
supporting Itamaraty's and President Lula's aggressive 
outreach to the region,  helping improve bilateral relations 
with almost every country in the Middle East, while 
showcasing Brazil as a bridge between two different and 
distant regions, important elements in Brazil's long-term 
strategy to gain a UNSC seat. 
 
¶20. (C) Comment, continued: Although it remains vague, the 
Brazilian formula for achieving peace can be outlined: it 
consists of having the broadest possible number of actors 
involved at the peace table, both state and non-state within 
and outside the region, putting pressure on Israel to uproot 
settlements and restrain itself from conducting 
 
BRASILIA 00000391  006 OF 006 
 
 
disproportionate retaliatory attacks, easing of what they see 
as hard-line positions with regards to talking to HAMAS, and 
finally, reduction of the U.S.'s preeminent role broker of 
peace as a result of our failure to be a balanced actor.  To 
the extent it has defined a role within this process, it 
consists of improving relationships with countries in the 
region, which they believe allows them act as a good faith 
mediator between all parties.  But without more meat to its 
policies, even those in the Arab world who welcome Brazil's 
place at the table see their efforts as ham-handed 
positioning for global leadership and seem to be growing 
impatient with Brazil's anodyne generalities. 
 
¶21. (C) Comment, continued: In light of Brazil's actions 
during Gaza, its role as driver of the ASPA process, its 
calls for a follow-up conference to Annapolis and its 
frequent criticism of the U.S. actions in the region, Post 
continues to believe that (per ref q) a visit to Brasilia by 
a high-level briefer or briefers from NEA or other agencies, 
preferably at the DAS-level or higher, for detailed 
discussions with Brazilian government officials would be of 
value.  Although we are unlikely to persuade the GOB to take 
an approach fully in step with ours, it is critical to engage 
the GOB both to ensure it has a complete understanding of 
U.S. policy and concerns in the region, and to demonstrate 
that we take Brazil's leadership aspirations seriously. It is 
our hope that doing so will encourage Brazil to consult with 
the United States more frequently and will serve to minimize 
the least helpful aspects of current Brazilian policy toward 
the Middle East. 
 
 
 
 
SOBEL