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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3881
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/ AND WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019 
TAGS: BR PINR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: (U)  2009 SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS (C-AL9-00153) 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 20677 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 273 
     ¶C. 08 BRASILIA 1636 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason 1.5(d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Ref B reports on Summit of the Americas (SOA) 
Coordinator Ambassador Hector Morales meetings with Brazilian 
officials, notably the increased Brazilian focus on the SOA. 
According to Brazilian Ministry for External Relations (MRE) 
Undersecretary Vera Machado, Brazil views the SOA as 
complementary to the Bahia Summit of Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) heads of state and government (Ref C) and an 
important means of communication for all Western Hemisphere 
governments.  Brazil, like most other Summit participants, 
has high expectations for the Obama Presidency and looks to 
the President for a positive signal as to the importance of 
the Western Hemisphere in U.S. policy considerations. 
Speaking at a Wall Street Journal-sponsored seminar in New 
York March 17, President Lula said the Summit would be "an 
ideal scenario (for the U.S.) to reestablish a policy of 
democratic and peaceful coexistence with the region."  For 
the Summit, Brazil will focus on the economic crisis, food 
security and energy, looking to avoid linkages between the 
latter two of these issues.  Although the GOB may agree to or 
actively devote resources to major new initiatives under the 
Summit process, it will seek to create a positive tone for 
the SOA, mediate differences among the participants, and use 
the SOA to launch a productive dialogue between the United 
States and LAC.  Answers to questions raised in ref a, are 
contained in paragraph 2 below. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) 
 
A1) Brazilian Presidential Advisor Marcel Biato told 
Ambassador Morales that Brazil hoped the U.S. would not enter 
the SOA with a series of new initiatives to push on Latin 
American governments and that the U.S. would do better to 
listen to the concerns of its neighbors.  In general, Brazil 
downplays substantive results from presidential summits.  The 
December Bahia Summit, for example, was more notable as a 
demonstration of Brazil's ability to convene its neighbors 
than for any result (ref C).  The Brazilian Government 
considers it important to agree on a Summit Declaration but 
may be less concerned about its specific content as long as 
consensus is achieved.  Human prosperity, social inclusion, 
job creation, and addressing the global economic crisis have 
emerged as the broad themes for which Brazil's priorities 
more closely match those of the United States.  Should the 
United States choose to pursue a regional energy initiative, 
Brazil will likely be much more supportive of a proposal 
which offers each country the choice of opting in or out of 
each element of the program.  There is significant opposition 
in Brazil to the idea of a "one size fits all" agreement on 
energy, or in general. 
 
2) It is highly unlikely that Brazil will use the SOA 
criticize the U.S. publicly, although the view that U.S. 
policies are to blame for other nations' economic 
difficulties is a common one in Brazil.  President Lula wants 
a good relationship with President Obama and will seek to 
avoid controversy and encourage Brazil's neighbors to do 
likewise.  There is potential for disagreement on Cuba as the 
Brazilians have become increasingly officious in their advice 
to us that a good relationship with the region depends on our 
unilateral concessions to an aggrieved Cuba.  President Lula 
has promised Raul Castro that he will do what he can to 
facilitate a better relationship with the U.S., and he will 
need to be able to demonstrate credibly that he has acted on 
this promise.  Brazil will prefer that the Cuba discussion 
avoid center stage and take place in private, but in this 
context will join, and may even lead, the bandwagon of 
governments trying to change U.S. Cuba policy. 
 
3) As noted in ref c, Brazil was the force behind the Bahia 
Summit and is looking for avenues to assert its leadership in 
the region, and especially in South America.  Brazil posited 
the Bahia Summit as the "first ever" meeting only of Latin 
American and Caribbean heads of state and government without 
"external" powers.  Indeed, the Bahia Summit appears to have 
successfully shifted the dynamic of the SOA from that of a 
"regional" meeting to an "inter-regional"  U.S.-Latin America 
meeting, along the lines of the Ibero-American Summit, the 
EU-Latin America Summit, and the Arab States-South America 
Summit.  For Lula, the SOA will provide an opportunity to 
carry the region's messages to President Obama and 
demonstrate leadership.  The Brazilian MRE and Presidency 
have assured us that Brazil believes that the new regional 
summit fora should be complementary to the OAS and SOA, and 
Brazil is unlikely to act in such a way as to undercut the 
SOA. 
 
BRASILIA 00000364  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
4) As noted above, Brazil is interested in a harmonious 
Summit and would prefer to avoid controversy.  It is likely 
that President Lula will attempt to moderate Chavez without 
coming out into blatant opposition to the Venezuelan 
President.  It is possible that, as a way of doing this, he 
will take a tougher rhetorical stance on some issues than he 
might in a bilateral setting. 
 
5) We have no evidence that Brazil would favor any measure 
that would jeopardize the Inter-American Human Rights System. 
 
B1) While we do not expect Brazil to agree with the U.S. on 
all issues, we believe the Brazil government will take a 
constructive approach to the Summit and seek consensus on a 
Summit Declaration.  Even where it agrees to broad language 
in the declaration in support of SOA themes, Brazil may 
resist concrete initiatives on topics that it perceives as 
potentially divisive in the region, such as democratic 
governance, energy, trade, and public security.  Brazil is 
unlikely to press issues that it knows will put the United 
States on the defensive, and is likely to try to mediate any 
such disputes that arise.  Brazilian Summit Coordinator 
Duarte has told us that Brazil has "high expectations for the 
Summit"  and would like to maintain "positive momentum" in 
U.S. relations with the region. 
SOBEL