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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0298

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000362 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019 
TAGS: BR PREL PGOV ETRD
SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA -- SELECTIVE 
PRIORITIES 
 
REF: A. 08 BRASILIA 64 
     ¶B. 08 BRASILIA 1435 
 
Classified By: DCM Lisa Kubiske.  Reason 1.5(d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  Reftel reported on Brazil's interest in 
Africa both as a matter of ethnic and cultural ties and of 
the policy of the Lula government to seek more global 
influence by cultivating other developing countries, the so 
called south-south policy.  One year later, Africa retains 
its status as a priority area for Brazilian engagement, but 
Brazilian relations with the continent continue to be 
characterized more by political rhetoric than by projects on 
the ground.  Although Brazil's involvement with Portuguese 
speaking countries has increased, resources for assistance 
remain severely limited.  Brazil continues to court African 
support for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seat and 
has focused on possibilities for providing training to 
African militaries with the aim of engendering peacekeeping 
capabilities.  The recent crisis in Guinea Bissau provides a 
good example of the strengths and limitations of Brazil's 
approach to Africa as Brazil's concern over the killing of 
the President has not led to any concrete action but an 
acceptance of the situation with hopes that things will turn 
out for the best.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C)  When Minister for External Relations (MRE) Amorim 
delivers his standard speech on Brazil's foreign policy 
priorities, Africa ranks behind only Brazil's neighbors as an 
area of interest.  President Lula has made nine trips to 
Africa and has supported the opening of seventeen new 
diplomatic posts on the continent.  Reftel provides details 
on the basis for Brazil's interest in Africa, an interest 
that continues as Brazil views Africa as an area in which it 
can gain global influence at a relatively low cost.  During 
the first week in March, Brazilian Ambassadors to African 
countries were summoned to Brasilia for a conference 
including three hours with President Lula.  The MRE cites 
this conference as evidence of Africa's continued importance, 
but in briefing on it noted that there has been no new 
foreign assistance designated in this year's budget. 
Similarly, the MRE Division for the UN named Africa as an 
area in which Brazil wanted more UN engagement, especially on 
peace building, but Brazil has not been able to contribute 
more than a handful of personnel to UN efforts.  Brazil's 
foreign assistance agency (Agencia Brasileira de Cooperacao - 
ABC) devotes approximately half of its worldwide budget of 
twenty two million dollars to Africa.  The largest share of 
this money goes to Cape Verde for public health and 
agriculture development.  Guinea Bissau and other Portuguese 
speaking countries get the lion's share of the rest, leaving 
almost no resources for most of Africa.  President Lula has, 
however, assured Brazilian embassies in Africa that they 
alone will be spared in upcoming budget cuts facing MRE posts 
abroad. 
 
¶3.  (C)  One reason for Brazil's interest in Africa is the 
Brazilian quest for a permanent seat on the UNSC, described 
by Minister Amorim as Brazil's highest foreign policy 
priority.  According to MRE UN Director Gilda Neves, Brazil 
will support the African Group's call for African Security 
Council seats to gain the backing of African members states 
for Brazil's aspirations.  Brazil is also counting on its 
widespread diplomatic presence in Africa to maintain support 
among African countries and will make the argument that as a 
permanent member Brazil will be a champion for all developing 
states, particularly Africa. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Security cooperation with Africa is among the more 
promising avenues for Brazilian involvement.  Although Brazil 
lacks formal security assistance programs, it has been able 
to offer what MRE Africa Director Luciano Macieira terms 
"capacity building" through the training of African officers 
at Brazilian military schools.  Currently, there are around 
forty Africans studying in Brazil.  Recently, Brazil has 
discussed embedding a Mozambique contingent in its 
peacekeeping forces in Haiti in order to enhance Mozambique's 
capacity to take on peacekeeping missions in Africa.  This 
concept is being developed in consultation with the UK 
government, and, according to the UK embassy in Brasilia 
 
BRASILIA 00000362  002 OF 002 
 
 
could lead to greater Brazilian involvement in peacekeeping 
in Africa.  The Brazilian MRE and military, however, have 
made it clear that they are not currently interested in 
deployments to Africa but in working with African militaries 
to handle peacekeeping duties on their own.  The concept will 
be further discussed during Defense Minister Jobim's visit to 
Maputo in late March. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Brazil also provides a limited amount of training to 
Portuguese speaking police in counter-narcotics.  In 2008, 
this consisted of the training of approximately sixty police, 
including forty agents of the Guinea Bissau police by the 
Brazilian federal police.  The Federal Police would like to 
make Africa a high priority and have told Embassy DEA reps 
that the majority of Brazil's drug exports go via Africa. 
Again, resources limit what Brazil can do about drug 
trafficking via Africa as does the Brazilian leadership's 
tendency to present Africa in a favorable light.  When poloff 
asked Africa Director Macieira about Brazilian policy 
concerning the transit of drugs to Africa, he quickly changed 
the subject to Brazilian training of African military 
officers.  The Federal Police proposed stationing three 
police attaches in Brazilian Embassies on Africa to improve 
counter narcotics cooperation, but this initiative was 
blocked by the MRE. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The recent killings of the President and Head of the 
Armed Forces of Guinea Bissau provide the best example of 
Brazil's approach to Africa and its limitations.  Initially, 
Brazil joined with Portugal and neighboring countries to call 
for calm in the wake of the killings of the President and 
Army Chief and to convene a meeting of Portuguese speaking 
countries in Lisbon to offer assistance.  As of March 10, the 
MRE had backed away from this idea, saying that the situation 
had quieted down.  Because President Vieira and General Waia 
were political rivals, the MRE believes their deaths may ease 
tensions in Guinea Bissau and allow economic development to 
proceed.  Macieira, however, contradicted this idea by saying 
that he believed drug traffickers had a hand in the killings 
(based on the sophisticated explosives used) and that Guinea 
Bissau was increasingly falling under the influence of 
criminals.  Although the MRE acknowledges that Guinea Bissau 
faces serious political and economic challenges, Brazil lacks 
the resources to provide additional assistance, which may 
explain why Brazil is officially portraying the situation 
there in a relatively positive light. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT.  It would be overly cynical to believe that 
Brazil is only interested in Africa as a means of bolstering 
its world power credentials.  Certainly, engagement with 
Africa serves this purpose and allows a great bang for the 
Real under a severely limited foreign assistance budget than 
elsewhere.  As noted in ref b, Brazil continues to place high 
importance on the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBAS) 
relationship and will make continuing this dialogue a 
priority.  It is true, however, that Brazilian leaders, 
especially President Lula believe that Brazil's examples of 
poverty alleviation and sustainable development can apply to 
Africa.  It is in this realm that potential for cooperation 
with the U.S. exists, particularly in such areas as improving 
public health, sustainable agriculture and expanding 
possibilities for ethanol production.  The potential training 
and deployment of Mozambique peacekeepers may provide an 
avenue for cooperation and is an initiative the U.S. should 
seek to encourage within available resources. 
SOBEL