R 121146Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3537
INFO WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
FRG COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
USMISSION USNATO 
USMISSION USOSCE 
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J5 DIRECTORATE (MC)//
CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

UNCLAS BERLIN 000286 
 
 
STATE FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/PAPD, EUR/PPA, EUR/CE, INR/EUC, INR/P, 
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/DSAA, DIA FOR DC-4A 
 
VIENNA FOR CSBM, CSCE, PAA 
 
"PERISHABLE INFORMATION -- DO NOT SERVICE" 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO GM AF US FR IR XF XH SU CU SY
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: AFGHANISTAN, NATO, MIDEAST, IRAN, SYRIA, 
ECONOMY, ICC 
 
¶1.   Lead Stories Summary 
¶2.   New Strategy on Afghanistan 
¶3.   France's Return to NATO Command Structure 
¶4.   Mideast and Iran Policy 
¶5.   Financial Crisis 
¶6.   Relaxation of U.S.-Cuban Relations 
¶7.   ICC Arrest Warrant for Bashir 
¶8.   Eastern European Economic Problems 
 
 
¶1.   Lead Stories Summary 
 
Almost all media opened with lengthy stories on the teenager who 
killed 15 people in southern Germany.  Handelsblatt led with a story 
on the rift between the U.S. and Europe prior to the G20 summit, and 
FT Deutschland led with a story on auto-parts manufacturer 
Continental's plans to close two plants.  Editorials focused on the 
school rampage and France's return to NATO's military command. 
 
¶2.   New Strategy on Afghanistan 
 
The weekly Die Zeit remarked in its lead story under the headline 
"Obama and the Rogue Guys" that:  "The President suddenly wants to 
talk to fundamentalists and dictators.  But history shows sometimes 
that this neither turns the baddies into good guys nor the Americans 
into peace angels....  However, after eight years of Bush, Obama can 
contribute something real.  He wants to listen and exploit the power 
of his country with others, not against them.  This is good for 
America and good for the rest of the world." 
 
¶3.   France's Return to NATO Command Structure 
 
Sueddeutsche commented: "Militarily, hardly anything will change 
when the French now rejoin NATO's command structure.  Sarkozy's turn 
towards NATO must rather be seen as a signal.  He no longer wants to 
be on the sidelines in an alliance with 26 members....  However, for 
Sarkozy this is not just about defining France's leading role.  The 
egomaniac in the Elysee also wants to improve his role.  He believes 
he is playing on the level of President Obama." 
 
Die Welt editorialized:  "With this change, the pro-American Sarkozy 
ended a long debate: the dispute between the Atlanticists, who 
wanted to cooperated closer with the United States, and the 
Europeanists, who called for a European defense identity as a 
counterweight to the United States.  As of yesterday, France is 
clearly situated on the Atlantic." 
 
Handelsblatt remarked: "President Sarkozy's policy is consistent. 
Given that French soldiers die in NATO missions in Afghanistan, it 
does not make sense for the country to stay out of the NATO command. 
 The policy of the 'empty chair' had become purely symbolic in 
recent years and France can well do without it.  France's special 
role meant no political advantage....  Sarkozy sold his NATO 
rapprochement somehow optimistically, saying that it was possible 
only because there now is a European defense policy.   But there is 
not much of a European defense policy to speak of....  If France 
with its European partners wants more influence in NATO, the 
Europeans must take action.  Otherwise the U.S. will not take this 
interest seriously.  Apart from the British and maybe the French, 
Europeans do not provide sufficient equipment for its forces.  The 
next test will be to stop Afghanistan from plunging into chaos; the 
U.S. calls on the Europeans to do more, but they are not very 
enthusiastic about it.  France's return to NATO is right, but it 
will not resolve the problems of Europe's defense policy." 
 
Die Zeit noted: "This is not a repentant concession.  The 
continental nuclear power, which spends more on its military forces 
than many other Europeans, sees itself as the builder of a European 
defense....  France maintains the claim to play a special role.... 
Sarkozy can now say:  We are back!  And he will be celebrated for it 
during the NATO summit in April." 
 
¶4.   Mideast and Iran Policy 
 
Die Zeit wrote: "Hillary Clinton just returned from her exploratory 
trip.  She struck all the right notes: a Palestinian state and 
support for President Abbas.  In Washington, however, those who 
served under Bush refer to the ugly rubble, noting that the 
two-state solution is not an option under the current conditions.... 
 So why does Clinton act is if it is possible? Because the world 
demands American actions....  Concerning Iran, an extended American 
hand is reaching out, but Ayatollah Khamenei already claims that 
Obama is on Bush's wrong path and President Ahmadinejad said America 
must first change its satanic nature.  This is of course 
revolutionary rhetoric but it also conceals real interests:  Iran 
wants the bomb and a leading role in the Mideast; America wants to 
stop the bomb and remain a hegemonic power.  Can such an enemy be 
killed with kindness?  Let's not forget that a regime like Iran that 
can no longer buy off its people with economic prosperity needs an 
external enemy.... Concerning Syria, talks with Damascus are meant 
to separate the country from Iran's embrace.  But with what?  With 
the Golan Heights?  Syrian could have had them 20 or 30 years ago, 
but only in return for a comprehensive peace. Maybe peace is not 
good for the Alaouite dictatorship, which is based on a very small 
minority." 
 
Frankfurter Rundschau commented:   "The right-wing populist 
Lieberman will probably become Netanyahu's foreign minister.  At 
best, he will only damage Israel's reputation....  Given this 
choice, Washington, Brussels and also Cairo will rub their eyes. 
Much can be said about Netanyahu, but you cannot claim that he does 
not know that an image is important in politics.  Lieberman is the 
completely wrong guy for the job.  He has no diplomatic talent.  In 
Egypt, he is a persona non grata because of his verbal muscle 
flexing." 
 
¶5.   Financial Crisis 
 
Handelsblatt carried an interview with European Commission President 
Barroso under the headline: "EU Falls out with the U.S. over 
Financial Crisis," and wrote:  "The majority of EU states and the 
European Commission are opposed to Washington's demands to increase 
their economic stimulus programs.  In an interview with the paper, 
European Commission President Barroso said:  "We have adopted an 
ambitious - and in the EU's history, unique - economic stimulus 
program.  We must now allow it to take effect.  Then we will also 
see positive results."  He added:  "We are not competing" with the 
U.S. about the best economic stimulus program.  Unlike the EU, the 
United States must invest in its social security system and in its 
infrastructure.  "Our infrastructure is further developed," he 
said. 
 
Spain's Finance Minister Pedro Solbes explicitly warned the EU in an 
interview with Handelsblatt against following the U.S.   Under the 
headline: "It is Still Too Early for a euro Bond," he noted that the 
past demonstrated in Europe that it was always more difficult to 
reduce spending once this spending had increased.  "That is why 
Europe should act more carefully than the U.S.," Solbes argued. 
 
In an editorial, Handelsblatt judged:  "The dreams about 
transatlantic harmony under President Obama can disappear very 
quickly when it comes to overcoming the global financial crisis. 
This issue is now turning into a splitting point between the U.S. 
and the majority of EU states.  The reason for the disgruntlement is 
a totally different philosophy when it comes to dealing with crises. 
 Thanks to the EU, the positions have at least narrowed down over 
the years, but as far as transatlantic relations are concerned, 
there is only NATO as a firm institution, but it is no longer enough 
to act as a link.  The U.S. and the EU have many more questions to 
discuss.  What we are missing is a permanent institution that 
guarantees a constant dialogue and thus creates the precondition for 
mutual understanding.  Obama must understand that the United States 
can no longer buy on credit.  On a global scale, there are great 
reservations about trusting especially the U.S. recipes.  The 
Europeans, in turn, have no reason to be arrogant.  From the 
viewpoint of other countries, they are among those who only take the 
pick of the bunch, while their willingness to support others with 
their strong finance and economic policy is underdeveloped." 
 
Weekly Die Zeit opined: "Barack Obama hadn't been in office even the 
first 100 days when he was confronted with the first transatlantic 
economic conflict.  Without the enormous indebtedness in the United 
States, this crisis would never have happened.  But it would be 
fatal if the Americans now of all times kept their money in their 
pockets, for global demand would then collapse.  First of all, the 
fire must now be extinguished before a new sprinkler system can be 
built.  That is why the fight against the global recession must be 
at the top of the agenda [of the G-20].  The G-20 will spend only 
one percent of its economic output for economic stimulus programs. 
This is too little because the economies in the EU and the U.S. 
could easily shrink by four percent.  Germany, especially, has some 
latitude.  But all additional measures cost money, and this is by 
far not as popular as the control of banks or the fight against tax 
oases, but it is at least as important.   In the 1930s, national 
egotisms prevented a common answer to the global economic crisis. 
The G-20 should not repeat these mistakes today." 
 
¶6.   Relaxation of U.S.-Cuban Relations 
 
Frankfurter Allgemeine wrote under the headline:  Washington Relaxes 
Sanctions on Cuba," that "Wednesday night, the Congress in 
Washington made the first steps for a relaxation of the sanctions on 
Havana."   Tagesspiegel and Die Welt noted:  "The United States has 
relaxed its trade and travel restrictions towards Cuba.  With this 
move, President Obama is reversing the policy of his predecessor 
George W. Bush." 
 
In an editorial, Frankfurter Allgemeine said:  "President Obama's 
approval for the lifting of travel restrictions for exiled Cubans 
and the lifting of trade sanctions is only a formality.  These 
decisions are offering Obama another opportunity to make visible at 
home and abroad a new style in U.S. foreign policy without 
questioning the continuity of foreign policy.  The pressure for 
reforms must come from within Cuba, and it will grow all the faster, 
the more humanitarian signals emanate from Washington." 
 
According to Berliner Zeitung, "following Obama's new policy towards 
Iran and Syria and his offer for talks to the 'moderate Taliban,' we 
now see a gesture towards the arch enemy at his front door.  Can we 
demand more from him after 50 days in office?  Yes, we can, for 
Obama could have done without his promise that the blockade towards 
Cuba remains intact.  This blockade includes not only embargo rules 
towards Cuba and third countries such as Germany but also many 
restrictions for U.S. citizens who are not of Cuban origin and who 
want to visit the island.  Not only must a few rules, but the entire 
embargo be abolished." 
 
Die Tageszeitung opined:  "The Obama administration is now keeping 
to its election campaign promises step by step.  It is true that the 
United States now wants to relax its trade and travel restrictions 
towards Cuba, but beyond a welcome symbolic act, this measure will 
hardly have any consequences.  It would have been unrealistic to 
expect a lifting of the embargo, for in the cold war between 
Washington and Havana the main issue is great emotions and a lot of 
money in the form of compensation for nationalized goods and 
property. That is why this initiative is only the beginning of a 
lengthy process which will get greater impetus in a few years when 
the Obama generation will have the say among the exiled Cubans. 
Those people are curious with regard to their home country and do 
not demonize it." 
 
 
¶7.   ICC Arrest Warrant for Bashir 
 
Weekly Die Zeit argued:  "A nice coalition has now joined forces [to 
criticize the ICC's arrest warrant]:  Arab potentates who are angry 
because one of them is now to be put in the dock: a veto power in 
the UN Security Council [China] that has highly armed the Sudanese 
regime for years, and western commentators [Wall street Journal, and 
Paris dailies] who are now degrading the ICC now when push comes to 
shove.  But the ICC's arrest warrant also met with a positive 
response, among others, from the Obama administration.  But neither 
Washington nor Brussels, Paris, London, or Berlin have thus far 
shown the courage to confront the elite in Sudan with the choice to 
either allow the NGOs to return to the crisis region, to seriously 
try to create peace and to oust your president; or to threaten a 
no-fly zone over Darfur, impose stricter economic sanctions, issue 
further ICC warrants and a launch a 'name-and-shame' campaign 
against every supporter of the regime.  In view of all the frenetic 
activities in the course of the global financial and economic 
crisis, we like to ignore the fact that the greatest progress in 
global crisis management has happened in the area of international 
justice.  With this arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir, the ICC 
has now put a fateful question to the international community:  Are 
you serious in the fight against the people who get off scot-free or 
was it not meant this way?" 
 
¶8.    Eastern European Economic Problems 
 
Berliner Zeitung opined:  "Economic prospects are bad everywhere, 
but they are even worse in eastern Europe.  For the countries of the 
region, this crisis is more than an enormous economic problem.  It 
is a test for the stability of the political system in young 
democracies.  This can be clearly seen in Latvia and Bulgaria but to 
a smaller extent also in Lithuania and Hungary.  But irrespective of 
this fact, the established parties in these countries consider it 
more important to continue their trench warfare despite the national 
emergency situation.  At issue is not so much a national rescue 
effort but who maintains power.  At the same time, populist and 
extreme rightist are gaining power.  A victory of such forces in the 
Latvian or Bulgarian elections, a possible ouster of the governments 
in Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania, or their victory in the upcoming 
European Parliament elections would be a nightmare that could become 
reality." 
 
According to Die Tageszeitung," The finance ministers of the euro 
countries do not want an early introduction of the Euro in the 
eastern European countries.  This allows only one conclusion:  The 
issue is getting more urgent, because, otherwise, the ministers 
would not have dealt with the matter.  And the financial crisis has 
demonstrated how quickly a 'no' can change to a 'yes.'  Eastern 
Europe has turned into a 'systemic' risk, just like quite a few 
banks.  The only question is:  What will be cheaper, the accession 
of the Eastern European countries to the euro or massive credit 
programs of the European Development banks." 
 
 
KOENIG