VZCZCXRO6970
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #0247/01 0611559
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021559Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4337
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3530
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3733
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO/PDAS WARLICK 
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY 
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER 
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BODY THAT DECIDES ELECTORAL DISPUTES OFF 
TO A ROCKY START 
 
REF: A. 08 BEIRUT 01520 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 00222 
 
SUMMARY AND 
BACKGROUND 
----------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) After a contentious battle in parliament to nominate 
five members to the ten-member Constitutional Court, cabinet 
ministers -- expecting a similar battle -- have thus far 
avoided discussions to name the Court's remaining five 
members.  As the June 7 election draws closer, the absence of 
a Constitutional Court, whose mandate includes settling 
election disputes, raises questions as to how the GOL will 
resolve disputes from the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
Political manipulation of the appointments of members to the 
court likely will make the final body less independent than 
was envisioned when it was created. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Constitution Court is a vital part of upcoming 
2009 parliamentary elections, as it provides the only legal 
recourse to question electoral results (ref A).  Neck-in-neck 
in the polls three months before election day, March 14 and 
the March 8/Aoun opposition both expect victory on election 
day.  Such a close race, with several districts too difficult 
to predict, sets up a scenario in which both sides could 
question official results, making the existence of the 
Constitutional Court handle post-election claim even more 
important.  End summary. 
 
MARCH 8 BRISTLES OVER 
PARLIAMENT APPOINTEES 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite efforts to avoid politicizing the 
Constitutional Court -- the mandate of which includes 
settling disputes arising from parliamentary elections -- the 
contentious process in December 2008 to decide the first five 
members set the court on unsteady footing.  MP Bahije 
Tabarah, a prominent constitutional expert, noted that before 
the official parliamentary session to name five of the court 
members, a smaller bureau in parliament met with both March 
14 and opposition representatives and agreed on five names. 
(Note:  Parliament and cabinet each select five members for 
the Constitutional Court.  End note.)  Tabarah, who was out 
of the country for the vote, told PolEconoff that he had left 
the country thinking the appointments were a "done deal." 
 
¶4. (SBU) During the parliament session, however, March 14 -- 
instigated by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt -- reneged on the 
previous agreement and insisted on the selection of Antoine 
Kheir, instead of former head of the Beirut Bar Association 
Raymond Eid, as the Maronite representative to the court. 
Jumblatt supported Kheir because of the latter's dedication 
to the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
The opposition, infuriated by the coalition's reversal, held 
back votes on all three Christian candidates, Antoine Kheir 
(Maronite), Antoine Messarra (Catholic), and Zaghloul Attieh 
(Greek Orthodox).  However, each were elected with around 60 
votes, due to March 14's majority in Parliament.  The Muslim 
candidates, Tareq Ziade (Sunni) and Ahmed Taqieddine (Shia) 
-- part of the previously-negotiated arrangement -- each 
earned more than 100 votes from both March 14 and opposition 
MPs. 
 
EXPECTING CONCESSION 
IN CABINET 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Because of the dispute in parliament voting, the 
opposition gained only one of "their" representatives on the 
court -- Ahmed Taqieddine -- while March 14 got four of the 
candidates it favored.  Feeling wronged, the opposition is 
demanding concessions in cabinet discussions to name the 
remaining five members to the Court.  In fact, the 
opposition's "blocking third" minority in cabinet probably 
will enable it to insist on a compromise arrangement, or at 
least force an extended delay. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000247  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Tabarah, allied with the March 14 majority, 
assessed that the opposition is calculating how to block the 
Court's vote, in a set-up akin to the opposition's "blocking 
third" in cabinet.  The support of seven of the ten court 
members is required to change an election result, so March 8 
would need four judges to block a decision by the court. 
This configuration would make the Court, without support from 
both sides, unable to pass decisions on disputes arising from 
elections. 
 
 
EXISTING DISPUTES 
ANOTHER ROADBLOCK 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Current tensions between March 14 Prime Minister 
Fouad Siniora and March 8 Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri 
over funding for Berri's Council for the South likely will 
sour the atmosphere further for compromise on the remaining 
Court appointees.  Chairman of the Administration and Justice 
committee MP Robert Ghanem told PolEconOff that even if 
President Sleiman stepped in to solve the dispute between 
Berri and Siniora, resentment from the situation would 
remain.  Ghanem expected a turbulent road to compromise on 
cabinet's naming of the remaining five Constitutional Court 
members. 
 
COMMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) With the June 7 election three months away, many 
observers are alarmed by the absence of a functional 
Constitutional Court.  Both sides, expecting painful 
negotiations, appear willing to avoid the task for the time 
being.  The cabinet has not even put naming the remaining 
members to the court on the agenda for its weekly meeting for 
some weeks.  However, delays in forming this vital electoral 
body could lead to two scenarios: failure to elect the 
minimum seven members to the court, or the establishment of a 
politically-charged ten person body with an opposition 
blocking minority. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Either scenario above -- naming of a court a 
blocking minority for the opposition or failure to name a 
court -- opens many negative possibilities in the aftermath 
of elections.  Without a court to rule on election disputes, 
candidates most likely would continue to maintain their 
claims of victory, as is the case with Michel Aoun's 11 
outstanding claims regarding 2005 election results. 
¶10. (SBU) Competing claims of victory in different districts 
would put March 14 and the opposition at loggerheads before 
the formation of a new cabinet, and would likely weigh on 
each side's stance regarding the selection of cabinet 
ministers.  Additionally, without the option of any official 
recourse or oversight, disputing parties could feel inclined 
to settle complaints outside the system.  Bottle-necking the 
political system, or resorting to violence, could become more 
feasible ways of expressing dissatisfaction with electoral 
results. 
GRANT