VZCZCXRO3734
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0601/01 0680924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH CONS POL
P 090924Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2760
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 9224
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2421
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4745
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2125
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 0015
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 0031
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0229
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 0118
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0695
ECON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 000601 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/P; CA/VO/L/C; EAP/CM; EEB/CBA; EEB/ESC; ISN/CB; L; M; 
OES 
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD 
CIA FOR DCI FROM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: CMGT CVIS OEXC ECON EAIR CH
SUBJECT: SAO DELAYS LOSE SALES AND COST AMERICAN JOBS FOR U.S. 
AVIATION COMPANIES 
 
REF: (A) BEIJING 435, 
(B) BEIJING 174, 08 BEIJING 3055, 08 SHANGHAI 133 
(C) BEIJING 130 
(D) 08 BEIJING 3116 
(E) STATE 7490 
(F) STATE 20889 
 
BEIJING 00000601  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
 
This cable is Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) and for official use 
only.  Not for transmission outside USG channels.  Not for internet 
distribution. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. U.S. aviation companies point to current SAO 
processing times of 16 weeks or longer as an unreasonable threat to 
U.S. exports, U.S. jobs, and the chances of recovery for their 
communities in the U.S.  The industry has grown remarkably over the 
past 5 years in China, and has successfully organized to engage 
local customers, officials and business partners.  But it cannot 
anticipate visa application requests four months in advance, even 
with its longest sales cycles.  SAO delays, caused by insufficient 
staffing at at least one clearing agency, prevent U.S. firms from 
reselling cancelled aircraft orders to eager Chinese buyers, and 
limit their ability to mitigate the impacts of the global economic 
crisis on their business, and create opportunities for foreign 
aviation competitors, including especially Airbus.  At the current 
16 weeks of longer, SAO delays will also hinder cooperation with 
Chinese suppliers, and could lead to global delays of key aircraft. 
As SAO delays and the global economic crisis grew in 2008, U.S. 
aviation exports to China fell by USD 2 billion.  The current state 
of affairs has led this flagship U.S. industry to seriously question 
the responsiveness of their own government to American business 
needs.  While the business community will welcome the change in SAO 
Mantis validities for Chinese nationals announced on March 5 (reftel 
F), they will continue to face inordinate processing delays until 
additional personnel are added by at least one clearing agency to 
resolve the backlog.  END SUMMARY. 
 
AVIATION EXPORTS GROW RAPIDLY; U.S. COMPANIES ENGAGED 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) In 2008, U.S. aviation exports to China totaled USD 5.1 
billion, down from their 2007 peak of USD 7.1 billion in 2007, but 
more than double the value in 2004.  (NOTE:  Aviation exports 
defined as U.S. domestic exports of HTS code 88 - aircraft, 
spacecraft, and parts thereof.)  In spite of the decline in 2009, 
since 2004 aviation exports grew at a compound annual growth rate of 
27 percent, exceeding the 20 percent growth rate of overall exports 
to China.  Moreover, the U.S. runs a large trade surplus with China 
in aviation, reaching USD 4.9 billion in 2008 after peaking at USD 
7.0 billion the previous year.  While market access issues remain, 
aviation has clearly been a sector where the Chinese recognize the 
U.S. comparative and technical advantage and value U.S. products 
highly. 
 
U.S. AVIATION TRADE WITH CHINA 
------------------------------ 
Units: USD mil.  2004    2005    2006    2007    2008 
                ------  ------  ------  ------  ------ 
U.S. EXPORTS     1,948   4,339   6,047   7,160   5,079 
U.S. IMPORTS        80      85     134     192     192 
U.S. SURPLUS     1,868   4,254   5,913   6,968   4,887 
SOURCE: USITC. Domestic exports at FAS value, imports for 
consumption at customs value.  Statistic for harmonized tariff code 
88: aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof. 
 
JOBS IN FIFTY STATES 
 
BEIJING 00000601  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) U.S. companies in China are well organized through the 
Aviation Cooperation Program (ACP) of the American Chamber of 
Commerce (AmCham), which is partially funded by a US Trade 
Development Agency (USTDA) grant.  U.S. companies' activity in China 
goes far beyond the big names of Boeing, United Technologies, and 
General Electric.  It includes general aviation manufacturers 
Textron (Cessna and Bell Helicopter), Hawker-Beechcraft, and Cirrus; 
systems and avionics manufacturers Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, 
Hamilton Sundstrand, Parker Aerospace and Moog; air traffic control 
systems vendor Telephonics; and airport design companies Leo A. Daly 
and HOK; as well as major U.S. airlines.  Since 2005, ACP's 
Executive Management Development Training (EMDT) program has sent 
nearly 100 trainees from the Civil Aviation Authority of China 
(CAAC) to the U.S. to learn about the U.S. aviation industry.  The 
result is a very broad-based and close relationship with Chinese 
regulators, airlines, and local aviation companies, helping to keep 
the door to China's burgeoning aviation market open.  But SAO delays 
of 16 weeks or more have begun to undermine the good work the 
industry has done in cultivating relationships in China.  It is not 
exaggeration to say jobs are created or lost in all fifty states 
depending on the health of this important industry.  The following 
examples illustrate firsthand the problems SAO delay pose for their 
business. 
 
BIG BURDEN ON BOEING'S BUSINESS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group was recently forced to 
delay a 777 freighter delivery to China due to an SAO delay, 
resulting in delayed revenue in the range of USD 250 million (list 
price).  The 777 was to be delivered in mid-February 2009, but 
required an inspection by CAAC Airworthiness Division.  The CAAC 
airworthiness inspection team leader applied for his U.S. visa on 
Oct. 20, 2008.  His application was tagged for SAO concerns and he 
was requested to provide additional information, which he did on 
Oct. 27.  Boeing checked on the status six weeks later on Jan. 9, 
2009, but was told that SAO administrative processing was taking 
eight to ten weeks.  With only a few weeks till inspection, and 
unable to clarify when the inspector's visa would be approved, 
Boeing was forced to postpone inspection and delivery, which will 
likely push revenue into the following quarter.  Even America's 
largest aircraft manufacturer had not anticipated the selection of a 
CAAC airworthiness inspector for SAO concerns, nor such a long 
delay. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Boeing has a National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) delegation slated for travel in April 2009, which will work 
on implementation of an MOU with Boeing on aviation safety and 
efficiency.  The Embassy will need to request expedited SAO 
processing since key members of the mission from NDRC and CAAC are 
those who actually approve vendor selection by Chinese airlines and 
will help determine the sale of up to 150 aircraft valued at USD 10 
billion.  Given the group's composition, with leading officials from 
a wide range of agencies, it is not practically possible to arrange 
their travel 16 weeks or more in advance.  To do so would have 
required they begin the application process nearly one-half year 
ago.  Chinese government officials have their own procedures for 
official travel.  One aviation contact asks, "How easy would it be 
for a U.S. Government official to gain approval and process their 
travel more than four months in advance?" 
 
THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 
----------------------- 
 
 
BEIJING 00000601  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Kenneth Yata of Boeing China, "A four month 
lead time is simply unacceptable for our customers and suppliers. 
At some point, they will simply say 'enough is enough, we can do 
business with the Europeans, Canadians, Israelis and Russians.'  In 
the early 1990s, Boeing had a 90 percent market share in China, 
versus 5 percent for Airbus.  Today, Airbus is up to 30 percent, 
Boeing down to 50 percent, and other vendors such as Bombardier have 
entered.  We want to partner with Chinese companies, but SAO 
processing times are making the return disproportionate to their 
efforts to work with us."  Yata is appreciative of the Embassy's 
efforts to expedite SAO processing, but fears the lengthening 
approval process has jeopardized so much travel that neither Boeing 
nor the Embassy can reliably expedite so many travelers. 
 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES FIGHTS AN UPHILL BATTLE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) United Technologies Corporation (UTC) is a large American 
aviation conglomerate, which includes Sikorsky (helicopters) 
Schweizer (small aircraft), Pratt and Whitney (engines) and Hamilton 
Sundstrand (aerospace systems).  UTC sales in China and Hong Kong 
were USD 2.7 billion in 2008, while exports from the U.S. to China 
were USD 223 million.  The company has been frustrated by SAO 
delays, and has done its best to learn how to work within the 
process.  But Jim Gradoville, President of UTC's China Division, 
observes that lengthening of SAO processing times over the past year 
to more than 16 weeks is making it harder and harder to do business. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) In 2008, the Deputy General Manager of a UTC Sikorsky 
helicopter joint-venture applied for a visa one month before a 
critical supplier conference.  His application was tagged for SAO 
processing, and he did not get the visa until six weeks later and 
was unable to attend the event.  UTC training for CAAC staff at 
Sikorsky and Schweizer was also cancelled in 2008 due to the group's 
inability to receive their SAO clearance on time.  The schedule had 
not been easy to coordinate with the Sikorsky facility and FAA. 
Sikorsky was forced to postpone dates for its suppliers' conference 
four times in 2008 while it waited for Changhe Aircraft employees 
SAOs to be approved.  Ordinarily, the company would have moved ahead 
as scheduled, but Changhe has become too important a supplier and 
Sikorsky feared excluding them would harm their business 
relationship. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Sikorsky's first Chinese customer for a S-76 VVIP 
helicopter applied in advance to take delivery of the aircraft in 
November 2008.  UTC had applied in advance, taking possible SAO 
processing of three weeks into account, and the buyer's wife and his 
company's aviation manager were indeed identified for SAO 
processing.  Unfortunately, processing time had grown to 6 weeks, 
which made it impossible to travel according to schedule, which 
delayed delivery.  A French competitor has told this customer that 
the Americans are just too difficult to deal with.  Sikorsky knows 
the customer wants to buy a second helicopter of this class, but 
fears the SAO processing issue could tip the purchase to their 
European competitor. 
 
GIVING UP ON SALES TO CHINA? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As-with many U.S. aviation companies, UTC has a broad 
range of relationships with Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
(AVIC).  Since UTC knows that AVIC employees are likely SAO targets, 
they generally no longer include them in any activities with less 
than a three month lead time.  This affects the company's planning 
which would benefit from AVIC's participation, and  hurts the 
 
BEIJING 00000601  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
company's relationships and competitiveness against European and 
Russian vendors.  Customers are well aware of the SAO hurdle, and 
even if they are sold on a particular aircraft, many fear their 
employees will not be able to attend essential training if they buy 
a U.S. manufactured product. 
 
SAOS THREATEN HOPES FOR SMALL AIRCRAFT VENDORS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (SBU) While China's commercial aviation market has been growing 
rapidly, air space control and regulation have hampered the growth 
of the general aviation (private airplane) sector.  With the 
Wenchuan Earthquake in May 2007, China's leadership and aviation 
regulators became acutely aware of the deficiency in China's small 
aircraft fleet.  China had virtually no heavy-load helicopters to 
assist relief efforts in remote communities in Sichuan Province. 
Since that time, China has begun to consider accelerated purchases 
of helicopters.  Moreover, it is also considering opening airspace 
control and regulation to allow development of a general aviation 
sector which could assist with disaster relief in a national 
emergency.  This potential regulatory change is expected to create a 
wave of new business opportunities for U.S. small airplane and 
helicopter companies, from Wichita to Wisconsin. 
 
¶12. (SBU) U.S. company Hawker-Beechcraft is a case in point.  The 
company recently opened a Beijing sales office to support its 
growing China business.  With over ten different small airplane 
models, the company has been introducing its range of aircraft to 
China through small sales, often for flight training applications. 
They are averaging eight to ten sales per year, valued at roughly 
USD 10 million per deal.   Currently the number of airplanes is 
small, but Regional Sales Director Matthew Liu says the potential 
market for private aircraft is huge, and the Chinese have the money 
to buy.  While corporate jet business is facing cancellations in the 
U.S., the China market continues to grow.  Hawker-Beechcraft even 
sees the opportunity to recover cancelled orders in the U.S., by 
selling these aircraft in China. 
 
¶13. (SBU) However, as Hawker-Beechcraft builds its business, each 
new aircraft type requires certification by the Civil Aviation 
Authority of China (CAAC).  Hawker's sales cycle is typically six 
months from order to delivery, but it has the chance to sell some of 
its cancelled orders on an even tighter schedule of three to four 
months.  Unfortunately, such sales cycles do not offer much 
opportunity to factor in a 12 to 16 week possible SAO processing 
time, and SAOs could likely scuttle many of these deals.  Hawker is 
waiting for the visa application results for a CAAC team seeking to 
inspect a new aircraft delivery to Shenzhen Airlines.  If, as in 
other cases, the inspector's application is submitted for an SAO, a 
16 week delay for will dramatically postpone any delivery. 
 
LONG WAIT TRANSLATES TO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶14. (SBU) According to AmCham ACP Executive Director Joseph 
Tymczyszyn, even when an SAO is finally cleared, the delays caused 
by the processing can contribute to anti-American sentiment among 
key Chinese officials.  In 2002-03, a CAAC Air Traffic Management 
Bureau (ATMB) official was delayed due to SAO.  The busy official 
made several attempts to reschedule, but after more than 6 months, 
the process was never concluded.  The official withdrew the 
application in disgust, and stated she would rather work with the 
Europeans and Japanese.  The official did eventually reapply in 
2004-05, when the application was delayed for an SAO but ultimately 
approved in time for her trip.  Unfortunately, other members of her 
delegation were not cleared in time, and the trip had to be 
 
BEIJING 00000601  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
postponed. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Since those experiences, the official has been promoted 
within ATMB, where she is a Deputy Director General (DDG) in charge 
of new technology and purchasing air traffic control (ATC) equipment 
for all of China.  Her office also determines ATC standards.  U.S. 
ATC vendor Telephonics initially had a good position with airports 
in southern and central China.  But acquisitions in the past several 
years, including upgrades at China's three largest commercial 
airports, have been given to a French vendor.  ATMB also approves 
landing slots for U.S. airlines at China's airports, and timing of 
arrivals and departures can greatly impact an airlines success.  It 
doesn't help to have key officials predisposed to dislike the U.S. 
 
HUNDREDS OF TRAVELERS MUST ABANDON TRAVEL 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Beijing Consular Section estimates SAO processing 
currently takes 16 weeks or longer.  Since October 1, 2008, Beijing 
has turned away more than 615 business travelers with inflexible 
dates of travel at the time of their interview due to SAO delay, 
including nearly 200 in the past 30 days.  During the month of 
February 2009, the NIV section turned away 25 percent of all B1/B2 
business travelers with a technology background and SAO requests 
were never sent.  (NOTE: Additional reporting on SAO processing 
statistics and its impact on travel to the U.S. will follow in 
septel.) 
 
AVIATION COMPANIES WANT TO BE GOOD CORPORATE CITIZENS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) U.S. aviation companies have been cooperative with the 
Embassy and work hard to cooperate with visa and SAO requirements. 
Many are active in the American Chamber of Commerce referral 
program, and do their best to stay up to date on changes in 
procedures and processing times.  But even in the best of 
circumstances the nature of their business does not allow them to 
have customers, government officials and business partners begin 
preparations for travel to the U.S. five or more months in advance 
to overcome a four month SAO process.  Worse yet, in turbulent 
economic times growth in China offers them a chance to mitigate the 
downturn in other markets, helping them to the maintain production 
and jobs in the U.S.  Inordinately long SAO delays hinder their 
flexibility to make such deals.  The current state of affairs makes 
them question the responsiveness of their own government to American 
business needs. 
 
AVIATION INDUSTRY SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) U.S. aviation companies deeply understand USG concerns 
about technology transfer.  The competitive nature of their industry 
and China's own efforts to build commercial aircraft means they deal 
with it every day.  But they have two practical suggestions for the 
SAO process which they believe would allow them to continue their 
cooperation, while still building a healthy business. 
(1) Create a special program for key Chinese government and aviation 
industry officials, executives, procurement or technical 
representatives who could be pre-approved for travel in advance. 
The Aviation Cooperation Program from AmCham could help prepare a 
list of 200-300 key officials, and subject it to annual review. 
(2) When the SAO backlog is current, work with U.S. aviation 
companies and AmCham to get the message out to their customers, 
government contacts and business partners in order to counter the 
angst which has accumulated. 
 
 
BEIJING 00000601  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
¶19. COMMENT.  Embassy Beijing welcomes the change in SAO Mantis 
validities for Chinese nationals announced by the Department on 
March 5 (reftel F).  This new policy will allow visas to be issued 
for a full year with multiple entry.  Our Consular Section has 
already begun to inform key U.S. business contacts of the change. 
While we anticipate aviation vendors will also welcome the 
announcement, these companies still face a four month processing 
time for pending visas until clearing agencies devote sufficient 
resources to eliminate the current backlog and stay current going 
forward.  END COMMENT. 
 
PICCUTA