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Viewing cable 09BEIJING556, China/G-20: Six Wants, Two Don't Wants, and a

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BEIJING556 2009-03-04 10:03 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXRO8924
PP RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0556/01 0631003
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041003Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3484
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2399
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2643
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000556 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR STATE/EEB/OMA WHITTINGTON 
FOR TREASURY/IMB MURDEN, MONROE, BEASLEY 
FOR EAP/EP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN CH
SUBJECT:  China/G-20: Six Wants, Two Don't Wants, and a 
Concern 
 
REF: STATE 17502 
 
1. Summary.   According to the British Embassy official 
responsible for engaging China in preparation for the G-20 
summit, China hopes to support initiatives designed to 
promote growth, combat protectionism, help low-income 
countries, reform international financial institutions, 
encourage financial regulation, and institutionalize a 
leaders' summit.  They oppose language on macroeconomic 
imbalances and climate change.  Beijing is concerned about 
the new U.S. Administration's perceived lack of engagement 
with them on summit preparations. End summary. 
 
2.   (SBU) The British Embassy's Economic and Trade Policy 
Counselor explained China's approach to the London G-20 
Summit to Econoff and Deputy Finatt at a March 4 breakfast. 
He detailed China's six objectives, two initiatives 
Beijing opposed, and one area of concern in the lead up to 
the summit. 
 
Support: Growth, Trade, LDCs, IFIs, Regulation, G-20 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
3. (SBU) Real Growth: According to the British Counselor, 
Beijing's primary objective at the London summit is to 
send a positive signal to the markets that the major 
economies are willing and able to take action to resolve 
the global financial crisis.  The Chinese would like the 
summit to restore confidence in both financial markets and 
the real economy. 
 
4. (SBU) Anti-protectionism:  China would like a firm 
commitment against protectionism.  They are willing to 
explore an enhanced WTO arrangement, including a 
reengagement of the Doha Round.  The Counselor was 
uncertain, however, if this could translate into a change 
in China's Doha positions. 
 
5. (SBU) Less-developed Countries: Beijing, which views 
itself in part as a valid voice for the developing world, 
would like initiatives to come out of the summit which 
protect the interests of and assist less-developed 
countries. 
 
6. (SBU) Reform of the IFIs: Beijing is interested in 
reform of the international financial institutions.  The 
Chinese are especially concerned with the question of 
enhancing International Monetary Fund (IMF) surveillance 
of developed countries.  They might be willing to increase 
their contributions to the Fund.  Beijing would like 
membership in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) before 
the summit.  The Counselor stated that China was not 
pushing for reform of the World Bank, except in terms of 
governance reform. 
 
7. (SBU) Financial Sector Regulation: Beijing is pushing 
for enhanced regulation of the financial sector in 
developed countries.  In this context, the Chinese are 
still firmly committed to the idea that inadequate 
regulation of financial activities in the developed world 
was exclusively to blame for the global financial crisis. 
 
8. (SBU) G-20 Future: Beijing is extremely interested in 
the future of the G-20.  They would like to see some sort 
of institutionalized forum for dealing with financial 
issues, although are not convinced the G-20 is the correct 
body. 
 
Opposed to: Blaming Imbalances, Climate Change 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9. (SBU) Blame: The Counselor stated that Beijing is 
adamant that the summit not dwell on the causes of the 
global financial crisis, but rather look forward towards 
solutions.  They are particularly sensitive to any attempt 
to apportion publically some of the blame for the crisis 
to Chinese macroeconomic imbalances. 
 
10. (SBU) Green Development: Beijing does not want to 
include language endorsing green recovery or other climate 
change initiatives.  The Chinese are concerned that such 
 
BEIJING 00000556  002 OF 002 
 
 
measures could be used to pressure China. 
 
Concerned About: Washington Engagement 
-------------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) According to the British Counselor, Beijing has 
expressed concern about the new U.S. Administrations' lack 
of engagement on the preparations for the summit. 
 
PICCUTA