VZCZCXRO6100
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0769/01 0800710
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210710Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2309
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000769 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
NEA/I FOR TBETTS, WWEEMS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM KCOR IZ
SUBJECT:  Guidelines for PRT and MND/BCT Engagement with Newly 
Elected Provincial Officials 
 
REFS: 
A) 2/2/09 Provincial Coordination Meeting 
B) Joint Campaign Plan 
C) Operations Order 09-01 
 
¶1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle 
accordingly.  Not for distribution on the Internet. 
 
¶2. (SBU)   Summary:  This message provides guidelines for PRT and 
MND/BCT engagement with newly elected provincial officials.  This 
guidance is being issued to assist PRT and MND/BCT personnel as they 
adjust to a changing post-provincial elections/post-Strategic 
Agreement political landscape.  The seating of new provincial 
councils will initiate what may be a turbulent period of transition 
as local governments negotiate new power-sharing modalities with 
Baghdad accordaQ?K=.47.QQIQQteam leaders should be the first USG personnel to 
engage with newly elected provincial officials.  PRT team leaders 
should coordinate these initial contacts with the PRT's USAID 
representative and the U.S. military commander.  If military 
officials accompany PRT team leaders on their initial calls, this 
should be undertaken in such a way that it is clear to Iraqi 
interlocutors and possible media representatives that the PRT team 
leader is the central USG representative in the province for 
non-security related issues. 
 
¶5. (U) PRT team leaders should engage early with newly elected 
officials and reiterate the USG's message that we are there to offer 
technical assistance and that we are coordinated in our efforts. 
They should explain the role of the PRT/ePRTs and team members; how 
they deal with officials and others within the province; the 
PRT/ePRTs' objectives; what assistance the USG can offer; and which 
activities are underway. 
 
¶6. (U) PRT team leaders will introduce the PRT USAID representative 
Q6. (U) PRT team leaders will introduce the PRT USAID representative 
as the lead USG development coordinator within the province.  The 
PRT USAID representative will explain USAID-funded programs and 
resources and how they assist the Iraqi people and provincial 
government. 
 
¶7. (SBU) PRT team leaders will introduce U.S. Military Commander as 
the leader of the supporting element for the PRT/ePRT efforts within 
the province and the USG entity that leads support in security and 
stability operations.  Stability operations are defined as those 
kinetic and coordinated (with the PRT) non-kinetic activities 
determined necessary by the U.S. military commander to support 
security operations.  U.S. military elements should not engage 
directly with newly elected governors and provincial council members 
on civil capacity efforts without coordinating beforehand through 
the PRT.  The U.S. military will engage and encourage/mentor their 
ISF counterparts to inform elected officials on issues that relate 
directly to security, the development of provincial security plans 
and stability operations support. IA/IP/DBE commanders should 
clearly identify and define the security and stability operations 
within the province for the elected officials and what support U.S. 
forces and governmental organizations provide the provincial 
 
BAGHDAD 00000769  002 OF 003 
 
 
government and Iraqi security forces. U.S. military commanders 
should inform PRT team leaders of significant security engagements. 
 
¶8. (U) Embassy political POCs on political engagements are POL 
Deputy Political Counselors Steve Walker and John Fox 
(WalkerSC@state.gov / FoxJ@state.gov), and OPA Political Officer 
Bonnie Long (LongBD@state.gov). 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Provincial Powers Law (PPL) Implementation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU)  PPL implementation will doubtless vary from province to 
province, according to local politics, custom and the closeness of 
the relationship between the province and the central government. 
PPL interpretation and implementation is a matter for Iraqis.  The 
USG should not be seen as taking sides in politically sensitive 
debates on these subjects.  This includes offering opinions on these 
subjects when asked.  Any assistance should be supportive not 
directive. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Concerning the PPL, PRTs/MNDs/BCTs should coordinate 
closely through their respective chain of command within the Embassy 
and refer for guidance to Embassy-drafted and cleared materials. 
The Embassy developed a "PPL Road-Show" that provides in-depth 
briefings for interested PRT/ePRT personnel on the substance and 
political aspects of the new law.  Details will be sent within the 
next two weeks. 
¶11. (SBU) USAID, through its Local Governance Program III program, 
has the Embassy lead on providing technical and capacity-building 
assistance to the PPL - mandated (Article 45) High Commission for 
Governorate Affairs.  POL, through CLA, will have the lead on 
providing technical assistance related to the Constitution Article 
105-mandated regions and governorates committee and efforts to 
establish a Federation Council (which, when created, will be 
parliament's upper house).  USAID and POL/CLA will consult closely 
to ensure coordinated, effective assistance. 
 
¶12. (U) Embassy POCs on PPL implementation and coordinated PPL 
activities for the newly elected officials are April 
Powell-Willingham (powell-willinghama@state.gov) in CLA, Steve 
Walker (WalkerSC@state.gov) in POL and Julie Koenen-Grant 
(jkoenen-grant@usaid.gov) in USAID. 
 
---------------------- 
Governance Programming 
---------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Embassy, in coordination with POL, OPA, USAID, CLA, 
Treasury and MNF-I, will provide guidance on governance training and 
assistance to the newly elected provincial officials. 
 
¶14. (U) USAID's LGP III team will provide direct capacity 
development to provincial governments - provincial councils, 
governors and their staffs -- in 11 provinces: Baghdad, Basra, 
Babil, Ninewa, Wasit, Karbala, Najaf, Salah ah Din, Diyala, Anbar 
and Maysan.  The direct capacity-development program will provide 
orientations, as requested, to new provincial councils, governors 
and staff.  In addition, assistance that combines training with 
mentoring will address budgeting, public investment planning, 
service delivery and performance improvement, oversight functions, 
development of professional provincial staffs, and support to the 
Local Governance Association.  LGP III will initially provide 
indirect support to the provinces of Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar and 
Muthanna, in the form of reference and training materials and an 
orientation for the benefit of interested, newly elected PC members. 
 Subject to funding, efforts will be made to expand direct capacity 
development via LGP III to Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar and Muthanna.  LGP III 
will engage and coordinate with the PRTs in the work-planning phase 
Qwill engage and coordinate with the PRTs in the work-planning phase 
of the project and will keep the PRTs informed of progress through 
briefings, discussions, and sharing of quarterly reports. 
 
 
¶15. (U) USAID's Tatweer Program will provide training, coaching and 
mentoring for provincial directors general, initially in six 
provinces and in seven key Baghdad ministries.  Technical assistance 
will focus on three main areas: budget formulation and execution, 
project management and project life-cycles, and human resource 
development. Training in all six public administration and 
management core areas will be conducted at an advanced level. 
Trainers, who graduated from the Tatweer Training of Trainer 
classes, will disseminate the training to their colleagues in the 
provinces.  Tatweer will work in close coordination with the 
PRT/ePRTs in the targeted provinces to maximize impact. 
 
¶16. (U) USAID's Community Action Program (CAP) will work with 
grassroots community groups and provide governance assistance, in 
the non-KRG provinces, to Qada (district) and Nahiya (local) 
councils.  CAP will coordinate with and share work-plans and 
 
BAGHDAD 00000769  003 OF 003 
 
 
quarterly reports with the PRT/ePRTs through the USAID 
representative to the PRT/ePRT. 
 
¶17. (U) US Embassy Treasury's PFMAG has two roles in supporting 
provinces for budgetary training.  The first role is to host a 
training conference in Baghdad that will include 5-7 Provincial 
Council officials from each province and will provide an overview of 
the budget process.  It will also be an introduction to the issues 
provinces will be facing.  The second is to conduct trainings in the 
provinces.   For the provinces where USAID/LGP has a presence under 
the LGP III contract, PFMAG will only provide assistance when asked 
by LGP.  For the provinces where LGP III is not working, PFMAG will 
provide budget training at the request of the PRTs.  The agenda for 
the province-specific trainings will be tailored to the needs of the 
individual provinces. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Embassy's Anti-Corruption Coordinator's Office (ACCO) 
requests that PRTs engage on anti-corruption issues with newly 
elected Provincial Council members and other provincial and local 
officials as opportunities arise.  Materials previously submitted to 
PRTs via e-mail can serve as a basis for PRTs' discussions of the 
anti-corruption dossier with officials.  ACCO also plans to make 
periodic visits to the provinces for consultations with officials 
and participation in public outreach events as desired by the PRTs. 
One area that the provincial councils must pay attention to is the 
establishment of their own individual Gazettes, as stipulated in the 
PPL (Article 7).  One means to fight corruption is for the council 
to write its own gazette law, making it as broad as possible.  This 
can be done by requiring not only the councils own rules and laws be 
published but that of the governor and such things as contract 
notifications, internal policies, and so on.  One of the first 
actions a council should consider is to publish its own rules of 
procedure thus locking in the right of the public to attend 
meetings.  ACCO will subsequently provide a list of provincial 
offices for the (Iraqi) Commission on Integrity.  ACCO is in the 
early stages of implementing anti-corruption projects with the 
United Nations and the University of Utah that involve strengthening 
the capacity of provincial and local authorities to combat 
corruption.  ACCO will keep PRTs apprised of the development of 
these projects.  ACCO will distribute additional anti-corruption 
related materials to you for use in engagements with newly elected 
officials. 
 
¶19. (U) ITAO's Provincial Reconstruction Development Council Program 
will reorient to provide PRT's with tools to assistance and support 
the newly elected Provincial Council efforts to provide essential 
services to their populations.  Executed through the PRTs, the 
program will be used as a capacity-building tool to assist the 
councils in developing their ability to plan, design, procure, 
contract and manage and sustain projects that will improve the 
equitable distribution of essential services and enhance their 
legitimacy at the same time as their capability to govern.  In 
addition, ITAO will provide expertise through their senior 
consultants and/or by acquiring local or international experts to 
assist Councils in determining the feasibility of solutions 
connected with project-planning design or execution.  In conjunction 
with the PRTs, ITAO will work with the newly elected Councils to 
institutionalize the skill sets required to maintain essential 
service infrastructure through targeted training programs that 
directly meet the maintenance and sustainment needs identified by 
Qdirectly meet the maintenance and sustainment needs identified by 
our Iraqi counterparts and the PRTs.  There is a dire need for 
planning initiatives in tS1Qand 
private spheres of the KR.  But their opinions differ on whether 
these political parties have advanced the democratic process in the 
KRG.  With few exceptions, students are dissatisfied with the 
current political status quo and seek greater participation in the 
socio-political development of the KR.  END SUMMARY 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES: TRAILBLAZERS OR ROADBLOCKS? 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2.  (U) Since the creation of the modern autonomous region, the 
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) have held heretofore unchallenged dominance of the 
political sphere in the Kurdistan Region (KR).  Over the course of 
history, their influence4Q^,L&+Q PQqj__QgC"|QQq++1eQcritical of dominant party 
control of all political 
and socio-economic developments in the Kurdistan Region. They 
accused those parties of closing the larger political process to 
anyone not affiliated with the KDP or PUK and using any means 
necessary to prevent the development of a proper opposition party 
within the government. (Note:  The KIU is the third largest 
political party in the KR, and received seven percent of the Kurdish 
vote in 2005.  Although KIU influence is slowly growing, it does not 
constitute a threat to either of the two major parties.) 
 
¶5.  (U) Political party youth leagues are also extremely vocal on 
the issue of a future independent Kurdistan.  Said a 23-year-old 
member of the KDP Youth League in Dohuk of the Iraqi federal system, 
"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some 
Q"This union is a compulsory marriage and we want a divorce!" Some 
went so far as to suggest that those who call for additional steps 
toward decentralization (such as a plethora of strong political 
parties rather than the current two-party monopoly) are insensitive 
to the fact that the Kurds must remain unified if they will ever be 
able to secure an independent Kurdistan.  Said another member of the 
KDP Youth League, "The most important goal is to be recognized as an 
independent nation.  Once we are independent, we will be able to 
have more parties.  But for now, we must unify against external 
threats instead of fighting against one another." 
 
¶6.  (U) The most critical students were those  either not affiliated 
with political parties or affiliated in name only as a sort of 
"insurance policy."  The variance in their opinions was reflected in 
the responses of the different groups to similar questions. 
Unaffiliated students cited unemployment, the lack of essential 
services and corruption as the issues of greatest significance, 
while political party youth league students replied Article 140 
implementation, Kurdish independence and the upcoming legislative 
elections.  (Note:  Responses from the unaffiliated group track 
popular opinion more closely.  During a recent youth-focused radio 
program on which RRTOff is a regular guest, 90% of callers' 
questions and comments were about fears of unemployment.  End Note) 
Many youth admitteQX{QQQQVJ|Qttudent at the University of 
Sulaimaniyah, "The political parties do not really care for the 
problems and concerns of youth.  The parties are struggling to 
maintain their influence in society and we are caught in the middle. 
 Youth are used as tools in the party."  Others believe that vested 
interests in the KRG are actively working against democratization 
and are incapable of moving democracy any further, since to do so 
would jeopardize the influence that [politicians'] have over 
socio-economic and political issues. (Note:  RRT local staff persons 
remark that previously, students were much more receptive of 
political party ideology. RRT local staff believe that the change 
reflects the degree to which elected KRG officials have failed to 
keep campaign promises. End Note) 
 
¶9.  (U) COMMENT:  Conversations at universities in Kurdistan can 
sound very similar to those at schools in developed countries. 
Youth here, like elsewhere, are eager to participate in a modern 
life that suits a youthful perspective, and take their place in 
society.  Recent changes in the Kurdistan Region indicate that 
students may soon have a greater chance to do so.  On February 11, 
the Kurdistan National Assembly lowered the minimum age of 
parliamentary officials from 30 to 25 and there is already 
competition for those seats.  Whether these young people will be 
able to affect change from within the system remains to be seen. END 
COMMENT 
 
BUTENIS