VZCZCXRO2931
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0741/01 0771525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181525Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2266
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000741 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ 201: THE COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 585 
 
(U) This is one in a series of messages intended to provide 
background for policy-makers on Iraq. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The three-year old, 275 member Council of 
Representatives (CoR) is suffering from growing pains, but 
has recently demonstrated potential to act as a more 
effective institution that can challenge executive power. 
Among its shortcomings, the CoR's credibility as a 
representative institution has been weakened by the closed 
list system under which its current members were elected, a 
fact that has undermined the Iraqi public's confidence in 
parliament.  Real power is in the hands of party bloc 
leaders; and it lacks the expertise or resources to 
effectively legislate.  As a result, most laws are written by 
the Executive or require substantial revision by the 
Executive during the legislative process.  But with the 
gradual maturation in Iraqi politics the CoR is seeing an 
increase in issue-based cross-sectarian alliances, such as 
the recent alliance on the budget aimed at limiting PM 
Maliki's centralizing policies (reftel).  The CoR's 2009 
election-year agenda will likely include a National Elections 
Law, but at this stage it appears unlikely that there will be 
a consensus on anything else.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Structure and Functions of the CoR 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) The Council of Representatives, Iraq's Parliament, 
consists of 275 members, about one per 100,000 Iraqi persons, 
elected for four-year terms.  Annual legislative terms are 
composed of two four-month sessions (Mar-Jun & Sep-Dec).  The 
first CoR was elected December 15, 2005, first met on March 
16, 2006 and will complete its work at the conclusion of the 
2009 legislative term.  Elections for the 2010-2013 electoral 
term should be held by January 30, 2010 so that a new CoR is 
able to convene March 16, 2010. 
 
¶3.  (U) Key requirements for the CoR stipulated by the 2005 
Iraqi Constitution are: "that the representation of all 
components of the people shall be upheld in it" and that an 
elections law should aim for female representation of at 
least one-quarter of the members of the CoR. 
 
¶4.  (U) The Speaker of the CoR (a currently vacant  position 
which traditionally is filled by a Sunni), the First Deputy 
Speaker Khalid Al-Attiya (United Iraqi Alliance ) UIA) and 
the Second Deputy Speaker Arif Tayfur (Kurdish Democratic 
Party - KDP) hold their positions by virtue of an unwritten 
power-sharing agreement between the Sunni, Shi,a and Kurds 
that allocated the three "Presidencies" -- the President of 
the Republic, the Prime Minister and the CoR Speaker -- 
according to the results of the (2005) National Election 
while providing deputy slots in each of the Presidencies for 
the other two ethno-sectarian groups, the blocs and parties 
within each of these groups determining the candidates for 
these latter positions. 
 
¶5.  (U) The Council of Representatives passes national laws, 
monitors the Executive, ratifies treaties, and approves the 
nominations of specified officials.  It elects the President 
of the Republic, who, in turn, selects the Prime Minister 
from the majority coalition in the Council of Representatives. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Political Determinants of Legislation: Power-Sharing, 
Blocs, Parties 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6.  (U) The Shi,a Islamist blocs, which include Da,wa, 
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Fadhila and Sadrists, 
currently control the greatest number of seats (128), 
followed by the Kurdish bloc, which includes the PUK and KDP 
Qfollowed by the Kurdish bloc, which includes the PUK and KDP 
(58 seats), and the Sunni blocs, which include Tawafuq and a 
newly formed Sunni group  (25 - 40  seats  depending on how 
they are counted).  While it would seem that the Shi'a blocs, 
with their 41% of the seats, should dominate CoR legislation, 
the reality is something else.  The practical necessity for 
political consensus derives from the current power-sharing 
agreement and the requirement that all laws must be approved 
by the current three-man Presidency Council composed of a 
Kurd, a Sunni Arab and a Shi'a, any one of which can veto the 
law.  For instance, while the pro-Maliki Shi'a blocs and the 
Kurdish parties had the votes to ratify it, Sunni Arab 
Vice-President Tariq Hashimi threatened to veto the SOFA 
ratification bill last November.  This threat led to the 
passage of CoR reform resolutions demanded by the Sunni Arab 
leadership in exchange for their support for the SOFA. 
 
BAGHDAD 00000741  002 OF 003 
 
 
Earlier in the Fall session, President Jalal Talabani's 
unhappiness with the Provincial Elections Law resulted in a 
Presidential veto and an amended law that achieved a broader 
political consensus.  Senior CoR figures, including acting 
CoR Speaker Attiya and Shi'a Islamist bloc leader Jalal 
ad-Saghir, have told us that this parliament still has to 
pass legislation on the basis of consensus among the Shi'a, 
Kurdish and Sunni Arab political blocs. 
 
¶7.  (U) Moreover, the competition and ideological differences 
between the parties and groupings that comprise the Sunni 
Arab and Shi,a blocs often weaken bloc solidarity on certain 
issues.  In the Sunni Arab camp, the Tawafuq coalition, which 
has represented the Sunni Arabs in the GOI since 2005, are 
now challenged by a new coalition composed of smaller 
parties, including one that used to be a part of Tawafuq.  In 
the upcoming legislative term, each coalition can be expected 
to compete for Sunni Arab votes by taking strong and likely 
differing positions in the CoR.  The same holds true for the 
two major Shi'a parties ) the Prime Minister's Da'wa Party 
and ISCI ) and, to a much lesser degree, the two Kurdish 
parties, the PUK and the KDP. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Finally, temporary coalitions that cross ethnic and 
sectarian boundaries can and do form in the CoR on the basis 
of issue salience.  The 2009 Federal Budget bill, passed nine 
weeks after the scheduled end of the 2008 Fall session, was 
held up by a Sunni Arab Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)-ISCI, 
Kurdish Alliance (KAL) insistence that the election of a new 
Sunni Arab CoR Speaker take precedence over all other 
legislation, and by their desire to use the budget to impose 
some restraints on the Prime Minister's authority. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Practical Determinants of Legislation: Closed Lists, 
Expertise, Physical Resources 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The current structure of the CoR and its lack of 
human and material resources prevent it from becoming a fully 
functioning entity.  First, the CoR's credibility and 
accountability to the populace is limited by the closed list 
system in which seats are awarded to many members whose 
qualifications are affiliation rather than expertise.  As a 
consequence, MPs' constituents are party bloc leaders rather 
than residents of the districts they represent, and their 
primary duties are to appear for key votes and to adhere to 
bloc discipline.  This has led to a situation in which real 
political power in the CoR is in the hands of the bloc and 
party leaders.  (Media reporting about the special benefits 
of CoR members, including relatively high salaries, 
diplomatic passports and even special access to land also 
diminish the standing of the CoR in the Iraqi public's eyes.) 
 
¶10.  (U) Consistent with the notion of bloc power, individual 
CoR members employ no professional staff other than 
bodyguards with their individual CoR allotments, although 
even if they did, there would be no place for them to sit, 
since individual CoR members do not have office space in the 
temporary CoR building. CoR members meet either in the suites 
to which their blocs are entitled or in CoR committee 
offices.  Unaffiliated CoR members hang out in the CoR 
cafeteria.  Yet the CoR's professional staff, upon which 
individual CoR members are forced to rely to research and to 
generate legislative proposals, lack the expertise to 
proficiently examine, write and amend legislation.  As a 
result, laws proposed by CoR members and CoR committees are 
so poorly drafted and flawed that they cannot accomplish what 
Qso poorly drafted and flawed that they cannot accomplish what 
is intended.  This means that after a law receives a first 
reading in the CoR, it is often rewritten by technical staff 
in the Ministries to ensure that it meets minimal standards. 
As a result, many if not most of the bills legislated by the 
CoR were either drafted by the  government or were CoR 
proposals that were substantially modified by the relevant 
Ministry, which has both the human and material resources to 
produce draft laws.  Much legislation is currently 
rubber-stamped GOI legislation. 
 
¶11. (U) The CoR also suffers from a deficiency of resources: 
photocopying machines break down regularly -- a reason often 
cited for the inability of the CoR staff to provide draft 
laws in a timely manner.  An electronic voting system donated 
to the CoR has never been installed because the equipment 
came without technical assistance, training or maintenance. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Upcoming Legislation, Legislative Challenges 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) A key legislative challenge for the CoR in the 
 
BAGHDAD 00000741  003 OF 003 
 
 
current year will likely be the passage of a new National 
Elections Law, probably modeled on the Provincial Elections 
law passed last Fall.  While national elections could be held 
under the old election law, that would involve using the 
closed list candidate system that is considered by many 
Iraqis to have had a negative impact on public confidence in 
elected politicians.  There will also be great interest in 
the passage of a &political parties8 law to more clearly 
define the structure and funding of political parties and 
blocs.  The rest of the fore-shortened Spring session will be 
devoted to cleaning up Saddam-era laws and the introduction 
of non-controversial legislation and, possibly, laws to 
formalize extra-constitutional entities such as Tribal 
Support Councils and National Security Office staff. 
Although it is the subject of much discussion, it is unlikely 
 that a hydrocarbons bill will be introduced -- let alone 
passed -- due to fundamental differences between key 
stakeholders.  Additionally, the CoR may consider legislation 
to carry out the CoR-mandated referendum on the SOFA 
agreement by July 31.  But it will likely be only a debate 
and an opportunity for election year posturing as few members 
of parliament are enthusiastic supporters of such a 
referendum.  Less clear is the future of the reform 
resolution that was passed in November 2008 in exchange for 
Sunni support for the SOFA.  While Prime Minister Maliki and 
his supporters are noticeably unenthusiastic about this 
resolution, IIP and ISCI leaders have told us they want 
Parliament to address the resolution. 
 
¶13.  (U) For all its problems, the CoR has shown in recent 
weeks that it has the potential to develop into a political 
institution capable of challenging Executive power.  It 
successfully held up the 2009 Federal Budget bill and used 
constitutionally mandated authority to alter the terms of the 
bill to remove funding from several controversial entities 
under the Prime Minister's direct control.  In doing so, the 
CoR ) although the process was driven by one bloc leader 
(the IIP's Ayad Samarraie) ) served notice that it could 
exercise its oversight responsibilities and may begin to hold 
the Maliki government responsible for its actions. 
 
¶14.  (U) We have multiple avenues of USG-funded assistance to 
the CoR now.  USAID has an institutional capacity building 
project that focuses on establishing an information resource 
center and also aims to build the CoR's legislative oversight 
capabilities.  The National Democratic Institute is working 
directly with several CoR committees, including Finance and 
Education, on how to build ties with the ministries they are 
to oversee and how to assess Iraqi government programs.  In 
addition, through the Embassy's Constitutional and Legal 
Assistance program we provide training on legislation 
drafting and tracking of legislation through committees and 
into the Executive Branch here. 
BUTENIS