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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD706, KIRKUK: SIXTH ANNUAL ARAB CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD706 2009-03-16 15:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO0710
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0706/01 0751505
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161505Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2210
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000706 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: KIRKUK:  SIXTH ANNUAL ARAB CONFERENCE FOCUSES ON 
ARTICLE 23 AND NEED FOR ARAB UNITY 
 
THIS IS A PRT KIRKUK REPORTING CABLE. 
 
This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle 
accordingly.  Not for distribution on the Internet. 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  During the sixth annual Arab Conference in 
Kirkuk, held March 14, speakers addressed the need for Arab 
unity, and progress on Article 23, Article 140 and detainees. 
 The conference was notable for the unity of its speakers in 
calling for support of the Article 23 process and the 
renunciation of violence as a means of effecting political 
change.  The participants did not offer any specific 
flexibility on disputes most important to the Kurds, but they 
also mostly avoided antagonizing the situation.  Settling the 
most important issues in Kirkuk will be challenging, but this 
conference at least did not make it more difficult.   END 
SUMMARY. 
 
----- 
THE PARTICIPANTS ) DRAWN FROM A WIDE SWATH OF THE ARABS OF 
THE PROVINCE, PLUS A FEW TURKMEN AND KURDS 
----- 
 
2. (SBU) The sixth Annual Arab Conference in Kirkuk, held on 
March 14, drew a crowd of over 200, including tribal sheikhs, 
academics, and professionals from throughout the province. 
The main theme of the conference was Article 23 of the 
Provincial Election Law.  Ahmed Obeidi hosted the event, to 
which over 500 people were invited, including Kurds and 
Turkmen.  The most notable Arabs at the conference included 
the following: Arab Unity Bloc Chairman Sheikh Hussein Ali 
Salih (aka Abu Saddam); Deputy Governor Rakan Saeed 
al-Juboori; Provincial Council (PC) Member Sheikh Abdullah 
Sami Al-Assi; PC Member Mohammed Khalil; and Council of 
Representatives and Article 23 Committee member Omar 
al-Juboori.  (NOTE:  Members of Moqtada al-Sadr's party 
refused to enter the conference center due to the presence of 
a USG representative.)  The only prominent Turkomen in 
attendance was Kirkuk City Council Chairman Munir Burhan 
al-Qafily, and the only prominent Kurd was the chief of the 
National Security Council for Kirkuk, Nozad Barzinji, a 
member of the KDP. 
 
----- 
SPEAKERS CALL IN UNISON FOR SUPPORT FOR ARTICLE 23 PROCESS 
AND REJECTION OF VIOLENCE 
----- 
 
3. (SBU) Ahmed Obeidi declared that the conference would 
focus on Article 23; he and every other speaker voiced 
support for its implementation.  Obeidi noted that the 
responsibility to support the Article 23 Committee belongs to 
members of every tribe and ethnic group, a sentiment echoed 
by Deputy Governor Rakan.  Omar Jaboori spoke extensively on 
the importance of Article 23 and the need for those present 
to support it.  He sought assistance from Arab intellectuals, 
sheikhs and tribal members in providing evidence to be used 
to support the Committee's recommendations. 
 
4. (SBU) Abu Saddam called for an end to violence and 
exhorted those gathered to permit no further delays in the 
implementation of Article 23.  Abdullah Sami pleaded to 
reject extremism and to refrain from inflammatory commentary. 
 Mohammed Khalil said the approaching deadline for the 
Article 23 Committee's recommendations made support by those 
present all the more important. 
 
----- 
CALLS FOR INTERETHNIC DIALOGUE BUT REPEATED REFERENCE TO 
OBSTACLES CREATED BY THAT "OTHER GROUP" ) THE KURDS 
----- 
 
5. (SBU) Obeidi expressed the need for inter-ethnic dialogue 
on Article 23 and other issues.  The Deputy Governor 
concurred, saying intra-ethnic discussion alone was 
insufficient.  He added that the Arabs are "open to dialogue, 
but it depends on the other side."  He alluded to alleged 
Kurdish abuses by saying "things happen in the province that 
QKurdish abuses by saying "things happen in the province that 
are against the Constitution." 
 
6. (SBU) Omar Juboori emphasized the intransigence of the 
Kurds, saying that "some sides" have power now and are 
finding it hard to cede their positions.  By "obstructing" 
the Article 23 process in this way, they may stop provincial 
elections in Kirkuk from occurring.  In addition, while 
discussing the demographic aspect of Article 23 regarding the 
review of voter registries, he said that "some seek to change 
the ethnic identity of the province." 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000706  002 OF 002 
 
 
7. (SBU) Abu Saddam alluded to the need for dialogue by 
saying that the Kurds must come to realize how dangerous this 
period is since "greedy neighbors" (i.e., Iran and Turkey) 
would like to intrude into Kirkuk's affairs.  He added how 
the Kirkuki Arabs previously had declined offers of (armed) 
help from Ramadi and Mosul against the Kurds.  He added that 
the interest of both the Arabs and Turkmen must be taken into 
account if there was to be any lasting resolution to the key 
issues. 
 
8. (SBU) His focus was mostly, however, on the failure of the 
Kurds to live up to the past promises.  Foremost among these 
was the December 2, 2007 agreement.  He then recounted how 
the impasse on that agreement eventually led to the enactment 
of Article 23.  The next promise allegedly broken was 
President Talabani's agreement in December 2008 to implement 
power-sharing within a month.  Finally, he mentioned a 
committee, which Massoud Barzani established during a meeting 
with the Kirkuk Arabs in Erbil, which was to resolve issues 
with the Arabs and which Abu Saddam said had achieved 
nothing.  In light of these examples, he believed the true 
intention of the Kurds was to delay.  He also cited 
kidnappings, disappearances and land trespasses by the Kurds 
since 2003. 
 
9. (SBU) Mohammed Khalil echoed Abu Saddam's opinions on the 
December 2, 2007 agreement, noting that had it been 
implemented, Article 23 would not have been necessary and 
provincial elections could have taken place already in 
Kirkuk.  He also raised the Kurds' resistance to transferring 
the PC Chairmanship to the Turkomen as outlined in a letter 
from the Article 23 Committee to the PC. 
 
----- 
THE NEED TO SET ASIDE TRIBAL ORIENTATION AND PARTICIPATE IN 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
----- 
 
10. (SBU) All the speakers addressed the need to put aside 
tribal allegiances and partake in the political process.  The 
Deputy Governor noted that the improved security in the 
province allowed greater participation in the political 
process and exhorted those present to become involved.  He 
reminded them of how past Arab boycotts had only resulted in 
the domination of provincial governmental institutions by 
"other groups" (the Kurds).  Omar Jaboori was encouraged to 
see the healthy turn-out for the conference, calling it a 
sign of increased political activism of the Arabs of the 
province.  Abu Saddam, Khalil, Sami and Omar Juboori all 
called for the Arabs to put aside their tribal differences 
and unite.  Sami added that any discord among them would be 
exploited by the "other side." 
 
----- 
OTHER ISSUES ) ARTICLE 140 AND DETAINEES 
----- 
 
11.  (SBU) Speakers also were united in their opposition to 
Kirkuk joining the KRG, with one explicitly stating that 
Article 140 had expired.  Abu Saddam mentioned in passing the 
need to eliminate corruption and the protection of the rights 
of minorities such as the Christians.  The issue of detainees 
was mentioned repeatedly, including by Sami who sought the 
release of innocent detainees by the "occupation" forces 
while avoiding releasing those against whom charges should be 
brought.  Speakers also demanded a release of those detained 
by the Kurdish security forces and an accounting for those 
who "disappeared" after being taken by such forces.  Ahmed 
Obeidi closed the conference by soliciting input in writing 
regarding the issues which had been discussed. 
 
12. (SBU) COMMENT.  The calls for a united front supporting 
Article 23 and rejecting violence were encouraging.  While 
QArticle 23 and rejecting violence were encouraging.  While 
those present did not reveal any concessions they might 
eventually be willing to trade with the Kurds in 
negotiations, they also mostly resisted rhetoric that would 
make such compromises more difficult.  End Comment. 
BUTENIS