VZCZCXRO8630
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0658/01 0721108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131108Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2144
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000658 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ MARR MOPS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: MOI OFFICIALS SEEK CONTINUED, EVOLVING U.S. 
ASSISTANCE TO IRAQI POLICE FORCES 
 
REF: SECSTATE 13379 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Embassy and U.S. military officials met 
between February 21 and March 7 with senior Government of 
Iraq (GOI) officials to discuss Iraq's priorities for the 
future development of its civilian security forces.  Mi6dqOS8QA](KQAffairs (DOIA) met with several 
senior Government of Iraq (GOI) officials between February 21 
and March 7 to discuss their visions and priorities for the 
future development of Iraq's civilian security forces, in 
preparation for an interagency assessment team that will 
arrive in late March to develop a roadmap for the future of 
USG assistance to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and 
its forces.  Embassy and DOIA officials met on February 21 
with Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs Major 
General Ayden Qadr, Senior Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan 
al-Asadi, and MOI Director General of Training and 
Qualifications Major General (Dr.) Jassim.  They met on 
February 25 with Mr. Hamza Hasan, Director General for 
Regional Planning in the National Security Council staff, to 
check the MOI officials' message against the broader thinking 
within the GOI's national security leadership.  The Embassy 
and DOIA officials met finally with Minister of Interior 
Jawad al-Bulani on March 7.  All of the officials expressed 
strong support for the forthcoming assessment team. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The U.S. military currently provides training and 
advising functions to the full range of MOI forces, including 
the National Police, Iraqi Police Service, Facilities 
Protection Services, the Department of Border Enforcement's 
border security forces, and the National Command Center.  The 
Qborder security forces, and the National Command Center.  The 
paramilitary National Police have deployed to support major 
operations in several provinces but report directly to 
Baghdad, whereas the Iraqi Police serve traditional policing 
functions throughout Iraq in local police stations and 
districts, reporting to provincial authorities as well as to 
the ministry.  The MOI now has roughly 600,000 total 
personnel, including all of these services, the majority of 
which are local Iraqi Police.  The U.S. military also 
provides advisors at the strategic level in the areas of 
personnel, intelligence, operations and planning as well as 
advice and assistance with logistics from the national to the 
local level.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams include Rule of 
Law advisors, some of whom serve in law enforcement advisory 
roles at the provincial level as well. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Progress Made in Developing, Reforming the MOI 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) All four MOI officials emphasized the significant 
progress the MOI has made since 2006, when Bulani became 
Minister of Interior, in developing and reforming the 
ministry and professionalizing its forces.  Asadi highlighted 
 
BAGHDAD 00000658  002 OF 004 
 
 
the challenges the MOI faced in the first few years after the 
fall of the Saddam regime, due to both the scale of expansion 
required in the ministry's forces and to inconsistent MOI 
leadership, with five ministers serving over little more than 
three years.  Ayden also noted 2006 as a turning point, when 
MOI leaders put in place new strategic plans to eliminate 
corruption from the ministry and militia or criminal elements 
from the police forces, while continuing to grow, train and 
equip those forces.  The officials emphasized this progress 
in making several points: that the MOI now has sufficient 
forces - in fact probably too many for the country's future 
needs - and that the MOI is now capable of taking full 
control of leading and providing for its forces. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Desire for Greater Ministerial Control 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) All of the officials consulted expressed 
appreciation for the extensive assistance they have received 
from U.S. forces over the past six years and the desire for 
continued assistance - for which the key has been the U.S. 
desire to build capacity, not dependency.  Several wish for 
this assistance to shift toward more advanced areas as 
appropriate to the progress that the MOI has made.  Both 
Asadi and Ayden argued for fewer U.S. advisors disbursed 
throughout Iraq, especially removal from local police 
stations and districts, by explaining that the MOI must now 
exercise control over the Iraqi Police rather than have them 
dependent on U.S. advisors.  Asadi said the relationships 
between local police stations, their provincial headquarters 
and the ministry in Baghdad are now quite strong and that 
Iraqi chain of command needs to be given primacy.  Ayden said 
that an advisor to each Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) 
would be sufficient, since all provincial units fall under 
his authority.  Jassim indicated that advisors are not needed 
at every police academy, but that some institutions still 
need more help than others, particularly the police colleges 
in Basrah and Mosul in addition to Baghdad. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Hamza expressed a somewhat different view, arguing 
that the Iraqi Police will eventually need to become more 
decentralized, reporting to provincial governors - who are 
not part of the MOI - and responsive to more local interests 
in general.  He noted that Iraq's Constitution gave the 
provincial governors authority over security and security 
forces within their jurisdiction.  Bulani expressed the 
desire that U.S. training teams and civilian police advisors 
remain partnered throughout the MOI's various forces to 
continue developing their professionalism.  He also stressed 
that extensive U.S. assistance to the MOI must continue and 
that any transition in the nature of the assistance role 
should be very gradual, so as not to leave any void. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Competition with Iraqi Military, MOI Still Needs Help 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While wishing to take ownership of their ministry 
internally, the officials indicated a strong external 
motivation for continued assistance from U.S. forces - the 
need to accelerate MOI development in order to compete with 
the MOD for primacy over internal security.  Iraqi military 
forces currently lead many security operations in key Iraqi 
cities and provinces, with even the National Police serving a 
secondary role to them.  Ayden perceives regaining the 
Qsecondary role to them.  Ayden perceives regaining the 
internal security mission is the MOI's greatest problem right 
now.  He suggested that if the MOI does not appear ready to 
secure Iraq's cities and towns by the time U.S. forces pull 
out of them, the MOI will have a much harder time winning 
authority back from the Iraqi Army at a later time. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Hamza expressed a similar view, saying that Iraq is 
now a Constitutional democracy and civilian authorities need 
to be in control, but the military clings to its greater 
historic role in society.  He believes that in the long term, 
the best strategy for maintaining stability in Iraq will be 
to have a smaller number of security forces who are very well 
trained, equipped, and professional - capable of and 
committed to fulfilling clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities.  Hamza indicated that U.S. training and 
assistance to the MOI will remain essential to the GOI's 
overall objectives for the foreseeable future.  Bulani 
acknowledged that Iraq's recent security needs compelled some 
exceptional implementation of security missions, but noted 
that it is time to begin moving toward normal civilian police 
taking the lead in Iraq's internal security.  He said the MOI 
will need strong support from the U.S. for at least the next 
two to three years to deal with Iraq's remaining security 
 
BAGHDAD 00000658  003 OF 004 
 
 
challenges. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Requests for Advanced, Specialized Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The MOI officials expressed the desire for 
strategic assistance in targeted areas where the ministry 
still lacks the advanced capabilities it needs.  Jassim 
stressed that Iraqi Police lack the expertise to deal with 
many of the major crimes prevalent in Iraq today, including 
kidnappings, money laundering and financial crimes, Internet 
crimes, and other organized crime particularly connected to 
terrorism.  He asked for assistance in developing advanced 
training opportunities in Iraq, including building a mock 
city for simulated urban security operations, procuring fire 
arms training simulators, and providing train-the-trainer 
programs in investigations, DNA forensics, intelligence 
collection and analysis, explosives, and finance.  Jassim 
also expressed interest in sending police officers to 
professional education training abroad and having MOI 
officials visit U.S. police academies to learn from their 
models. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Asadi focused on the MOI's Planning Department, 
which conducts strategic planning several years out, 
establishing plans for the organization of the ministry, 
development of existing sections and creation of new ones. 
The department has some capability to conduct this level of 
planning but needs more, and Asadi stressed that this is the 
one area of the MOI - besides advanced police training - that 
still genuinely needs U.S. advisors.  In terms of training, 
Asadi mentioned new programs the MOI is developing for 
finance professionals and for law enforcement in conjunction 
with the judiciary, working with other regional and European 
countries.  He highlighted the value of train-the-trainer 
programs in advanced skills both inside and outside of Iraq. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Bulani characterized the MOI's responsibilities as 
falling into two broad categories: paramilitary operations 
conducted primarily by the National Police; and traditional 
law enforcement missions for which the MOI needs help 
building the full spectrum of capabilities including criminal 
investigations, internal affairs, special MOI courts, and 
public relations for crime prevention.  He echoed Jassim's 
desire for increased partnerships with parallel institutions 
in the U.S.; both suggested seeking memorandums of 
understanding for cooperative relationships with those 
institutions.  Hamza agreed with the need for advanced skills 
training, deferring to MOI officials on specific requirements 
but responding enthusiastically to the suggestions of 
assistance with criminal investigations and strategic 
planning.  He also spoke highly of the professional training 
the Italian Carabinieri are providing to the National Police 
through NATO Training Mission-Iraq and emphasized the need 
for increased training of border security forces. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Resourcing Challenges Remain Unclear 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) The officials expressed mixed views as to whether 
or not budget shortfalls and other resource constraints would 
pose a challenge to MOI force development.  Ayden said that 
the MOI acquired plenty of equipment and other supplies over 
the past two years and that he doesn't foresee difficulty 
with resources in the near future.  Jassim, from his more 
operational perspective, however, said that budget 
constraints affect every aspect of the ministry's work 
Qconstraints affect every aspect of the ministry's work 
because expenditures require the approval of multiple 
officials.  Training outside of Iraq requires the Prime 
Minister's approval, whereas training inside Iraq requires 
Minister Bulani's, and all programs require the Minister of 
Finance to approve the funds.  Jassim said that the delay in 
passing the 2009 budget severely limited what the MOI was 
able to spend. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) MOI officials' views reflect Iraq's overall 
impatience to stand on its own balanced by its need to ensure 
that the drawdown of U.S. forces does not reverse the gains 
made in recent years.  Desires for sovereignty and 
empowerment of central leadership over a vast and previously 
disjointed ministry are consistent with the leadership trends 
and strategic objectives of the GOI.  At the same time, the 
MOI has struggled for years to make progress in developing 
 
BAGHDAD 00000658  004 OF 004 
 
 
its capabilities and reforming as an institution.  It has 
made a lot of progress over the past two years but that 
progress is still fragile, and the MOI continues to face 
competition from more advanced Iraqi military forces that 
have encroached upon its internal security missions.  While 
MOI leaders seek to convince U.S. officials of their 
self-sufficiency, they still acknowledge their need for 
robust assistance in many areas to achieve the capabilities 
they have become impatient to reach. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Post encourages the assessment team to consider the 
complex, sometimes competing motivations on the part of MOI 
and GOI leaders.  Some of the officials' comments reflect 
desires to centralize in Baghdad all authority over Iraqi 
security forces, while in reality many decisions impacting 
stability and the rule of law will and should be made more 
locally.  Such motivations often play out in Iraqi officials' 
tendencies to exaggerate their capabilities, without 
necessarily meaning that they don't want or need help in 
achieving the desired end state.  Post views some continued 
U.S. advisory presence throughout the provinces as highly 
valuable to continued oversight of local stability, 
development of professional forces, and human rights 
mentoring.  This continued presence is not mutually exclusive 
from a gradual shift toward more advanced, strategic 
assistance to the ministry in Baghdad, which the improving 
situation in Iraq also merits.  Overall, the team should seek 
the appropriate balance of assistance that recognizes the 
progress and independence the GOI wants while providing 
sufficient assistance to support the ambitious objectives 
Iraq hopes to achieve. 
BUTENIS