VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAN #0187/01 0771314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181314Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2214
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0140
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 000187 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV 
ADDIS ABABA FOR DYAMAMOTO 
PRETORIA FOR RBROWN, HLALIME 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
BRUSSELS FOR DFRANCIS 
USUN FOR RDICARLO, AWOLFF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: Engaging with the new Malagasy "Government" 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Post seeks guidance from the department on an 
expected request for contact with the transition government of Andry 
Rajoelina (see paragraph 3).  The transfer of power from the 
short-lived military directorate to another unnamed entity with 
Rajoelina as its president occurred Tuesday, and today Madagascar's 
High Constitutional Court (HCC) has ruled - outrageously but 
expectedly -- that it is constitutional.   The Ambassador (among 
other diplomats) expects to be convoked very soon by the new 
government and requests Department guidance on this expected 
situation.  In terms of how to respond to what was clearly an 
unconstitutional transfer of power, splits are already visible in 
the positions likely to be taken by the French, AU, UN, EU, 
Francophonie, and bilateral partners, which suggest a need for 
urgent coordination with other capitals/organizations.  Informal 
translations of the founding documents of the new government are 
included in paras 6-8.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests urgent department guidance on 
how the Ambassador (or DCM) should respond to an expected, formal 
convocation from "President" Rajoelina, or members of his 
yet-to-be-named government.  Note that media will almost certainly 
be present and that participation would confer, in public opinion, 
some sense of legitimacy on the new administration.  On the other 
hand, failure to appear would almost certainly bring further 
condemnation on the United States and potentially endanger personnel 
and private citizens here by the supporters of the new regime who 
have little tolerance for international norms or comprehension of 
international law.  Given the above, our recommendation is to 
appear, listen to what the Malagasy interlocutors have to say, take 
note initially with minimal comment, and make no public remarks for 
the time being. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Divisions within local diplomatic corps.  In light of 
yesterday's events and this morning's HCC ruling, it is likely that 
the Rajoelina's "High Transitional Authority" HTA Government soon 
will convoke members of the diplomatic corps in Antananarivo, 
individually or together.  Ambassador Marquardt has already received 
a phone call from HTA"Minister of Finance" Benja Razafimahaleo 
expressing his desire to work with the United States and other 
international donors, to which he responded noncommittally.  In a 
meeting among the diplomatic corps this morning, the French clearly 
signaled a willingness to hold their noses, praise the Malagasy for 
(so far) the absence of further violence during the ongoing transfer 
of power, and move on; the arrival this afternoon of new ambassador 
Jean-Marc Chataigner portends a felicitous French position via-a-vis 
TGV, in most observers' eyes.  The EU expressed a strong preference 
in favor of re-establishing constitutionality, respecting human 
rights, good governance, etc. - but admitted that their position 
would depend on coordination among member states (in which France 
will no doubt play a lead role).  Ambassador Marquardt said that 
Washington is still reviewing the situation and that the USG would 
not get out in front of the process, but expressed the view that 
after two months of evoking the consequences of an unlawful 
solution, the international community cannot fail to react to the 
obviously unconstitutional outcome.  Several COMs expressed their 
unconditional willingness to respond if Rajoelina calls them, but 
others remain hesitant given the tenuous legal situation, 
notwithstanding the HCC's endorsement, which was not unexpected. 
All ambassadors agreed on one thing:  further statements or 
reactions should come from capitals and headquarters, not from 
embassies here, and they should not be rushed in the current tense 
climate. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The AU (Special Envoy Oeudraoago) seems very flexible, as 
well as the Francophonie (Kodjo); their concerns seemed more aimed 
at having the right impact in Madagascar than in upholding 
principles; the Francophonie's position was closer to France's, and 
the AU seemed more concerned about practicalities than principles. 
Among the envoys, only the UN (Drame) expressed a strong position in 
support of consequences, and accompanying statements and talking 
points, for the extra-constitutional solution now in progress.  In 
formulating a USG response to recent events, we recommend looking 
first to the African Union and the United Nations for their 
reactions.  We also continue to believe that any formal declarations 
concerning the status of this new government and our reaction to the 
means by which it came to power should come from Washington, in 
prior coordination with the AU, UN, EU, Paris, and South Africa, as 
appropriate.  As noted above, France is unlikely to be in favor of 
anything but a pragmatic response, given their significant presence 
here; indeed, TGV praised their position today - on no one else's -- 
on the public square - in part due to their having taken him in last 
week (with cover from the rest of us. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Founding documents of the HTA government: as background, 
summary translations of the three key documents that have led to the 
formation of the new government follow.  These documents include: A. 
the ordinance transferring power from former President Ravalomanana 
to a military directorate;  B. the ordinance transferring power 
from the military directorate to Andry Rajoelina; and C. a letter 
from Rajoelina to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) requesting a 
judgment on the "validity" of these documents and the legalization 
of Rajoelina's control.  Around noon, March 18 the HCC 
unsurprisingly announced its decision on this request by giving 
Rajoelina full authority at the head of the High Transitional 
Authority. 
 
¶6. (U) Following is a summary translation of Ordinance 2009-01, in 
which then-President Ravalomanana transferred power to the Military 
Directorate. 
 
Begin translated text 
 
Republic of Madagascar 
Presidency of the Republic 
The President 
Ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009 
Conferring full powers to a Military Directorate 
The President of the Republic 
 
Noting that the prevailing circumstances require the safeguarding of 
the higher interests of the nation; 
 
Considering that the principle of continuity of the state 
constitutes a general legal principle with constitutional value; 
 
Given the constitution, notably article 44 paragraph 1, which 
contains: 
 
"The President of the Republic guarantees the respect of the 
Constitution.  He is the guarantor of the indivisibility of the 
Republic.  He is the guarantor, by his arbitrage, of the regular 
functioning of public powers, of national independence, and of 
territorial integrity.  He guarantees the protection and respect of 
national sovereignty, both internally and externally.  He is the 
guarantor of National Unity." 
 
Orders: 
 
Article 1: Full powers are given to a Military Directorate, headed 
by the oldest member of the highest rank of all armed forces.  He is 
the President. 
 
Article 2: The composition and organization of this Military 
Directorate are left to the President's discretion. 
 
Article 3: The Military Directorate exercises cumulatively the 
functions of President of the Republic and those of the Prime 
Minister, which are granted to them by the Constitution. 
 
Article 4: The Military Directorate has the following mission: 
Organize a national conference in order to discuss and elaborate 
eventual modifications to the Constitution; 
 
  Prepare revisions to the Electoral Code; 
 
  Prepare the law on political parties; 
 
  Organize elections in at least twenty four months; 
 
  The Military Directorate can take all other measures that it deems 
necessary in order to restore public order, and ensure an authentic 
national reconciliation permitting true economic and social 
development. 
 
Article 5: For reasons of urgency, and conforming to the 
dispositions of article 4 of ordinance 62-041 from September 19, 
1962 concerning the general dispositions of internal law and private 
international law, the current ordinance enters into effect 
immediately as soon as it has been posted or published by radio or 
television, independent from its publication in the official 
journal.  It will be executed as law of the government. 
Antananarivo, March 17, 2009 
 
Marc RAVALOMANANA [Signature] 
 
End translated text 
 
¶7. (U) Following is a summary translation of Ordinance 2009-02, from 
the Military Directorate, transferring power to Andry Rajoelina. 
 
Begin translated text 
 
The President of the Military Directorate 
 
Given the constitution, 
 
Given Ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009 conferring full power to 
a Military Directorate, 
 
Orders: 
 
Article 1: Full powers are given to Mr. Andry Rajoelina to manage 
the country, in place of the Military Directorate install by 
ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009. 
 
Article 2: He exercises the functions and attributions of President 
of the Republic, conforming to the dispositions of the constitution 
for a maximum period of 24 months. 
 
Article 3: Mr. Andry Rajoelina has as his mission the organization 
of a transition regime towards a Fourth Republic, and to take all 
measures necessary to this end. 
 
Article 4: For reasons of urgency, and conforming to the 
dispositions of article 4 of ordinance 62-041 from September 19, 
1962 concerning the general dispositions of internal law and private 
international law, the current ordinance enters into effect 
immediately as soon as it has been posted or published by radio or 
television, independent from its publication in an official journal. 
 It will be executed as law of the government. 
Antananarivo, March 17, 2009 
 
Vice Admiral Hyppolite RARISON RAMAROSON, President [Signature] 
Major General Ranto RABARISOA, Member [Signature] 
Major General Rivo RAZAFINDRALAMBO, Member [Signature] 
 
End translated text 
 
¶8. (U) Following is a summary translation of Rajoelina's request for 
a judgement on the validity of this ordinance, and of Ordinance 
2009-01, in which then-President Ravalomanana transferred power to 
the Military Directorate. 
 
Begin translated text: 
 
President Andry Rajoelina 
Villa 26, Residence of Ambatobe 
TO 
The President, Ladies and Gentlemen of the High Constitutional 
Court 
Ambohidahy 
Antananarivo, March 17, 2009 
 
Mr. President, 
Ladies and Gentlemen High Councilors, 
 
 
I have the honor to send you two ordinances: 
 
Ordinance 2009-001 from March 17, 2009 conferring full power to a 
Military Directorate. 
Ordinance 2009-002 from March 17, 2009 transferring full powers to 
Mr. Andry Rajoelina 
 
I would appreciate your certification of the validity of these two 
ordinances and to take appropriate action. 
 
Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen High Councilors, please accept 
assurances of my highest consideration. 
President Andry Nirina Rajoelina [Signature] 
 
End translated text 
 
 
MARQUARDT