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DE RUEHAN #0178/01 0730856
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P 140856Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2203
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000178 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND AF/FO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM ECON CN
SUBJECT:  Inter-Comoran Dialogue Ends 
 
REF:  ANTAN 153 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  After five days of talks on the constitution, 
institutions, and governance, the Inter-Comoran Dialogue closed 
March 7.  While the recommendations are not binding, an overwhelming 
majority of participants insisted that President Sambi not seek to 
extend his mandate in the upcoming referendum.  Union Ministers were 
inflexible on this point, insisting Sambi had the "last word" to ask 
the people for an extra year in office.  The previously reported 
March 22 referendum date will likely slip but no new date has been 
announced.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Significant Accomplishments... 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  The closing plenary March 7, like the opening March 4 
(REFTEL) offered the podium to the Comoros' leadership spectrum: 
Union, island, civil society, religious, diaspora, workers, and 
traditional.  The commissions on governance and institutions 
conducted rigorous work, identifying many problems and sources of 
dysfunction and making concrete recommendations.  These discussions 
and reports, observers agreed, will serve as a point of reference 
for future work on reform in the Comoros. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Dialogue participants agreed in principle that the Comoran 
system of government did not work and required a major overhaul. 
The disagreement was over timing and implications for unity.  It was 
an accomplishment for the Dialogue that the final report faithfully 
indicated that "many participants" were against President Sambi's 
effort to extend his mandate via referendum.  Their arguments 
against Sambi were also recorded:  calling into question the 
rotating presidency (due to go to Moheli in 2010); violating the 
principle of non-retroactivity by allowing Sambi to benefit from the 
change while in office; and challenging Sambi's main argument about 
"harmonizing elections."  Union Ministers present offered two 
arguments in defense, "we are the government, this is not illegal," 
and "Sambi's extension in office helps harmonize elections." 
 
¶4. (SBU)  There was consensus that governance and institutions were 
impaired by the "shared authority" provision of the 2001 
constitution.  In attempting to establish a federal structure, the 
constitution outlined specific Union (central) and island powers and 
authorities.  However, for the sake of expediency, unresolved power 
designations were declared "shared," to be resolved later -- leading 
to paralysis.  Participants also agreed a poor country like Comoros 
could not afford its expensive government structures (called 
"budgetivore").  Development was impossible with so many layers of 
government.  Of course they differed on who was to blame:  the 
islands said Sambi travels too much and the Union wastes money; the 
Union said the island "presidents" were unnecessary and costly. 
 
...Several Key Failures 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The hoped-for direct meeting between President Sambi and 
the "opposition" island executives of Grande Comore and Moheli never 
happened.  AU S/E Madeira pushed for such a meeting, but in the end 
President Sambi did not commit to a time. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  After efficient and organized commission reports to 
plenary on governance and institutions March 6, over eight hours on 
March 7 were devoted to (trying) to deliver the final report from 
the commission on constitutional reforms.  Unlike the specific 
recommendations from the other two, the constitution report was 
vague.  Former Prime Minister Bolero, head of the Mohelian 
delegation, declared, "if Sambi's referendum passes, he will only be 
president of Grande Comore and Anjouan."  Even Anjouanese 
participants called on Sambi not to remain in office, saying they 
did not want another of their island's sons to lead the Comoros into 
crisis.  Significantly several senior Imams, traditionally Sambi's 
constituency (he is a Muslim cleric), said the President's attempt 
to stay in office was illegal.  Each time a Union Minister took the 
podium to defend Sambi's desire to remain in office, he was shouted 
down and the Dialogue chairman had to suspend the proceedings to 
restore order. 
 
¶7. (SBU) March 5 and 6 constitutional commission meetings were 
attended by the leaders of all delegations -- clearly it was viewed 
as the most important.  There were numerous heated exchanges and the 
Mohelian delegation finally walked out when the Union Ministers 
insisted Sambi had the right to seek to extend his mandate.  A/U SE 
Madeira and Comoros Officer convinced the Mohelians to return for 
the plenary.  Union Chief of Cabinet Dossar became irate when one 
civil society representative compared Sambi's referendum to 
Anjouan's Mohamed Bacar staying in power in 2007 -- calling it an 
insult. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  More generally, most Dialogue participants demonstrated 
ignorance about the Comoran constitution and laws; international 
legal experts frequently tried to guide the commission discussions 
 
ANTANANARI 00000178  002 OF 002 
 
 
and diplomatically point out erroneous legal assertions.  Many 
speakers insisted that Mayotte was the first and only problem in the 
Comoros; that once France returned the island to Comoran 
sovereignty, stability and prosperity would be automatic.  Some 
Comoran leaders disapproved of this simplistic view in private, but 
did not dare say so in public - the Mayotte distraction is 
illogical, impassioned, and incontrovertible to Comoran public 
opinion. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Finally and unfortunately, women were not heard at the 
Dialogue.  Despite a degree of economic empowerment in Comoran 
society, women remain relegated in politics and public debate.  Each 
commission had female representatives present, but (by choice or 
custom) contributed little.  The UN's appointment of a female "local 
expert" to one commission was barely tolerated.  The one exception 
was that the Dialogue's chief reporter responsible for editing the 
final text was an influential woman, Amina Cheikh.  Like elsewhere 
in the developing world, this diminished voice was disproportionate 
to women's responsibilities in the household and community in the 
Comoros. 
 
COMMENT: 
- - - - - 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The Inter-Comoran Dialogue's final report will serve as a 
point of reference for all future political discussions in the 
Comoros.  Without persistent pressure from the African Union and 
facilitation by several international partners, the Dialogue would 
never have occurred.  A growing number of Comorans, not just 
politicians but also religious and civic leaders, are publicly 
calling on President Sambi to not seek to extend his term in office. 
 No new date has been set for the constitutional referendum and it 
is unclear to what extent the GOC will incorporate Dialogue 
recommendations into their proposed revisions.  The President and 
his top Ministers appear confident following recent ceremonies with 
Kuwaiti, Iranian, and other Gulf friends who will help them "build 
Comoros."  END COMMENT. 
 
MARQUARDT