VZCZCXRO2353
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #0477/01 0861445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271445Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9262
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU//TCH//
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/TSR ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA//
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/425ABG IZMIR TU//CC//
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2029 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL OSCE IZ TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  DECONSTRUCTING PKK AMNESTY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
This is a joint Embassy Ankara/Consulate Adana Cable. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent statements by Iraqi President Jalal 
Talabani and KRG PM Nechirvan Barzani about amnesty for PKK 
militants are significant, particularly since their comments 
were not roundly denounced by Turkish officials.  While 
suggesting leniency for PKKers poses political risks for any 
Turkish leader, if the GOT wants to resolve this decades-old 
insurgency, it needs to facilitate the demobilization of some 
3,500 PKK fighters and permit at least some of them to 
reintegrate into society.  For Kurds in southeastern Turkey, 
"Amnesty" (a term that may have outlived its usefulness in 
Turkey's political discourse) is considered a sine quo non 
for ending the conflict and many in the Turkish establishment 
also see it as a necessary evil.  There is no shortage of 
international experience in addressing demobilization; ideas 
discussed previously in Turkey include a phased approach 
stretched out over several years; establishment of a 
streamlined legal process to judge fighters who turn 
themselves in; and plans to offer PKKers permanent sanctuary 
in Iraq and/or Europe.  END SUMMARY 
 
TALABANI SAYS "AMNESTY," NO ONE REACTS BADLY 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) During a recent visit to Istanbul by Iraq President 
Talabani and then during President Gul's historic visit to 
Baghdad March 24-25, Talabani and KRG PM Barzani reintroduced 
the issue of an amnesty for PKK fighters as part of a deal in 
which the PKK would declare an end to its armed struggle. 
Unlike previous similar statements by Iraqi Kurds, Talabani's 
comments did not elicit strong knee-jerk negative reactions 
from Turkish authorities.  Gul merely noted that discussions 
on the amnesty issue had not been "on the agenda" during 
meetings between GOT and Iraqi officials and that it is 
"Turkey's domestic problem to deal with." 
 
¶3.  (C) Amnesty proposals are almost as old as the PKK 
conflict itself and numerous "repentance" schemes have been 
introduced, but none has brought closure to the conflict 
because they were not accompanied by other measures 
addressing Kurds' desire for legal recognition of their 
identity, cultural/linguistic rights and economic 
development.  By the same token, a political initiative on 
the Kurdish issue that did not include provisions for 
reintegrating militants would fail to win significant support 
in the Southeast and would likely be sabotaged by the PKK. 
 
¶4.  (C) Kurdish leaders in Turkey's Southeast believe that 
finding a means to demobilize the PKK's estimated 3,500 
fighters, most of whom are in the mountains of southeastern 
Turkey and northern Iraq, is the key to restoring peace in 
the region.  In western Turkey, however, the issue of amnesty 
has largely been taboo as politicians are wary of appearing 
soft on the PKK.  The current lull in fighting ) no Turkish 
soldier has been killed by the PKK this year ) could present 
an opportunity for bold moves, including an amnesty, once 
Turkey emerges from election campaigning for March 29 local 
elections.  Many PKK sympathizers now tell us openly that 
amnesty, i.e. an honorable defeat, is now their top priority. 
 
¶5.  (C) Those favoring some form of amnesty/reintegration can 
be divided into at least three categories: 
 
--PKK Fighters and Sympathizers.  In addition to insurgents' 
obvious interest in protecting their own equities, an amnesty 
would (in their minds) bestow legitimacy on their "struggle" 
and the status of the PKK as an "army."  Perhaps equally 
important for the hard-core militants is their (vain) hope 
that imprisoned PKK leader Ocalan would also benefit from the 
 
ANKARA 00000477  002 OF 004 
 
 
amnesty, either immediately or in the future. 
 
--Pragmatic Kurds.  The majority of Kurds in the Southeast, 
including those who oppose the use of violence, recognize 
that a means of allowing PKK fighters to return to their 
families is necessary.  GUNSIAD (an influential regional 
business association) captured this mainstream sentiment in a 
2006 statement calling for both a PKK cease-fire and an 
amnesty.  GUNSIAD President Sahismail Bedirhanoglu told us 
that an amnesty need not be universal, but it is essential 
because thousands of families have relatives in the hills. 
Pragmatic Kurds recognize that the PKK is a liability to 
their aspirations, but understand that an agreed-upon 
demobilization is needed to marginalize the PKK and 
ultimately make it disappear.  Some AKP politicians from the 
region share this view. 
 
--Pragmatic Turks.  Many in the Turkish establishment 
understand that a successful counter-insurgency campaign 
against the PKK requires offering an exit strategy for the 
militants.  The prospect of demobilization would also 
strengthen those in the Kurdish political movement who favor 
pursuing their goals peacefully.  One Turkish nationalist 
politician, Mehmet Agar, articulated this view during the 
2007 election campaign, saying that the PKK "should be 
involved in politics instead of holding weapons in the 
mountains." 
 
TREACHEROUS POLITICAL WATERS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The amnesty issue is the Bermuda Triangle of Turkish 
politics -- it's a dangerous issue bounded by three mutually 
suspicious institutions:  a powerful, yet insecure AKP that 
wants to resolve the Kurdish issue, but also fears taking 
actions that expose it to attacks from Turkish nationalists, 
particularly before local elections that will take place 
March 29; the military, which harbors existential fears about 
giving too much grounds to Kurds' ) let alone the PKK's ) 
political aspirations, but also has no credible "military" 
solution to this seemingly endless and costly conflict; and 
the Kurds' own dysfunctional politics, in which the PKK, 
still clinging to Abdullah Ocalan and his outdated ideology 
of a violent liberation struggle, remains the most powerful 
force ) and the biggest obstacle to improving the lives of 
ordinary Kurds.  Nonetheless, a majority of Turks probably 
would support a solution that ended the violence, preserved 
Turkey's territorial integrity and avoided the perception 
that the state had caved in to terrorism.  A number of 
constituencies understand that demobilization must be part of 
such a package, even if they are reluctant to say so 
publicly. 
 
¶7. (C) In 2007, the GOT floated some trial balloons 
suggesting a new amnesty law was under consideration, but 
nothing was ever formally proposed.  Meanwhile, according to 
press reports, the rate of PKK fighters turning themselves in 
seems to be increasing and the judiciary is showing leniency 
to most who surrender.  In 2008, the Turkish military 
distributed leaflets urging PKK fighters to "Make your 
decision and leave the organization.  Go to the nearest 
military unit or police station. You will be welcomed with 
love."  Prior to his promotion as CHOD, Ilker Basbug was 
quoted as saying young PKKers who have not been involved in 
violence should be "pardoned," though he opposes a general 
amnesty.  As CHOD, Basbug has avoided public comments about 
the campaign against the PKK, but he is widely believed to be 
more pragmatic than his predecessors.  This is borne out by 
comments made during a March 19 briefing to resident defense 
attaches by a senior TGS J2 official, who responded to a 
question about amnesty by stating that all options are on the 
table.  Such sentiment represents a marked change in TGS 
 
ANKARA 00000477  003 OF 004 
 
 
policy from that of recent years, when the military did not 
look favorably upon amnesty, nor consider it a viable option. 
 Despite this more pragmatic approach, TGS acceptance of a 
possible amnesty will likely depend upon how it is calibrated 
for ordinary PKK rank-and-file, those who have been involved 
in causing the deaths of Turkish soldiers and/or civilians, 
and senior PKK leadership. 
 
FIND THE RIGHT WORDS 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) When Turkish policymakers take up this issue again, 
they should avoid using the terms "amnesty" or "repentance." 
Because the term amnesty implies a government pardon for 
crimes (and in Turkey's legal tradition is used regularly to 
commute the sentences of "ordinary" criminals) a different 
term should be used to address PKK terrorists to make the 
initiative more politically acceptable.  The term 
"repentance," meanwhile, raises hackles on the other side. 
Turkey's repentance laws, which were introduced for defined 
periods between 1985 and 2003, resulted in the surrender of 
1,900 fighters.  These laws, however, required those turning 
themselves in to provide intelligence to the authorities; not 
surprisingly, this approach never won the approval of the PKK 
leadership and it exposed the beneficiaries to reprisals from 
their former comrades. 
 
OPTIONS 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Several ideas on demobilization have been floated 
during the conflict with the PKK and are likely to be 
considered again: 
 
--A phased approach.  According to author Jonathan Randal, in 
1993 President Turgut Ozal was considering a three-tiered 
amnesty proposal under which rank-and-file volunteers who had 
not committed acts of violence would be allowed to rejoin 
society immediately; middle-ranking fighters would be given 
amnesty after two years and senior leaders (including Ocalan, 
who was at large at the time) would need to wait five years. 
Ozal died before acting on the proposal.  Such an approach ) 
which could not include Ocalan ) would have the advantage of 
maintaining leverage over time on the PKK and guarantee that 
it adheres to promises to disband.  An additional 
"preliminary phase" could be introduced into this scenario: 
the granting of an amnesty or promise of non-prosecution for 
the 10,000 plus residents of Makhmour refugee camp in 
northern Iraq; mostly women, children, and senior citizens 
who are not seen as a direct security threat to Turkey but do 
serve as a source of support, and perhaps as a recruiting 
pool, for the PKK.  Discussions on the closure of the camp 
took place 2004-2007, but ended in spring 2007, just prior to 
national parliamentary elections, when the GOT decided it 
politically unsustainable to accept for resettlement such a 
large number of PKK sympathizers/supporters.  Successful 
reintegration of a large non-combatant population such as 
that located at Makhmour could help to convince fighters at 
Kandil and elsewhere that the GOT truly has turned the page 
on the past. 
 
--Judicial Scrutiny/Probation.  A variation on the "Ozal 
Plan" would expand the role of the courts in the process, 
requiring those wishing to benefit to undergo a streamlined 
judicial proceeding.  Depending on circumstances, such as the 
individual's rank in the PKK and responsibility for violence, 
the person could be put on probation for a period of years 
and/or barred from participation in politics or access to 
certain public services. 
 
--Go West/East.  According to some media reports, another 
option under consideration is for PKK members to go into 
 
ANKARA 00000477  004 OF 004 
 
 
permanent exile in Iraq or (unnamed) Scandinavian countries. 
The GOT would then drop demands that these individuals return 
to Turkey to face justice.  To keep the number of exiles 
manageable, low ranking fighters would still likely need to 
have the option of returning to Turkey.  This plan is also 
attractive because it would keep many PKK ring-leaders 
abroad, thereby reducing the influence of terrorist and 
criminal elements on Kurdish politics within Turkey.  (The 
receiving countries may be less enthusiastic about this 
idea.)  This has been a de facto demobilization method for 
many years as hundreds of PKK members have escaped the 
organization and now live in Iraq or Europe. 
 
--Ocalan's Detention.  For PKK representatives and for many 
in the DTP, Ocalan's imprisonment will be at or near the top 
of the amnesty agenda.  Proposals include ending Ocalan's 
solitary confinement by allowing him to do time with other 
PKK prisoners or placing him under "house arrest."  While the 
government could probably alter Ocalan's detention regime, 
even considering early release would be politically 
impossible.  For any negotiation to succeed, the PKK will be 
forced to accept that their leader will not benefit from any 
program for the foreseeable future. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: The recent military successes against the 
PKK and the diplomatic success of building bridges with the 
KRG puts the GOT in a strong position to attempt to achieve a 
lasting settlement to the Kurdish issue.  Demobilization will 
be key to any settlement.  Without it, a majority of Kurds 
will doubt the GOT's sincerity in solving the process.  And 
successful demobilization will require a settlement that wins 
the PKK's explicit or implicit endorsement.  Otherwise, the 
PKK can be expected to perpetuate the conflict as there will 
always be hundreds of youths willing to go the mountains to 
join the struggle ) however hopeless it has become. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey