VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0094/01 0352219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 042219Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5772
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2147
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 2429

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC PHUM KDEM PARM IN PTER PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE'S MEETING WITH INDIAN PR NIRUPAM 
SEN 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR SUSAN RICE, FOR REASONS 1.4 B/D 

¶1. (C) Summary: The United States is eager to ""sustain and accelerate"" recent progress in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship and wishes to enhance our cooperation in multilateral fora, especially the UN, Ambassador Rice told Indian PermRep Nirupam Sen in an initial call on February 3. Sen said India was eager to cooperate with the U.S. in the UN and bilaterally, and looked to the U.S. as a crucial partner with the same values. He said India,s major goals within the UN were to strengthen democracy and the UN,s peacekeeping capacity and to make progress on Security Council reform. They also discussed international economic governance, the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and India,s desire to sanction additional Pakistani individuals and organizations suspected of links to al-Qaida and the Taliban. End summary. 

STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Rice opened by emphasizing the desire of the U.S. to work cooperatively with India at the UN as well as bilaterally. She said the two countries shared common values, especially democracy. Sen agreed, and said ""to strengthen democracy is to strengthen peace."" He said the Mumbai attacks were likely caused by President Zardari,s courageous statements promoting peace with India. These statements were ""life-threatening"" to the Pakistani military and ISI, said Sen. India did not take military action against Pakistan following the attacks because they knew that by doing so, they would inflame Pakistani public opinion in favor of the military and the ISI. Turning to the UN, Sen said India strongly supported the UN Democracy Fund and the Democracy Caucus as impartial mechanisms to advance democracy. The Caucus was neither too large nor too small, and was focused on modest initial steps, including democracy education and the role of women. 

REFORM OF PEACEKEEPING 
¶3. (C) Sen said he was happy to engage with the U.S. on peacekeeping issues. He did not support the revival of the Military Staff Committee because of its exclusivity. Ambassador Rice underscored the importance of focusing on the effectiveness and efficiency of peacekeeping operations. The key is to close the gap between the demands on peacekeeping operations and the institutional capacity to carry out mandates effectively. She said the U.S. was willing to offer its intellectual capital and support to the reform effort. Sen welcomed this willingness, saying that strengthening peacekeeping was the single most important issue for the UN. If it cannot keep the peace, it ""might as well close up shop,"" said Sen. 
¶4. (C) Ambassador Rice asked if Sen saw a need for an updated Brahimi Commission to examine peacekeeping operations. Sen replied that this might be useful, but the mandate must be narrower, because many of the issues raised by the Brahimi Commission have already been addressed. He suggested that a new mandate could focus on the gap between resources and expenditures, and the fashioning of effective mandates. Ambassador Rice also asked for Sen,s views on incorporating civilian protection into peacekeeping mandates. Sen replied that this should be done, although the toughest question is how, given the lack of the peacekeeping capacity that would be required on the ground. He acknowledged, however, ""the whole business of peacekeeping is protecting civilians."" The Ambassador asked for his further detailed thoughts on peacekeeping reform, and Sen said he would be happy to provide them. 

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
¶5. (C) Sen said that the UN does not have a preeminent role in international economic governance, although India would not oppose a debate in the General Assembly on the current financial crisis. The Ambassador asked if an outcome was necessary; Sen replied that any type of outcome from the General Assembly would be so watered down as to be meaningless, given that all the members would have to agree. He added that an outcome might adversely impact the deliberations of the G-20. Sen also pressed for greater attention to exchange rate issues as noted in Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement. He suggested establishment of a new credit facility within the IMF or the World Bank that would be more democratic and have its own governance board, to take into greater account the views of developing countries. 

SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM 
¶6. (C) Sen emphasized India,s focus on Security Council reform, and asked ""If the heirs of Stalin and Mao have a seat on the Security Council, why not the heirs of Gandhi?"" Ambassador Rice said the U.S. is open to Security Council reform and recognizes that the Security Council must change its post-World War II architecture, provided that the changes do not diminish its effectiveness and efficiency. She added that the U.S. would not necessarily link Security Council reform to other parts of UN reform. Sen said it was key that member-states know the U.S. is ""open and benevolent"" to the idea of Security Council reform, although it was not absolutely necessary for the U.S. to weigh in on current negotiations beyond that basic message. He said India would insist on maintaining the standard rules of procedure for negotiations (i.e., UNGA Decision 62/557, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UNGA Rules and Procedures and past practice), and would oppose new rules put forth by the Uniting for Consensus coalition. 

COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
¶7. (C) The Indian PermRep pressed for U.S. action regarding the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and noted a revised text was given to the U.S. in New Delhi a few weeks ago. Ambassador Rice noted that the 2002 text was seen as the least objectionable. Sen said India would be happy with any of the versions, although he said the 2002 text would not receive two-thirds approval. He urged consideration of the 2005 or 2007 texts, because both would come closer to two-thirds approval. Sen also asked that the U.S. agree to a preambular reference to ""self-determination."" Even India with its Kashmir issue could go along with such a reference, said Sen. He believed it would assist the U.S. in its Middle East peace process efforts. 

ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS LISTINGS? 
¶8. (C) India was pleased with the recent listing in the 1267 Sanctions Committee of Pakistani individuals and organizations linked to al-Qaida and the Taliban, said Sen. He wondered if it would be possible to go further, and to list more individuals and organizations. He suggested listing former heads of the ISI, especially Hamid Gul, who had described the Taliban as ""the first line of defense."" However, India was sensitive to supporting President Zardari, said Sen. He urged that Zardari be consulted regarding whether he would support listing Gul. Perhaps Zardari would approve, Sen suggested. 

Rice