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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUNQEW YORK 0695
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1250
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1190

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000046 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC FEBRUARY 25: EXPERTS SAY CFE-FROZEN CONFLICTS 
LINK FAILED 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  At the Forum for Security Cooperation on 
February 25, international security experts from European 
think tanks agreed that NATO and Europe have been the victims 
of their own success in structuring a stable security 
environment for the last twenty years and, now, the security 
acquis urgently needs adjustment.  One expert said NATO's 
link of ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty to resolution 
of frozen conflicts through Russian fulfillment of its 
Istanbul commitments was irretrievably broken.  U.S. 
"disinterest" or benign neglect of European security was 
partly to blame for the present impasse over CFE and 
uncertainty over the future shape of the European security 
architecture. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Later, Russia announced it would address reopening 
the Vienna Document at the March 11 FSC.  The working group 
approved the draft decision to extend the deadline for Code 
of Conduct questionnaire responses to June 15.  Russia 
announced a number of edits to the draft update of the Code 
of Conduct questionnaire.  The FSC Chair recommended the 
Annual Security Review Conference be held June 23-24.  End 
summary. 
 
Disarmament is Back, but Europe Has Its Own Problems 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Wolfgang Zellner, at the Center for OSCE Research at 
the University of Hamburg, claimed disarmament was "back on 
the agenda," noting information of the White House website 
that President Obama is seeking to "achieve dramatic 
reductions" in the numbers of U.S. and Russian nuclear 
weapons.  Although some, he noted, hoped progress in 
strategic arms control would lead to improvement of the 
current climate for conventional arms control in Europe, this 
was not a foregone conclusion.  Zellner said the needs of the 
European states were more heterogeneous and the U.S. did not 
place a high priority on European arms control.  It was 
therefore up to EU states to take the initiative.  Zellner 
added the security issues and conflicts that concern Europe 
are essentially European, with the possible exception of 
missile defense. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Zellner included the August 2008 conflict in Georgia 
and Russia's suspension of CFE implementation among the 
issues that confront Europe.  He decried the mutual mistrust 
between NATO, which suspects Russia wants to reestablish a 
sphere influence in the QS area, and Russia, which views 
NATO enlargement with unease and doubt. 
 
Istanbul: Can the Circle Be Squared 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Zellner recommended NATO follow Germany's advice to 
find a way to modify the Parallel Action Package so that 
continued insistence on Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul 
commitments does not derail movement toward the adapted 
treaty and threaten the survival of the entire CFE regime. 
He wondered if the Geneva Conference on Georgia could find 
another course, but doubted any solution would be timely.  He 
noted with approval the Merkel-Sarkozy article that suggested 
a rapid solution to the Transnistria issue in Moldova was 
possible. 
 
 
USOSCE 00000046  002 OF 006 
 
 
Link Between A/CFE and Istanbul a Failure 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Zellner asserted that the impasse over A/CFE was 
linked to sub-regional conflicts, as reflected on the 
Istanbul commitments and the "flanks" issue.  He concluded 
that the attempt to resolve the issues in Georgia and Moldova 
by linking them to ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty 
(A/CFE) was a failure.  Europe will, in any case, have to 
move beyond A/CFE as many of the region's ongoing security 
issues are not addressed by existing arms control mechanisms. 
 A new model is needed hat will ensure pan-European stability 
a la CFE while resolving and presenting sub-regional 
conflicts. 
 
Medvedev Proposal Faute de Mieux 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Zellner said conventional arms control will be 
needed to support  strategic arms reduction and this 
relation, when combined with sub-regional conflicts and 
emerging issues such as missile defense illustrates the 
inadequacy of the existing negotiating fora.  If only because 
of the need to tie the different security areas together, he 
endorsed the Medvedev and Sarkozy proposal for a European 
security conference.  Zellner also noted that the current 
financial crisis is the greatest immediate threat to security 
for all members of the OSCE, whose weaker members might face 
economic and even political collapse without international 
support. 
 
Current Acquis Successful, up to a Point 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Camille Grand, director of the Foundation for 
Strategic Research in Paris and formerly the French 
representative to the "NATO High Level Task Force" on 
conventional arms control, described the relative success of 
the current European security arrangements, although he noted 
existing conflict prevention mechanisms could not prevent the 
conflict in Georgia.  The current security system was 
undermined by the impasse over CFE and "unilateral" measures. 
 It was no surprise the Russian suspension had led to erosion 
of the acquis. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Grand said tensions between Russia and the West were 
at the core of the present crisis.  Benign neglect had led to 
a return to a Cold War mentality that could degenerate into 
an arms race and the reassertion of spheres of influence 
modeled on the Westphalian balance of power. 
 
Shopping List for Medvedev 
-------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Grand suggested the Medvedev response to these 
problems, describing it as comprehensive and treaty-based, 
might be feasible.  It would need to balance hard and soft 
security, as at the OSCE, include Canada and the U.S., uphold 
values sovereignty, territorial integrity, and restraint from 
use of force, incorporate existing alliances, and somehow 
improve on the existing arrangements.  This would means a new 
European security architecture would still include classic 
arms control, but would also contain crisis management and 
 
USOSCE 00000046  003 OF 006 
 
 
conflict prevention mechanisms and address new and emerging 
threats like terrorism, transnational crime, and 
proliferation. 
 
Constructive Mistrust 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Grand argued it was mistake to think mutual trust 
was a precondition for negotiating a new architecture.  A 
certain amount of "constructive mistrust" might actually be a 
goad to beginning work.  Discussion should be open-ended and 
should not fixate on the format of an agreement, which might 
be a treaty or a political declaration or something else: its 
shape would emerge naturally as a by-product of the 
negotiations.  No issues should be pre-judged and parties 
should avoid an "all or noting" approach. 
 
CFE Suspension: the Point of No Return 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Zdzislaw Lachowski, at the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, observed that while the Adapted CFE 
Treaty was needed by both Russia and NATO to address 
post-Cold War realities, the fundamental strength of the 
existing acquis meant that Europe still felt secure despite 
the impasse over A/CFE and Russia's suspension.  He warned 
that this situation could not be indefinitely sustained: the 
treaty's erosion, leading to reduced transparency and the 
re-emergence of rivalries is bound to reach a point of no 
return.  Lachowski said South Caucasus states and Ukraine 
have begun to recalculate their security positions should CFE 
collapse. 
 
Asymmetry of Strategic Perspectives 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Lachowski argued that NATO and Russia must overcome 
the "asymmetry of strategic perspectives" if the CFE crisis 
is to be resolved.  He said U.S. and NATO indifference to 
Russian perceptions allowed the stalemate to develop.  The 
shift in U.S. focus away from Europe and classic arms control 
has exacerbated the situation.  Some way must be found to 
bridge NATO's continued insistence on fulfillment of Istanbul 
commitments with Russia's insistence on defining its own 
security needs and separating arms control and hard security 
issues from elections, the rule of law, and energy. 
 
Accept No Substitutes 
--------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Lachowski concluded that, despite the almost 
insuperable obstacles to resolving the impasse over the 
treaty, the CFE regime remains essential to Europe's 
continued security and stability.  The Vienna Document or 
bilateral agreements are not adequate substitutes.  Russia 
seems to recognize this, as it attempts to use its suspension 
for accelerating movement toward the adapted treaty. 
 
Russia: We Just Want to Help 
---------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) commented that it no longer viewed 
Istanbul commitments as an obstacle because it had fulfilled 
 
USOSCE 00000046  004 OF 006 
 
 
them: attention should shift instead to commitments made by 
Georgia and others.  Russia did not seek to drive wedges into 
NATO, which would only enhance the solidarity of the Allies. 
Instead, Russia sought to restore balance to Europe and 
viability to conventional arms control.  NATO enlargement 
needs to be compensated for, especially on the flank. 
Russia, after all, is no more interested in arms control than 
any other state.  Some thought they could use our commitment 
to arms control against us with regard to the Istanbul 
commitments, but this has been a failure. 
 
Georgia and Moldova Remain Unconvinced 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Georgia asked if any new arrangement could 
guarantee the security of small states against their more 
powerful neighbors when Russia had violated all of its 
existing commitments by invading Georgia in August 2008. 
Moldova added it did not accept that Russia had fulfilled its 
Istanbul commitments.  Host nation consent and the CFE Treaty 
continued to be very important to Moldova, and it supported 
the Parallel Action Plan. 
 
Allies' Views 
------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Germany asked for more focus on the 
multi-dimensional nature of any new arrangement and suggested 
a separate discussion soon at the OSCE of the "third 
dimension" component.  The UK agreed that "benign neglect" of 
the faltering security system had worsened the impasse. 
Luxembourg declared that all should have seen in 1999 when 
they agreed to the Istanbul commitments that arms control 
mechanisms could not resolve intra-state conflicts.  A 
mechanism relevant to such conflicts was still needed. 
 
Echoes from the JCG 
------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Responding to mention of South Caucasus security 
issues in the experts' presentations, Azerbaijan and Armenia 
exchanged recriminations over arms holdings in excess of 
(CFE) treaty limits and unaccounted for treaty limited 
equipment. 
 
Reopening the Vienna Document 
----------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) announced it intended to initiate 
discussion of the weaknesses of the Vienna Document 1999 in 
the March 11 FSC, presumably under the Security Dialogue. 
Ulyanov noted the document had been amended four times in its 
first ten tears but had not been touched since.  Despite the 
march of time, Ulyanov said, some delegations saw reopening 
or adjusting the document as taboo: they needed to explain 
themselves. 
 
ASRC Dates 
---------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The FSC Chair's letter to the Permanent Council 
Chair recommending the Annual Security Review Conference be 
held June 23-24 was sent without objection, although Turkey 
 
USOSCE 00000046  005 OF 006 
 
 
announced it reserved the right to make an interpretive 
statement. 
 
Code of Conduct 
--------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) The working group agreed to submit to the plenary a 
draft decision to extend the deadline for Code of Conduct 
questionnaire submission from April 15 to June 15 
(FSC.DD/1/09). 
 
¶22. (SBU) Russia then announced it had several "technical 
responses" to the latest version of the draft update of the 
Code of Conduct questionnaire (FSC.DD/14/08).  These included: 
 
- remove the compilation form summarizing responses; 
 
- make optional responses to question 1.4 on efforts to 
prevent and combat terrorism in addition to those not 
mentioned in questions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3; 
 
- remove the words "of war" from the phrase "international 
humanitarian law of war" from question 4.1; 
 
- insert the word "technical" before the word "update" in the 
title of the draft decision; 
 
- support for Belarusian proposals for the decision's 
preamble that would substitute language on the Helsinki Final 
Act for the existing reference to the principles of the 
United Nations Charter (FSC.DEL/186/08); and 
 
- change the deadline for the first reply to the updated 
questionnaire to June 15, possibly adding a provision to 
excuse states that have already answered the current version 
from needing to also answer the update. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Belarus welcomed the Russian proposals.  Finland 
reminded it still wants a reference to UNSCR 1325 on the role 
of gender in security affairs. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The FSC Code of Conduct coordinator (Eischer, 
Austria) announced an informal meeting on February 27 to 
review Russian and other proposals for the draft.  He will 
circulate a compilation of these proposals shortly. 
 
End Use Certificate Exchange 
---------------------------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) In response to Denmark's question, the chairman of 
the Informal Group of Friends of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(Schweizer, Germany) explained that responses to the 
information exchange of sample end use certificates 
(FSC.DEC/12/08) could include documents prepared by the 
exporting or importing party per the language in the 
decision, "end use certificate . . . or other pertinent 
documents." 
 
Ukraine Melange 
--------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (Geertsen) reported 
a successful conference and site visits in early February for 
 
USOSCE 00000046  006 OF 006 
 
 
firms responding to the OSCE-Ukraine request for bids on the 
destruction of melange rocket fuel oxidizer.  Geertsen said 
the project was still on track for melange elimination to 
begin in the summer. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶27. (U) The next FSC plenary and working groups will be on 
March 11.  The Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting will 
be on March 3-4. 
SCOTT