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FM USMISSION USOSCE
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INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0685
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1240
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1180

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 USOSCE 000038 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J-5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR HAYES 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
EUCOM FOR J-5 
CENTCOM FOR J-5 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC-PC FEBRUARY 18: DFM GRUSHKO SHEDS LITTLE LIGHT 
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Offering what he said was more a "vision" 
than a proposal, Russian DFM Grushko told the February 18 
joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and 
the Permanent Council that "new realities" and mounting 
evidence of the weakness of existing institutions 
necessitated a new, genuinely collective approach to European 
security.  Pointing to Kosovo and the "disaster" in the 
Caucasus, Grushko argued Europe's contemporary security 
framework had been undermined, and asserted NATO "centrism 
and exclusiveness" would prevent the rise of true 
partnerships.  He acknowledged, however, that the OSCE could 
play a unique role in a new security dialogue, as instruments 
like the FSC were already in place, and said Russia was 
willing to make the OSCE the primary ) but not the only ) 
forum for discussion, as the ongoing EU-Russia Dialogue and 
the NATO-Russia Council could also serve as useful platforms. 
 According to Grushko, Russia is seeking a "Helsinki Plus," 
or a means of affirming agreed principles in a legally 
binding manner and establishing a "new and improved" arms 
control regime. 
 
¶2. (SBU) While stopping short of proposing the complete 
elimination of the human and economic dimensions of security, 
Grushko emphasized the importance of "hard security" 
concepts, and noted that while Russia agreed a comprehensive 
approach was necessary, the various aspects of security need 
not be "crammed into a single mechanism." In closing, Grushko 
asserted Russia's right to ensure its own security, and 
argued Russia could not overlook a significant military 
alliance's creep toward its borders.  He also claimed CFE 
discussions had "lost any bearing" on contemporary reality 
and argued Russia had fulfilled its Istanbul commitments, 
adding the "small technical issues" of Gudauta and Kolbasa 
were of little importance.  Finally, Grushko welcomed the 
Greek Chairmanship's proposal for informal consultations and 
a separate high-level event, and urged the Annual Security 
Review Conference (ASRC) to be at the ministerial level this 
year, and that Russian FM Lavrov planned to attend. 
 
¶3. (SBU) While Belarus, Serbia, and Kazakhstan warmly 
welcomed Russia's initiative and expressed support for a 
dialogue that could strengthen security in our "common 
space," others (the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland, Norway, Italy, Romania, Cyprus, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Canada, and the U.S.) noted the 
continuing value of agreed principles and existing 
institutions, and emphasized their belief in an indivisible 
and comprehensive concept of security.  Several recalled the 
Helsinki Final Act and called attention to the CFE Treaty, 
arguing these provided a useful foundation for Euro-Atlantic 
security and should not be tossed lightly aside. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Many participating States, including the U.S., 
questioned Russia's credibility, observing it was difficult 
to trust Russia's expressed commitments to territorial 
integrity and other key concepts when it had so blatantly 
violated those principles.  The U.S. noted the right of all 
States to freely choose their military alliances.  All States 
expressed a guarded willingness to engage in open and frank 
dialogue within the OSCE, but only if discussions included 
both sides of the Atlantic.  The U.S. noted the need for more 
concrete answers from Russia and the lack of agreement on 
holding the ASRC at the ministerial level.  End summary. 
 
USOSCE 00000038  002 OF 008 
 
 
 
Merkel, Sarkozy, and Churchill 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Russian DFM Aleksandr Grushko began his presentation 
by contrasting Winston Churchill's 1946 Fulton, Missouri 
speech, which pondered whether the U.S. would be able to live 
up to its then new super power status, with a recent article 
by German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy, 
which asserts that "no one country can by itself solve the 
world's problems," to emphasize how far the security climate 
has changed in 60 years.  Grushko said that events such as 
9/11, as well as the current global economic crisis, the war 
on terror, establishment of peace in the Middle East and 
Afghanistan, proliferation of WMD, and combating global 
climate change left little doubt that a new perspective and 
new approach to principles of Euro-Atlantic collective 
security was needed. 
 
Failure of Existing Security Arrangements 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Grushko conceded that Euro-Atlantic principles have 
been advanced over the years, but complained they had not 
reached their full potential.  He lamented that the 
principles of Helsinki have not progressed beyond the 
cold-war mentality of "ours versus theirs."  The unilateral 
declaration of independence of Kosovo, the NATO intervention 
in the Balkans, and the "disaster in the Caucasus" all 
demonstrated the failure of contemporary current 
Euro-Atlantic security arrangements. 
 
NATO Inhibits Collective Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Grushko pointed to security-based alliances such as 
NATO, among others, as the primary inhibitor of true 
collective security.  He charged that the exclusiveness of 
NATO generates dividing lines that splinter Europe. 
Recalling NATO's reaction to the crisis in Georgia, Grushko 
said that in August everyone saw how impervious NATO had 
become to Russian appeals; how it denied Russia the 
inalienable right of a state to be heard.  He added, "This is 
not a proper relationship." 
 
Time to Re-Boot 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) On more than one occasion, Grushko referred to the 
"desire of several states to "overhaul the Euro-Atlantic 
security structure."  He said that his experiences at the 
informal luncheon at the Helsinki Ministerial in late 2008 
and the Munich security conference earlier in February has 
led him to believe that we need fresh, novel ideas; in short, 
we need to "re-boot."  He invited all to get down to the 
business of negotiating a new treaty, in line with Russian 
President Medvedev's proposals, that would form the basis for 
a qualitatively new type of cooperation, based on the 
principles of Helsinki, and that would make these principles 
legally binding.  Grushko said Russia had put its own ideas 
forward and he hoped that those ideas would generate 
qualitative responses from its partners.  (Comment: Since 
Grushko did not provide specific proposals, he was likely 
 
USOSCE 00000038  003 OF 008 
 
 
referring to an informal paper distributed previously by 
Ulyanov, the Russian chief arms control delegate in Vienna. 
End comment.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Grushko reiterated that he wanted this process to 
lead to a legally binding instrument that would recognize all 
participants as equals and that would ensure no individual 
state could pursue its own security at the expense of another 
state.  The instrument would require a reassessment of arms 
control, provide a unitary conflict resolution mechanism, and 
respond to global threats.  Its negotiation would also 
include existing organizations or alliances such as NATO, 
OSCE, CIS, CSTO, and the EU, not to mention Canada and the 
U.S. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Grushko rhetorically asked "what is the added value 
and what is so lacking in the current system?"  He said that 
Russia is open to discussing why the previous instruments 
have only been partially implemented in the past.  This 
discussion would identify which of the current security 
instruments remain valid and which need to be updated.  He 
added that clear criteria and measures in place for conflict 
prevention are needed and that trust must be at the heart of 
the dialogue. 
 
A Comprehensive but Uncrowded Security Document 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Turning to the issue of comprehensive security, 
Grushko contended that Russia envisions a comprehensive 
instrument, but added that it is not important to try and 
"cram all elements of the three dimensions into one 
document."  For example, there have been a lot of good 
decisions on the human dimension that have resulted from 
Helsinki.  Furthermore, there are other bodies and formats 
that are more appropriate for the second and third 
dimensions, such as the Council of Europe. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Grushko said no one is trying to detract from this 
ongoing work on the human dimension and any new treaty was 
not intended to slow this work.  He mischievously asked if 
perhaps OSCE members would want to add a human dimension 
provision banning of the death penalty.  However, he 
continued, gender equality, for example, does not have a 
direct impact on European security and would not be included. 
 He said we need to prioritize our efforts and determine how 
to proceed. 
 
Do As We Say, Not As We Do 
-------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) We see a problem with the hard security component. 
We see hard security as a way of moving beyond simple 
political statements.  Since 1991, the Russian Federation has 
abided by all commitments, removing troops from Eastern 
Europe, destroying 100,000 of thousands of pieces of military 
equipment and have abided by all of the Istanbul commitments, 
withdrawing our forces from Georgia in 2007.  Our partners 
have to demonstrate a similar commitment.  The Medvedev 
proposal was made before the August war in Georgia.  Russia's 
reaction was, therefore, not a policy decision but a reaction 
to a situation.  We were forced to take sides.  We have said 
as a matter of principle no state should interfere with the 
 
USOSCE 00000038  004 OF 008 
 
 
internal disputes of another state.  That the resolution can 
not be imposed from the out side. That was before August 7. 
 
Alliances in General, NATO in Particular 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Later, noting NATO's approaching 60th anniversary, 
Grushko said Russia expected a "new strategic concept" from 
the Alliance that would include cyber security, energy 
security, and the Arctic.  He claimed these issues impact 
Russia directly and will require discussion in several fora, 
including the NATO-Russian Council and the EU-Russia 
Strategic Dialogue.  Grushko said NATO'S Bucharest communique 
does not reflect the contributions of non-NATO members to 
Euro-Atlantic security. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Grushko insisted, in response to a U.S. question, 
Russia does not deny the right of states to choose alliances, 
but rather it asks all participating Sates to implement the 
OSCE Code of Conduct principle to consider the security 
requirements of others.  The enlargement of alliances to 
Russia's borders, let alone any additional members, cannot be 
overlooked.  The (CFE) Flank problem, Grushko added, is 
another example of the exclusionary, non-collective 
approaches that a new architecture is meant to replace. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Grushko said any security architecture devised by 
Euro-Atlantic members must be implemented by all pS, 
organizations and alliances.  Transparency will be critical 
for working toward the same goal.  Russia favors the widest 
possible dialogue on these matters, including states, 
academics, and institutions. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Russia does not favor "spheres of influence," but 
others must recognize the "special relationship" the states 
of the former Soviet space have with each other, which 
resembles those between the U.S. and the UK or between Cyprus 
and Greece. 
 
Arms Control in Vienna: We'll Give You Another Chance 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Grushko claimed that the OSCE's work in the 
political-military dimension has been idling.  He said that 
Russia is focused on hard security because it wants to 
improve the performance of the OSCE in the first dimension. 
He conceded that some aspects of the other dimensions could 
be included in a new Treaty, such as those related to new 
threats.  However, he added that this only emphasizes the 
point that the widening array of threats contrasts greatly 
with the narrow focus and motives of organizations.  New 
functions such as energy security and cyber security will 
require new instruments.  But he said that these cannot be 
addresses unless all states in the Euro-Atlantic space are 
contributors.  De facto selective decision making, such as 
the U.S. European missile defense program, will not work. 
 
Istanbul Commitments: "Technical Issues" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) With regard to arms control, the OSCE could play a 
unique part.  It has experience, expertise, and several 
existing instruments.  The new agenda could even include 
 
USOSCE 00000038  005 OF 008 
 
 
strategic issues as are now discussed in Geneva.  In recent 
years some countries have linked conventional arms control in 
Europe to the resolution of questions in Moldova and Georgia, 
holding the Adapted CFE Treaty hostage to these secondary 
issues.  If we want to revive CFE, we will need an additional 
overarching set of principles.  Russia  regretted that so 
much has been sacrificed to this one-sided approach and that 
so much could have been accomplished since Istanbul if the 
Adapted CFE Treaty had entered into force in 2001-2002. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Likewise, Grushko said, there has not been much 
progress on CSBMs within the OSCE, including Russian 
proposals on measures for rapid reaction Forces and naval 
Forces.  Russia supports German FM Steinmeier's proposal to 
hold a high-level conference this spring on arms control. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Grushko said the FSC could be used to discuss the 
concept of "reasonable military sufficiency."  Euro-Atlantic 
states should discuss how an instrument could be developed. 
A new arrangement would provide a mechanism for the 
cooperation of all the international and regional 
organizations functioning in the Euro-Atlantic space. 
However, the new architecture would not supplant the CFE 
Treaty, the Vienna Document, or the Open Skies Treaty. 
 
Ministers Should Discuss a New Treaty at ASRC 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Finally, Grushko noted that the Russian Federation 
would like to see a focused effort at the 2009 Annual 
Security Review Conference (March 3-4), "which this year will 
be at the ministerial level."  He claimed Russian FM Lavrov 
planned to attend. 
 
EU: Willing to Discuss, But All Must Uphold OSCE Acquis 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) The European Union, represented by the Czech 
Republic (Pocuch), was first to response to Grushko's 
statement.  Pocuch reminded all of the positive spirit of the 
debate at the Helsinki OSCE Ministerial and that the EU 
supported the eight points made there by Stubbs, the Finnish 
Chairman-in-Office.  Pocuch emphasized the EU's openness to 
new ideas that enhance European security in a transparent 
process.  He believed the OSCE is the natural forum to 
discuss European security due to its inclusive nature and 
comprehensive approach.  The EU believed the OSCE should 
focus its effort on restoring mutual confidence and trust, 
allowing all participating states to address their legitimate 
security concerns.  Additionally, it was equally important to 
revitalize the CFE regime bringing it back into full 
operation as well as full implementation of the Vienna 
Document 1999 and the Open Skies Treaty. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Pocuch called upon all parties to preserve and 
fully implement the existing arms control agreements and 
CSBMs, as well as to explore options for strengthening them. 
 The EU is committed to the concept of cooperative, 
indivisible, and cross-dimensional security.  Strict 
adherence to and implementation of these commitments are 
crucial for the sustainability of cooperative security. 
Pocuch reaffirmed the EU commitment to the principles 
outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. 
 
USOSCE 00000038  006 OF 008 
 
 
Pocuch insisted all three dimensions of the OSCE equally 
contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability and 
security and m should not be prioritized.  Finally, Pocuch 
reminded all that the EU considers the comprehensive security 
architecture, developed over years, based on existing 
organizations, shared commitments and principles should not 
be undermined (FSC-PC.DEL/8/09). 
 
Georgia: "A Small, Occupied Country" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶25. (SBU) Calling itself a "small and occupied country," 
Georgia (Giorgadze) immediately went on the attack against 
Russia.  Recalling  Medvedev's support for the principles of 
sovereignty, political independence, and those found in the 
UN Charter, Giorgadze wondered about the value of Russia's 
new treaty proposal since Russia was bound to break these 
principles again.  He asked how a new treaty would prevent 
participating States from breaking it.  Giorgadze raised 
Russian failure to abide by the September 12 cease-fire 
agreement, citing its failure to depart Georgian territory, 
and refusal to allow access to military monitoring officers. 
Giorgadze sarcastically stated that Russia wants a new treaty 
so it can break it. 
 
Serbia: Kosovo UDI Symptom of Larger Malaise 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) Serbia (Beham) supported Grushko's call for 
dialogue on a new European security agreement.  Beham cited 
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as an 
example of the failure of current agreement.  She opined that 
Kosovo's actions, which violated Serbia's sovereignty, would 
eventually lead other separatist groups to take similar 
secession actions.  Beham declared that the Kosovo UDI 
problem should be solved through open dialogue within the 
rule of law. 
 
Belarus:  Let's Start to Negotiate 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) Unsurprisingly, Belarus (Sychov) stated that the 
current Europe security structure was eroding and voiced 
strong support for Russia's proposal of a new security 
treaty.  Sychov declared that the pol-mil aspect of security 
should be give priority and that discussion of a new treaty 
should begin immediately.  Belarus supported discussion of 
the Russian proposal at the upcoming ASRC and holding a 
summit. 
 
Kazakhstan: A/CFE Will Need to Be Adapted 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) Kazakhstan (Abdrakhmanov) welcomed the Russian 
proposals.  He complained about the lack of progress on A/CFE 
and the Parallel Actions Package.  Abdrakhmanov reminded all 
that Kazakhstan had already adopted A/CFE, but since it has 
been so long, A/CFE now needed further "adaptation." 
 
Allies and Others: More Questions than Answers 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶29. (SBU) Turkey (Buluc) aligned itself with the content of 
 
USOSCE 00000038  007 OF 008 
 
 
the EU statement.  Buluc stated that the OSCE was the right 
platform for European security discussion because of its 
comprehensive dialogue with all parties.  Turkey believed all 
participating states need to reaffirm their political and 
legal commitments.  Buluc also warned against distinguishing 
the pol-mil dimension from the other dimensions in the OSCE. 
Buluc wondered how any new instrument could be better than 
the current agreements. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Switzerland (Marfurt) supported having the security 
discussion in the OSCE. Marfurt said the North American and 
Central Asian countries need to be involved. 
 
¶31. (SBU) Armenia (Hovhannisyan) agreed that the OSCE was a 
place for candid discussion.  He opined that the current 
security arrangement was based on old ideas and that it 
needed revitalization.  Hovhannisyan reminded that security 
of one states should be not at the expense of another states. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Romania (Feruta) voiced its support for the EU 
statement.  Feruta also supported the current security 
agreements calling them valuable.  The problem is full 
implementation of the current commitments.  He asked Grushko 
what role the CFE Treaty would have in the Russian proposal. 
 
¶33. (SBU) Canada (Gregory) wanted confirmation that the new 
treaty would cover from Vancouver to Vladivostok and asked 
for concrete details on the new proposal.  Gregory emphasized 
the need to honor the current commitments in any future 
agreement.  She emphasized that human rights and current 
commitments are not negotiable.  She wanted to know how the 
new security proposal would integrate the three OSCE 
dimensions as well as the CFE Treaty. 
 
¶34. (SBU) Norway (Vik) called for current agreements to be 
preserved in any new security discussion.  Any new treaty 
should not take away from current agreements.  Vik stated 
that until the details are worked out, there should not be a 
rush to schedule higher level meetings. 
 
Italy: Serious Engagement Offered 
--------------------------------- 
¶35. (SBU) Italy (Varvesi) voiced it support for the EU 
statement by the Czech Republic.  Varvesi supported an 
examination of Russia's proposal, but insisted that the three 
OSCE dimensions must be included in any new agreement. 
Varvesi supported CiO Greece's call for a brainstorming 
session on the issue. 
 
U.S.: Our Principles Fine, but Their Implementation Wanting 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶36. (SBU) The U.S. (Scott) supported the EU statement.  Scott 
questioned Russia's call for a legally-binding agreement when 
it was not abiding by the CFE Treaty.  He also questioned 
Russia's support for principles that they were currently 
violating in Georgia.  Scott asked Grushkov what he meant by 
Helsinki-Plus and whether Russia supported the principles of 
host nation consent, right to choose alliances, and avoiding 
spheres of influence.  The current problem is not the lack of 
principles, Scott said, but rather poor implementation.  He 
reminded Grushko that there was no agreement to hold the ASRC 
at the minister-level. 
 
USOSCE 00000038  008 OF 008 
 
 
 
UK: NATO Open to All 
------------------- 
 
¶37. (SBU) In response to Grushko's accusation that NATO was 
an exclusive club, the UK (Cliff) countered that NATO was 
open to all interested countries and NATO does not support a 
zero-sum security approach.  Cliff told Grushko that for 
trust to be reestablished, the problems at Kolbasna and 
Gudauta must be resolved.  He said any new agreement must 
reaffirm all current agreements and values and cannot be 
selective.  Cliff wanted to know if Russia considers the OSCE 
the primary venue for the new European security discussion. 
 
Germany: New Perspectives Needed 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶38. (SBU) Germany (Horsten), recalling FM Steinmeier's 
statement, said a new perspective on conventional arms 
control including the CFE Treaty was needed.  Horsten called 
for movement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
claimed that the soft security issue was just as important as 
any other security issue. 
SCOTT