VZCZCXRO2442
OO RUEHSK
DE RUEHVEN #0015/01 0331051
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021051Z FEB 09 ZDK DUE TO MULTIPLE REQUESTS
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6173
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1704
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000015 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR M HAYES 
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS AJ AM
SUBJECT: CFE/JCG: 27 JANUARY PLENARY - AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA 
TRADE CHARGES ON RUSSIAN ARMS TRANSFERS 
 
REF: A. STATE 004933 
     ¶B. USOSCE 0010 
     ¶C. BAKU 73 
     ¶D. 08 USOSCE 321 
 
USOSCE 00000015  001.3 OF 005 
 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified; please protect accordingly.  Not 
for Internet 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  At the January 27 Joint Consultative 
Group plenary, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia clashed in 
another round of lengthy dueling statements.  This followed 
charges last week by Azerbaijan regarding Russian CFE 
Treaty-limited equipment transshipped through Armenia into 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Russia rejected the Azeri accusations that 
it had shipped the equipment, and testily declared supporting 
documents &fake.8  Russia said it has responded to the 
Azeri Embassy in Moscow and considers the matter closed. 
Armenia claimed the Azeris were trying to disrupt the Minsk 
Group process, and raised Azeri Treaty non-compliance issues. 
 Azerbaijan characterized the Armenian responses as &fairy 
tales.8   NOTE:  These exchanges took place against the 
backdrop of recent high-level OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair 
meetings January 19-20 in capitals and January 27-28 in 
Zurich. (See SEC.PR/18/09) 
 
¶2. (SBU) Both JCG meetings so far this session were dominated 
by the extensive series of interventions between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia, as well as Russia (the accused TLE supplier). 
Several areas of non-compliance with the CFE Treaty were 
mentioned in their statements amidst the ongoing political 
rhetoric.  Many delegations believe both States Parties are 
in violation of certain Treaty provisions, and that although 
Azerbaijan is open about it, Armenia is not.  Allies remained 
silent during both rounds.  At a meeting on January 26, Quad 
Allies said they prefer not to engage in the JCG on these 
allegations of non-compliance.  However, they took the point 
that if the debate continues, Allies may not be able to go on 
ignoring these cases of non-compliance in the JCG while we 
repeatedly raising those of Russia.  If necessary, they 
believed a series of coordinated national statements by 
Allies would be better than a NATO approach as a whole. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On the margins, per Ref A, USDel spoke to the Azeri 
Ambassador about our concerns that its data declarations 
clearly show them in violation of certain TLE limits.  He 
acknowledged that was the case, and said it has nothing to 
hide, unlike Armenia.  USDel notes that Ref A guidance was 
written before the latest exchanges of non-compliance 
allegations emerged.  There may be a need to address the 
issue in the JCG -- should these bilateral exchanges continue 
-- if NATO states are to be seen as addressing concerns about 
non-compliance with the Treaty in a balanced way and not 
unfairly singling out Russia.  USDel welcomes additional 
guidance on such an approach.  End Summary. 
 
Azeri-Armenia-Russia equipment accusations 
-------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU)  On January 16, Azerbaijan distributed an 
unclassified statement to OSCE delegations describing the 
Russian transfer of 69 types of weapons, ammunition, and 
combat equipment of approximately 800 million USD to Armenia, 
including a chart in English and Russian listing equipment 
and ammunition by type and quantity. (see SEC.DEL/14/09 and 
14/09/Add 1 of 16 January)  The Azeri statement claims the 
document gives evidence to the transfer of equipment from the 
Russian military 102nd base in Gyumri, Armenia.  Azerbaijan 
is deeply concerned that such transfers will significantly 
strengthen the combat potential of the Armenian faction 
occupying part of Azeri territory in N-K.  Such transfers 
would be a direct violation of the relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions on the N-K conflict, as well as the UN 
General Assembly Resolution on &the situation in the 
occupied territories of Azerbaijan8 adopted on March 14, 
¶2008.  Comment: Per Ref D, if the Azeri claims are true, then 
 
USOSCE 00000015  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
Russia, as one of the Minsk Group co-chairs, may have given a 
military boost to one of the sides in a conflict it is 
supposed to be mediating.  End comment. 
 
¶5. (SBU) At the January 20 JCG plenary, the Azeri Ambassador 
Ismayilov made a lengthy statement clarifying its concerns 
regarding the chart disseminated through the media, focusing 
its remarks on the numbers of CFE Treaty-limited types of 
equipment with respect to CFE data exchange information 
provided in December 2008, including battle tanks, armored 
combat vehicles (ACVs), and artillery over 100 mm.  (see 
JCG.JOUR/684, Annex 3)  In the CFE Treaty context of 
Treaty-limited equipment, the media chart includes 
information on shipment of:  21 battle tanks, 61 ACVs and 54 
artillery systems (100mm and above).  The Azeri statement 
alleges that: 
 
--Armenia has been in breach of the Treaty since its 
signature, as well as after the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 
1992 (which divided up the ceilings for Soviet Union states); 
 
--Armenia has 40 well-equipped combat units in N-K with up to 
350 tanks, 398 ACVs, and 426 artillery units (NOTE: 
statement does not include the source for these numbers); 
 
--Armenia in its Annual Exchange of Military Information as 
of January 1, 2009 declares 110 tanks, 140 ACVs, and 239 
artillery units; 
 
--Armenia,s limits under Tashkent 1992 are 220 tanks, 220 
ACVs, and 285 artillery units; 
 
--Therefore, Armenia is exceeding its CFE Treaty limits as 
follows:  261 tanks, 379 ACVs, and 433 artillery. 
 
             Tanks        ACVs     Artillery 
N-K forces    350       398         425 
AEMI         110        140         239 
New transfer   21       61          54 
Total         481       599         718 
 
Limits under 
Tashkent      220       220         285 
--------------------------------------- 
Armenia,s 
Excess              261       379         433 
 
--Armenian data exchange information has not changed much 
since 1996, when it declared 101 tanks, 218 ACVs, and 225 
artillery units.  However in 1996 Armenia received one 
billion USD in military equipment from Russia &free of 
charge8, including 84 tanks, 50 ACVs and 116 artillery units; 
 
--Armenia did not distribute the F22 and F23 Treaty 
notifications last year required by the Protocol on 
Notification and Exchange of Information, Section IX, 
paragraph 1A and B &Information on the entry and removal 
from service with the conventional armed forces of a State 
Party of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty within previous 12 months;8 
 
--No secret that all armaments and equipment which Armenia 
receives or buys are directly transferred to the occupied 
territory of Azerbaijan, and kept out of the arms control 
regime; 
 
--Azerbaijan does not consider the excess Armenia TLE to be 
so-called UTLE (uncontrolled Treaty-limited equipment). 
Rather, these TLE belong to one State Party, and have never 
been declared, counted or limited; 
 
--When speaking about preserving the CFE regime in Europe, we 
also have to take these violations seriously.  This is not 
just a problem of two States Parties; 
 
 
USOSCE 00000015  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
--Azerbaijan has always declared its procurements in a timely 
manner and made them subject to inspection.  Azeris are open 
and transparent in its actions. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Armenian Ambassador Hovakimian, obviously 
prepared for this exchange, also made his own lengthy reply, 
disputing the authenticity of the document in question and 
denying any wrong-doing claiming this was yet another 
propaganda stunt by Armenia to unsettle the Minsk Group peace 
process. (see JCG.JOUR/684, Annex 4)  The Armenian points 
included: 
 
--Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has denied the veracity of 
the suspect chart, which could have been prepared by anyone. 
Also called into question the actions of the Azeri government 
based on a document found on the internet; 
 
--Not first time Azeri,s have accused Armenia of not 
fulfilling its arms control obligations, and all previous 
cases have been proven false; 
 
--Perhaps another attempt to justify its own (Azeri) 
unprecedented military expenditures and transfers of combat 
equipment; 
 
--Azeri misrepresentation of nature of UNSCR on N-K conflict 
) its  assertions that this is an inter-state conflict are 
distortions aimed at misleading the international community; 
 
--Azeri one-sided policy bias led co-chairs of Minsk Group to 
vote against the UN General Assembly resolution that it 
proposed; 
 
--Regret lack of coherence from Azeri delegations at 
negotiations versus proceedings held elsewhere. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Russia (Ulyanov) said it has already discussed the 
subject bilaterally with the Azeris, and agrees with Armenia 
that the document in question is most likely a fraud 
perpetrated with the intent of interfering with the political 
process.   Turkey expressed concerns that the issue could 
have a negative impact on the security of the Caucuses. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Azerbaijan reiterated that the main issue is the 
alleged transfer of weapons by one of the mediators and 
co-chairs of the Minsk process to the state occupying Azeri 
territory.  There are many agreed mechanisms that all have 
signed up to that call for refraining from the use of force. 
It called on Russia to investigate this case. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Armenia noted that it has now been accused a 
second time of violating the CFE Treaty, however it is not 
Armenia that has openly bought and exceeded its Treaty 
holdings (i.e., Azerbaijan left unsaid).  The Azeris do not 
declare all the Objects of Verification (OOVs) required by 
the Treaty, and there is a long list of other violations. 
There is no way to check the numbers of equipment present in 
N-K, it is a black hole and a convenient way for the Azeris 
to hide UTLE.  Azerbaijan should check its own levels of 
declared equipment. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Azerbaijan responded again by noting it has 
provided all necessary information and clarified that 
inter-state references in the UNSCR mean conflicts between 
states.  It signed the Moscow Declaration of November 2008. 
Armenia replied that if the Azeri logic applied, then Armenia 
and Russia would have signed as well. 
 
&Armenian Fairy Tales8 
---------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) On January 27, Russia (Ulyanov) recalled that at 
the previous meeting it responded to the Azeri statement by 
noting the chart in question is not in line with reality. 
Moscow studied the document and determined that it contains 
 
USOSCE 00000015  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
at least 15 grammar and substantive mistakes ) which means 
the document is clearly fake.  Following receipt of the Azeri 
note verbale, Moscow has since sent a reply note verbale to 
the Azeri Embassy in Moscow condemning the document as 
anti-Russian in nature, noting that it does not help mutual 
relations, is a fraud, and that Russia considers the matter 
closed. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Azeri Ambassador confirmed receipt of the reply 
note from the Russian Federation and said it is under study 
in Baku.  However, a wide range of issues needs to stay open, 
and requested that all facts be studied.  Azerbaijan is ready 
for a constructive dialogue, and will inform the JCG of any 
new details. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  Despite claiming that it was not planning to speak 
on the topic, Armenia (Papikyan) proceeded to read from a 
prepared, 3-page statement in response to some of the Azeri 
remarks from the prior week.  (see JCG.JOUR/685, Annex) 
Specifically, Armenia disputed the Azeri claim that it had 
not provided the F22 notification data TLE entering into 
service during the previous 12 months, and provided the CFE 
notification number (CFE/AM/08/0013/F22/O).  He expressed 
hope that all States Parties would join the OSCE 
Communications Network so as to ensure all messages are 
received properly. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Armenia said it is not worth commenting on Azeri 
claims from the 1990,s ) &How can we look at what occurred 
in the 1990s, and anticipate a dialogue on that matter with a 
State Party when it blatantly and unapologetically violates 
the Treaty today?8  &The record of Azerbaijan,s compliance 
with the Treaty,s provisions during the past years, in 
extent and essence, and the scope of the threat to the 
Treaty,s integrity, at least in our region, makes it totally 
inappropriate and meaningless to examine what happened in the 
past.8 
 
¶15. (SBU) Regarding the Azeri comment that Armenia has 
purchased only a modest amount of TLE, Armenia believes its 
numbers are similar to those of other States Parties and 
modest compared to the imports by Azerbaijan in the last 
three to four years, including:  164 tanks, 151 artillery 
units, and 21 aircraft.  In the JCG in 2006, when Armenia 
raised questions about Azerbaijan exceeding its maximum 
levels of holdings, Azerbaijan claimed it was in the process 
of modernizing its armed forces.  Since then, Azerbaijan has 
reported that only 5 ACVs and 7 artillery pieces have been 
removed from service. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Armenia noted that as of today, Azerbaijan is 
exceeding its allowed holdings of TLE by 161 tanks (maximum 
220 allowed) and 119 artillery pieces (maximum allowed 285). 
 Azerbaijan claims that the transfers took place 
transparently, as if the Treaty allows violations of ceilings 
if they take place openly.  Why was it done openly ) because 
under the United Nations information exchange on Conventional 
Arms Transfers both the exporter and importer have to report, 
e.g., if the exporter reports the transfers then Azerbaijan 
must report the import.  Armenia is glad the information on 
exports and imports has been reported, but it that does not 
mean all armaments have been covered.  Comment: Per Ref C, 
after studying the 2009 CFE annual exchange of information we 
reported that Azerbaijan is over its Treaty limits by 161 
tanks and 119 artillery pieces.  End comment. 
 
¶17. (SBU) With respect to verification mechanisms, Armenia 
criticized the Azeri record of compliance with the Treaty 
listing the following comments: 
 
--Azerbaijan fails to specify the geographic location 
information for 9 of its units, thus making it impossible to 
verify the information on TLE stationed there.  Rather 
Azerbaijan justifies this shortcoming by claiming their 
peacetime location has been changed.  The case of the 9 Azeri 
 
USOSCE 00000015  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
units creates a black hole in the area of application, giving 
Azerbaijan a convenient opportunity to conceal its TLE; 
 
--The Treaty is very clear, Article 14 stipulates the right 
of the States Parties to conduct, and the obligation to 
accept, inspections.  Paragraph 2 (A) defines the purpose of 
the inspections as being &to verify, on the basis of the 
information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information 
Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical 
limitations(.8 - which is impossible in the case of 
Azerbaijan; 
 
--Section 5, paragraph 1, of the Protocol on Notification and 
Exchange of Information commits all States Parties to provide 
information specifying its OOVs and enumerating its declared 
sites, including each site,s designation and location, 
geographic name and co-ordinates; 
 
--Further, Section II, paragraph 1, of the Protocol on 
Inspection commits States Parties to facilitate inspections 
for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with 
the Treaty; 
 
--Nothing in the Treaty allows parties to stop providing 
information on the location of units and/or to continue to 
notify on the previous location of the unit if it has been 
moved to a new place; 
 
--Annex B, paragraph 11, of the Final Document of the first 
Review Conference requires notification of any creation of, 
or relocation of, an OOV at least 42 days advance. 
 
--Considering that a ceasefire has been in place, why did the 
number of units increase from 8 to 9 in 2002, although these 
units have allegedly been relocated.  Further, Azerbaijan 
does not allow inspection of those units for &security 
reasons8 ) an artificial reason unless the TLE is on the 
line of contact.  If the TLE is on the line of contact this 
means only one thing ) resumption of the armed conflict. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Azeri Ambassador had the last word by saying 
the Armenian statement is just a repeat of its June 2008 
FSC/PC statement.  It is ridiculous to comment on the 
Armenian statement as it merely represents words by an 
aggressive country occupying my country.  Azerbaijan has many 
reasons to cease implementation of the CFE Treaty, but is 
resisting that course of action.  He hopes no one believes 
these Armenian fairy tales any more, and reserves the right 
to reply in the future. 
 
U.S. Conversation on Margins with Azerbaijan 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶19. (SBU) On the margins, USDel (Neighbour) spoke to the 
Azeri Ambassador on January 27 per Ref A instructions about 
U.S. concerns that its data declarations clearly show them in 
violation of certain TLE limits.  Ismayilov acknowledged that 
was the case, and said it has nothing to hide, unlike 
Armenia.  We also sought clarification on whether his 
statement that Azerbaijan also has reasons to suspend its 
observation of the Treaty was based on those made last year 
or on some new policy development.  Ismayilov assured us that 
there is no new position in that direction, and his comment 
was based on those made previously. 
SCOTT