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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000062

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL

REF: STATE 9988

Classified By: Political Advisor Walter S. Reid for reasons 1.4(B)&(D).

¶1. (C/NOFORN) Summary. Implementation coordination for 2009 dominated discussions in the 5 February 2009 VCC and Experts, with Turkey raising unexpectedly strong objections to provisions that dictate which Ally loses in the event a non-Ally preempts an Allied verification activity. Turkeys objections seemed linked to the fact that under the draft, which most other Allies understood would be agreed, Turkey would lose its passive quota for an inspection to the Russian Federation as a result of a recent notification of intent to inspect Russia by Switzerland. Turkey finally consented to move the draft along, but resumed its opposition in the VCC. The paper has since been placed under silence which ends close of business, 16 February.

¶2. (SBU) Allies indicated their intention to table national papers at the AIAM, which will likely not mirror the papers discussed in the Experts meeting, and which are expected to be disseminated within a week or two prior to the AIAM.

¶3. (C) On the margins, France and Hungary indicated they had already consulted with Georgia on their upcoming VD 99 evaluation visit and inspection respectively, while France indicated some support for the idea of including Russian inspectors if the logistics could be worked out in short order. France also noted that it was considering proposing in Vienna a new CSBM consisting of reciprocal visits to Russia and Georgia by a team lead by mutually agreed neutral state. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Implementation Coordination - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶4. (SBU) Much to the surprise of Allies, discussion on the IS working paper on Implementation Coordination (AC/319-WP(2008)0009-Rev7) dominated the VCC and meeting of experts.

¶5. (SBU) Background note. Implementation coordination is a NATO attempt to mitigate the effects of the so-called "quota race," which historically resulted in participating States (pS) exhausting the limited number of passive quotas for VD 99 evaluation visits and inspections within the first few months of the calendar year. In late 2007 Allies, who historically conduct the largest number of inspections to pS of interest such as Russia, agreed to coordinate the allocation and scheduling of NATO VD 99 inspections for 2008. Most Allies were satisfied with the results of this experiment, agreeing to coordinate activities for 2009. During an extended review of the modalities for NATO coordination, debate has centered on provisions in paragraph eight of the coordination paper, which addresses the loss of an available passive quota in the event a
non-NATO pS preempts a coordinated NATO activity. Despite the extended debate on paragraph eight, Allies allocated and deconflicted the 2009 schedule in accordance with this IS working paper. End background note.

¶6. (C/REL NATO) Turkish rep (Yuksel) opened the experts meeting in strong opposition to the compensation provisions found in paragraph 8 of the IS working paper. Yuksel explained that Turkey considers "something missing" from the current version. Yuksel recalled that Turkey had lost an inspection to a non-Ally in 2008, and that since the last VCC in January 2009, Switzerland had notified an inspection to the Russian Federation. Since Turkey was scheduled to inspect Russia in February, according to the provisions in revision seven, Turkey would lose an inspection again. (Note. Over the last several months, experts have debated which Ally should lose its quota in the event of an unplanned inspection, but settled on the following construction: "the Ally next scheduled after a 4-week period will lose its inspection/evaluation, unless otherwise agreed amongst affected Allies or unless otherwise coordinated through the VCC." The four-week period was added to protect an Ally that had already committed resources to an upcoming inspection. End Note) Yuksel noted that while Turkey had fully complied with IS instructions to provide locations, dates and guest inspectors for its desired inspections and evaluations, some Allies had not provided dates and are listed on the schedule in a column labeled "not fixed." As revision seven calls for the "next scheduled" Ally to lose its quota, Allies listed in the category of "not fixed" fall outside the provisions and are protected from losing a quota.

¶7. (C) Comment. To say that Allies where surprised with the Turkish position would be an understatement. Most Allies, including USDel, understood that experts had agreed in January to use the paper, including the text of paragraph eight, provisionally as a guide until it was formally approved in the VCC. Since Allies had only proposed two minor edits to revision six that fell outside paragraph eight, most expected revision seven to reach consensus in the experts meeting with minimal discussion. End Comment.

¶8. (C/REL NATO) Norway, the sole "unscheduled" Ally holding a passive quota for the Russian Federation, rejected Turkeys position, repeating its long standing position on the purpose of VD 99 inspections--that inspections should be used to verify military activity. Acknowledging the fact that other Allies have different points of view, Norway argued that it cannot schedule an inspection until such time as it receives indications of military activity or suspects such activity. Despite the fact that the IS requested inspections dates from Allies,
Allies are under no obligation to pre-schedule VD 99 inspections.

¶9. (C/REL NATO) An unmoved Yuksel reminded Allies that coordination of VD 99 activities is optional, and that the VCC is not mandated to deconflict VD 99 scheduling. Furthermore, according to NATO procedures the VCC, not experts, may approve a working paper and then only after it is placed under silence. Therefore, Yuksel argued, the current paper remains under discussion, and any Ally has the right to introduce edits at any time.

¶10. (C/REL NATO) Norway, Belgium, Spain, Canada, France, Denmark, Italy, Romania, and the U.S. attempted to placate Turkish concerns by offering potential compromises. Several Allies emphasized that the provision for the loss of a quota would only take effect in a case where consultations between affected Allies and within the VCC fail to address the problem equitably. Canada posed that if Turkey was concerned that some Allies where technically unscheduled, then those Allies could be moved from the "not fixed" column to week 52 as a place holder. Finally, U.S. rep (Meyer) proposed that Allies approve revision seven at experts level in order to move the paper forward to the VCC. In turn, experts could take up Turkeys concerns at the next meeting as a preliminary discussion for revising coordination for 2010. The Chair finally called for a recess so the affected Allies (those holding passive quotas--Turkey, Spain and Norway) could attempt to find an equitable solution to Turkeys quota loss.

¶11. (C/REL NATO) Despite these attempts, Turkey held fast. Yuksel opposed Canadas proposal to move Allies on the schedule from the "not fixed" column to week 52 because Norway would still consider itself free to move forward if it received indications of military activity. Likewise, Yuksel rejected outright the idea of forwarding revision seven to the VCC without addressing Turkeys loss this year. Finally, Yuksel lamented that the three affected Allies could not agree to a specific solution since there are only two remaining quotas for three Allies and Turkey had already bought tickets and invited guest inspectors.

¶12. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion wound down in the experts meeting, the Chair indicated that there was no consensus to move the paper forward to the VCC. Belgium then questioned whether Allies would be using procedures from the new paper or from last year. Canada reminded Allies that, if the current paper was not approved, Allies would be back to announcing inspections on a first-come-first-served basis two meetings in advance of the desired period of inspection. After another round of aggravated interventions from Allies, Yuksel finally relented, announcing that Turkey would not block a decision to move the paper to the VCC. However, he
cautioned that if it got that far, Allies could expect Turkey to place conditions on silence procedures; for example, an extended silence of one to two months. The Chair reissued the paper with one minor uncontested edit as revision eight and forwarded it to the VCC.

- - - - - - - Into the VCC - - - - - - -

¶13. (C/REL NATO) During the VCC Turkey reignited its opposition to the provisions in paragraph eight. USDel asked Turkey to clarify its claim that the provisions were unfair, to which Turkey repeated its talking points regarding "unscheduled" Allies. Finally Italy, stating what all seemed to be thinking, alleged that Turkey simply resented the fact that it would lose its passive quota to Russia and was trying to stall the paper just long enough to notify its inspection. Turkey could do this either by blocking the paper or by placing it under silence for an extended period or until it sent its notification. (Note. According to the deconflicted schedule, Turkey is scheduled for an inspection in week 8, 16-20 February, and would therefore send its notification the week prior, 9-13 February.)

¶14. (C/REL NATO) Yuksel flatly denied that Turkey was basing its objection on its inspection schedule, and noted that the length of time for silence procedures could be one week, one month, or two months for that matter. In audible rumblings around the table, Allies complained that any length was fine, as long as it was long enough to allow Turkey to notify its intent to inspect. Turkey then said it only objected to paragraph 8, and that Allies could put paragraphs 1-7 and 9-11 under silence.

¶15. (C/REL NATO) In another twist, Canada said that it could not accept placing only part of the paper under silence and asked the Chair (Wiederholtz) whether the position taken by Turkey implied that none of the provisions in the paper were valid. (Note. The VCC Chair Miggins was recovering from a bout of the flu.) Wiederholtz conceded that Turkeys interpretation of the status of the paper was correct, that the paper was indeed not agreed, and that as a result none of the papers provisions were agreed, to include those for allocating and deconflicting schedules. The implication, Wiederholtz lamented, was that Allies would have to re-bid for verification activities in accordance with pre-2007 procedures.

¶16. (C/REL NATO) As the discussion vacillated back and forth over which procedures are in force, and whether Allies would have to re-bid for allocations, a determined Belgium provided some comic relief by attempting to align with the general discussion its position on whether it would or would not inspect Serbia. (Under the procedures proposed in revision seven Belgium would lose its quota to Serbia due to an
unscheduled inspection by Austria. Under the old procedures Slovakia would lose the inspection.) With each new claim that the old/new procedures were in effect, Belgium intervened to make known its position, indicating its intent to conduct/lose its passive quota to Serbia.

¶17. (C/REL NATO) Norway lamented that it seemed the issue could not be resolved and expressed frustration over the expenditure of time and resources over the last several months in revising this paper. U.S. rep (Meyer) empathized with Norway, stating that the U.S. would also be extremely disappointed if all of the work and resources expended by Allies in December and January were now voided and wasted as a result of Turkeys position. Meyer proposed that, regardless of the final status of revision seven in the VCC, Allies agree to adhere to the published 2009 scheduled, which was deconflicted in accordance with the new procedures in December and January. Despite some caution expressed by the Chair, Allies rallied in agreement to continue to execute the deconflicted 2009 schedule, at least until the next VCC.

¶18. (C/REL NATO) Feeling the pressure of isolation, Yuksel finally agreed to return to capital to get permission to place the document under silence for one week. Yuksel asked the Chair to give him until the following days close of business to get his instructions. (Note. While the Chair and several Allies understood this to be a formality, and stated that the paper would be placed under silence Friday, 6 February, USDel understood that Turkey would need the day to get instructions, and that only with Turkeys final approval would the paper go under silence. In a follow up call on Friday, the IS confirmed that this was indeed the case as Turkey agreed to place the paper under silence, but not until the close of business the following Friday, February 13. In the end, the working paper was placed under silence on Monday, 9 February for a period of one week. Turkey did not indicate whether it expected to break silence. End Note.)

¶19. (C/NOFORN) Comment. Yuksel was visibly stressed, stating that he was under strict instructions from Ankara and that he had no room to maneuver. Ankara, whos position seemed clearly linked to avoiding the loss of its inspection quota for Russia, may resent the loss of inspections two years in a row, while perceiving that Norway and other "unscheduled" Allies remain exempt from losses by hiding in the "not fixed" column. If so, this position ignores the fact that Allies who remain unscheduled incur greater risk with each passing month that an unscheduled inspection from a non-NATO partner will exhaust another passive quota. As such, an Ally waiting for indications of military activity before scheduling its inspection is at greater risk of losing its
quota than it would be if it schedule the inspection in the first few months of the year. Turkeys argument also makes light of Norways long-standing minority, but technically valid position on the purpose of VD 99 inspections. Therefore, Turkeys claim that some Allies are protected from the loss of inspections is largely muted by long-standing national policy and the practical realities of implementing VD 99 inspections.

¶20. (C/NOFORN) Turkey also seemed intent on delaying the approval of revision seven in order to preserve its inspection to Russia. In response to questions from Allies on why Turkey did not raise its objections earlier, Yuksel stated that the situation had changed since January--in other words; Switzerland had notified an inspection to Russia, thus placing Turkeys inspection at risk. Yuksel admitted that Turkey had no alternative proposals or edits, except to add a line to the text indicating that its provisions be considered for 2010 inspection/evaluation coordination. Finally, Yuksel stated repeatedly in the experts meeting that Turkey saw no reason for Allies to rush to adopt the document. In contrast to Allied calls to forward a good, albeit imperfect paper to the VCC, Yuksel held that the paper contained a significant gap and that it was the responsibility of the VCC and experts to ensure the paper was as perfect as possible. End Comment.

- - - - - - - - - - - Implementation Papers - - - - - - - - - - -

¶21. (C/REL NATO) As discussion on implementation coordination consumed most of the experts meeting, there was little time for discussion of AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, on Implementation Issued for the 2009 AIAM. Canada announced that it would table a Food for Thought paper at the AIAM on Force Majeure. Canada noted that its FFT would be based on the paper it developed for the VCC, but that the Canadian delegation in Vienna was consulting with several delegations and would incorporate additional comments and suggestions into the final draft. Canada also noted that, despite Frances stated opposition to the paper the French delegation in Vienna had responded to the paper positively. Nevertheless, in the VCC, French rep said he had checked with the MFA and with the French Del in Vienna and he reaffirmed Frances opposition to the Canadian paper.

¶22. (SBU) Denmark also noted it would table a paper on the size of evaluation and inspection teams, as would Norway on the quota calculation system. Denmark and Norway also indicated their papers would not be identical to the papers developed for the VCC. Finally, all three indicated they expected their papers to be completed and distributed one to two weeks in advance, although Denmark noted it would forward its paper
to the CPC and leave the timing of distribution up to them.

¶23. (SBU) Turkey noted that it was still considering whether to table a paper on digital cameras, and Germany, who drafted the paper on Briefings for Military Commanders, did not have instructions indicating whether Berlin would table naything at the AIAM.

¶24. (C) As it was obvious that Allies were no longer inclined to discuss the details of AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, USDel took the opportunity to make the following points in both the experts meeting and the VCC:

-- U.S. understands that the papers tabled at the AIAM will be national submissions. While we welcome the papers, we want Allies to understand that they should not consider the papers annexed to AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4 to be agreed, because they are not.

-- The U.S. understands that Allies are agreed that we do not want to open VD 99. The papers, as drafted in AC/319-WP(2008)0010-Rev4, did not make that clear. We would encourage those Allies tabling papers to ensure that their submissions and presentations clearly indicate that any proposed suggestions are voluntary standards or voluntary approaches for the proposes of transparency. Allies could expect the U.S. to make comments along these lines on any paper or presentation that does not adequately make this point. (Note. Allies seemed receptive to this point; however, some Allies are leery of "voluntary" measures, arguing that many of the existing voluntary measures are simply ignored by participating States. Therefore, in preparing U.S. guidance for the AIAM, it would be helpful to differentiate between the need to protect a specific U.S. equity (i.e. a measure we may choose not to implement) and the need to preserve the integrity of VD 99 (i.e. the text clearly indicates the measure is voluntary, but we would generally agree to implement it under normal circumstances.) End note.)

-- The U.S. would also encourage Allies for the purposes of clarity to ensure the language used in the papers remains consistent with that found in VD 99 (i.e. Use the specific term "specified area" vs. "area" when appropriate.)

¶25. (SBU) During the VCC, Turkey asked whether the U.S. intended to raise the issue of Russias new visa procedures at the AIAM. U.S. rep (Meyer) said that while the U.S. would raise the issue if needed, the U.S. was under the impression that other Allies in Vienna had indicated initially their intent to bring this up either at the AIAM or in the VCC.

- - - - - Schedules - - - - -

¶26. (C/REL NATO) U.S. announced its VD 99 evaluation to the Russian Federation had been rescheduled from week 5 to week 7, and

that its CFE inspection for the Russian Federation in the 13th residual year had been moved from TB 48 to TB 50.

¶27. (C/REL NATO) Other changes to the deconflicted CFE schedule for the next treaty year are as follows:

-- Germanys bilateral inspection to Ukraine has been rescheduled from TB 53 to TB 1.

-- Germanys paid inspection in Ukraine has been rescheduled from TB 26 to TB 51.

-- Portugals inspection to the Russian Federation has been rescheduled from TB 53 to TB 6.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - About Georgia on the Margins: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

¶28. (C/REL NATO) USDel relayed the talking points ref guidance regarding Georgias request for the U.S. to conduct a verification activity in Georgia soon to the VCC representatives of Hungary, Spain and France. Hungary, scheduled to conduct an inspection in week 12, indicated that it had already consulted with Georgia on its inspection. The Hungarian Verification Agency representative noted Georgias flexibility in allowing Russian inspectors to accompany other teams, but was cool to the idea of the U.S. informing Georgia that it had consulted Allies regarding inspections. (Note. While he did not say why he was hesitant, perhaps he was taken off guard, it could be that since the NATO schedule is already agreed, it would be disingenuous to imply that Allies had adjusted their schedules to accommodate Georgias request. End Note.)

¶29. (SBU) The Spanish representative, a Lieutenant Colonel fresh from their verification agency, was new to the VCC. He noted U.S. points and was ambivalent. He did not think Spain had discussed its intentions with Georgia and did not have an opinion on discussing our consultations with Georgia.

¶30. (C/REL NATO) The French rep (Paeyn) indicated that France had already requested to bring auxiliary personnel on their inspection and had consulted with Georgia. Georgia agreed to the French request at no additional cost to Georgia. Payne was intrigued by Georgias willingness to take a Russian inspector, but said it was likely too late for France to arrange for a Russian guest inspector. Payne had no opinion on whether the U.S. should discuss Allied consultations with Georgia.

¶31. (C) Payne also reported that France was considering proposing a CSBM based on reciprocal visits between Georgia and Russia. France would request Russia and Georgia provide a list of pS that each felt could serve as a neutral observer. France would approach a mutually acceptable country and ask them to lead reciprocal visits in Georgia and

Russia with their teams composed of observers from the neutral state and an unspecified number of Russians to Georgia and Georgians to Russia. Payne did not indicate when France might propose this new measure.
VOLKER