VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0071/01 0511316
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201316Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9028
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0138
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1499
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000071 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR 
MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DIRECTOR GENERAL REPEATS CALL FOR 
SYRIAN COOPERATION IN MARCH BOARD REPORT 
 
REF: 08 UNVIE 00612 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The Director General's February 19 report on 
Syria's undeclared nuclear activities  is more categorical 
than his November report in re-focusing the Agency's  nearly 
year-long investigation on Syrian noncooperation.  Most 
importantly, the report debunks the Syrian red-herring 
allegation that the man-made uranium particles came from 
Israeli munitions.  The technical analysis of the uranium 
samples stipulates that there is a low probability this could 
be the case and further notes that the uranium is not of the 
type found in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material. 
 With additional particles now detected, it will be more 
difficult for Syria to deflect this issue.  The report places 
the emphasis back on Syria's failure to respond to Agency 
requests for information and access to debris and locations, 
as outlined in the November report.  The DG underlines that 
without Syria's cooperation, the IAEA will be unable to 
complete its assessment.  Taking a page from the Iranian 
playbook, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on February 
17 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation 
immediately before the report's release.  Helpfully, the 
report also sees through this stratagem, noting that Syria's 
"only partial answers" failed to address most of the Agency's 
questions. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Overall, the report is a clear improvement over the 
November report but whether this will substantially change 
the dynamic in the Board Room will also depend on the tenor 
of the DG's opening remarks.  Although it will be difficult 
for NAM and Arab group defenders of Syria to applaud 
"cooperation" on the basis of the report, a change in the 
DG's tone at the Board or a development in the next week, 
e.g. involving minimal cooperation by Syria, could prompt 
some Board members to again rally behind Syria.   Notably, 
there is no broad condemnation of Israel's bombing in the 
report, though the DG may again harken back to this in his 
opening remarks and NAM/Arab Board members will certainly not 
lose any opportunity to castigate Israel for violating 
international law.  Some Board members are also likely to 
focus on the Director General's call, at the end of the 
report, upon Israel and others to provide information and 
satellite imagery, which the DG may also repeat in his 
opening remarks as he did in November. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Taken together, the two IAEA reports on Syria 
provide a compelling technical case for continued 
investigations into claims of undeclared nuclear activities 
in Syria.  As the evidence mounts, and if Syria continues to 
stonewall, pressure will build for Board action.  The 
negative dynamics on the Board and the DG's stance do not 
allow for consideration of a resolution on Syria's 
noncooperation at this juncture.  As the Israeli Ambassador 
has noted, Syria does not present an imminent proliferation 
risk but eventually the Board will have to respond to 
maintain the credibility of Agency safeguards.  Our immediate 
objective in the March Board will be to solicit more forceful 
national statements, which on the basis of this report should 
be forthcoming, with exception of the NAM troika (Cuba, 
Egypt, Malaysia).  Mission will also support the public 
release of this report and seek to undo the negative 
precedent set in November when Cuba and Egypt blocked release 
of the Syria report.  NAM/Arab Board members would be 
hard-pressed to bring this issue to a vote given that they 
would lose, and blocking release lends the appearance that 
Syria has something to hide.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Call for Syria to Cooperate 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Director General's report on the Implementation 
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic 
(GOV/2009/9), released on February 19, strengthens the case 
against Syria and puts the onus on the need for Syrian 
cooperation for the IAEA to complete its assessment.  The DG 
departs from his usual rhetoric that focuses on the 
unilateral use of force and the late provision of information 
concerning the building at Al-Kibar (referred to in the 
report as Dair Alzour) and instead lists out the specific 
areas in which Syria should cooperate, areas that have been 
conveyed to Syria on numerous occasions.  The list includes 
 
 
provision of additional information and supporting 
documentation about the past use and nature of the building 
at the Al-Kibar site, information about the procurement 
activities, access to other locations alleged to be related 
to Al-Kibar, and access to sample destroyed and salvaged 
equipment and debris from the Al-Kibar site. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Taking a page from the Iranian playbook, Syria 
delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February attempting 
to demonstrate a degree of cooperation immediately before the 
report's release.  The report notes that while Syria's letter 
responds to "some of the questions" raised by the Agency, the 
responses in the Syria letter "were only partial" and did not 
address "most of the questions raised in the Agency's 
communications."  Syria did not receive the desired 
recognition for its efforts in the report. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Additional Uranium Identified in Samples 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Agency identified new uranium particles in the 
samples taken during the Agency's visit to Al-Kibar in June 
2007, in addition to the "significant number of natural 
uranium particles" first identified in the November 2008 
Board report (GOV/2008/60).  These new particles are also 
anthropogenic (or man-made).  Furthermore, the Agency notes 
that all the uranium particles identified to-date "are of a 
type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear 
material."  Press reports provide additional details 
regarding the environmental samples not identified in the DG 
reports; that the uranium was "uranium dioxide" according to 
a senior UN official, and that graphite (although not 
specifically "nuclear-grade" graphite) had been found in the 
samples.  (Comment: The U.S. assesses the nuclear reactor 
under construction at Al-Kibar was a graphite-moderated, 
gas-cooled reactor-type, which uses uranium metal fuel.  End 
comment.)  The DG dispels the notion that the man-made 
uranium, identified at Al-Kibar by numerous Laboratories in 
the Agency's Network of Analytic Laboratories, was introduced 
by Israeli missiles that destroyed the site in September 
¶2007.  The DG calls this a "low probability" due to the 
isotopic composition, chemical composition, and morphology of 
the particles, which are "all inconsistent with what would be 
expected from the use of uranium based munitions." 
 
----------------- 
Unhelpful Element 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In what appears to have been added almost as an 
afterthought at the end of the report, the Director General 
injects an element of unhelpful "balance" after calling for 
Syrian cooperation -- a call on Israel and other States to 
provide information and imagery.  Some Board statements will 
likely reflect this "balance" which detracts from the 
report's focus on Syrian noncooperation, and some may also 
harken back to conspiracy theories about the lack of 
commercial imagery.  U.S. and likeminded statements should 
underline steadfast support for the investigation to mitigate 
this unhelpful element. 
 
----------- 
Procurement 
----------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Other than the new uranium findings, the only other 
area in which the Agency continued to make progress was in 
its review of Syrian efforts to procure materials and 
equipment which could support the construction and operation 
of a nuclear reactor.  Additional details are not provided 
about the specific procurements, although the February 17 
letter from Damascus responded to some of the Agency's 
questions in this regard, which the Agency is now assessing. 
 
------------------ 
Building the Case 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) This new report does not repeat the Agency's 
analysis of satellite imagery and other information, as it 
first reported in its November report.  In November, the 
Agency made a compelling case for continued investigations in 
Syria with the uranium findings and its assessment that the 
containment structure of the destroyed facility at Al-Kibar 
"appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that 
 
required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors," and 
the "overall size of the building was sufficient to house the 
equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged." 
In addition, the November report noted the water pumping 
infrastructure at the site had enough pumping capacity "for a 
reactor of the size referred to in the allegation" as well as 
"sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping 
system." 
 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Despite the stark report, Syria will undoubtedly 
seek to rally support by reminding Member States that Syria 
has cooperated with the Agency as required by its Safeguards 
Agreement.  Its agreement to allow inspectors to visit 
Al-Kibar, which it claims is not nuclear-related and, 
therefore, not on the Agency's list of declared nuclear 
sites, is technically considered going beyond the letter of 
the law with its Safeguards Agreement.  While the Agency 
raises compelling and legitimate questions in order to 
conclude there are no undeclared nuclear material or 
activities in Syria, its hands are tied without Syria's 
"goodwill" or invoking special inspections.  In addition, 
Syria refuses to sign the Additional Protocol while Israel 
remains out of the NPT, which could also be an instrument for 
the Agency to use to gain access to additional sites.  Strong 
member statements during the March Board urging Syrian 
cooperation will be imperative to move the Agency's 
investigation forward. 
SCHULTE