VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0067/01 0491657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181657Z FEB 09

FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9018
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA 
NA-243-GOOREVICH/OEHLBERT, BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR, SIEMON; 
NA21-CUMMINS, ILIOPULOS; NE- MCGINNIS, PEKO, CLAPPER 
NRC FOR OIP - DUNN LEE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA MARCH BOARD: PREVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
 
Ref: A) UNVIE 0047 and previous; B) Wickes-Timbie email 2/13/2009 
 
---------------------- 
March Board Objectives 
---------------------- 
 
1.(SBU) The March 2-6 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the first 
meeting under President Obama's Administration, will be a platform 
to enunciate enhanced U.S. support for the IAEA and renewed 
commitment to multilateral cooperation.  Mission recommends that 
U.S. interventions at the Board reflect an overarching objective of 
building a robust IAEA that can effectively fulfill its nuclear 
safeguards, safety and security mandate and promote peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. Other delegations and the IAEA Secretariat will 
also closely track U.S. statements for signals of policy shifts, 
particularly on Iran and Syria.  With this in mind, our objectives 
should include: 
 
-- Ensuring that the election of the next Director General is 
conducted in a timely manner with minimal disruption while securing 
Board support for DG term limits; 
 
--Urging cooperation by Iran with the IAEA investigation, i.e. 
Iran's blockage of the investigation while ramping up its enrichment 
capacity is not an acceptable status quo, and such cooperation would 
take forward momentum on diplomatic engagement and direct dialogue; 
 
 
-- Signaling continued support for IAEA verification in Syria with 
an appropriate technical focus on the need for Syrian cooperation 
and access to debris and locations; 
 
-- Seek preliminary Board discussion of an International Nuclear 
Fuel Bank (INFB) and the Russian fuel assurance proposal with a view 
toward approval by the June Board. 
 
The Arab Group may seek to further politicize the Syria 
investigation via counter-claims against Israel and raise the 
alleged use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions in Gaza under the 
Safety Review Agenda item or Any Other Business (reftel).  USDEL 
should be ready to deflate Arab Group efforts that go beyond the 
mandate of the IAEA as a technical agency or that inappropriately 
link the issue of depleted uranium in Gaza with natural uranium 
found via the safeguards investigation in Syria. 
 
¶2. (SBU) U.S. statements should take the high road and focus on the 
Administration's support for the IAEA as an institution, including 
in areas covered by the Safety and Nuclear Technology reviews, i.e. 
safety, security and technical cooperation.  Agenda items on nuclear 
verification in Iran and Syria will be previewed septel upon the 
issuance of the respective DG reports.  Although largely a 
placeholder, the DPRK agenda item affords an opportunity to reaffirm 
the new Administration's commitment to the Six Party Process and 
IAEA role in verification.  Toward the end of the Board session, the 
Chair will report on her consultations with Board members regarding 
the candidates for Director General.  USDEL should express support 
for a timely and transparent process to elect the next DG and 
strenuously oppose any effort to postpone the election process until 
June.  Although not yet on the Provisional Agenda, Geneva Group and 
other delegations are formally requesting the addition of an item on 
institutionalizing term limits for the Director General.  An 
International Fuel Bank (INFB) is also not on the current agenda but 
Mission is consulting with the Director General on addition of an 
INFB as an information item for the March Board.  Whether under a 
specific agenda item or "Any Other Business," the U.S. statement on 
an INFB should focus on the need to move forward with the 
establishment of an INFB, consistent with the Administration's 
advocacy of this initiative.  End Summary. 
 
--------------  -------- 
Agenda Item 1:   DG's Introductory Statement 
--------------  ------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) As is customary, the Director General will elaborate on his 
reports to the Board on each agenda item.  On DPRK, the DG's oral 
remarks will substitute for a written report.  Mission seeks to 
encourage the Director General to support an International Fuel Bank 
(INFB) initiatives in his introductory statement, in particular to 
seek Board approval of an INFB by June.  DG ElBaradei is unlikely to 
comment on the election process for his successor.  He may urge 
Member State support for the proposed 2010 budget increase and the 
Future of the Agency discussion in his remarks.  No U.S. statement 
is appropriate; any comments should be reserved for the particular 
agenda item or AOB. 
-------------    ---------- 
Agenda Item 2:    Applications for Membership 
-------------    ---------- 
 
¶4. (U) The Secretariat has not received new applications for IAEA 
membership and the item is likely to drop from the agenda.  Mission 
will seek guidance if any new applications are forthcoming. 
 
--------------   --------- 
Agenda Item 3:   2008 Nuclear Safety Review 
--------------  ---------- 
 
¶5. (U) The Safety Review agenda item will be the first time the U.S. 
takes the floor in the Board under the Obama Administration.  After 
first noting that fact, the U.S. statement should begin with a broad 
expression of support for a robust IAEA, including in the areas of 
nuclear safety and security covered by the 2008 Nuclear Safety 
Review, "Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in 
Nuclear, Radiation and Transport Safety and Waste Management" 
(GOV/2009/2). This report is supplemented by two Notes: "Safety 
related events and activities worldwide during 2008" (2009/Note 4) 
and "The Agency's safety standards: activities during 2008" 
(2009/Note 5).  The U.S. should take note of all three documents and 
highlight the following: 
 
--Safety is Essential: The IAEA has developed the Global Nuclear 
Safety Regime in these documents, underlining that nuclear safety s 
an important global responsibility.  It is essential that all Member 
States take this responsibility seriously and ensure that all 
activities involving radioactive materials or nuclear technology are 
performed in accordance with the highest levels of safety.  The U.S. 
should commend the IAEA for its significant impact on improvement of 
the Global Nuclear Safety Regime.  The U.S. should encourage Member 
States to continue to stress the importance of safety by enacting 
rigorous legislation, establishing strong independent safety 
regulators, and making nuclear safety a priority. 
 
-- Continuous Improvement:  The IAEA stresses the need for countries 
not to become complacent about safety.  Most of the more than 400 
nuclear power facilities operating in the world today have 
maintained very good safety records and statistics show that safety 
worldwide has been steadily increasing.  However, Member States 
cannot become complacent and must continue to focus on safety.  Many 
nuclear plants are facing ageing issues since they are 40 years old 
or older.  The aging work force is also a concern, as experienced 
plant operators, and safety regulators are reaching retirement age, 
and there are large shortages of highly training qualified workers 
to fill the gap.  The U.S. should state that these issues require a 
renewed commitment to keeping safety a priority.  Member States 
cannot rest on their laurels of past safety performance while facing 
such large issues of maintaining an aging infrastructure.  The U.S. 
should encourage Member States to maintain vigilance on safety of 
existing facilities by making use of IAEA peer review services, 
seeking out the lessons learned from other Member States and sharing 
operational feedback information, and by bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral cooperation on safety issues. 
 
-- New Entrants: The Safety Review refers to the large number of 
countries that have expressed interest in nuclear power.  The IAEA 
stresses that the same high level of safety currently applied to 
operating reactors must be applied to new and future reactors.  High 
levels of safety and quality cannot be rushed and adequate time must 
be devoted to establishing a rigorous safety infrastructure to 
support the planning, bidding and construction stage of any reactor 
program.  The nuclear industry is already seeing shortages of 
qualified workers to support current facilities and Member States 
must focus on capacity building.  The U.S. should encourage Member 
States to continue to fully integrate a focus on safety during the 
planning and scheduling phases of any new facility; participate in 
international safety cooperation and collaboration activities; to 
increase safety infrastructures, and to sign up to the international 
safety conventions. 
 
--Safety Conventions: The 4th meeting of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety was held in 2008 and the next meeting of the Joint Convention 
on Spent fuel will be held in 2009.  The U.S. should encourage other 
Member States to accede to Safety Conventions and praise the work 
IAEA has done to promote these Conventions, thereby increasing the 
safety and security of sources worldwide. 
 
¶6. (U) The Safety Review also encompasses nuclear security programs. 
 The U.S. statement should underline the importance we attribute to 
nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism.  We can highlight 
specific U.S. initiatives on supporting nuclear and other 
radiological security, emergency response, border radiation 
detection, conversion of research reactors from HEU to LEU, secure 
transportation of radiological sources and collaboration with the 
IAEA on overall HEU minimization globally. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Note: The Arab Group may raise its request for an IAEA 
investigation of possible depleted uranium contamination in Gaza 
under the Safety Review agenda item.  Mission recommends that the 
U.S. not engage this debate unless Arab Group members delve into 
areas outside the IAEA's mandate, or make erroneous attempts to link 
it to the Agency's safeguards function.  A short contingency 
statement should focus on the technical findings of previous IAEA 
and UNEP depleted uranium studies, namely that DU has not caused any 
significant health concerns.  The U.S. should note that the IAEA 
mandate relevant to DU does not extend beyond such health and safety 
surveys.  End Note. 
 
--------------  -------- 
Agenda Item 4:  Nuclear Technology Review 
--------------  ---------- 
 
¶8. (U) The U.S. statement under this agenda item should underline 
support for research and development of peaceful uses of nuclear 
technology, a priority for the G-77, and the essential role of the 
IAEA in helping Member States understand how nuclear technology is 
best applied.  The Agency's Nuclear Technology Review 2009 Report 
(GOV/2009/3) highlights the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide, 
and notes that new endeavors will not only help the environment but 
will also bring increased activity to many sectors of the world 
economy.  The U.S. should express support for Agency's continued 
role in helping spread nuclear technology for development purposes 
as well as its role in the nuclear energy sector.  Under this agenda 
item we should also update the Board on our bilateral and 
multilateral work with countries or mechanisms, including the Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which promote the use of nuclear 
energy in a safe and secure manner. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: Although the report is very comprehensive as 
regards nuclear power, there are some concerns. A chart on regional 
comparison of nuclear power costs (Figure A-1) indicates North 
America has the highest estimated costs whereas Asia has the lowest. 
 Cost estimates are extremely difficult to define and obtain, 
therefore, a regional comparison may be meaningless.  This chart may 
create a false impression that American technologies are too costly. 
 Furthermore, under section A.4:  Additional factors affecting the 
future of nuclear power, in addition to "costs", the report does not 
mention factors such as oil price volatility, energy independence, 
energy security, and policies aimed at curbing CO2 emissions, which 
also affect decision-makers' consideration of nuclear energy as a 
viable and reliable energy source to meet growing energy demand. 
End Comment. 
 
¶10. (U) The 2009 Report also speaks volumes about the Agency's work 
in providing Technical Cooperation (TC) to Member States to promote 
development in areas such as human health, agriculture, water 
management, and cancer therapy. The breadth and depth of the IAEA TC 
contributions to the world's developing societies, environment and 
scientific understanding would not be possible without the 
substantial U.S. annual contribution to the Technical Cooperation 
Fund.  Given the Obama Administration's recognition of development 
as one of the core pillars of our foreign policy, these aspects of 
the IAEA's work should be highlighted along with our expectation 
that the Agency plan and implement projects that assist Member 
States in attaining commitments to global development.  There are 
many examples of how nuclear technologies are being used to reach 
development goals in many regions throughout the world.  One such 
application is the eradication of the insidious tsetse fly in Africa 
by sterilization of the pest using radiation and release of sterile 
males into the wild population in order to reduce the prevalence of 
human and livestock disease in large areas of Africa.  The U.S. has 
traditionally supported this project not only monetarily but also 
through cost-free experts and it is one of the IAEA's TC success 
stories.  A second TC "success story" is the use of nuclear 
technology in the development of nutritional therapies in combating 
diabetes, heart disease, and HIV/AIDS, while increasing 
understanding of how nutrition effects growth and human development 
from conception to adolescence.  The U.S. statement can draw on 
these and other examples of our support to IAEA Technical 
Cooperation for development purposes. 
 
----------------   ---------------- 
Agenda Item 5a     Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, APs 
----------------   ---------------- 
 
¶11. (U) The Board will have before it a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with Djibouti for 
approval.  The Secretariat indicates that an AP with Bahrain may 
also be submitted before the March Board.  We still see an India AP 
as unlikely for March.  Recommendation and Action Request: Mission 
should join consensus in approving Djibouti's CSA and AP and any 
other agreements.  USDEL may consider a short statement welcoming 
the conclusion of APs, noting implementation of the U.S. AP, and 
encouraging other countries to follow suit. 
 
---------------   ---------------- 
Agenda Item 5b    Staff to be Used as Inspectors 
---------------   -------------- 
 
¶12. (U) The Board Chair confirmed on February 17 that this item will 
be dropped from the agenda and considered at a subsequent meeting. 
 
 
---------------   ----- 
Agenda Item 5c    DPRK 
---------------   ----- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Although no written report is expected on the 
implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, the Director General will 
again provide a brief oral update to the Board on the Agency's 
activities in country.  The DG's remarks on disablement were less 
detailed in his November 2008 Board statement than in previous 
statements, only noting that the Agency has been monitoring 
disabling activities and left it to the Six Parties to brief on the 
results of any deliberations as "the Agency is not part of this 
process."  We expect his March remarks to provide limited details on 
disablement. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Mission anticipates interventions from the Six Party Talks 
participants (China, Russia, Japan, and ROK), as well as from 
Australia, Canada, France on behalf of the EU, South Africa, Cuba on 
behalf of the NAM, Switzerland, and New Zealand.  We expect Member 
States will express continued support for the Six Party process and 
call for a substantive, comprehensive role for the IAEA in the 
verification process. Recommendation and Action Request: As the 
first meeting under the Obama Administration, Mission recommends the 
U.S. statement reaffirm our support for the Six Party process and 
the IAEA's involvement in all stages of the implementation of the 
September 2005 Joint Statement.  To the extent possible, Mission 
recommends the U.S. statement provide any updates on the status of 
discussions or negotiations in the Six Party talks.  In addition, 
the U.S. statement should provide an update on disablement, which is 
especially important now that the DG appears to be moving away from 
providing details in his opening statement.  We also should again 
voice our support for UNSCR 1718, noting that it remains in effect. 
 
-------------  --------- 
Agenda Item 6  Appointment of the Director General 
-------------  --------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) In accordance with the Rules of Procedure on Appointment 
of the Director General, the Board Chair will report to the Board on 
the outcome of her consultations with Board members regarding the 
two candidates, Japanese Governor Yukiya Amano and South African 
Governor Abdul Minty.  She will indicate that there is no consensus. 
 Recommendation and Action Request: By the time of the Board, we 
hope that the Board Chair will have announced the timing of a 
Special Session to conduct a formal vote, most likely on March 26. 
If she has not, the U.S., in consultation with other like-minded 
Board members, should deliver a strong statement urging a timely and 
transparent process for appointment of the next Director General. 
The statement should request a Special Session in March and deflect 
any effort to delay a vote until June, noting past precedent and the 
fact that holding a first vote in June would not allow any time for 
a new call for nominations should the Board be deadlocked on the two 
candidates, i.e. if neither of them can command the required 
two-thirds vote.  The U.S. should seek an early decision so as to 
not drag out the process and exacerbate divisions on the Board. Any 
U.S. statement should be careful to portray this as a procedural 
matter and avoid the appearance of partiality toward a particular 
candidate.  The U.S. can make a general statement acknowledging DG 
ElBaradei's stewardship of the Agency and looking forward to the 
continuation of this work by the next Director General. 
 
¶16. (U) The U.K. is also preparing to send a letter with several 
co-sponsors, including the United States, to request the inclusion 
of an agenda item on term limits for the Director General in order 
to initiate a preliminary discussion.  While most of the signatories 
are from the Geneva Group, we have actively sought G-77 support so 
that this is not perceived as a Western initiative.  Recommendation 
and Action Request:  The U.S. should deliver a strong statement of 
support for a two-term limit, consistent with best practices in 
other international organizations.  We should be prepared to respond 
to possible G-77 arguments that previous IAEA Directors General have 
not been held to a two-term limit. 
 
-------------   ----------------- 
Agenda Item 7:  Personnel Matters 
-------------   ----------------- 
 
¶17. (U) Consistent with the UN salary scale adopted at the 63rd 
UNGA, the Board is asked to approve a revision to the salary scale 
for professional staff and higher (including the Director General) 
at the IAEA.  The IAEA has provisionally implemented the salary 
scale with an  increase of 2.33 percent since January 1 and it will 
be applied on a no loss/no gain basis.  Recommendation and Action 
Request:  USDEL should join consensus in approving the salary scale. 
 No statement is necessary. 
 
------------------  ----- 
Any Other Business:  INFB 
------------------  ----- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Mission participated in a meeting with Russian and IAEA 
Officials February 13 previewing Russian intent to raise their 
proposal for a fuel assurance mechanism at the March Board under AOB 
(ref B).  The U.S. AOB statement should welcome the Russian proposal 
preview and urge the DG to report to the June Board on the 
Secretariat's views of the proposal and accompanying model 
agreements.  We will also continue to seek Board approval of an 
International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB) by June.  Mission seeks to 
encourage statements, particularly by potential recipient countries, 
calling for a more detailed discussion of Reliable Access to Nuclear 
Fuel (RANF) proposals at the June Board. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The U.S. and other states, primarily those with enrichment 
capabilities, have previously and repeatedly expressed support for 
the implementation of a RANF  mechanism under AOB.  An INFB or other 
fuel assurances mechanism would be intended to supplement the 
existing commercial market for nuclear fuel and create an incentive 
for states voluntarily to choose the market over the development of 
indigenous uranium enrichment capacity.   The IAEA has received 
several proposals for fuel assurance mechanisms, most of which are 
complementary.  As reported ref B, the IAEA Secretariat has elicited 
agreement from Russia to establish a fuel reserve in Russia's 
International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk and is developing 
concepts for an IAEA-administered fuel bank with initial funding 
generated through the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) challenge 
grant.  In the face of bitter opposition from the G-77 expressed in 
the September 2008 Board, the Director General has been unwilling to 
bring any of these concepts to the Board or to lead publicly by 
spurring consultation among Member States.  Recent developments with 
the Russian proposal may allay ElBaradei's misgivings, however, 
Mission still believes Member States will need to call on the DG to 
lead on the issue.  Mission has also floated at the working level 
with donors Norway, the UAE, and the EU the idea of a joint 
statement in the Board; however the Czech Republic as Presidency is 
already drafting an EU statement (for use under AoB) to formally 
notify the Board of its 25 million Euro contribution to an INFB and 
call for Board discussion of a concrete proposal.  Mission will at a 
minimum urge the UAE to make a statement in the Board formalizing 
its pledge (as Norway did in November 2008) and calling for progress 
toward implementation. 
 
20.(SBU) Recommendation and Action Request:  The U.S. statement 
should reaffirm support for the safe, secure, 
proliferation-resistant development of nuclear energy as a means of 
meeting growing energy demands while mitigating the negative impact 
of carbon emissions.  We should reaffirm our support for RANF and an 
INFB initiative, the implementation of which would aim to provide 
assured supply of nuclear fuel for states that wish to have the 
option of such a mechanism as they consider making nuclear power a 
component of their sustainable economic development and national 
energy policy.  The statement should highlight U.S. support to an 
INFB, welcome Russian proposal preview, and call upon the DG and 
Secretariat to provide information to Member States prior to the 
June Board on Russian and NTI proposals so the Board can make 
necessary decisions on model agreements or use of NTI challenge 
grant funding.