Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA46, HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09UNVIEVIENNA46.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA46 2009-02-03 15:31 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0046/01 0341531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031531Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8971
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0257
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1468
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000046 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER AF
 
SUBJECT:  HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF:  A) KABUL 00179, B) UNVIE 0033 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Among  issues handled by the UN Organization for Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), none looms larger in the U.S. national interest than 
the Afghan narcotics trade and its impact undermining stability and 
contributing to terrorist activity in the region. UNODC's 
Afghanistan strategy compliments and supports the U.S. 
counternarcotics strategy.  US's leadership in establishing the 
Paris Pact initiative in 2003 has brought together 56 countries in 
regular dialogue to produce recommendations to strengthen the fight 
against Afghan opium and has helped raise the profile of the Afghan 
counter-drug issue.  The Paris Pact meetings have also provided a 
venue for the Mission to promote USG interests, such as the Good 
Performers' Initiative (GPI).   Mission's encouragement of UNODC's 
longstanding advocacy for greater ISAF engagement on 
counternarcotics in Afghanistan contributed to UNODC Executive 
Director Antonio Costa's presentations to NATO which in turn led to 
the October 2008 decision of the NATO Defense Ministers to permit 
ISAF, in conjunction with Afghan forces, to strike drug facilities 
and facilitators supporting the insurgency. 
 
2.  (SBU) On a program level, we should work with UNODC and the 
government of Afghanistan to encourage the GOA to take a grassroots 
approach to incentives such as  the Good Performers' Initiative 
(GPI); encourage UNODC's expansion of its provincial and local 
programs in Afghanistan, including building on the relevant 
commitments of our allies; promote UNODC's regional approach to 
combating counternarcotics, including possible assistance to its 
activities in East Africa; help UNODC build upon its successes in 
interdicting precursor chemicals; strengthen its efforts to help 
Afghanistan to fight corruption in the country and encourage it to 
establish programs to help countries to implement crime conventions 
that could serve to disrupt the vast underground economy fueled by 
drug money. UNODC depends on voluntary contributions to fund 85-90% 
of its activities.  USG contributions have been made on a 
year-to-year basis.  A longer time frame for such contributions 
could give UNODC critical stability.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Working the Provinces 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Per Ref A, UNODC plans to broaden local operations in the 
south and southwest, specifically Herat and Nimroz provinces. 
Canada, which has become the largest donor to UNODC's Afghan 
programs, intends to focus on Kandahar with its next tranche of 
donations of Cdn$25 million for two years starting 4/1/2009.  (Note: 
 Canada gave Cdn$27 million to UNODC for its Afghanistan programs 
over the two years 2007-2009.  End Note.)  We should support UNODC's 
efforts in those three provinces.  UNODC's local operations could 
improve border control between Heart, Nimroz and Iran. Nimroz and 
Kandahar are among the five southern provinces which account for 90% 
of Afghanistan poppy production.  We could build on Canada's efforts 
to have UNODC expand its activities in Kandahar province which 
shares a long border with Pakistan. 
 
--------------------------- 
Continuing Regional Efforts 
--------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) UNODC's regional strategy reflects recognition that there 
are many countries that lie between Afghanistan and the market 
countries in western Europe.  The UNODC first focused on improving 
control of the long border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian 
states, such as mobile interdiction teams and border liaison 
offices.  In 2006 it started the Central Asian Regional Information 
and Coordination Center (CARICC) to strengthen the analytical 
capability of the border control agencies.  With ratification of the 
CARICC MOU from four of the member states, CARICC will formally 
enter into force in 2009. In 2007, UNODC also launched the Triangle 
Initiative among Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.  USG support for 
such regional initiatives will help to stem the export of Afghan 
opium.  UNODC has also made forays into Eastern Europe and East 
Africa, seeking ways to disrupt these trafficking routes. Given the 
excellent law enforcement and counternarcotics infrastructure and 
abundant resources in Europe (e.g., EC, EUROPOL), the U.S. may want 
to direct resources to East Africa, where the Europeans have 
displayed less enthusiasm. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
REWARD SUCCESS IN PRECURSOR INTERDICTION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (U) UNODC, with the cooperation of a number of countries, 
including the United States, helped Afghanistan and the surrounding 
countries to launch Operation TARCET in late 2007-early 2008. 
TARCET aims to disrupt the flow of precursor chemicals (acetic 
anhydride and others) into Afghanistan, which is needed to convert 
opium into heroin.  The program trains law enforcement officers in 
detection techniques and methodology and promotes 
information/intelligence sharing among the countries.  The results 
have been impressive -- with seizures in 2008 of 19 tonnes of acetic 
anhydride, and over 20 tonnes of other chemicals in Iran, Pakistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
6.  (SBU)  According to UNODC, recent intel operations suggest that 
most chemical precursors enter Afghanistan from the Republic of 
Korea and EU countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
The government of Afghanistan in December notified the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) that there were no legitimate 
requirements for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan.  The announcement 
renders all shipments of the chemical contraband, which should 
improve interdiction. 
 
7. (SBU) The next phase of Operation TARCET would focus on 
intelligence-driven operations to facilitate "backtracking" of 
chemicals across borders, building forensics capacity, and fostering 
greater cooperation among key players like India, China, the UAE (a 
major transit country), and the ROK.  Recently the USG contributed 
more than $370,000 to UNODC for such purpose (Ref Paris Pact cable). 
 USG should reward UNODC's success in chemicals interdiction by 
further financial contributions to TARCET, and support UNODC 
programs to build forensics capacity in Afghanistan to analyze drug 
seizures. 
 
----------------------- 
Drugs, Money, and Crime 
----------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  In a recent meeting with Ambassador (Ref B),  UNODC 
Executive Director Antonio Costa highlighted the "unexplained 
economy" worth billions that results from the link between drug 
trafficking and organized crime.  In fact, in a recent press 
interview, Costa claimed that drug money had entered the legitimate 
capital market to provide liquidity in times of financial crises. 
In his view, there is lagging implementation of the existing crime 
treaties.  Paris Pact members at a recent meeting agreed to a new 
action plan to address financial flows related to Afghan drugs. 
U.S. support for programs to strengthen legal capacity of nations to 
implement the crime treaties (e.g., the UN Convention against 
Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime) and to the Paris Pact action plan would contribute to 
progress in this regard. 
 
------------------- 
Fighting Corruption 
------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Afghanistan became a party to the UN Convention on 
Corruption (UNCAC) in December.  This opens the door for us to work 
with UNODC to develop an overall anticorruption strategy. UNODC has 
a $3.2 million program to provide practical assistance to build 
Afghanistan's capacity to fight corruption which is not fully 
funded.  Main beneficiaries include the newly formed High Office for 
Oversight and the Supreme Court.  UNODC is also conducting an 
analysis to identify the large gap between UNCAC requirements and 
national legislation.  The emphasis is on the reform of the 
judiciary and prosecution services and on legal and administrative 
reforms.  USG financial support for this program may now be 
appropriate. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.  (SBU) UNODC receives 85% to 90% of its operating budget from 
voluntary contributions.  Most of its Afghan activities are subject 
to voluntary funding.  The USG has made contributions on 
year-to-year basis because of own budgeting process.  Any 
contributions on a longer time frame would provide UNODC with some 
financial stability critical for its long-term planning in 
Afghanistan.  End Comment. 
 
 
SCHULTE