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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1087
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 7950
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S E C R E T TOKYO 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/J, EAP/K 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA - SEDNEY/HELVEY/BASALLA 
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J2/J5 
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J2/J5 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR KN KS JA
SUBJECT: READ-OUT ON COORDINATION MEETING WITH JAPANESE 
OFFICIALS ON POSSIBLE TD-2 LAUNCH 
 
REF: A. 06 TOKYO 4543 
     ¶B. 06 TOKYO 5336 
 
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 ( 
b/d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Alliance and intelligence managers from the 
Embassy, U.S. Forces Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Joint Staff Office and Ministry and Defense met on February 
20 to discuss policy and intelligence coordination in 
anticipation of a possible North Korean missile launch.  The 
meeting followed a request from the Foreign Ministry on 
February 16 to activate mil-mil Bilateral Coordination 
Centers (BCCs) at Yokota Air Base and MOD Headquarters.  In 
order to support a coordinated response to a possible launch, 
the Japanese side offered to stand up informally 
elements of the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM).  Both 
sides recognized the importance of both discrete and flexible 
coordination and the need to address intelligence sharing and 
information security issues related to the process. The U.S. 
side deferred policy discussions to separate diplomatic 
channels and urged both sides to 
focus on the mechanics of coordination.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------- 
PARTICIPATION 
------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) U.S. and Japanese Director-level Alliance managers 
convened on February 20 a preliminary meeting to discuss 
bilateral coordination modalities relating to a near-term 
possible North Korean missile launch.  Embassy Tokyo 
Political Section, Regional Affairs Section (RAS), Defense 
Attache's Office (DAO), and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) J-2 and 
J-5 represented the U.S. side.  The Japanese side included 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials from the 
National Security Policy Division, Northeast Asia 
Division, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division, Policy 
Coordination Division, and First Division of the MOFA 
Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS).  Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) officials from the Defense Policy Division, 
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Defense 
Intelligence Division, and Joint Staff J-5 also 
participated.  (Full participation list in para 17) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
STRUCTURING COORDINATION: THE ""AZABUDAI"" EXPERIENCE 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Embassy Pol-Mil Chief asked the Japanese side to 
lay out its expectations on the bilateral coordination 
structure necessary to prepare for a potential DPRK missile 
launch.  The 1997 Revised Defense Guidelines include 
specific coordination mechanisms.  In 2006, however, the 
Japanese side turned down the U.S. request to activate 
these bodies, leading the two sides to rely on an ad hoc 
coordination body in the lead-up to the 2006 missile launch 
(the ""Azabudai"" process).  Before proceeding further, he 
added, it would be useful to consider the extent to which 
future coordination should be formalized.  He added that 
the focus for this discussion would be on the mechanics of 
coordination.  Separate diplomatic channels are more 
appropriate for policy discussions, as all the content of 
our response will be made in Washington. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director 
Kazuhiro Suzuki noted that the Japanese government had 
considered activating the BCM during the 2006 launch, but 
decided against it out of concern that doing so would have 
an escalatory effect.  Embassy Pol-Mil Chief pointed out 
that both sides had agreed during the September 2006 
""Capstone Lessons Learned Conference"" for reviewing the 
bilateral response to the 2006 DPRK missile launches (Ref 
B) not to link the Bilateral Coordination Mechanism (BCM) 
activation with a decision to invoke the Situations in Areas 
Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) Law but instead, explore a wide 
spectrum of policy coordination.  Both sides had agreed at 
the Capstone Conference on the need to begin consultations 
well before any public announcement. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
FLEXIBLE OPTIONS: AN ""INFORMAL"" BCC, BCM? 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S/NF) MOD Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division 
Director Kiyoshi Serizawa said the Japanese government 
formally decided in 2008 that there is no hard linkage 
between activation of the two Bilateral Coordination Centers 
(BCCs) and SIASJ in order to allow greater flexibility.  USFJ 
J-5 Director agreed that both sides should be as flexible as 
possible about initiating the BCM.  He added that the recent 
Keen Edge bilateral exercise validated the BCM's utility.  He 
also noted that the Azabudai meetings in 2006 seem to play 
the same role envisioned for the Policy Committee outlined in 
the Guidelines.  MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division 
Director Suzuki agreed, but suggested that the two sides 
not get too focused on the titles of various coordination 
organizations, to allow for flexibility in responding to 
inquiries if news of bilateral consultations got out. 
 
--------------------- 
BCC SIZE/TEMPO/TIMING 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Regarding MOFA's suggestion of activating the two 
BCCs, USFJ J-5 Director stressed that both sides needed 
to pace the level of our activities carefully, as it could 
take weeks until an actual launch.  Embassy Pol-Mil Chief 
asked whether JSO was planning an incremental BCC 
activation -- such as a low-level exchange of liaison 
officers -- or a hard start, with both sides standing up 
24-hour watch centers.  JSO J-5's CAPT Takashima responded 
the Japanese side is flexible on the size and participation 
of the BCC, noting, however, that sustaining full 
participation over long stretches of time would be difficult. 
 The start time would depend on the intelligence 
and analysis available at the time, as well as decisions by 
policymakers.  Takashima agreed with USFJ's assessment that 
standing up the BCC at both MOD and USFJ Headquarters 
during the Keen Edge exercise was useful. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director 
Suzuki asked whether MOD Internal Bureau would also be part 
of the BCC, or would participation be limited to uniformed 
officers.  He suggested that MOFA may also send liaisons to 
ensure that they have visibility on any breaking 
developments.  MOD's Serizawa highlighted the need to discuss 
the issue with JSO J-3 and MOD's Operational Policy 
Bureau.  Pol-Mil Chief suggested that both USFJ and MOD ask 
their J-3 offices to develop a concept for the BCCs so that 
we can better frame future discussions.  It would be useful 
to clarify whether both sides agree on what is the trigger 
for activation, frequency and other modalities, and at what 
stage are other government agencies brought in. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
KEEPING POLICY GROUP SEPARATE FROM JCG 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S/NF) MOFA Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director 
Suzuki asked whether Relevant Ministries and Agencies (RMAs) 
responsible for supporting military operations should be 
included in future coordination meetings.  Embassy Pol-Mil 
Chief noted that the BCM envisions separate bodies to discuss 
policy-level (Policy Committee) and technical-level support 
(Joint Coordination Group, JCG) issues.  In this instance, it 
would make sense to maintain this distinction in order to 
protect sensitive information.  We could convene a separate 
JCG meeting to involve RMAs such as the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transportation and Tourism (MLIT) and 
Ministry of 
Information and Communication (MIC) to assist with issues 
such as frequencies, air space management, and other 
technical support activities.  These meetings could focus 
on specific operational support issues without touching on 
sensitive or compartmentalized information.  He noted that 
the existence of such a forum in 2006 could have helped 
facilitate our request to accelerate the operation of the 
FBX-T (X-band) radar in Shariki. 
 
--------------------------------- 
NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION FLOW 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Pol-Mil Chief recommended that both sides review 
information sharing and notification procedures, as well as 
ensure both sides have the physical means of sharing 
classified information securely.  MOFA National Security 
Policy Division Director Shimokawa said MOFA, MOD, and 
other national security ministries would normally pass all 
classified information to the Cabinet Secretariat, which 
would then disseminate to all organizations with a need to 
know.  He questioned whether it is feasible to establish a 
single route for sharing information, as each agency has 
its own channels with U.S. counterparts. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Embassy RAS representative pointed out that both 
sides should examine existing channels for sharing 
classified information.  MOD Defense Intelligence Division 
Director Atsuo Suzuki suggested that such intelligence 
should only be dealt with in designated channels, even 
though this may lead to delays in coordination and 
dissemination.  The need for maintaining established 
channels runs counter, however, to the need for speed and 
removal of stovepipes. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) Pol-Mil Chief responded that the two sides need to 
consider not only the flow of intelligence, but also 
operational information.  In 2006, one major gap was the 
inability to get information on North Korean missile 
launches to MOFA.  MOD was receiving real-time feed from 
USFJ, as was the Embassy, but there was no method to 
accurately convey developments to MOFA.  This led to a gap 
in public statements between the Foreign and Defense 
Ministers regarding the number of missiles that North Korea 
had fired. 
 
¶12. (S/NF) MOFA's Kazuhiro Suzuki noted that intelligence 
accumulates in a matter of minutes when the situation 
reaches a crisis level, making it impossible to share 
information effectively if kept solely within established 
channels.  Having a MOFA liaison to Japan's BCC at MOD 
headquarters would help, since there is a secure line 
between MOFA and MOD.  MOD's Atsuo Suzuki stressed that 
intelligence channels should be kept separate from 
operational channels.  USFJ J-5 Director questioned the 
utility of doing so. 
 
¶13. (S/NF) USFJ J-2 representative highlighted the usefulness 
of co-locating Japanese and U.S. officials during the Keen 
Edge exercise, underscoring the importance of having a common 
bilateral intelligence and operational picture.  Pol-Mil 
 
Chief suggested both sides clarify and expand on two points: 
first, how should both sides share information if the threat 
is imminent; and second, at what level should both sides 
approach each other if conducting initial notification. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CLEARANCES: NOT FEWER BUT SMARTER 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S/NF) Embassy Pol-Mil Chief stressed that everyone 
involved in bilateral coordination should possess the same 
level of security clearances and be subject to the Defense 
Secrets Act (Note: which mandates up to 10 years 
imprisonment for unauthorized leaks).  The aim is not to 
narrow the number of people with access to information, but 
to make sure those officials who will be making decisions 
possess the appropriate security clearances.  Embassy RAS 
representative seconded this point, offering to help key 
Japanese officials get cleared for information in order for 
them to carry out their assignments. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
LAUNCH AUTHORITY POSSIBLY DELEGATED TO COMMANDERS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶15. (S/NF) MOD's Yamamoto said one major difference between 
the current environment and 2006 from MOD's perspective is 
the deployment of Japanese and U.S. ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) assets.  MOD might possibly issue -- for the 
first time -- an advance order to the Air Defense Command 
to shoot down a North Korean missile if it were heading 
towards Japanese territory.  USFJ J-5 Director asked if MOD 
envisioned the advanced deployment of PAC-3 missile 
batteries.  Yamamoto responded that MOD does not plan to 
deploy PAC-3 at this stage in order to avoid attracting 
public attention. 
 
------------ 
OTHER ISSUES 
------------ 
 
¶16. (S/NF) MOD's Atsuo Suzuki pointed out that the two 
governments need to discern the DPRK's intent and initiate 
discussion on how to react in the event of a launch. 
MOFA's Shimokawa commented that MOFA has already begun 
internal discussions on a public press line to issue in 
response to a DPRK launch.  Once this is finished, MOFA will 
provide to the U.S. side for coordination.  Embassy Pol-Mil 
Chief said that we would share this with Washington so that 
we can consider complementary messages. 
 
---------- 
PARTIPANTS 
---------- 
 
¶17. (U) 
 
U.S.: 
 
Marc Knapper, Political Section Deputy, Embassy Tokyo 
Raymond Greene, Pol-Mil Unit Chief, Embassy Tokyo 
Steven Benfell, Regional Affairs Section, Embassy Tokyo 
COL Jeffrey, Wiltse, J-5 Policy and Plans, USFJ 
COL Edward McAllister, DAO, Embassy Tokyo 
Joseph Flanz, DAO, Embassy Tokyo 
Kevin Murrow, J-2 Intelligence, USFJ 
Sangmin Lee, Pol-Mil Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker) 
 
Japan: 
 
Makita Shimokawa, Director, National Security Division, MOFA 
Shigeo Yamada, Director, Northeast Asia Division, MOFA 
 
Kazuhiro Suzuki, Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
Division, MOFA 
Satoshi Suzuki, Director, First Division, Intelligence and 
Analysis Service, MOFA 
Keiichi Ichikawa, Senior Coordinator, Policy Coordination 
Division, MOFA 
Mikito Tomiyama, Deputy Director, Policy Coordination 
Division, MOFA 
Yuriko Kuga, Deputy Director, Policy Coordination Division, 
MOFA 
Yutaka Kashiwabara, Deputy Director, Northeast Asia Division, 
MOFA 
Noriaki Abe, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
Division, 
MOFA 
Mayumi Fukushima, Deputy Director, First Division, 
Intelligence 
and Analysis Service, MOFA 
Tatsuo Yamamoto, Director, Defense Policy Division, MOD 
Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 
Division, MOD 
Atsuo Suzuki, Director, Defense Intelligence Division, MOD 
CAPT Tatsuhiko Takashima, J-5, Joint Staff Office 
Osamu Ashizuka, Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation 
Division, MOD 
ZUMWALT