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DE RUEHKO #0332/01 0430911
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120911Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0737
INFO RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA IMMEDIATE 2399
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA IMMEDIATE 0238
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 4742
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE 6186
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO IMMEDIATE 2951
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RUEAEPA/HQ EPA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000332 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR OES, EEB, EAP/J 
STATE ALSO FOR OES/EGC - TSTERN, TTALLEY, NBARTH, CSIERAWSKI 
DEPT PASS CEQ 
EPA FOR CGRUNDLER 
USDOE FOR S-3, RMARLAY, SRUEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SENV ENRG KGHG PREL JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S POSITION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Japan has been an active participant in 
negotiations on a post-Kyoto climate change agreement in the 
UNFCCC, as well as in talks on the subject in the Major 
Economies Meetings, G8, and APEC.  Seeing itself as a bridge 
between the U.S. and EU on climate change, the GOJ also has 
had to satisfy its powerful business lobbies, some of which 
strongly but quietly oppose Kyoto's provisions.  While the 
final outlines of any domestic emissions trading system are 
unclear, Japan continues to advocate for long-term emissions 
reduction goals, inclusion of the major emerging economies in 
any post-Kyoto framework, and use of some form of sectoral 
approach in setting national or international targets.  The 
GOJ maintains a strong desire to work closely with the U.S. 
-- strategically but also tactically in the UNFCCC and other 
conferences -- on finding a way forward on climate change 
that cuts greenhouse gases and safeguards the environment 
that at the same time secures economic growth and does not 
give China or other emerging market economies a free ride. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) While Japan takes pride in being the "home" of the 
Kyoto Protocol, many in the Japanese business community and 
government feel shortchanged by the agreement.  Japan's 
efforts at cutting energy use following the oil shocks of the 
1970s made it the most energy efficient country in the world 
by 1990, the Kyoto baseline year.  Japanese critics of the 
agreement complain Japan is held to a higher standard by 
being forced to reduce emissions by an additional six percent 
when it was already well ahead of most other developed 
countries in terms of energy efficiency.  Japan's overall 
emissions, however, have increased by around six percent over 
the same period, putting it far behind its Kyoto target of a 
six percent reduction on 1990 levels.  The primary reason for 
this increase is rising use of energy for air conditioning 
and other residential uses as well as high automobile use. 
In per capita terms, Japan's GHG emission levels remain 
essentially unchanged and experts note only the UK and 
Germany are lowering their emissions to a point of competing 
with Japan. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Even with opposition from some in the business 
community, and sometimes differing views among the Foreign, 
Environment, and Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
Ministries, GOJ climate policy has coalesced around three 
major themes: 1) setting and achieving greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions goals, 2) meaningful participation by 
major emerging economies in a post-Kyoto framework, and 3) 
use of a "sectoral approach" in setting emissions targets for 
individual industries.  While Japan is conducting a trial 
voluntary domestic emissions trading scheme and is likely to 
implement some kind of emissions trading in the future, the 
form such a scheme would take and the degree to which it 
would be mandatory and binding remain under debate. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Regarding targets for greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions, Prime Minister Abe first called for reducing 
global GHG emissions by 50 percent by 2050 when he announced 
his "Cool Earth 50" proposal prior to the 2007 G8 Summit in 
Germany.  Prime Minister Fukuda followed in June 2008 with 
his call for a 60-80 percent reduction in domestic GHG 
emissions by 2050.  Speaking at Davos this January, Prime 
Minster Aso said he intends to announce a domestic mid-term 
target by June 2009.  The GOJ has also advocated for a change 
in the baseline year. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In addition to hoping to include the U.S. in any 
post-Kyoto framework, the GOJ has focused much of its 
diplomatic effort on including major emerging economies such 
as China and India in such an agreement.  Japan was an active 
participant in the Major Economies Process, hosting a one day 
MEM prior to the March Gleneagles G20 meeting in Japan and 
the Major Economies Leaders Meeting the closing day of the 
2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaido.  The GOJ has developed and 
strongly advocated a sectoral approach as a means to include 
China and other emerging market economies in achieving 
meaningful global GHG reductions and to avoid giving an 
unfair advantage to the growing steel and other industries in 
China, India, etc.  While not using the term "environmental 
 
TOKYO 00000332  002 OF 002 
 
 
dumping," Japanese officials note it is unfair and an 
extremely tough sell domestically to let Chinese industries, 
which compete quite effectively against Japan's in some 
sectors, produce and export without needing to meet the same 
GHG and other environmental constraints as Japanese firms. 
At the same time, Japanese firms have developed technologies 
to enhance energy efficiency and cut emissions that they are 
interested in selling in Chinese and other markets.  Japanese 
prime ministers and senior officials have made a point of 
trying to include language on the sectoral approach in joint 
statements following official visits, such as the May 2008 
Hu-Fukuda summit.  The GOJ saw to it that the sectoral 
approach was mentioned in the July MEM leaders' declaration. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Japan's sectoral approach proposal seems to be 
evolving, however.  It is sometimes touted an alternative to 
a top-down, cap-and-trade system, other times as a method for 
determining a national GHG target by aggregating targets for 
different sectors, and still other times as a method for 
limiting GHG emissions for particular sectors across national 
borders.  More recently, GOJ officials have touted the merits 
of carbon-intensity or energy-intensity targets, rather than 
absolute targets for specific sectors, as a way for 
developing countries to improve their energy efficiency 
without capping growth. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The GOJ's current position on climate change is 
reflected in its latest submission to the UNFCCC's Ad Hoc 
Working group, which it released to the public February 6. 
The submission, which closely mirrors Japan's September 
submission, calls for an expanded definition of developed 
countries to include all OECD or OECD equivalent economies. 
(Note: Japanese officials also point out that the list of 
developed countries is likely to change dramatically by 2050, 
something which should be allowed for in current 
negotiations.  End note.)  Japan also advocates the use of 
metrics such as GHG intensity by developing countries to 
limit the growth in their GHG emissions.  Regarding the 
baseline year, Japan again calls for a basket of base years 
when calculating GHG reduction targets.  Finally, the 
submission emphasizes the need for international 
collaboration on green technologies and establishing 
mechanisms for technology transfer, without specifying 
details. 
ZUMWALT