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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/04/09 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Nuclear verification process still over the horizon (Sankei) 
 
(2) Japan's think tanks: Idea of merger triggered by financial 
difficulties; Human resources not developed (Yomiuri) 
 
(3) Autobiography of former Ambassador Howard Baker: Japan willing 
to provide support to U.S.-led campaign against terrorism (Nikkei) 
 
(4) Politics demoralizes SDF personnel (Sankei) 
 
(5) Where is the reduced burden? Town criticizes increased noise at 
Kadena Air Base; 126 aircraft arrived at Kadena, 30 planes moved out 
of prefecture for exercises (Okinawa Times) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Nuclear verification process still over the horizon 
 
SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) 
February 4, 2009 
 
Takashi Arimoto, Washington 
 
U.S. President Obama had a telephone conversation on Feb. 2 with 
South Korean President Lee Myung Bak, during which the two leaders 
agreed to keep pressing North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons 
and nuclear development programs in a verifiable way through the 
six-party talks. The Obama administration is expected to push ahead 
with the six-party talks while holding bilateral talks with North 
Korea. But the question is how to establish a framework for the 
verification of North Korea's nuclear facilities, a challenge left 
over from the former Bush administration. The answer is still over 
the horizon. 
 
According to the South Korean government's press release, Obama told 
Lee that he would send Secretary of State Clinton to South Korea in 
mid-February. Clinton will also visit Japan and China around her 
visit to Seoul to exchange views with her Japanese and Chinese 
counterparts on how to negotiate with North Korea from now on. 
 
The U.S. State Department is now going over its North Korea policy 
while hearing its officials in charge of negotiations, with the new 
administration having come into office, 
 
"It's a wrong argument to choose between the six-party talks and the 
United States' direct talks with North Korea," Balbina Hwang, a 
former senior adviser to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs at the State Department, told the Sankei Shimbun in an 
interview. Hwang tackled North Korea issues until January. She 
stressed that the United States should also push for its talks with 
North Korea in a proactive way under the six-party talks. 
 
At the six-party talks in December last year, the United States and 
other six-party members called for North Korea's commitment in 
writing to the verification process. However, North Korea 
disagreed. 
 
"North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan (who is North 
Korea's chief delegate to the six-party talks) said (in October's 
talks between the U.S. and North Korea) that North Korea would 
 
TOKYO 00000270  002 OF 008 
 
 
accept the verification process. But the North Korean delegation is 
only made up of officials from its foreign ministry. It does not 
reflect the intention of North Korea as a whole." With this, Hwang 
implied that there is a limit to Kim's negotiating authority. 
 
According to Hwang, the U.S. government made formal and informal 
proposals each time to the North Korean government for getting in 
touch with the North Korean military before sitting down at the 
negotiating table. Furthermore, whenever the six-party talks were 
held, the U.S. delegation always had U.S. military officers attend 
the talks, thereby indicating that the United States is always ready 
to talk with the North Korean military. However, North Korea did not 
comply with the proposal. 
 
In the meantime, Hwang made suggestions for the Obama 
administration, maintaining that the United States should first hold 
trilateral talks with Japan and South Korea and that it is important 
to confirm the three countries' unity. In this sense, Hwang said, 
Clinton's tour of East Asian countries is "very good." Furthermore, 
she noted that the U.S. government had some problems in its 
interdepartmental cooperation under the former Bush administration. 
In this regard, she indicated that the Obama administration should 
appoint a high-level envoy to coordinate its North Korea policy 
within the U.S. government. 
 
(2) Japan's think tanks: Idea of merger triggered by financial 
difficulties; Human resources not developed 
 
YOMIURI (Page 13) (Abridged slightly) 
February 4, 2009 
 
Masahiko Sasajima, Yomiuri Research Institute 
 
An idea has emerged to combine some private-sector policy research 
institutes (think tanks) in Japan that are specialized in foreign 
and security policies. 
 
Main points 
 
 The idea resulted from a lack of funds for activities. The aim is 
to increase the own fund of the envisaged new think tank. 
 
 In order to aim at a nonprofit research institute independent of 
the government, cultivating human resources and having the ability 
to externally transmit information are essential. 
 
Yukio Sato, former president of the Japan Institute of International 
Affairs (JIIA), has nurtured this idea over the last five years. A 
report proposing the merger that has been released recently has 
created a stir among those concerned. 
 
JIIA's budget consists of subsidies from the Foreign Ministry and 
its own fund. In fiscal 2007, subsidies from the Foreign Ministry 
totaled 420 million yen and own fund 150 million yen. Its own fund 
has declined about 60 PERCENT  over the last five years. The decline 
is ascribable to sharp drops in projects commissioned by the Foreign 
Ministry and in corporate membership fees amid economic recession. 
This has forced JIIA to scale back on its research projects and give 
up on the planned publication of its research results. JIIA is 
highly alarmed, with Sato saying, "If this situation persists, we 
would have to reduce the scale of our research activities." 
 
 
TOKYO 00000270  003 OF 008 
 
 
As a result, JIIA has come up with the idea of increasing the 
overall fund by merging with other research institutes specializing 
in foreign and security policies into a new organization. On the 
mind is banding together with the Institute for International Policy 
Studies (IIPS), the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), 
and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS). The three 
organizations are dismissive of the idea. IIPS President Yoshio 
Okawara articulately denied the option, saying: "The spirit and 
nature of each institute is different, so the merger is difficult. 
We cannot buy the idea." 
 
JIIA was founded in 1959 at former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's 
initiative as an institute dedicated to researching Japan's national 
interests and security policy. In reality, JIIA's activities have 
been centered on promoting exchanges with foreign research 
institutes with the help of scholars. The UK-based International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was established at around the 
same time. The Japanese think tank is way behind IISS, which has 
earned a solid international reputation for the publication of The 
Military Balance. Compared to Western countries, Japanese research 
institutes are all suffering from fund shortages and have been 
inactive in nurturing human resources, making policy proposals, and 
providing government organizations with human sources. 
 
In the United States, private think tanks are thriving. Funded by 
individuals and corporations, think tanks in the United States are 
vying with each other over new ideas and influence through their 
policy studies and proposals. For instance, the Obama 
administration's advocacy of using "smart power" is based on a 
proposal by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS). Further, under the political appointee system, Susan Rice, a 
senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has been appointed 
ambassador to the United Nations. 
 
Although JIIA's proposal was triggered by financial difficulties, 
its real challenge is to foster research fellows capable of making 
policy proposals to the government and to acquire the ability to 
transmit information externally. Kyoto University Professor Hiroshi 
Nakanishi noted: "The weak intellectual and economic foundations 
supporting the think tanks are a challenge." 
 
Think tanks in Japan do not function well because bureaucrats keep a 
tight grip on information and authority. It is essential for 
democratic society to have the function to transmit information to 
the people and expand the circle of policy debates from a 
private-sector position distinct from academic studies. 
 
If the political appointee system is widely introduced as a result 
of civil service reform, think tanks in Japan would become a source 
of political appointees. The time has come to review the measures to 
expand that role from a broader perspective. 
 
Major Japanese think tanks specializing in foreign and security 
policies 
 
Name Number of researchers Annual budget 
Japan Institute of International Affairs 10 
13 guest researchers 570 million yen 
Institute for International Policy Studies 14 270 million yen 
Japan Forum on International Relations 12 190 million yen 
Research Institute for Peace and Security 20 (mostly university 
professors) 96 million yen 
 
TOKYO 00000270  004 OF 008 
 
 
 
Brookings Institution 96 
Over 200, including guest researchers 32.55 billion yen 
 
(3) Autobiography of former Ambassador Howard Baker: Japan willing 
to provide support to U.S.-led campaign against terrorism 
 
NIKKEI (Page 36) (Full) 
January 27, 2009 
 
I think that Americans living in modern history will never forget 
Sept. 11, 2001. 
 
When terrorists launched the nightmarish attacks on Washington, the 
capital of the U.S., and New York that morning, I was at an airport 
in Chicago with my wife, Nancy, on my way back to Japan after 
attending a ceremony to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the 
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and seeing my children and 
grandchildren in my home state of Tennessee. 
 
Terrorists hijacked airliners and crashed the planes into the Twin 
Towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, and another 
airliner struck into the Pentagon in Washington. Upon learning the 
details of the plot by al-Qaeda, an international terrorist group, 
the U.S. government issued an order to ban all flights across the 
nation, and we were stranded in Chicago. We finally arrived in Japan 
on the afternoon of Sept. 15. 
 
On the morning of Sept. 17, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited 
the U.S. Embassy to offer condolences for those victimized in the 
terrorist attacks. At that time, the prime minister said: "Japan is 
willing to render necessary support. Providing support is the 
responsibility of Japan as an ally." I responded: "The United States 
and Japan are real friends. Both countries must face this challenge 
in close cooperation with other countries." I also told Foreign 
Minister Makiko Tanaka: "Japan is a powerful ally of and a country 
friendly to the United States. We hope Japan will provide support in 
a way that represents such a relationship." 
 
Prime Minister Koizumi held a press conference at the Prime 
Minister's Official Residence on the night of Sept. 19 and announced 
the nation's seven-point assistance package to back up the U.S.-led 
antiterrorism campaign. The package included a pledge to make 
necessary legal changes to enable the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to 
provide rear support if U.S. and other foreign forces launch a 
retaliatory offensive. It also included measures to quickly dispatch 
SDF vessels to the Indian Ocean for an intelligence-gathering 
mission and provide emergency economic aid to India and Pakistan. 
 
Cooperation between Japan and the U.S. in the war on terror further 
strengthened through a retaliatory attack against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and other operations. In late October, after the 
collapse of the Taliban regime, I frequently met Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who shored up the Koizumi administration, to 
exchange in-depth views on what specific measures Japan should take 
based on the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, which is still a 
key political theme in Japan. 
 
The basic plan by the Koizumi administration to support the U.S. 
military did not include a plan to dispatch an Aegis-equipped 
destroyer of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean. 
Although I had anticipated that Japan would decide to do so, I tried 
 
TOKYO 00000270  005 OF 008 
 
 
to refrain from expressing this desire, emphasizing: "Since Japan as 
a sovereign nation made the decision, we will not tell Japan to do 
this or that." This stance was the basis of the Bush 
administration's policy toward Japan from the start, so I had no 
intention to change this policy stance. 
 
One scene I saw when I returned to the U.S. Embassy in Akasaka, 
Tokyo after the long journey in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks has been deeply fixed in my mind. I saw innumerable Japanese 
people gathering in front of our embassy to express their 
condolences. 
 
Both the U.S. and Japan have respected each other and have 
established a favorable relationship despite different cultures, 
customs, and religions, needless to say about the tragedy of the 
past war. The gathering of so many people around the U.S. embassy 
reminded me of the deep ties between the two countries over more 
than a half century. 
 
(4) Politics demoralizes SDF personnel 
 
SANKEI (Page 11) (Full) 
February 3, 2009 
 
Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and 
Security (RIPS) 
 
In my recent contacts with some of the ranking officers of the 
Self-Defense Forces, I noticed that their morale was down. Over the 
past year or so, there were a number of problems, such as the 
leakage of confidential data about an Aegis ship, a Maritime 
Self-Defense Force destroyer's collision with a fishing boat, and 
Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff Tamogami's remarks. However, I 
heard from them that the SDF's frustration does not stem so much 
from being criticized for such incidents but is attributable more to 
the unwillingness of politicians to understand the SDF's tasks and 
hardships. 
 
Such frustration, if left as is, will not only demoralize SDF 
members but will also undermine the SDF as the mainstay for Japan's 
national defense. Any country's armed forces will not feel like 
doing a difficult mission at the price of their lives if there is no 
strong support from the people and their representatives (i.e., 
government and parliament). For the SDF's samurai warriors, honor 
comes before anything else. 
 
First and foremost, those in the SDF are frustrated with their 
status under the Constitution. They wonder if they are really an 
"armed force." None of the politicians in the Liberal Democratic 
Party, the New Komeito, and the Democratic Party of Japan will give 
a clear-cut answer to that fundamental question. Politicians are 
little aware that their negligence has been damaging the 
sensitivities of SDF members. It is truly regrettable. 
 
Secondly, Ground and Air Self-Defense Force members were sent to a 
"noncombat area" in Iraq. Politicians might simply think to 
themselves that this noncombat area was a "safe" place. This is 
another reason for the frustration of SDF personnel. SDF members 
were sent to Iraq under the Iraq Special Measures Law. In Iraq, they 
were tasked with a difficult mission to carry out in a "noncombat 
area." Those SDF members accomplished the mission with flying 
colors. Moreover, they all came back to Japan safely without any 
 
TOKYO 00000270  006 OF 008 
 
 
loss of life. 
 
However, the "noncombat area" is defined simply as an area where no 
battle is going on. Actually, that area was not free from danger at 
all. 
 
The GSDF therefore had to guard its local camp in its own way. In 
point of fact, the GSDF camp came under rocket attacks. The same can 
be said of the ASDF. Aircraft flying at a low altitude-shortly after 
taking off or before landing-are in danger of encountering rocket 
attacks from the ground. Given such danger, the ASDF C-130 cargo 
planes zoomed up in their takeoffs and spiraled with a random steep 
approach (RSA) in their landings at Baghdad Airport and other 
airports. 
 
This-according to one SDF staff officer's account-requires a high 
level of piloting techniques. The ASDF pilots on the airlift mission 
in Iraq have done this 800 times without encountering any attack for 
five years. The SDF staff officer contended that this is "a result 
of training" and is "a result of strong their willingness to 
complete the mission." However, politicians have shown no 
understanding. This dissatisfies the SDF officer. 
 
If the SDF had come under attack in Iraq, the opposition parties 
would have put the blame on the government by claiming that it was 
not a noncombat area and it was a violation of the law. In addition, 
the government might have reproved the SDF for a misjudgment of the 
situation. For fear of this, the SDF would not tell its hard 
experience in Iraq, the SDF officer said. This is also a reason for 
politicians' lack of understanding. 
 
Third, the government imposes the "irrational" guidelines on the SDF 
to restrict its use of weapons. Politicians, however, do not think 
such guidelines are irrational. The SDF officer is dissatisfied with 
this. 
 
The government is now preparing to send SDF vessels in order to 
crack down on pirates in waters off the coast of Somalia. It looks 
like the government will task the SDF vessels with a mission to 
protect only Japanese ships and Japan-linked ships until a new law 
is enacted. 
 
In addition, the government is going to apply the weapons use 
guidelines that will not allow the SDF vessels to fire on pirates or 
pirate ships even in the face of danger unless its "legitimate 
self-defense" is clear. 
 
The government plans to create a new law, under which the SDF will 
be allowed to protect foreign ships and will be also allowed to fire 
on pirate ships and capture them. This legislation would face 
opposition from the New Komeito and the Democratic Party of Japan, 
however. The government would therefore have to set strict 
guidelines for the SDF's use of weapons. 
 
However, that will result in creating an irrational law to put an 
excessive hoop on the SDF vessels in their antipiracy activities. 
None of the political parties would think in this way. In that case, 
an SDF vessel on an antipiracy mission could be abducted. That is an 
unamusing joke. 
 
Then, what if a foreign ship asks for help? One possible response 
might be "that's not our mission until a new law is in place." Is 
 
TOKYO 00000270  007 OF 008 
 
 
this all the SDF can say to that foreign ship? All the SDF can do is 
to extend minimal cooperation? If that is the case, such security 
policing is unacceptable in the international community. Moreover, 
the SDF members there will only be put out of countenance. 
 
Politicians should lose no time in responding to the SDF members' 
reasonable frustration. It is extremely unhealthy to keep them 
frustrated. I hope politicians will understand their hardships and 
encourage them. Politicians must create a political environment in 
which the SDF members can be willing to carry out their missions, or 
they will not feel like living for the defense of Japan. 
 
The SDF is an entity of armed forces. Based on this political 
judgment, politicians should make the SDF and its members take 
pride. This is the first step to civilian control. 
 
(5) Where is the reduced burden? Town criticizes increased noise at 
Kadena Air Base; 126 aircraft arrived at Kadena, 30 planes moved out 
of prefecture for exercises 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 25) (Full) 
February 3, 2009 
 
Kadena 
 
"The relocation of training" has been referred to as a showcase to 
reduce the burden in the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The 
relocation of Kadena Air Base's F-15s to an Air Self-Defense Force 
base outside Okinawa started in March 2007. To date, a total of 30 
F-15s have taken part in seven cases. At the same time, according to 
Kadena Town, since 2007 at least 126 aircrafts, including fighters, 
have come from outside the prefecture, increasing the noise. The 
town criticized the situation, with one saying: "The number of 
aircrafts that have come to the prefecture is far greater than that 
of aircrafts moved out of the prefecture. Reality is a far cry from 
a reduction in the burden." 
 
(Kenya Fukusato) 
 
The relocation of training was incorporated in an agreement reached 
in 2006 between Japan and the United States. 
 
According to the Okinawa Defense Bureau, (the relocation of 
training) first took place at ASDF Tsuiki Base (Fukuoka Prefecture), 
followed by Komatsu (Ishikawa Prefecture), Misawa (Aomori 
Prefecture), Nyutabaru (Miyazaki Prefecture), and Chitose 
(Hokkaido). 
 
Meanwhile, 12 F-22A Raptors, the U.S. Air Force's state-of-the-art 
stealth fighters, were temporarily deployed at Kadena Air Base for 
about three months starting in February 2007. F-22A Raptors have 
been temporarily redeployed at the base since January this year. 
 
The U.S. Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps conducted joint rapid 
response exercises in December 2007 and December 2008 in which some 
30 aircrafts, including FA-18 fighters and AV-8 Harriers, vertical 
short takeoff and landing fighter/attack aircraft, came from the 
Iwakuni base. They repeatedly conducted exercises based at Kadena 
Air Base. 
 
According to Kadena Town, relocated training kept F-15s out of the 
prefecture for a total of 36 days. The average number of daily 
 
TOKYO 00000270  008 OF 008 
 
 
occurrences of noise for fiscal 2006 was 109. Of those 36 days, 24 
days recorded frequencies greater than the average. Only four days 
fell below the average, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and local high 
school entrance examination days for which the local municipality 
asked not to conduct exercises. 
 
Kadena Mayor Tokujitsu Miyagi said: "The Japanese government has 
pledged to lessen the burden, but in reality, the burden has clearly 
grown. A reduction in noise, which is what the residents want most, 
has yet to be realized. I will negotiate with the government to make 
efforts to alleviate the burden while showing data." 
 
Aircraft from outside Okinawa 
 
February 2007 F-22A 12 aircrafts 
December 2007 FA-18 30 
March 2008 F-16 12 
June 2008 Harrier 6 
July 2008 FA-18 9 
July 2008 Harrier 5 
November 2008 FA-18 16 
November 2008 Harrier 6 
December 2008 FA-18 8 
January 2009 F-22A 12 
January 2009 F-16 10 
 
Relocated F-15 exercises 
 
Period New location Number of aircrafts 
3/5/07 - 3/8/07 Tsuiki 5 
5/16/07 - 5/23/07 Komatsu 5 
7/16/07 - 7/21/07 Misawa 5 
9/3/07 - 9/4/07 Nyutabaru 2 
7/23/08 - 7/30/08 Misawa 6 
9/2/08 - 9/4/08 Nyutabaru 2 
12/8/08 - 12/12/08 Chitose 5 
 
ZUMWALT