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DE RUEHTC #0088/01 0401542
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2496
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000088 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC:  SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
55TH SESSION, FEBRUARY 17-20,2009 
 
REF: A. 08 THE HAGUE 1015 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 71 
     ¶C. 08 THE HAGUE 898 
     ¶D. THE HAGUE 40 
     ¶E. THE HAGUE 59 
 
This is CWC-04-09. 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) With few scheduled meetings the past few weeks, 
OPCW has been buzzing with corridor conversations on the 
aftermath of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) 
in December and whether Iran will request a special 
session of the Conference, and on potential candidates 
for the office of Director-General (DG).  Iran's tactics 
for the upcoming Executive Council (EC) following its 
isolation at the CSP will undoubtedly impact how much 
business can be done.  Iraq will become a State Party 
(SP) to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) just days 
before this EC; whether and how Iraq will participate is 
not yet known.  EC-55 will welcome Iraq's accession to 
the treaty; more difficult questions lie ahead when Iraq 
makes its initial declaration. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The newest item on the EC agenda is the 
appointment of a Director-General by the end of the year. 
Iran has already signaled that it is "too early" to start 
the search and that "informal informals" will be needed 
first.  Iran will also likely raise questions on the 90- 
day reports on destruction progress and may try to push 
for stronger language on future sites, specifically in 
the U.S.  Iran also has submitted additional changes to 
its Schedule 1 Facility Agreement the EC deferred in 
October. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Industry issues lack prominence on this agenda, 
with two open facilitations still waiting for volunteers 
to lead them.  The list of nominations for the Advisory 
Body for Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF) has 
grown to eight; Delreps have been quietly promoting 
broader reform of ABAF to improve its expertise.   The 
election of a new EC chair and vice chairs may turn 
contentious if the Iranians choose to pursue the Asian 
vice chair without an Ambassador, or if they challenge 
other groups' candidates, particularly the Mexican 
Ambassador as the chairman. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
THE JOKER'S WILD - HOW WILL IRAN PLAY ITS NEXT HAND? 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Following Iran's intransigence and near total 
isolation at the Conference of States Parties in December 
(ref a), OPCW officials and delegations are wondering who 
will represent Iran at this EC.  Mohsen Naziri Asl, the 
de facto leader of the local Iranian delegation since the 
departure of their ambassador in September, informed the 
EC Bureau in January that he would be departing The Hague 
before the EC.  However, he has waffled on the precise 
date of his departure in conversations with other 
delegates, implying that he would attend the EC. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Naziri Asl appeared for the informal 
consultations on the EC-55 agenda on February 9, and 
signaled questions on agenda items concerning 
destruction, industry consultations, and the selection of 
the Director-General.  As the chief architect of Iran's 
failure at the CSP, Naziri Asl's leadership at the EC 
would confirm a continuing hard line and lack of 
Qwould confirm a continuing hard line and lack of 
compromise.  A new face from Tehran, or a leading role by 
Naziri Asl's savvy colleague Hassan Vejdani (a former 
instructor at the Iranian diplomatic school), would 
suggest a fresh start toward renewed consensus, or at 
least fresh tactics on the floor.  Del expects this next 
 
round will continue to be led by Naziri Asl. 
 
-------------------------- 
IRAQ - THE NEW KID IN TOWN 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Iraq's recent accession to the CWC has generated 
some discussion, but is likely to be greeted at EC-55 by 
congratulatory remarks.  Del anticipates the difficult 
discussions will begin only after Iraq has submitted its 
initial declaration.  In a meeting with Mexican 
Ambassador Lomonaco, Del learned that Iraqi Ambassador 
Banaa apparently believes his country is acceding to the 
CWC as a "non-possessor," and has told Lomonaco that U.S. 
forces have destroyed any chemical weapons that existed. 
This points to a need to communicate several points to 
Banaa and his delegation at the earliest possible 
opportunity.  First, Iraqi reps in The Hague should be 
aware of the contents of their national declaration. 
Second, they should clearly understand what recovery 
activities have been undertaken so far, and the fact that 
these do not mean that all Iraqi CW has been eliminated. 
Third, it will be important for Banaa and his staff to 
understand the current political dynamics in the 
Executive Council and their likely impact on Iraq. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Del recommends several meetings on the margins 
of EC-55:  a working level bilateral with the UK, a 
bilateral meeting with the Iraqi delegation, and a 
meeting with the Technical Secretariat (TS) and the UK to 
discuss TS activities and possibly the forthcoming U.S. 
and UK declarations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
NEW HORIZON - THE SEARCH BEGINS FOR A DIRECTOR-GENERAL 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Agenda item 13 requests the Council to consider 
the matter of the appointment of a new Director-General 
(DG).  Del expects the Chairperson to outline a 
nomination process, but it is not clear how much 
consultation or blessing she wants from the Council. 
Ambassador Javits and others have advised her not to open 
the issue of procedures for choosing the DG to an EC 
decision, at risk of endless debate.  Algeria is already 
openly stating its intention to nominate its OPCW 
ambassador, Benchaa Dani, as a candidate (ref B).  Many 
delegates are assuming that Deputy Director-General (DDG) 
John Freeman is running for the top job, and speculation 
is rampant about other potential candidates from a 
variety of countries.  Delrep was even asked if 
Ambassador Javits might be nominated. 
 
¶9. (SBU) During the February 9 informal consultations on 
the EC-55 agenda, the South African delegate asked what 
delegations can expect to see for this agenda item.  EC 
Chairperson Tomova responded that it is important to 
engage the member states and to provide time for the 
process to unfold before the annual meeting of the CSP. 
She also mentioned the possibility of an Open Ended 
Working Group.  The Iranian delegation stated that the 
"time is not ripe" for such consultations and that 
"informal informals" would be needed first.  Tomova 
replied that it is necessary to start the process, but 
that there would be lots of opportunities to exchange 
views.  (Del comment:  Following the meeting, Tomova 
Qviews.  (Del comment:  Following the meeting, Tomova 
spoke with several delegations, including ours, about 
meeting later in the week to discuss this issue.  End 
comment) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
SHOWDOWN ON DESTRUCTION? - 90-DAY REPORTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Two sets of 90-day reports on destruction 
progress are on the Council's agenda.  Given that 
destruction progress was the topic that resulted in the 
 
first failure of the Conference of States Parties to 
agree to a final consensus report, this agenda item has 
the potential for an Iranian reprise of CSP antics.  Del 
has heard from several sources that Iran has claimed only 
to be seeking previously agreed report language.  EC-54 
language is, of course, acceptable, but Iran is unlikely 
to be satisfied with this alone.  The Russian delegation 
has shared its concerns that Iran will come forward with 
something far more creative, and has asked Delreps how 
the U.S. plans to respond, and what might be done to 
avoid another Friday-midnight finish.  Having learned 
that they have been overestimating the value of the final 
report, Iranian reps are also far more likely to force a 
showdown on the agenda item itself, instead of waiting to 
fight the battle in report language. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Iranian questions on prospects and dates for 
Pueblo and Blue Grass will probably start in the 
Destruction Informals, as they have at the past several 
Council sessions.  Del recommends the U.S. provide a 
clear, consistent response, beginning with the Informals, 
and remind Iran and other delegations that the purpose of 
the reports is for the EC to review progress, as stated 
in paragraph 28, Part IV A of the Verification Annex. 
Del also recommends beginning the EC with a clear sense 
of what (if any) report language beyond that agreed at 
EC-54 would be acceptable to the U.S. 
 
------------------------------------- 
FACILITY AGREEMENTS - IRAN'S AND OURS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Deferred from EC-54 in a tit-for-tat, 
amendments to the Iranian Schedule 1 Facility Agreement 
(originally approved by the EC in 2002) and the first- 
ever U.S. Schedule 1 Facility Agreement are both up for 
consideration and approval.  To date, the Iranian 
delegation has contacted neither the TS nor the Del with 
any questions or comments on our facility agreement.  The 
Iranian delegation has been similarly reticent in 
responding to questions raised by the U.S. Del and others 
on the floor of EC-54 specifically regarding the reasons 
why Iran is changing its facility agreement to a facility 
arrangement.  While the Del understands that a number of 
countries (e.g., the UK and Japan) have chosen to 
conclude arrangements with the OPCW to avoid having to 
obtain domestic legislative approval, it is not clear if 
this is the motivation behind Iran's sudden desire to 
transform its agreement into an arrangement.  Nor is it 
clear if the original facility agreement ever was 
approved by the Iranian parliament.  Additionally, in 
late January, Iran proposed a number of more substantive 
changes -- most of which were copied from provisions in 
the U.S. facility agreement -- without any explanation or 
justification. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Del requests that Washington provide 
substantive comments to accompany any objections to 
approving the Iranian amendments to their facility 
agreement.  Otherwise, Del recommends approval of the 
Iranian facility agreement, as it is clearly within the 
scope of what the U.S. considers acceptable at our own 
Schedule 1 facilities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Q-------------------------------------------- ------------ 
SETTING THE PRECEDENT - FORMER PRODUCTION FACILITIES TEN 
YEARS AFTER CONVERSION 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶14. (U) The Russian delegation has made clear that they 
will not join consensus on the Secretariat's 
recommendations on continued verification measures at the 
UK former CW production facility at Portreath. Russia 
objects to the precedent these recommendations set for 
other former production facilities that reach the ten- 
year point following certification of conversion. 
 
---------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY ISSUES - FADING FROM VIEW 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The DG's assessment of the revised site selection 
methodology for Other Chemical Production Facilities 
(OCPFs) is the only new Industry Cluster item on the 
agenda.  Industry Cluster consultations on OCPF 
Declaration Enhancements and on Schedule 2A/2A* Low 
Concentrations will take place during the week before EC- 
55; Del does not expect any substantive discussion on 
industry issues during EC-55.  Without facilitators for 
outstanding industry issues -- including OCPF site 
selection methodology, industry issues will probably 
continue to plod along.  The concomitant danger is that 
unresolved OCPF issues once again will dominate budget 
negotiations in the autumn. 
 
------------------------------------- 
AVOIDING ANOTHER SAB EXPERTS' MEETING 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) The report of the Twelfth Session of the 
Scientific Advisory Board and the accompanying note by 
the Director General are on the Council's agenda.  While 
the recommendations appear to be non-controversial, there 
is a danger that Iran, India, and others may use this as 
an opportunity to try to set up a Governmental Experts 
meeting to review each and every SAB report.  Whether or 
not this occurs may be contingent upon the outcome of the 
Governmental Experts meeting the week before the EC to 
review the SAB report to the Second Review Conference. 
 
------------------------ 
ABAF - LET'S MAKE A DEAL 
------------------------ 
 
¶17. (SBU) After having deferred the consideration of 
seven nominees (three replacements for previous members 
and four new candidates from African Group delegations) 
to the Advisory Body for Administrative and Financial 
Matters (ABAF) at EC-54 (ref C), Del has been consulting 
informally with other delegations, within WEOG and with 
the TS on ways to proceed.  Currently, there are two 
issues: clearing the pending nominations before the EC as 
more nominations are expected to be added to the mix; and 
taking the opportunity to reform the ABAF to insure it 
provides independent, expert advice.  When deferring the 
nominations at EC-54, the U.S. requested that curricula 
vitae of all nominees be circulated to the EC before 
approving candidates to serve on the ABAF.  The TS has 
circulated a paper with the nomination letters and 
curricula vitae of three of the deferred nominees; 
however, the four African candidates have refused to 
provide their curricula vitae describing the request as 
discriminatory and not required by the ABAF's rules of 
procedure. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In order to move ahead, Del suggests approving 
all pending nominations for a provisional period.  During 
this provisional period, the ABAF and the EC would have 
the opportunity to clarify procedures for nominations and 
appointments.  At the end of the provisional period, the 
ABAF would then be re-constituted (with currently serving 
members eligible to apply for re-appointment) in 
accordance to the revised rules. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Del has engaged Costa Rican Ambassador 
Francisco Arguilar in his role as EC Vice-Chairman for 
QFrancisco Arguilar in his role as EC Vice-Chairman for 
Administrative and Financial Issues.  Arguilar has agreed 
to take up the issue during the EC, including holding an 
informal consultation on the margins.  Del does not 
expect the issue to be resolved during EC-55 but believes 
that with sufficient engagement, a compromise can be 
accomplished during EC-56 in April -- in advance of the 
ABAF's first meeting this year in late May. 
 
----------------- 
MUSICAL EC CHAIRS 
----------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The slate of candidates for election of the EC 
chair and vice chairs to begin office in May are on the 
agenda for this EC.  GRULAC will have the Chair and has 
agreed that Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomonaco will be 
their nominee.  Del expects no opposition to Lomonaco, 
except possibly from Iran, as Lomonaco has been the most 
vocal proponent of voting at the last several meetings of 
the Council and CSP, notably when Iran was blocking 
action in those bodies.  If Iran does object to his 
nomination, this election might well push the EC to a 
vote, although consensus would be highly preferable. 
 
¶21. (SBU) WEOG approved the nomination of Dutch 
Ambassador Pieter de Savornin Lohman as vice chair. 
German Ambassador Werner Burkart had indicated his 
willingness to stay on, but bowed out in deference to his 
colleague.  Lohman plans to retain Burkart's destruction 
portfolio (ref B). 
 
¶22. (SBU) Other regional groups have not yet officially 
chosen their candidates for vice chair, although the 
Russian delegation would like to take the Eastern 
European seat.  The question of the Iranian retention of 
the vice chair without an accredited Representative could 
re-emerge if Iran pushes to remain in the Asian seat. 
Strict adherence to the Rules of Procedure would deny 
that, but could also affect the Russians as their 
ambassador will be leaving The Hague this spring. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Delrep asked Algerian Ambassador Dani if he 
would retain the African vice chairmanship; he replied 
that he hoped another ambassador would step forward to 
take it.  (Del comment:  Given Dani's DG ambitions, he 
may want more time to campaign.  A more active vice chair 
on industry issues is long overdue, although most of the 
African delegations are not staffed to take a Bureau seat 
on.  End Comment) 
 
--------------------------------- 
WILL THERE BE ANY OTHER BUSINESS? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) The Iranian delegation has been canvassing key 
delegations (not the U.S.) for support for a special 
session of the Conference of States Parties to reconsider 
the report from CSP-13 and adopt a final report by 
consensus.  Japan, Mexico, Russia and western delegations 
have firmly told them that the decisions of the 
Conference stand, the CSP chairman's report is valid, and 
no special session is needed.  French delegate Annie Mari 
believes the Iranians are getting some support from the 
NAM, but Del strongly doubts that the Iranians can obtain 
anywhere near enough member states' support for a special 
session.  The Iranians might try, however, to include 
discussion of this issue at the EC under "any other 
business." 
 
¶24. (U) Beik sends. 
GALLAGHER