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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0129/01 0561252
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251252Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2573
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0132
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000129 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC IZ
SUBJECT: CWC:  MEETINGS ON IRAQ'S ACCESSION TO THE CWC ON 
THE MARGINS OF EC-55 (FEBRUARY 17-20, 2009) 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 000104 
     ¶B. STATE 11851 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 000071 
 
(U) This is CWC-10-09. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU)  On the margins of the 55th Executive 
Council (EC) session of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Delreps met 
with representatives of Iraq, the United Kingdom, 
and the Technical Secretariat.  Although the tone 
of EC-55 toward Iraq was congratulatory, Iraqi 
officials in The Hague seem to have come away from 
the Council session with a clear understanding of 
the complexity of Council business and the 
difficulties Iraq is likely to encounter following 
submission of its initial declaration.  The 
Technical Secretariat (TS) is now taking a more 
active role in explaining Iraq's Chemical Weapons 
Convention obligations, particularly regarding 
chemical weapons declarations, inspections, and 
destruction.  However, senior TS leadership still 
seems reluctant to engage more fully with Iraq, 
lest the OPCW be seen as giving Iraq preferential 
treatment. 
 
------------------- 
MEETING WITH THE UK 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 16, Delreps met with the UK 
delegation to discuss the status of Iraq's 
accession and the U.S. and UK declarations of 
rounds recovered in Iraq that will follow Iraq's 
own declaration.  Both delegations briefly 
discussed total numbers of rounds recovered to 
date, and strategies for presenting this 
information to the OPCW.  U.S. Delreps also gave an 
update on interactions with the Iraqi Embassy in 
The Hague and information received from U.S. 
Embassy Baghdad. 
 
----------------------------- 
MEETINGS WITH IRAQI DIPLOMATS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Delreps Clagett, Ferguson, Robinson, and 
Rodjom met with Iraqi Ambassador Siamand Banaa on 
February 17 to follow up on earlier discussions 
where detailed information on upcoming issues 
related to Iraq's accession and future EC 
interactions was provided (REF A). Ambassador Banaa 
had no questions on the material provided 
previously, and indicated that he had not had time 
to review it thoroughly.  He did, however, note 
that he expected the number of recovered rounds to 
be much higher.  He provided no insight as to when 
Iraq's declaration would be submitted, but 
recognized that its on-schedule submission (by 
March 14, 2009) would require an appropriate 
response at EC-56 (April 21-24, 2009) supported by 
Iraqi experts. Delreps agreed to support the need 
for participation from Baghdad, and to provide 
suggestions to him as to appropriate attendees. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Banaa requested that the U.S. ask Embassy 
Baghdad to make the case with the Iraqi Government 
for augmenting the Ambassador's staff to assist 
with increasing OPCW activities. He also offered 
his opinion on several issues, including Iraq's 
continuing need for training support; Iraq's intent 
 
to become active in OPCW affairs; his expectation 
that more chemical weapons will be recovered in the 
future based on his knowledge of the directives of 
the previous regime; and his personal support for 
prosecution of the companies that supplied items to 
support the CW program of the former regime. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a follow up meeting with Iraqi First 
S ecretary Abbas Fadhil Al-Khafaji, Delreps 
Ferguson, Miller, and Robinson provided a copy of 
the most recent draft declaration received from 
Embassy Baghdad, and reviewed its classified and 
unclassified contents. They also discussed issues 
associated with future OPCW inspections, including 
the safety and security of inspectors. Abbas said 
that Ambassador Banaa had not given him the papers 
the U.S. had provided on February 12. Delreps also 
provided a table summarizing the immediate tasks 
ahead.  Abbas thanked the U.S. for the information 
and advice, and acknowledged that there are likely 
to be a number of questions about Iraq's 
declaration.  He therefore agreed that the presence 
of experts from Baghdad at EC-56 will be critical. 
Del will follow up with Abbas regarding the 
information provided, and to discuss Iraq's 
preparation for the EC-56 destruction informals 
presentation. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
MEETING WITH OPCW VERIFICATION DIVISION 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) On February 17, Delreps Clagett, Ferguson, 
Robinson, and Rodjom met with Technical Secretariat 
representatives Dr. Horst Reeps (Director, 
Verification Division) and Dominique Anelli 
(Head, Chemical Demilitarization Branch) to discuss 
Iraq's progress in preparing and submitting its 
initial declaration; and participation of Iraqi 
experts in EC-56. Also present were Dr. Jim McGilly 
and Clive Rowland from the UK. Delreps provided 
a summary of recent interactions with Embassy 
Baghdad, and indicated that the U.S. had just 
received a copy of what U.S. experts thought was 
likely to be the final version of the Iraqi 
declaration. NOTE: Del subsequently determined that 
the document received had been prepared in the 
December 2008 to February 2009 time frame, making 
it likely that this is the version destined for 
submission. END NOTE. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Reeps made clear that the TS has taken the 
steps necessary to prepare for conducting initial 
inspections if they are not precluded by inspector 
safety and security issues. He indicated that if 
the GOI did not clearly state its inability to 
ensure inspector safety, it would be left to the 
Director General to make that determination. 
Reeps indicated that the TS would remain officially 
in "reaction mode" in terms of Iraqi assistance 
until the declaration is submitted.  He added that 
DG Pfirter intends to avoid treating Iraq 
differently than any other new member state. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Reeps also made several requests for the 
U.S. and UK to support Iraq in preparation for EC- 
56: 
 
- that the USG or UK provide more current 
photographic documentation of the condition of the 
declared CW facilities (particularly the interior 
Qdeclared CW facilities (particularly the interior 
of storage bunkers), in order to:  aid in Iraq's 
EC-56 presentation; document the security 
situation; provide information for inspection 
planning; and possibly to provide a future 
 
supplement or even alternative to inspections 
 
- that the USG consider providing pre-briefings to 
TS inspectors on Iraqi conditions, e.g., no-go- 
locations, and 
 
- that the USG press the GOI to provide the 
preparation and expert participants needed to 
present Iraq's initial declaration at the EC-56 
destruction informals, and to answer any associated 
questions.  TS reps suggested that Iraqi 
participants arrive in The Hague sufficiently in 
advance of EC-56 to ensure their adequate 
preparation and coordination with the TS and USG. 
Delreps offered to encourage officials in Baghdad 
to arrive the week prior to EC-56. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Delreps reminded Reeps that USG operations 
in Iraq are now governed by the new Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) and bi-lateral Security 
Agreement between Iraq and the USG that took effect 
January 1, 2009.  Although the U.S. is amenable to 
providing appropriate support, future actions will 
be guided by GOI requests and coordination. 
 
¶10. (SBU) U.S. and UK reps also informed the TS of 
their respective current totals of Iraqi chemical 
weapons rounds recovered and destroyed.  At the TS 
request, U.S. reps gave a brief overview of the 
information that will be contained in the U.S. 
supplemental declaration, and what other 
information the U.S. has retained as back-up 
verification data.  Reeps was noncommittal as to 
whether or not this type of information would be 
considered sufficient for verification purposes. 
 
¶11. (SBU) DEL COMMENT:  Del recommends further 
discussions with the Secretariat on this topic, 
prior to U.S. submission of its supplemental 
declaration.  If other delegations have questions 
about whether the U.S. acted in accordance with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, it will be important 
for the TS to be able to confirm that it is 
satisfied the rounds were destroyed in accordance 
with CWC requirements.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) Beik sends 
GALLAGHER