R 240711Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0612
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000437 
 
 
DEPT FOR CA, NEA, DS 
 
E.O. 12958:N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CMGT PINS PREL IS
SUBJECT:  COORDINATING THE GAZA EVACUATION: TEL AVIV'S ACCOUNT 
 
REF: 2008 CAIRO 0104 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv coordinated a multinational 
evacuation from the Gaza Strip during 19-22 Jan 2009.  More than 500 
foreign nationals, representing citizens from 36 countries, were 
successfully evacuated.  Among them were over 150 American citizens 
and their immediate family members.  This cable reports the 
Embassy's role, along with lessons learned.   END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. BACKGROUND:  As State's Travel Warning for Israel, the West Bank, 
and Gaza makes clear, State strongly urges that Amcits refrain from 
all travel to the Gaza Strip.  As a consequence of a longstanding 
prohibition on travel by USG employees into Gaza, the ability of 
consular staff to assist U.S. citizens there is extremely limited. 
This has not prevented Amcits and their non-Amcit family members 
from continuing to reside in Gaza, where many of them have their 
extended families and their livelihoods. 
 
¶3. On 27 Dec 2008, air strikes heralded the beginning of Operation 
Cast Lead, an Israeli military incursion into the Gaza Strip.  On 31 
Dec 2008, COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the 
Territories, a branch of the IDF) advised Post to plan for an Amcit 
evacuation in a week's time.  On 01 Jan 2009, however, COGAT 
suddenly informed Post that the evacuation would take place the next 
day.  Post immediately informed ConGen Jerusalem (responsible for 
American citizens in the Gaza Strip) and the Ops Center and surmised 
that the new date meant a ground operation was likely to begin over 
the long New Year's weekend.  Twenty-seven Amcits took advantage of 
the buses arranged by the ConGen and, with Embassy coordination and 
escort, transited the Erez crossing to Amman, Jordan on 02 Jan 2009. 
 
 
¶4. The IDF began a ground operation in Gaza on Saturday 03 Jan 2009. 
 Aware that dozens of Foreign Missions were anxious to evacuate 
their foreign nationals, COGAT requested one Foreign Mission serve 
as the point of contact for all Missions involved in evacuating 
their citizens.  Canada took the lead and conducted an evacuation of 
several dozen foreign nationals on 08 Jan 2009.  With many more 
foreign nationals clamoring to leave, COGAT then asked if the U.S. 
would coordinate the next evacuation.  On 11 Jan 2009, post 
accepted. 
 
¶5. On 12 Jan 2009, Post hosted a meeting for all of the Foreign 
Missions interested in evacuating their citizens from Gaza. 
Twenty-six Foreign Missions attended.  Over the next two weeks, Post 
worked closely with diplomats from twenty-eight diplomatic missions. 
 The largest numbers of foreign nationals came from the U.S., 
Philippines, Russia, and Ukraine.  Post updated the Foreign Missions 
up to thrice daily until the evacuations were completed on 22 Jan 
¶2009. 
 
¶6. Post coordinated with Embassies Amman and Cairo, and with the 
Egyptian and Jordanian Embassies in Tel Aviv, to guarantee 
permission of entry for the foreign nationals, as well as assisting 
these missions in evacuating their own citizens from Gaza.  The 
daily communications necessary to this coordination strengthened 
post's relations with a number of embassies, including those of 
Russia, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. 
 
¶7. In conjunction with ConGen Jerusalem and USAID officers connected 
to both missions, post worked tirelessly to secure a commitment from 
the ICRC and UNRWA to escort the evacuees inside Gaza.  Without 
escorts, we feared evacuees would face life-threatening dangers from 
air and ground attacks as they made their way from pick-up points to 
official crossing points out of Gaza.  In spite of Post's efforts, 
no international organization agreed to devote its resources to 
supporting the multinational evacuations.   IO representatives 
stated that they did not want to be seen as favoring foreign 
nationals when so many Palestinians had no way to leave Gaza, and 
that the situation on the ground was too dangerous for them to risk 
moving large groups of people inside Gaza. 
 
¶8. As the war continued, IDF forces bisected the Gaza Strip.  Post 
considered numerous evacuation scenarios and settled on two separate 
evacuations: first, from southern Gaza via the Rafah Border Crossing 
into Egypt; and second, from northern Gaza via the Erez Border 
Crossing, then to Amman, Jordan.  Post collated over 1,100 names of 
foreign nationals wishing to evacuate from thirty-six countries 
represented by twenty-eight diplomatic missions; Post then submitted 
the names to COGAT.  Individual countries including the U.S. 
submitted separate lists of their citizens to the Governments of 
Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to secure permission to travel. 
 
¶9. Evacuation 1:  Rafah to Cairo, 19 Jan 2009: 
On 19 Jan 2009, in the midst of land and air operations, 10 
Americans and 67 other foreign nationals made their own way to the 
Rafah border crossing into Egypt, where consular officers from 11 
Embassies, led by Embassy Cairo, met them and caravanned by bus to 
Cairo.  Embassy Cairo led the caravan and evacuated Amcits, while 
coordinating the evacuation efforts of the 11 other countries, 
including Canada, Turkey, and Russia. All evacuees left Gaza 
unharmed, although it took 10 hours to process them across the 
border (reftel). 
 
¶10. Evacuation 2: Erez to Amman, 21 Jan 2009: 
A ceasefire began at 7pm on 20 Jan 2009, which made evacuations 
easier and safer.  Although ICRC and UNRWA were unable to assist the 
evacuation effort, the YMCA allowed their Gaza City facility to be 
used as a gathering point.  Due to the large number of evacuees, 
Post split up the multinational evacuation from northern Gaza over 
two days.  On 20 Jan 2009, post sent SMS messages to other Embassies 
confirming that the evacuation the next day was a "go."  Meanwhile, 
ConGen phoned each American family on the next day's list and asked 
them to be at their designated meeting point, the YMCA in Gaza City, 
by 06:30 the next morning. 
 
¶11. The first evacuees emerged from the border crossing at 10:00 on 
21 Jan 2009.  Younger children played with toys donated by ConGen 
Jerusalem staff, while the teenagers asked about life in the United 
States.  One older man had left Gaza carrying only a change of 
clothes and a deflated basketball.  The evacuees thanked consular 
officials for their help and encouragement.  International 
journalists interviewed some evacuees and Embassy staff.  At 16:00, 
the bus left for the Allenby/King Hussein Bridge Crossing to Jordan. 
 
¶12. Approximately 250 persons were evacuated on 21 Jan 2009, 
including 97 American citizens and their immediate family members. 
In addition to the U.S., a number of embassies, including Australia, 
Denmark, Germany, and Jordan participated in the evacuation. 
 
¶13. Evacuation 3: Erez to Amman, 22 Jan 2009: 
Embassies from seven countries in addition to the U.S. participated 
in day two of the northern evacuation.  Approximately 200 foreign 
nationals were evacuated, among them 33 Amcits. 
 
¶14. The evacuees were eager to share their stories with staff.  One 
father had studied in Miami on a U.S. Government grant and was 
returning there to work.  Another father had been a Fulbright Fellow 
in Utah and planned to accept a professorship at the state 
university.  They repeatedly expressed their appreciation to the 
U.S. Government and to the United States as a country. 
 
¶15.  LESSONS LEARNED: 
-- Coordination and open communication are essential. Embassy Tel 
Aviv's coordination of the multinational evacuation was successful 
because of the excellent cooperation and communication within the 
Embassy, particularly among Front Office, CONS, POL, PD, and RSO. 
Post worked closely with the IDF, MFA, Israel Security Agency (Shin 
Bet), and MOD to secure exit permits and freedom of travel for the 
evacuees.  ConGen Jerusalem communicated regularly with American 
citizens in Gaza and organized bus transport within Gaza and through 
Israel.  Embassy Cairo coordinated with the Government of Egypt 
prior to and on the day of the Rafah evacuation and organized bus 
transportation for dozens of evacuees.  Embassy Amman worked with 
the Government of Jordan to secure entry to Jordan for the evacuees, 
and continues to work closely with DOS and DHS to facilitate travel 
to the U.S. for non-American citizen family members of American 
citizen evacuees. . 
 
-- Good relations with other diplomatic missions are essential.  In 
addition to protecting American citizens, the successful evacuation 
bolstered diplomatic relationships between Embassy Tel Aviv and 
other foreign missions in Israel.  Several of the foreign missions 
sent thank-you letters, including a hand-written note from the 
Spanish Ambassador. 
 
-- Take advantage of positive PR opportunities.  PD's excellent 
coverage of the evacuation, including sending an Embassy 
photographer, provided valuable materials for Post's ongoing public 
diplomacy efforts. 
 
-- Create a special e-mail address to simplify communications. 
 
-- Send daily (or more frequent) sitreps to all participating 
missions. 
 
-- Use modern technology to facilitate communication.  Post used an 
SMS messaging service for last minute "go/no go" and other important 
messages. 
 
-- Diplomacy works.  GOI required that all foreign nationals 
departing Gaza be screened by Israeli security.  Due to security 
concerns, GOI initially barred several individuals from leaving 
Gaza.  Post intervened at a high level to bring Israeli attention to 
these cases.  In the end, all Amcits who wanted to leave Gaza were 
able to exit. 
 
¶16. CONCLUSION:  The confusion that descends upon a region at war 
can make communication, travel, and decision-making extremely 
problematic.  Thrust into the role of evacuation coordinator, 
Embassy Tel Aviv relied upon an extensive network of contacts in 
various GOI ministries and in the IDF, with International 
Organizations and within the participating embassies to overcome 
these limitations.   But even our good offices could not reduce 
risks for the evacuees unable to leave Gaza, could not force the GOI 
to prioritize the evacuation, could not eliminate bureaucratic 
hurdles, and could not ensure success.  Thanks to our colleagues in 
Amman, Cairo and Jerusalem, and the patience of our colleagues at 
third-country embassies in Tel Aviv, we eventually arranged a 
successful departure from Gaza despite the Travel Warning advice 
that "the ability of consular staff to offer timely assistance to 
U.S. citizens there is extremely limited."  Cairo and Amman have 
cleared on this cable. 
 
CUNNINGHAM