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Viewing cable 09TASHKENT220, UZBEKISTAN: 2008 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09TASHKENT220 2009-02-26 05:32 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tashkent
VZCZCXRO4715
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHNT #0220/01 0570532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 260532Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0516
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0052
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0017
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0004
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0064
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0024
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0055
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TASHKENT 000220 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
DEPT FOR INL TIM BARRY AND ANDREW BUHLER 
ANKARA FOR DEA CHRIS MELINK 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL ASEC AFIN EAID UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: 2008 INL END USE MONITORING REPORT 
 
REF: a) 07 STATE 166080 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  001.2 OF 010 
 
 
REF: 07 STATE 166080 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED  Please protect accordingly. 
 
Per instructions in reftel, Embassy Tashkent presents the 
required annual End Use Monitoring Report to the Bureau 
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(INL) for calendar year 2008.  As bilateral relations 
with Uzbekistan continue to improve, end use monitoring 
trips have provided excellent opportunities to network 
and rebuild contacts with local law enforcement 
officials.  A substantial portion of the inventory of 
INL-donated equipment has now exceeded its useful 
lifespan, and we will remove some quantities of equipment 
from our monitoring lists; however, we will continue to 
request inspection of such equipment at our discretion. 
Meanwhile, INL should consider increasing investments in 
Uzbekistan to reflect its growing strategic importance to 
the United States in the context of our enhanced regional 
approach to resolving the conflict in Afghanistan. 
 
---------- 
PROCEDURES 
---------- 
 
A. Inventory Management 
 
Timothy Buckley is responsible for the INL Tashkent 
program.  He can be reached by telephone at: 998-71-120- 
5450; fax: 998-71-120-6335; or unclassified email: 
BuckleyTP@state.gov.  INL Assistant Dmitriy Dogovorov can 
be reached by office telephone: 998-71-120-5450; fax: 
998-71-120-5400; or unclassified email: 
dogovorovd@state.gov. 
 
Post has one full-time Locally Engaged Staff (LES) 
position to support INL initiatives in Uzbekistan.  The 
Embassy continues to improve procedures for INL equipment 
monitoring.  In 2007 we created an INL equipment database 
containing records of all equipment provided to the GOU 
and records of previous inspections.  The database 
includes all equipment-related information and supports 
dozens of different queries.  INL equipment has been 
distributed throughout all 12 provinces of Uzbekistan, 
although a majority has now exceeded its reasonable 
expected lifespan. 
 
The INL program in Uzbekistan has been very modest in 
recent fiscal years and is administered by an officer in 
the political and economic section who must divide work 
time between several portfolio items.  Other than the one 
INL LES there are no other post positions with end-use 
monitoring responsibilities and there was no change in 
staffing from year 2007.  Due to post security concerns 
the LES is only authorized to visit host government law 
enforcement installations when an American officer is 
present, which makes end use monitoring more resource 
intensive.  Other pol/econ officers, especially one who 
handles the Export and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
portfolio, also occasionally visit facilities to conduct 
end use monitoring involving INL-donated equipment. 
 
No other USG agencies represented at post conducted any 
end use monitoring of INL-provided resources.  However, 
in late 2008 and early 2009 a visiting Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) Agent conducted some end-use 
monitoring of INL-donated equipment, which was an 
excellent opportunity to build contacts in the host 
government in anticipation of greater engagement on 
counternarcotics.  The poloff responsible for the INL 
portfolio performed end use monitoring tasks for a 
project implemented by the Department of Justice 
International Criminal Investigative and Training 
Assistance Program (DOJ-ICITAP). 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  002.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
B. Counterpart Agencies 
 
The following Uzbek government entities have received 
INL-donated equipment: 
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) 
State Customs Committee 
Ministry of Health (MOH) 
National Security Service (NSS) (includes the Border 
Guards) 
Office of the General Prosecutor 
 
Cooperation on end use monitoring improved in 2008 along 
with the bilateral relationship, yet there are still 
bureaucratic obstacles.  The GOU continues to regard its 
law enforcement installations as very sensitive and, like 
all post's dealings with the government, any request for 
access must be submitted well in advance via diplomatic 
note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Approval of the 
notes can cause significant delays in subsequently 
conducting end use monitoring visits.  Late approval by 
the host government of our formal diplomatic note 
outlining visits in the autumn of 2008 resulted in some 
of our end use monitoring for calendar year 2008 to be 
conducted in January 2009. 
 
In 2008, the secretive National Security Service finally 
allowed us to inspect a Jeep Cherokee which it 
commandeered from the State Customs Committee several 
years ago.  The negative aspects of this incident were 
well-documented in previous editions of this report, and 
this year marked a step in the right direction in that we 
could finally confirm the vehicle is being used by the 
government, albeit not by the agency it was originally 
intended for.  The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
State Customs Committee maintain positive relationships 
with the Embassy and appreciate the USG equipment they 
have received over the years; however, they are still 
bound by bureaucratic procedures which continue to limit 
our access and contact with officers. 
 
Embassy Tashkent requires the Government of Uzbekistan to 
sign an End User Certificate upon receipt of all INL- 
funded equipment.  This document requires relevant GOU 
agencies to provide the Embassy information regarding 
each donated item, including product description, serial 
number, and geographical location where the equipment is 
deployed.  Post submitted a diplomatic note to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as required by the 
Government of Uzbekistan, to request access to specific 
equipment for monitoring purposes.  It is not possible to 
conduct random, surprise inspections at Uzbek law 
enforcement installations where our equipment is located. 
 
C. On-Site Inspections 
 
On-site inspections are the only reliable means of 
conducting required end use monitoring, even though they 
must be arranged far in advance.  Typically, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs then provides us with a local contact 
who represents the appropriate ministry and we plan our 
visit details.  Random, unscheduled visits are not 
possible and government officials at all levels 
throughout the country adhere to strict bureaucratic 
requirements to arrange permission far in advance through 
formal channels. 
 
There were 22 scheduled on-site inspections performed in 
2008 (and early 2009 as part of our process for the 2008 
calendar year) around the country.  There were some 
opportunities for unscheduled inspections when embassy 
officers crossed land borders or visited checkpoints 
where some INL-donated equipment is located.  For 
instance, at an official visit to the border checkpoint 
of Xayraton (the main crossing between Uzbekistan and 
Afghanistan near Termez) in June 2008, the Ambassador 
observed Uzbek Customs officers using INL-donated 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  003.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
flashlights, leatherman utility toolkits, and search 
mirrors to conduct vehicle inspections, even though it 
was not an end use monitoring trip. 
 
Scheduled On-site Inspections performed: 
 
Date        Location        Site 
01/14/08    Bukhara            Provincial Customs Office 
01/15/08    Navoiy            Provincial Customs Office 
01/25/08    Tashkent        MVD Sensitive Investigative Unit 
04/25/08    Tashkent        Main Forensic Laboratory 
08/27/08    Nukus            Provincial Customs Office 
12/18/08    Tashkent        NSS Jeep 
01/20/08    Ming-Tepa        Border Checkpoint 
01/20/08    Kesken-Er        Border Checkpoint 
01/21/09    Ferghana City        MVD Counter Drug Dept 
01/21/09    Urgench            Khorezm Forensic Laboratory 
01/21/08    Urgench            MVD Counter Drug Dept 
01/22/09    Pitnak-Dustlik        Border Post 
01/22/09    Yangibazar        Border Post 
01/23/09    Nukus            MVD Counter Drug Dept 
01/26/09    Tashkent        Main MOH Forensic Laboratory 
01/30/09    Tashkent        MVD Sensitive Investigative Unit 
01/30/09    Tashkent        MVD Counter Drug Unit 
01/30/09    Tashkent        MVD City Police Counter Drug Unit 
01/31/09    Tash Region        MVD Counter Drug Unit for 
Province 
02/02/09    Guliston        MVD SyrDarya Counter Drug Unit 
02/02/09    Jizzakh            MVD Counter Drug Unit 
02/03/09    Samarqand        MVD Counter Drug Unit 
 
There is a large quantity of INL-donated items to be 
inspected, many dating from a previous era of stronger 
bilateral cooperation.  For instance, INL funding was 
used to completely equip the Sensitive Investigative Unit 
(SIU) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Equipment at 
this facility alone includes everything from handcuffs to 
GPS units to computer workstations.  In 2007, INL 
provided several hundred flashlights and Leatherman 
utility toolkits for Customs Officers, particularly for 
those stationed in Surkhandarya Province near the 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan borders.  It is therefore not 
practical to inspect all INL-donated equipment on an 
annual basis.  This year we conducted field visits to 
check the status of key collections of INL-funded 
equipment or items which we did not inspect in 2007.  We 
prioritized major items such as vehicles, laboratory 
instruments, and the extensive equipment provided to the 
counter-narcotics-focused SIU.  We also visited several 
small provincial police stations where INL-funded TVs, 
VCRs, and camera equipment was distributed. 
 
D. Secondary Methods of Monitoring Resource Status 
Comparison of Records 
 
Written and computerized government records in Uzbekistan 
are not well-developed and are not yet a reliable source 
of information.  Frankly, we would not likely be granted 
regular access to such databases.  Rather, we use our own 
detailed databases to identify priority equipment to 
inspect each year and submit diplomatic notes to arrange 
permission to conduct physical on-site inspections. 
 
-------------------- 
STATUS - COMMODITIES 
-------------------- 
 
A. Type of Commodity 
 
The following major equipment, mostly purchased during 
previous fiscal years, is included on our end-use 
monitoring inventory: 
 
Computers to SIU -- In January 2004, Embassy delivered 25 
workstations to the counter-narcotics-focused Sensitive 
Investigative Unit within the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  004.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
Communications Equipment to SIU -- In July 2003, 30 
cellular telephones, 30 Motorola GP-360 handheld radios, 
and four Thuraya satellite phones were provided to the 
SIU within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
 
Vehicles to Customs -- In August 2000, the Uzbek State 
Customs Committee received nine 4-wheel-drive Jeep 
Cherokees and spare parts. 
 
Vehicles to SIU -- In December 2003, INL delivered 28 
vehicles to the SIU of various makes and models to assist 
with counternarcotics investigations. 
 
Laboratory Equipment to MVD  In July 2004, post 
delivered and finished installation of laboratory 
equipment to enhance the GOU's capabilities to perform 
forensic analyses of explosives substances.  Equipment 
donated to the explosives laboratory at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs included a Sabre-2000 portable explosive 
detector, five digital scales, and an Agilent 
Electrophoresis system.  A Nicolet IR Spectrometer system 
was previously delivered to the lab in 1999. 
 
Laboratory Equipment to MOH Lab -- The main forensic 
laboratory at the Ministry of Health (which analyzes 
narcotic substances) received several sophisticated 
instruments funded by INL, including an Agilent Gas 
Chromatograph and Mass Spectrometer System, which greatly 
supported evidence processing in criminal drug cases. 
This is the only active project (administered by DOJ- 
ICITAP) for which we are continuing to purchase and 
transfer extensive quantities of equipment. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- In October 
2001, INL provided the then Committee for State Border 
Protection document examination equipment to improve 
passport control activities at border checkpoints. 
Donated equipment included: 100 Universal Desktop 
Magnifiers and spare lamps, 200 Hand-Held UV-spot 
detectors and spare UV lamps, eight Multifunctional 
Passport Readers, and one set of Passport computer 
software with samples of more than 2,000 different 
passports and identification documents. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to SIU  Basic investigative 
equipment was distributed to the Counter Drug Department 
of the Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs.  The equipment 
transferred included 21 digital video cameras, 68 
portable digital audio recorders, 36 digital cameras, and 
19 TV sets and VCRs.  We were able to check a significant 
amount of this equipment during visits to provincial 
police stations this year. 
 
Furniture for Border Checkpoints -- INL supported a joint 
border project with the Embassy Export Control and 
Related Border Security Program (EXBS), which provided 
modular shelters for Uzbek Border Guards.  INL Tashkent 
purchased, delivered, and installed custom-made furniture 
for the shelters. 
 
B. Location 
 
Computers to SIU -- The 25 workstations are located at 
the main SIU headquarters in Tashkent. 
 
Communications Equipment to SIU -- All equipment, 
including 30 cellular telephones, 30 Motorola GP-360 
handheld radios, and four Thuraya satellite phones, is 
located at the main headquarters in Tashkent. 
 
Vehicles to Customs -- The nine 4-wheel-drive Jeep 
Cherokees were dispersed throughout the country.  Uzbek 
Customs assigned three vehicles to counter-smuggling 
units in Tashkent Province (which includes rugged 
mountain terrain in its territory) as well as one each to 
Bukhara, Navoi, Karakalpakstan and Ferghana Provinces. 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  005.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
The two remaining vehicles, which were commandeered by 
the National Security Service and the Office of the 
General Prosecutor, are located in Tashkent. 
 
Vehicles to SIU -- The 28 vehicles delivered to the SIU 
are based at the headquarters in Tashkent. 
 
Laboratory Equipment to MVD  Equipment donated to the 
explosives laboratory at the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
included a Sabre-2000 portable explosive detector, five 
digital scales, and an Agilent Electrophoresis system.  A 
Nicolet IR Spectrometer system was previously delivered 
to the lab in 1999.  It is located in Tashkent. 
 
Laboratory Equipment to MOH -- The main forensic 
laboratory at the Ministry of Health is where our most 
active INL project is proceeding.  We continued to donate 
a range of sophisticated laboratory instruments to the 
facility, which is located in the capital of Tashkent.  A 
small amount of equipment, including microscopes and 
refrigerators, were donated to other provincial 
laboratories. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- Document 
examination equipment to improve passport control 
activities at border checkpoints is distributed to more 
than 40 checkpoints around the country as well as the 
Border Guard Academy. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to MVD  Basic investigative 
equipment was distributed to the Counter Drug Department 
of the Uzbek Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Numerous 
equipment is maintained at the SIU headquarters in 
Tashkent, while other communications equipment was 
distributed to various counter drug departments at 
provincial command posts throughout the country. 
 
Furniture for Border Checkpoints -- INL-provided 
furniture is located at four rural border checkpoints. 
Two are on the border with Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana 
Valley and two are on the border with Turkmenistan in 
Khorezm and Karakalpakstan Provinces in the far 
northwest. 
 
C. Use 
 
Computers to SIU -- Emboffs visited the facility in 
January 2008 and a visiting DEA Agent performed an 
inspection visit in January 2009.  In both cases it was 
clear that the computer equipment is being actively used 
by law enforcement officers for its intended purpose of 
supporting counternarcotics investigations. 
 
Communications Equipment to SIU -- Emboffs and a visiting 
DEA Agent inspected the equipment this year.  The cell 
phones are now obsolete but some are still in use; in 
other cases officers have returned the phones for 
inventory purposes but prefer to use their personal 
phones with modern features.  The satellite phones are 
not in use due to the high cost of the service, which the 
SIU could no longer afford when the Government of 
Uzbekistan suspended cooperation with the DEA in early 
2007.  As a whole, the array of equipment provided by the 
U.S. Government still makes the work of the SIU easier, 
but it is less pivotal with each passing year. 
 
Vehicles to Customs -- The seven vehicles remaining with 
the State Customs Committee are of limited utility since 
spare parts are unavailable.  Several in Tashkent region 
are still actively used by Customs, while others in the 
provinces are inoperable.  However, they are securely 
stored and officers were able to explain how they use the 
vehicles to support their operations. 
 
Vehicles to SIU -- INL Tashkent conducted a thorough 
check in early 2008 and found all 28 vehicles are 
actively used by police officers of the current unit.  A 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  006.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
visiting DEA Agent also inspected the vehicles and was 
positively impressed that not only are the vehicles being 
actively utilized, but much of the other support 
equipment that should be utilized in the field is indeed 
with cops on the street. 
 
Laboratory Equipment  The INL-funded project to upgrade 
the capabilities at the Main Forensic Laboratory of the 
Ministry of Health is still active, and numerous embassy 
officers -- including the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of 
Mission, and Political Chief on separate visits -- were 
warmly welcomed for tours and demonstrations of the 
equipment during 2008.  The laboratory staff is extremely 
grateful for U.S. assistance and participated in 
professional development and training events abroad to 
enhance the benefit of our equipment donation.  The 
Embassy included a press release of the Ambassador's 
April 2008 participation in a signing ceremony and tour 
at the laboratory on its website. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- We did not 
specifically inspect this equipment during this reporting 
cycle, but poloffs noted the equipment was utilized at 
the recently constructed modern border checkpoint on the 
Afghan border at Termez as well as at other vehicle 
crossing points in the Ferghana Valley and north of 
Tashkent. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to SIU  Inspections by poloffs 
and visiting DEA Agent confirmed the equipment is being 
properly utilized by officers with counternarcotics 
responsibilities.  The creative unit has its own audio- 
visual technician who improvised modifications to use 
local handbags that make hidden cameras more discreet. 
 
Furniture for Border Checkpoints -- We visited each of 
the four rural border checkpoints this year and found the 
furniture to still be in use. 
 
D. Condition 
 
Computers to SIU -- Poloff and visiting DEA Agent 
determined on separate visits that the equipment is still 
in good condition.  Extra equipment is carefully packaged 
and stored on the premises for end use monitoring 
inventory purposes.  The computers are no longer state- 
of-the-art after several years of use. 
 
Communications Equipment to SIU -- An Uzbek police 
officer has been designated as responsible for 
maintaining and tracking the inventory, and all equipment 
is accounted for and in excellent condition given the 
time elapsed.  The cell phones are now obsolete but some 
are still in use; in other cases officers have returned 
the phones for inventory purposes but prefer to use their 
personal phones with modern features.  The satellite 
phones are not in use due to the high cost of the 
service, which the SIU could no longer afford when the 
Government of Uzbekistan suspended cooperation with the 
DEA in early 2007.  Much of the equipment is no longer 
state-of-the-art, and the SIU will need updated equipment 
in order to keep pace with modern police entities. 
 
Vehicles to Customs -- The condition of the Jeeps is 
generally poor.  Customs officers have clearly done the 
best they can to maintain the Jeep Cherokees, although 
the government has not provided resources to make 
repairs.  Jeeps are not common in Uzbekistan and spare 
parts must be imported from abroad; mechanics also are 
unfamiliar with the vehicles and have difficulty fixing 
them.  The vehicles in Buhkara, Navoiy, and Nukus are 
inoperable and awaiting repairs.  However, they are 
securely stored in garages.  The two vehicles 
commandeered by other Uzbek government agencies are in 
the best condition. 
 
Vehicles to SIU -- INL Tashkent conducted a thorough 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  007.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
check in early 2008 and found almost all vehicles in good 
condition despite intensive use.  A visiting DEA Agent 
conducted a follow up visit and confirmed our earlier 
findings.  The fleet is intentionally mixed, including 
several local models, to allow undercover units to blend 
in with their surroundings.  The local models are much 
easier for the SIU to maintain since there is ready 
availability of spare parts and mechanical expertise. 
Two Opel Astras still require approximately USD 2,000 of 
repairs that the SIU has no funds to complete; however, 
the vehicles are kept in a secure garage and otherwise 
appear to be in good condition.  The vehicles are 
approaching the end of their useful expected lifespan. 
 
Laboratory Equipment  Several new sophisticated 
instruments were donated to the forensic laboratory in 
2008 and U.S. experts conducted associated visits and to 
describe international accreditation standards. 
Equipment from previous years is also in excellent 
condition and is carefully cared for by qualified 
scientific staff.  The Uzbek Government, in response to 
the INL efforts to upgrade the laboratory, is building a 
modern new building that will soon house the equipment. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to Border Guards -- It is 
difficult to arrange access to border checkpoints and the 
Border Guards have been absorbed into the National 
Security Service.  The equipment has been utilized for a 
reasonable time period and we will no longer specifically 
monitor its disposition; however, we will note when it is 
observed during routine entry or exit formalities. 
 
Miscellaneous Equipment to MVD  As with other equipment 
provided to the SIU, poloff and a visiting DEA Agent 
found the camera and video equipment to be maintained in 
excellent condition.  However, cameras are no longer 
state-of-the-art, especially as newer-generation digital 
technology makes cameras from a half-decade ago seem 
clunky and obsolete.  One police official in Ferghana 
Province said some of the tv, vcr, and camera equipment 
provided had since been lost or damaged; however, he said 
the responsible officers had to purchase replacements 
themselves, which he provided for inspection. 
 
Furniture for Border Checkpoints -- Visits to each of the 
four remote border checkpoints during this reporting 
period confirmed that the furniture (including 
refrigerator, oven, bookshelves, lockers, beds, and 
desks) is being maintained in good condition. 
 
E. Unmonitored Commodities 
 
We conducted extensive checks during this reporting 
period, but there were still several provincial police 
stations which we did not visit to check small quantities 
of digital cameras, televisions, and VCRs. 
 
--------------------- 
STATUS -- INVENTORIES 
--------------------- 
 
There are no INL-funded vessels, aircrafts, weapons, or 
canine programs to monitor in Uzbekistan.  Numerous 
vehicles donated in previous years are tracked in the 
status-commodities section above.  A summary table below 
itemizes the INL-furnished vehicles in Uzbekistan: 
 
STATE CUSTOMS COMMITTEE, COUNTER SMUGGLING UNITS (Donated 
in 2000): 
 
Vehicle                Inventory 
 
Jeep Cherokee Sport 2.5TD    7* (two other Jeeps were 
requisitioned by the National Security Service and the 
Office of the General Prosecutor) 
 
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE UNIT (Donated in 2003): 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  008.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
Vehicle                Inventory 
 
Opel Astra Sedan            3 
Opel Vectra Elegance            1 
Toyota Land Cruiser 100GX        2 
Toyota Land Cruiser 100STD        1 
Toyota Corolla                1 
Daewoo Nexia GLE            11 
Daewoo Matiz DLX            2 
Daewoo Damas                 2 
VAZ NIVA 21310                2 
VAZ LADA 21099                3 
 
------------------ 
STATUS -- SERVICES 
------------------ 
 
A. There were no construction projects administered by 
INL in this reporting period. 
 
B. There were no drug demand reduction projects funded by 
INL in this reporting period.  An INL-funded DDR project 
was completed in late 2007 by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  There is INL funding from FY 
2008 that will be used for a follow up DDR project 
building that is expected to kick off in 2009. 
 
A successful INL-funded anti-trafficking in persons 
program continued during 2008.  A total of 14 training 
events were held around the country reaching more than 
500 law enforcement officers and other stakeholders; the 
host government credited the multi-year project with 
improving sensitivity to victims among law enforcement 
officers and it helped key anti-TIP NGOs build lasting 
connections with local police.  Uzbekistan was promoted 
from Tier 3 to the Tier 2 watchlist on the 2008 edition 
of the report, and post reported more substantial 
progress on the 2009 submission.  This anti-TIP project 
work will conclude during 2009. 
 
C. There were no other professional services funded by 
INL during this reporting period. 
 
-------------- 
PROGRAM IMPACT 
-------------- 
 
The INL program budget dropped considerably in recent 
years as the result of the strained bilateral 
relationship.  Our end use monitoring is in many ways a 
vestige of a prior era, and the program impact of some 
major investments diminishes with each passing year. 
Since the second half of 2007, the Government of 
Uzbekistan has consistently expressed more willingness to 
engage with the United States on issues such as 
counternarcotics, trafficking in persons, and border 
security.  There is now once again an increased demand 
for INL programs, and we will need budgetary allocations 
to reflect the heightened cooperation with the host 
government as well as the strategic importance of 
Uzbekistan in our broader goals in stemming the tide of 
narcotics from Afghanistan. 
 
The ongoing anti-TIP program administered by an 
International Organization for Migration (IOM)-affiliated 
NGO has had a big impact in this reporting period.  In 
2008 there were 14 events that provided training 
opportunities to more than 500 people, mostly in remote 
areas where awareness about the serious TIP problem was 
low.  The Uzbek government openly credits the work of INL 
and the implementing partner in raising awareness and 
sensitivity among law enforcement officers, and TIP is 
undoubtedly the most successful engagement we have seen 
on the human rights front in the country. 
 
The forensic science program also stands out in its 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  009.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
impact this year, as we have provided equipment and 
training opportunities to a previously forgotten cadre of 
scientists who play a central role in ensuring the 
integrity of evidence and investigations in the criminal 
justice system.  Scientists better understand their role 
in not only prosecuting the guilty but also in 
exonerating the innocent.  The investments have also 
contributed to more effective homicide investigations by 
establishing causes of death more reliably and quickly, 
and the skills and equipment has even been used to 
provide treatment to patients suffering from mysterious 
poisonings. 
 
The most enduring legacy from numerous equipment 
donations in previous years is the goodwill among rank- 
and-file law enforcement officers toward the United 
States.  They appreciate the equipment, even though it is 
now often dated, and express a hope that U.S. trainers 
and equipment will once again reach them on the front 
lines. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PROBLEMS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN 
--------------------------------- 
 
A. Unmonitored Resources -- Many of the laptop computers 
delivered to the Border Guards are now broken after years 
of extensive use.  The products have now exceeded their 
useful expected life span.  It is also difficult to 
arrange access to border posts, especially now that the 
Border Guards have been incorporated into the National 
Security Service.  No corrective action is required since 
we will discontinue monitoring this equipment. 
 
B. Repair and Maintenance of Commodities -- A substantial 
amount of INL-donated equipment is ageing after intensive 
use.  The GOU typically does not provide adequate 
resources to local branches of law enforcement agencies 
for repairs and maintenance.  This was made difficult by 
the provision of foreign brands of vehicles and equipment 
for which it is difficult to find spare parts or 
expertise to complete repairs.  Due to the low quality of 
the fuel in the Uzbekistan retail market, the majority of 
vehicles also require replacement of the fuel systems. 
As a result, for example, numerous Jeep Cherokees are 
broken down in Customs garages in remote corners of the 
country.  They were used intensively for a reasonable 
timeframe, but the modest provision of spare parts would 
allow resourceful local commanders to continue to put the 
equipment to good use. 
 
The Nicolet IR spectrometer and portable Sabre-2000 
explosive detector have long since broken and require 
replacement.  Poloff noted the staff at the lab are very 
professional and have taken excellent care of all 
equipment, but their effectiveness would be enhanced by 
the repair of these instruments. 
 
C. Lack of Use and Misuse of Commodities -- Emboffs and 
visiting DEA Agent were consistently impressed by the 
professionalism of Uzbek law enforcement agencies and how 
much they appreciated U.S. assistance in a resource-poor 
government.  There is no problem with misuse of 
commodities other than the previously documented incident 
in which the National Security Service and Office of the 
General Prosecutor took two of the nine Jeep Cherokees 
intended for the State Customs Committee. 
 
D. Disposal of Commodities -- Many items in our inventory 
of previously donated INL equipment have reached the end 
of their useful life.  During 2009 we will stop 
monitoring some stockpiles of equipment.  If appropriate, 
we will contact the recipient agency to discuss 
disposition assistance.  However, the equipment may be 
utilized and cared for over a longer period if we do not 
announce our intention to stop monitoring certain 
equipment from our inventory (such as vehicle search 
 
TASHKENT 00000220  010.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
mirrors and laptops).  We will attempt to identify funds 
to repair big-ticket items such as vehicles which, 
although ageing, are still capable of contributing to the 
effectiveness of law enforcement operations. 
NORLAND 
 
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