VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #6717 0542302
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 232247Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 7858
INFO RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0676
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 016717 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EWWT JA
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO JAPAN'S REQUEST FOR MEGAPORTS 
RECIPROCITY 
 
REF: TOKYO 231 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paras 2-3. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As outlined in reftel, officials in the Government 
of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs have repeatedly 
requested Megaports "reciprocity" and information-sharing 
(reftel) in the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB). 
Embassy Tokyo's response should emphasize the following 
objectives: 
 
-- Stress the continuing position of the U.S. Government that 
implementing Megaports "reciprocity" or any other additional 
security measures for Japan-bound cargo from the United 
States should not/not be a requirement for moving forward 
with our bilateral cooperation on Megaports. 
 
-- Note that considerable and successful reciprocity already 
exists between Japan and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken and 
will continue to take operational measures to enhance that 
cooperation (see points below for more on these).  If Japan 
believes that the current level of cooperation is 
insignificant, seek specific proposals for modifications. 
 
-- If Japan continues to push "reciprocity" for Megaports, 
emphasize that DOE's Megaports Initiative is not a bilateral 
or reciprocal program -- it is a global program.  If Japan 
truly wishes to implement reciprocity for Megaports, then 
Japan would need to embark on international nonproliferation 
cooperation to provide equipment, training, and technical 
support to foreign partners around the world.  Ask if this is 
what Japan has in mind. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In delivering this message, Embassy is encouraged to 
draw from the following talking points, which have been 
cleared by the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
Energy (DOE): 
 
-- Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), U.S. 
officials stationed at four Japanese ports work to identify 
and, in concert with Japanese officials, further inspect 
high-risk cargo destined to the United States. 
 
-- Japanese officials also work in U.S. locations in concert 
with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials to target 
containers bound to Japan.  Japanese officials are stationed 
in the Port of LA/LB, and the National Targeting Center for 
Cargo. 
 
-- CSI is a reciprocal program.  As such, DHS remains 
committed to sharing available information on Japanese-bound 
containers that either originate or are transshipped through 
the United States. 
 
-- DHS has accommodated 100 percent of Japanese requests for 
information or inspection of suspect or high-risk containers 
and will continue to provide outbound manifest information on 
shipments bound to Japan.  Further, DHS will commit to 
sharing with Japanese targeters the results of all scans 
conducted on suspect or high-risk containers destined for 
Japan and will commit to using both non-intrusive imaging and 
radiation detection technologies to conduct such scans. 
 
IF JAPAN CONTINUES TO REQUEST ADDITIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, 
SUCH AS MEGAPORTS RECIPROCITY: 
 
-- Based on your experiences at LA/LB and the National 
Targeting Center, we would like your thoughts on what has 
worked well, and what modifications you would suggest to 
enhance the current level of cooperation. 
 
-- (If Japan asks for Megaports equivalent):  We understand 
your request for reciprocity for Megaports.  As agreed upon 
in previous discussions, reciprocity is not a requirement for 
moving forward with our bilateral cooperation on Megaports. 
 
-- However, we are intrigued by your interest in replicating 
our program.  Does Japan have a similar program under 
consideration?  What countries have you approached in terms 
of participation?  What level of support do you intend to 
provide under your program in terms of equipment and 
training?  When do you anticipate your program becoming 
operational?  Suggest we jointly explore countries which may 
be beneficial in terms of expansion opportunities. 
CLINTON