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TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0000

UNCLAS STATE 012311 
 
SIPDIS 
THE HAGUE FOR THE CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: JA KTIA MARR PARM CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  GUIDANCE FOR 
GOVERNMENT EXPERTS MEETING TO  CONSIDER SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISORY BOARD REPORT TO THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE 
 
REF: A. NOTE BY THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT S/723/2008 
        DATED 15 DECEMBER 2008. 
     ¶B. NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RC-2/DG.1 DATED 28 
        FEBRUARY 2008. 
     ¶C. NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RC-2/DG.1/CORR.1 
        DATED 5 MARCH 2008. 
 
 
¶1.  Guidance in paragraphs 6-8. 
 
-------- 
Overview 
-------- 
 
¶2.  This cable provides information and guidance to the U.S. 
delegation for use during 11-13 February 2009 meeting of 
government experts to consider the report submitted by the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to the Second Review 
Conference.  The meeting,s objective is to consider the 
report,s suggestions and recommendations and prepare a 
report for submission to the Executive Council.  The outcome 
of the meeting should be a lucid, objective report that 
provides recommendation to the Council for future SAB efforts 
and associated Secretariat support. 
 
¶3.  Ref A announced the meeting and called on States Parties 
to nominate government experts to attend the meeting.  The 
U.S. plans to send Richard D,Andrea (DOS), Thomas Cataldo 
(DOD), and Larry Denyer (DOC).  Armando Alcaraz (LLNL) will 
also attend as an advisor.  Refs B and C provide the 
Director-General,s assessment of the issues covered by the 
SAB in its report and Ref B includes the subject report. 
 
¶4.  The SAB report provides a thorough assessment of advances 
in science and technology and their implications for the CWC. 
 In general, the report a) characterizes broad trends with 
implications for the CWC, b) reports on specific issues, many 
of which were reviewed at the request of the 
Director-General, and restates recommendations made; and c) 
reports on ongoing developments and identified needs in 
verification technology, international cooperation and 
assistance, and public outreach. 
 
¶5.  The SAB report and the Director-General,s assessment are 
divided into six main topics: (1) Advances in science and 
technology, (2) Schedules of chemicals, (3) Verification, (4) 
 
Destruction of chemical weapons, (5) Assistance and 
Protection against the effects of chemical weapons, and 
international cooperation, and (6) Education and outreach in 
the context of the Convention.  The previous meeting to 
discuss the SAB report to the First Review Conference was 
unproductive due largely to an overly broad agenda and a 
dearth of genuine experts.  This three day meeting to discuss 
these wide ranging topics is fraught with opportunities for 
technical and political mischief making.  The difficulty will 
be in keeping the meeting focused on providing direction for 
future SAB deliberations of meaningful and practical issues 
and avoiding technical and political dead ends. 
 
-------- 
Guidance 
-------- 
 
¶6.  Delegation should endeavor to keep the meeting focused on 
the agenda and promote U.S. positions such that the meeting 
report reflects U.S. views for future SAB efforts on 
meaningful and practical issues. 
 
¶A. Specifically, the SAB should further assess: 
- the convergence of chemistry and biology to determine 
near-and medium-term implications for the CWC, 
- whether saxitoxin should be moved to Schedule 2A, 
-methods for the analysis of toxins, and 
-advances in science and technology that provide for enhanced 
protection from chemical weapons and international 
cooperation and assistance. 
 
¶B. Additionally, the SAB should monitor: 
- developments in the discovery of new chemicals in the 
chemical industry, 
- developments in chemical production technology, 
- the combination of nanotechnology and particle delivery 
technologies, 
- advances in analytical methods such as liquid 
chromatography ) mass spectrophotometry, 
- developments in new detection technologies, and 
- developments in education and outreach especially those 
coming out of collaborative efforts between the OPCW and 
professional and trade organizations. 
 
¶C. Del should avoid: 
- discussion of chemical weapons destruction deadlines, 
- debate on the relevance of the term &nonproliferation8 as 
it applies to the CWC, 
- using the term, non-lethal weapons, when discussing 
incapacitants or toxic chemicals for law-enforcement, 
- any discussion related to the recent disclosure of 
Non-traditional Agents (NTA) information, 
-debate on adding a new class of chemical weapons to the 
schedules, and 
- any topics not directly associated with the agenda. 
 
¶D. Del should oppose the notion of establishing a standing 
group of government experts to review SAB recommendations. 
Del should draw on overview and the more detailed analysis 
below regarding U.S. views during discussions with the other 
government experts and the Technical Secretariat. 
 
¶7.  U.S. Objective.  The U.S. objective for this meeting is a 
lucid, objective report that provides recommendations to the 
Council for future SAB efforts and associated Secretariat 
support focused on the assessment and monitoring topics 
above.  However, Del should oppose completion of a report 
that contains problematic text, and may propose or support a 
proposal that such a report not be finalized. 
 
¶8. The Del should report results of the discussions by cable 
to Washington.  Notify Washington immediately if the NTA 
disclosure is raised. 
 
-------- 
Analysis 
-------- 
 
¶9. This section summarizes the report,s suggestions and 
recommendations and outlines a U.S. position or a way forward 
for each topic that may be discussed. 
 
¶A. Advances in Science and Technology 
(1) Convergence of chemistry and biology.  The report 
mentions, but does not elaborate in any detail on the 
convergence of chemistry and biology in the post-genomic era 
along with the emerging ability to replicate life processes. 
This convergence reinforces the overlap between the CWC and 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as does the 
increasing number of toxins and potentially toxic 
bioregulators being characterized.  The DG is of the view 
that this matter warrants further study and that additional 
advice might be sought from the SAB, from States Parties that 
have assessed these developments, and from stakeholders in 
industry and academia; and such additional advice might be 
considered by the policy-making organs in due course. 
(2) Accelerated discovery of chemicals.  The report notes 
that biologically active molecules are being discovered and 
characterized at an unprecedented rate, however, weaponizing 
a new toxic compound would require a major offensive program 
which somewhat mitigates the risk.  The U.S. agrees and the 
SAB should continue to monitor this topic. 
(3) Nanotechnology.  Legitimate, non-offensive work in the 
expanding field of nanotechnology and particle engineering 
offer opportunities to develop defensive measures against 
chemical weapons.  However, a number of important and useful 
advances could potentially be misused for chemical weapons 
(CW) purposes (see paragraph (4) below).  This underscores 
the importance of strict adherence to the general purpose 
criterion (Article I), and the need for effective national 
implementation measures that complement the CWC to help 
ensure that chemicals, enabling technologies and materials 
that have a CW proliferation potential are sufficiently 
regulated. 
(4) Technology for delivery systems.  Many of the 
considerations that promote the design of particles for the 
effective and targeted delivery of drugs via the respiratory 
system would be applicable to the dissemination of a CW 
aerosol.  The spray-drying equipment needed to create such 
particles is widely available, although the optimization of a 
well-engineered particle requires expertise and considerable 
effort.  The combination of nanotechnology and particle 
delivery technologies could be misused for CW purposes and 
developments warrant continued monitoring by the SAB. 
(5) Production technologies. The SAB points out that new 
production technologies such as use of microreactors, and 
multipurpose production equipment could make CW production 
more efficient and/or mask currently known signatures 
indicative of CW production.  However, the report also notes 
that microreactors are not yet widely used in industry, and 
they are being integrated into industrial-scale production 
more slowly than some had predicted.  As production 
technologies change and the number of potential CW agents 
increases, verification at other chemical production 
facilities (OCPF) and the frequency of inspections becomes 
more important.  This regime needs to evolve further in terms 
of the number of inspections conducted, the selection of OCPF 
plant sites, and how inspection objectives are determined 
with regard to unscheduled chemicals in order to ensure 
compliance and that such sites are not being used for 
purposes prohibited under the CWC.  The U.S. strongly 
supports increased OCPF inspections and improved OCPF site 
selection methods, however, consideration of how inspection 
aims are determined requires further elaboration and then 
would require careful consideration in Washington. 
Developments in chemical production technologies are an 
important topic that the SAB and the Technical Secretariat 
should closely monitor (&watching brief8) as developments 
warrant. 
 
¶B. Schedules of Chemicals 
(1) Captive use of Schedule 1 chemicals.  The SAB sees no 
need for adjustments to Schedule 1 to accommodate captive use 
issues.  The U.S. considers this issue to have been fully 
addressed by previous Conference decisions and sees no need 
for further discussion. 
(2) Salts of scheduled chemicals.  The SAB reiterates its 
view that &from the standpoint of the end user, there is no 
essential difference between the free base and the 
corresponding salt,8 and acknowledges that States Parties 
have disagreed with its recommendations that all salts of 
scheduled chemicals be treated in the same way as their 
corresponding bases.  The U.S. position is that only salts of 
scheduled chemicals specifically listed in the Schedules of 
Chemicals are currently covered.  The schedules would need to 
be revised if the salts were to be included.  Furthermore, 
the current U.S. position is that it is not particularly 
useful to modify the schedules given the potential problems 
that could be raised with regard to incapacitants or NTA. 
(3) Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) Registry Numbers.  The 
SAB view is that CAS numbers are useful in the identification 
of chemical compounds; however, this usefulness should not 
lead to the assumption that they should have any regulatory 
power within the context of the Convention.  The SAB suggests 
that it would be helpful, if the OPCW Declaration Handbook 
were to provide references to the various CAS numbers that 
are related to an entry in the schedules such as for 
different isomers of a scheduled chemical.  The U.S., for CWC 
purposes, treats CAS numbers listed in the schedules as 
having regulatory effect.  While the listing of &related8 
CAS numbers in the OPCW Declaration Handbook may be helpful 
the U.S. recognizes that CAS numbers do not necessarily have 
a one-to-one relationship with chemical structures. 
(4) The SAB raises saxitoxin as an example of both the salt 
and CAS number questions pointing out that the CAS number in 
the CWC refers to the saxitoxin base while the CW agent of 
concern was the hydrochloride salt.  The SAB also notes past 
discussions of whether Schedule 1 or Schedule 2A would be 
more appropriate for saxitoxin, makes no recommendations, and 
agreed to take the matter up at a future Session.  The U.S. 
agrees. 
(5) Ricin.  Ricin has multiple molecular forms and multiple 
CAS numbers.  The Director-General asked the SAB to consider 
what, within the meaning of the Convention, constitutes 
ricin.  The SAB proposed that ricin requires the &native8 
bipartite molecular structure, A-S-S-B, necessary for 
mammalian toxicity, be present.  Once the inter-chain S-S 
bond is broken or the protein denatured, it is no longer 
ricin.  The U.S. supports the SAB view and for CWC purposes 
considers as declarable only ricin in the form of 1) Ricinus 
Communis Agglutinin II (RCA II), also known as ricin D or 
Ricinus Communis Lectin III (RCL III); and 2) Ricinus 
Communis Lectin IV (RCL IV), also known as ricin E. 
(6) New toxic compounds.  The SAB view is that adding a large 
number of new toxic compounds to the schedules of chemicals 
would introduce additional burdens on reporting requirements 
and verification.  The SAB instead calls for transparency in 
chemical defense programs and assessment of the development 
of toxic chemicals for law-enforcement purposes.  The SAB 
concludes that non-lethal chemicals and the associated 
terminology surrounding so-called incapacitants require 
further study.  The U.S. agrees with the SAB that adding 
numerous new toxic compounds to the schedules would introduce 
additional burdens on reporting requirements and 
verification.  The U.S. also supports further assessment of 
the development and availability of toxic chemicals such as 
incapacitants for law-enforcement.  The SAB should be asked 
to specify or further elaborate on which toxic chemicals they 
had in mind as they considered the subject of increased 
transparency in the area of &new toxic compounds.8 
 
¶C. Verification 
(1) On- and off-site sampling and analysis.  The SAB view is 
that GC-MS in combination with the OPCW dual-mode software 
containing the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) are 
&fit for purpose8 and acknowledges that liquid 
chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS) has utility in 
analysis of aqueous samples on-site.  However, LC-MS in its 
current design would only increase the logistic burden of 
on-site analysis while the Secretariat is trying to reduce 
the burden.  The SAB recommends that it closely monitor LC-MS 
developments.  The U.S. agrees. 
(2) Proficiency tests.  The SAB notes the success of the 
current system of proficiency testing used for designated 
laboratories and those seeking designation.  The SAB points 
out, however, that current proficiency test protocols require 
that spiked samples and blank samples be labeled as such, but 
in real cases of off-site analysis such labeling would not be 
used.  The SAB recommends that the proficiency test format be 
changed to accurately reflect how real samples would be 
handled.  The SAB further recommends that the OPCW consider 
establishing a process whereby all sample handing, waste 
management, and confidentially procedures be practiced more 
regularly.  The U.S. supports this view. 
(3) Analysis of toxins.  Analysis of toxins is difficult 
because GC-MS methods do not work.  Analytical methods exist 
for saxitoxin and ricin, and the SAB recommends that the OPCW 
determine which designated labs have those capabilities.  The 
SAB further recommends that if the overall capability is 
deemed inadequate, then the Director-General should consider 
utilizing laboratories outside the designated laboratory 
system.  This appears to be an obvious course of action, 
however, it raises quality control, cost, and confidentially 
issues that the SAB should identify and carefully consider 
further. 
(4) OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD).  In certain 
scenarios, particularly those involving allegations of 
alleged use, the capability to analyze riot control agents 
and degradation products of scheduled compounds is important 
in the context of verification.  The SAB recommends that riot 
control agents (RCA) and degradation products of scheduled 
chemicals be added to the OCAD.  The U.S. has long supported 
this position. 
(5) Analysis of biomedical samples.  The SAB points out that 
the OPCW has no capability to handle or analyze such samples 
and there is no system of designated laboratories for the 
analysis of biomedical samples.  The SAB Temporary Working 
Group (TWG) on biomedical samples recommended that the OPCW 
Laboratory &move forward on the issue of biomedical sampling 
and analysis,8 and that the Director-General make sufficient 
resources available to initiate and maintain the process. 
The OPCW Laboratory has initiated efforts to determine what 
information, training, and equipment would be required to 
acquire this capability.  The U.S. endorses this effort. 
¶D. Destruction of Chemical Weapons 
(1) Destruction of declared CW stockpiles.  The SAB concludes 
that technologies used in the destruction of declared CW 
stockpiles appear to have matured to a point where 
implementation of the requirements of the Convention requires 
no further technological innovation or development.  The U.S. 
concurs. 
(2) Destruction of Old and Abandoned CW (OACW).  The SAB 
notes that further research and development are needed for 
the safe recovery of OACW both by excavation and by removal 
from the sea at relatively shallow depths.  The SAB also 
notes that there is a continuing need for innovation in and 
new approaches to, the destruction of recovered items. 
The U.S. concurs. 
¶E. Assistance and Protection Against the Effects of CW, and 
International Cooperation 
(1) Advances in science and technology.  The SAB notes that 
advances in the life sciences, information technology, 
materials science, and nanotechnology have the potential to 
help States Parties improve the level of protection they can 
offer against chemical weapons.  Effective defense should 
discourage the development and use of CW.  Enhanced 
international cooperation in this field can act as an 
incentive for States not Party to join the Convention.  The 
SAB should further explore this topic and identify specific 
examples for enhanced international cooperation. 
(2) Detection devices.  The SAB acknowledges the considerable 
amount of time and effort required to transfer a new 
detection technology from laboratory instrumentation to a 
reliable and robust field-detection device.  The SAB opines 
that technologies that have already matured will continue to 
play a key role in the detection of CW agents over the next 
five years and further speculates on other potential 
technologies that may greatly expand the effectiveness of 
inspections in the future given the appropriate design and 
cost factors.  The U.S. encourages the SAB to continue to 
monitor the developments of such technologies. 
(3) Medical countermeasures.  The SAB notes that improvements 
are necessary both in available treatments (for example, 
antidotes that can be used against a broader range of 
agents), and in the planning of medical countermeasures and 
the management of casualties.  Current emergency-response 
procedures can be time-consuming and can delay the treatment 
of victims.  Best practices need to be identified and 
followed, and training exercises are essential to maintaining 
the required level of preparedness.  This common sense 
analysis warrants no further discussion. 
(4) Decontamination.  The SAB notes that decontamination 
requirements are taking account of the changing nature of 
such operations, which are more likely to take place in urban 
areas and to affect civilians directly.  Standard military 
decontamination technology is often not appropriate under 
such conditions or for decontamination of some industrial 
chemicals.  There is a need for smaller and 
easier-to-transport decontamination equipment that requires 
fewer personnel to operate it.  Decontaminates should be 
environmentally friendly, less corrosive, and less 
aggressive.  Advances in science and technology are expected 
to contribute to further improvements in the field of 
decontamination and medical treatment of CW victims.  This 
analysis warrants no further discussion. 
¶F. Education and Outreach in the Context of the Convention 
(1) Workshops, conferences and seminars.  The report lists 
the major CWC workshops, conferences and seminars dating back 
to 2005 citing OPCW and International Union of Pure and 
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) efforts in a number of European 
countries.  The U.S. encourages further collaborative 
outreach efforts between the OPCW and professional and trade 
organizations such as IUPAC, The European Chemical Industry 
Council (CEFIC), The American Chemistry Council (ACC), and 
the like. 
(2) Written materials.  The report cites written materials 
that have been prepared on the issue of the multiple uses of 
chemicals and the ethical questions it gives rise to.  The 
SAB opines that joint OPCW-IUPAC pilot studies have confirmed 
the validity and usefulness of these materials, which have 
been subsequently updated.  Further pilot studies are being 
considered and plans are being made for the written materials 
to be translated into the six official CWC languages and to 
be made available on the IUPAC website.  The SAB should 
continue to monitor such educational and outreach efforts. 
CLINTON