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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0000
INFO RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD 0000
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC 0000
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC 0000
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC 0000

UNCLAS STATE 010260 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
CAIRO FOR MELISSA CLINE 
CAIRO FOR JACK MELVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EG ETTC KOMC OTRA PARM PREL
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN: DISCUSSIONS WITH CENTCOM AND 
EMBASSY CAIRO OFFICIALS OCTOBER 21-22 
 
REF: 08 STATE 61434 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Compliance Specialists from the 
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance 
(PM/DTCC) met October 21-22 in Cairo with USG officials to 
discuss the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program and 
related defense trade and compliance issues.  Topics included 
third-party transfers, Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Section 
3 violations involving unauthorized re-transfers and 
re-exports, and the export of defense articles and technology 
from the U.S. to Egypt.  Briefings to the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) CENTCOM End-Use Monitoring 
Regional Forum and country team members strengthened DOS-DOD 
collaboration by clarifying distinctions between State (Blue 
Lantern) and Defense (Golden Sentry) end-use monitoring 
requirements and procedures, and identifying areas for future 
cooperation.  Meetings with Embassy country team members were 
part of PM/DTCC's ongoing efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of Blue Lantern through outreach visits with 
posts, industry and host governments. END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (U) Administered by PM/DTCC, Blue Lantern is a global 
program designed to verify the end-use, end-users, and 
disposition of commercially exported defense articles, 
technology, and services.  PM/DTCC also works with the 
Department's Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers 
(PM/RSAT) to investigate unauthorized re-transfers and 
misuses of defense articles and relevant technical data. 
Under Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the 
Department, as the President's delegate, must report to 
Congress any unauthorized re-transfer or re-export of items 
originally transferred or sold under military assistance 
programs or DCS transactions that reach certain Congressional 
notification thresholds. 
 
CENTCOM EUM BRIEFINGS 
 
¶3. (U) On October 21, PM/DTCC Compliance Specialists Judd 
Stitziel and Kyle Ballard briefed participants of the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) CENTCOM End-Use 
Monitoring (EUM) Regional Forum on Blue Lantern, third-party 
transfers, AECA Section 3 violations involving unauthorized 
re-transfers and re-exports, and new registration and EUM 
requirements under Section 1228 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA).  Participants included 
Security Assistance Officers (SAO) from nearly all CENTCOM 
military groups, officers responsible for international 
programs at CENTCOM headquarters, and program managers of 
DSCA's Golden Sentry EUM program in Washington.  Successful 
joint outreach experiences such as the SOUTHCOM EUM Regional 
Forum in Guatemala in April 2008 (reftel) involving PM/DTCC 
and DSCA have helped audiences to better understand the 
similarities and differences between the regulations 
governing the export of defense articles and technology 
exported via direct commercial sales (DCS) and Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS).  The session began with back-to-back 
briefings on Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern as well as AECA 
Section 3 and third-party transfers of items that had 
originally been exported via DCS and FMS.  PM/DTCC also 
briefed the new registration and EUM requirements for lethal 
defense articles exported to Iraq mandated in NDAA Section 
¶1228. 
 
¶4. (U) Questions and discussion during the CENTCOM forum and 
sidebar meetings focused on the differing requirements and 
capabilities of EUM through Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry, 
especially concerning night vision devices (NVDs).  Many 
forum participants expressed concern that entering DCS-origin 
NVD serial numbers in DSCA's Security Cooperation Information 
Portal (SCIP) database would effectively leave SAOs solely 
responsible for all NVD EUM.  This concern was amplified by 
recurring assertions that SAOs in many CENTCOM countries 
already lack the experienced manpower required for effective 
EUM.  PM/DTCC allayed these concerns by emphasizing Blue 
Lantern's independent EUM mandate, reiterating that any data 
entered into SCIP would not shift any DOS EUM 
responsibilities to DOD, and noting that many SAOs around the 
world have voluntarily entered DCS NVD serial numbers into 
SCIP on their own initiative in order to facilitate and 
simplify EUM for both Golden Sentry and Blue Lantern.  Forum 
participants agreed that both DOS and DOD would benefit from 
increased communication and collaboration in the EUM of DCS 
NVDs. 
 
¶5. (U) Stitziel and Ballard conducted sidebar meetings with 
Capt. Steven Moore from MNSTC-I,s SAO unit in Baghdad to 
discuss the logistics and other considerations of 
implementing the new registration and EUM requirements for 
"lethal defense articles" exported to Iraq under NDAA Section 
¶1228.  The current policy affects exports of lethal defense 
articles that generally fall under Categories I, II, and IV 
of the U.S. Munitions List (Section 121.1 of the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation).  PM/DTCC had 
planned to visit Baghdad in October before traveling to Cairo 
in order to coordinate the implementation of NDAA Section 
1228,s EUM requirements, but the trip was postponed. 
PM/DTCC and DSCA are now planning a joint visit in late 
February 2009. 
 
MEETINGS ON AECA SECTION 3 VIOLATIONS IN EGYPT 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Stitziel and Ballard met with several USG officials 
as part of the Department's ongoing investigation of a number 
of potential unauthorized re-transfers covered by AECA 
Section 3.  Post expressed its commitment to providing timely 
information on potential Section 3 violations, and stressed 
the importance of providing comprehensive and accurate 
reports to Congress.  The PM/DTCC representatives addressed 
Post's concerns by emphasizing that reporting even potential 
AECA Section 3 violations is a statutory requirement. 
Stitziel and Ballard also made clear that such reports to 
Congress highlight the facts of a given case as they relate 
to the law and ultimately get cleared by multiple Department 
officials, up to and including the Undersecretary for Arms 
Control and International Security.  PM/DTCC also emphasized 
its commitment to utilize all resources available in 
investigating potential Section 3 violations and welcomed 
Post's assurance of continued full cooperation and support. 
 
COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFINGS 
 
¶7. (U) Stitziel and Ballard briefed the Blue Lantern program, 
AECA Section 3, and general trends in DCS exports of 
U.S.-origin defense articles to Egypt to several country team 
members, including Col. James Piner, head of the Office of 
Military Cooperation (OMC); Political-Military Officer 
Melissa Cline; Economic and Political Officer Eugenia 
Sidereas; Mark Russel, Commercial Attache; Capt. Jack Melvin 
of the OMC; Col. Kenneth Thompson, Air and Defense Attache; 
and a Regional Affairs Office representative. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Since January 2002, PM/DDTC has received over 1,200 
applications for commercial defense exports to Egypt worth 
more than $2.4 billion.  During that time, PM/DTCC attempted 
to conduct 24 Blue Lantern checks, evenly divided between 
pre-license checks and post-shipment verifications, on 
applications and licenses that listed end-users in Egypt.  Of 
these, 19 were completed (79 percent) and 3 were closed 
'unfavorable' (Note: this rate of 12.5 percent unfavorable is 
lower than the worldwide average). The majority of 
'unfavorable' Blue Lanterns were due to the behavior of 
private companies and intermediaries and not the Government 
of Egypt. Embassy Cairo's response times since 2002 are 75 
days for pre-license checks and 150 days for post-shipment 
verifications. 
 
¶9. (U) Piner expressed concern about difficulties in 
concluding Blue Lantern checks in Egypt prior to his arrival 
and assured that he supported the goals of the program.  Both 
Piner and Cline noted the general difficulty in soliciting 
timely replies from Egyptian officials, but stated that 
PM/DTCC can expect more timely responses to future Blue 
Lantern requests. 
 
¶10. (U) Discussion with Mr. Russell focused on potential 
benefits of involving Department of Commerce (DOC) 
representatives in select Blue Lantern checks and PolMil 
officers in DOC's Extrancheck end-use monitoring program. 
Due to Russell's upcoming posting to Iraq, PM/DTCC 
representatives also briefed him on NDAA Section 1228 
registration and EUM requirements. 
 
¶12. (U) PM/DTCC would like to express its gratitude to 
Embassy Cairo and especially control officers Melissa Cline 
and Capt. Jack Melvin in helping to arrange and execute this 
visit. 
CLINTON