VZCZCXRO5093
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0070/01 0490811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180811Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5774
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2019 
TAGS: ENRG ECON PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: BULGARIA:  MINISTER OF ENERGY ON POST-GAS CRISIS 
STRATEGY 
 
REF: SOFIA 0060 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Minister of Economy and Energy Petar 
Dimitrov used a February 13 meeting with the Ambassador to 
lay out Bulgaria's post-gas crisis energy strategy.  Heavy on 
diversification projects, the as-yet unwritten plan seeks to 
distance Bulgaria from Russian energy sources.  In the 
two-hour meeting, Dimitrov did not once mention South Stream. 
Instead, he accused Russia of blackmailing Bulgaria into 
dropping compensation claims against Gazprom by threatening 
retaliation for Bulgarian arms sales to Georgia. He 
questioned the future of the Russian-led Belene nuclear power 
plant project while stoking interest in a separate, proposed 
Westinghouse-led project.  He commited to support efforts to 
improve transparency in Bulgaria's notoriously-opaque energy 
sector and pled for Washington attendance at Bulgaria's April 
24-25 Energy Security Summit, so that the event would not 
become "a ball at which only Putin will dance." End Summary. 
 
 
A DECIDEDLY ANTI-RUSSIAN MESSAGE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Dimitrov's February 13 message had a decidedly 
anti-Russian tone.  He described Bulgarian preparations to 
launch a legal claim against Gazprom for the losses Bulgaria 
incurred as a result of January's two-week gas cut off.  The 
Russians continue to claim that Ukraine is the guilty party, 
but, Dimitrov said, "we have no contracts with Ukraine."  He 
said it was clear that Gazprom did not supply Ukraine with 
the volumes of gas needed for export, so Gazprom is clearly 
"at fault."  Dimitrov said Putin has acknowledged that the 
Socialist-led Bulgarian government suffered clear political 
losses during the crisis, and as a consequence the Russians 
have hinted at some flexibility on the issue of abandoning 
the shady Gazprom-owned intermediaries currently operating in 
the Bulgarian gas market.  But this hint of flexibility is a 
ruse, indicated Dimitrov, as Russia is now threatening to 
invoke sanctions against Bulgaria for providing arms to 
Georgia, if Bulgaria proceeds with its Gazprom compensation 
claim.  Dependent on Russian maintenance and spare parts for 
large swaths of its Soviet-era military hardware, such 
sanctions would deal a severe blow to the Bulgarian military 
and hurt its ability to meet its NATO commitments, said 
Dimitrov. 
 
 
LITANY OF DIVERSIFICATION PROJECTS, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON TURKEY 
--------------------------------------------- ----------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Dimitrov recounted a list of diversification 
projects that the gas crisis placed on the front burner: 
expansion of gas storage, gas interconnections and LNG 
cooperation with Greece and Turkey, greater support for 
on-going domestic gas exploration and extraction, especially 
with the British company Melrose at Kaliakra and with the 
Colorado-based Direct Petroleum at Deventsi.  While it was 
Greece that came through for Bulgaria during the gas crisis, 
the Bulgarians are especially keen to pursue greater energy 
cooperation with Turkey and they are seeking our help to 
develop more of an appetite on Turkey's part for such 
cooperation.  Possibilities include making the gas pipelines 
between Bulgarian and Turkey reversible, pursuing a 
Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector hook-up in Turkey (if the 
Greece TGI hook-up does not materialize), Bulgarian access to 
Turkey's LNG facilities, and dusting off plans for joint 
hydro projects. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Dimitrov hinted at problems at the Belene Nuclear 
Power Plant project (being built by Russia's AtomStroyExport) 
and made a full court press to get Westinghouse interested in 
a new nuclear project, Kozluduy 7 and 8.  While the 
government remains commited to Belene, Dimitrov said Bulgaria 
would be interested in taking a minority stake of a future 
Kozluduy 7 and 8 project, if Westinghouse would take the 
lead.  The Ambassador commited to sharing Bulgaria's interest 
with Westinghouse.  (Note: problems at the Belene NPP are 
being reported septel.) 
 
THE APRIL ENERGY SUMMIT 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  In a now common-refrain, Dimitrov pled with the 
Ambassador for high-level Washington representation at the 
April 24-25 Energy Security Summit, which will likely be held 
in Bulgaria's second city Plovdiv.  Dimitrov worried that 
 
SOFIA 00000070  002 OF 002 
 
 
without high level USG representation, the summit would be 
unbalanced -  "a ball at which only Putin would dance."  The 
Ambassador indicated it was still too early to know who might 
attend from Washington, but Bulgaria could improve the 
profile of the summit by offering a clear vision of what 
would be accomplished.  An emphasis on achieving greater 
energy security through diversification and increased 
transparency would be a start. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment:  Normally soft-spoken, on-message and 
hesitant to criticize Russia, Dimitrov has delivered an 
increasingly anti-Russia message of late. This meeting with 
the Ambassador (where South Stream was not mentioned once) is 
another indication that change is afoot.  The gas cut-off has 
opened some eyes and changed the dynamic.  The test will come 
when it is time to turn this hard talk into concrete action. 
 
McEldowney