VZCZCXRO4314
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0069/01 0481414
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171414Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5772
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO EUR/CE TOM YEAGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019 
TAGS: ENRG PGOV PREL BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA'S BELENE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - BUYERS 
REMORSE ON ALL SIDES EXCEPT RUSSIA'S 
 REF: 08 SOFIA 0815 
 
Classified By: Amb. Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: Despite its status as Bulgaria's highest priority energy project, the Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is foundering.  Marred by cost over-runs, financing problems, infighting between strategic partners, rumors of corruption, and serious delays, the project is looking increasingly like a lemon.  The relationship between the government and the project's strategic investor, the German RWE, is one of mutual buyer's remorse.  But with 700 million euros in sunk costs, in addition to priceless political capital already invested, the government is unlikely to walk away from the project.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) When Bulgarians talk about the Belene nuclear power plant, they increasingly do so in hushed tones.  Issues of delays, financing woes, non-transparent horse-trading and side deals, Russian influence, middle-man rent seeking, and the interests of well-connected politicians and energy oligarchs inevitably come up.  Belene's construction offered the perfect chance for Bulgaria to decrease its independence on Russian energy sources.  But the Stanishev-led government, indebted to Russia-connected energy oligarchs, let the 
opportunity slip away.  In 2006, Bulgaria chose Russian company AtomStroyExport over a Skoda-led consortium as Belene NPP's main contractor.  The tender was managed by former Minister of Economy and Energy Rumen Ovcharov, a pro-Russia energy maestro, who left office (but not political life) in June 2007 after an energy-related corruption scandal.  The Belene deal lacked transparency and reeked of side deals involving the proposed South Stream gas pipeline and the long-term gas transit contract Ovcharov was negotiating with 
Gazprom at the same time. 
 
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ONE OLD PROJECT GETS A NEW LIFE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Belene was originally started in the 1980s, but was 
abandoned in the early 1990s due to lack of funds.  In 2005, 
to make up for the European Commission's decision to close 
Bulgaria's Kozluduy NPP reactors 1-4, the Bulgarian 
government approved the construction of a new 2000 MWe plant 
at Belene.  (Note:  Kozluduy units 1 and 2 were shut down due 
to safety concerns in 2003, while units 3 and 4 were taken 
off-line at the end of 2006, on the eve of Bulgaria's EU 
accession.)  The Bulgarian National Electric Company (NEC) 
hired WorleyParsons as the strategic architect engineer for 
the financing and construction of the plant in 2005. 
Belene,s two units (1 and 2) will be of the Russian A-92 
design (third generation) with pressurized water reactor 
(PWR), each producing 1000 MW electric power.  The main 
contractor of the project, AtomStroyExport, is working with 
the main foreign contractor CARSIB Consortium (Areva and 
Siemens).  In December 2008 NEC and RWE (Germany) signed a 
strategic investor agreement for the project with NEC 
controlling 51 percent and RWE with 49 percent. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Bulgarian company participation in the Belene 
project is approximately 30 percent.  (Note:  Risk 
Engineering is one Bulgarian-owned company involved in 
Belene.  It is owned by notorious Bulgarian energy oligarch 
Bogomil Manchev, the "godfather" of the Bulgarian nuclear 
sector.  He has an ownership stake in 10 different firms and 
is the sub-agent for hundreds of other firms).  The French 
bank PNB Paribus financed the pre-construction loan of 250 
million Euros.  Currently, teams are preparing the site for 
new construction by tearing down old infrastructure from the 
1980s.  The plant's construction is expected to begin in late 
2009 or early 2010.  Construction will be in two stages. 
Unit 1 was originally planned to come on-line in 2014-2015 
followed by Unit 2 in 2015-2016, according to the Belene NPP 
Managing Director, Jordan Georgiev.  These time frames are 
now widely in doubt. 
 
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BUYER'S REMORSE 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Despite its due diligence, our contacts tell us Belene,s strategic investor, RWE, is now experiencing regret about its purchase.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, RWE 
 
SOFIA 00000069  002 OF 002 
 
worries about the project's lack of transparency and the need 
to work with AtomStroyExport.  RWE wants to enforce European 
business practices, and is now demanding to review all 
Belene-related agreements.  RWE is reportedly negotiating 
with Belgium's Electrabel to join it as a subcontractor 
(likely to be announced in mid-March) to help re-inforce 
standard European business practices.  RWE's insistence on 
reviewing all agreements is causing Bulgaria heartburn. 
Delays of 3-5 years have already been announced, and Belene 
is not expected to come on-line until 2016-2017.  According 
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, RWE realizes that working with Russian and 
Bulgarian companies in the energy sector is a "poisonous 
combination" for European investment.  Transparency is 
affecting financing.  RWE (and Electrabel) want European 
banks to finance their half of the project, hoping EU 
restrictions and western lending standards would help with 
transparency.  However, with the current global financial 
crisis, they believe finding a European bank will be 
difficult and may reluctantly have to turn to Russia for the 
money. 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Bulgarians are also experiencing buyer's 
remorse.  Despite Russia's offer to extend a loan of about 
four billion Euros for the project, rumors abound that the 
Russians do not have the money to finance the project and the 
Bulgarians have been reluctant to take the money in any 
event, for fear of being seen as "too close" to the Russians. 
 For their part, the Bulgarians at Belene are chafing at 
RWE,s close scrutiny of all decisions and complain that this 
approach is needlessly slowing the project.  Our contacts say 
that some Bulgarian officials are beginning to admit 
privately that in Belene, they have bought "a lemon."  NEC 
has sunk approximately 700 million euros into the project, 
while the Russians are not out of pocket and could walk away 
losing nothing.  Meanwhile, cost estimates for Belene 
continue to creep up, running as high as eight billion euros, 
double the original price. 
 
------------------------------ 
BELENE VS KOZLUDUY UNITS 7 & 8 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  The rumors of trouble at Belene have resurrected the 
idea of a competing project at Bulgaria's only working 
nuclear power plant, Kozluduy. Bulgarian Minister of Energy 
and Economy Petar Dimitrov has been actively and publicly 
courting Westinghouse to invest in a project to build two new 
reactors at Kozluduy -- units 7 and 8.  Contacts say that the 
existing infrastructure, powerlines connecting Kozluduy to 
the national power grid, and a highly-skilled workforce close 
by at currently-operating Kozludy 5 and 6 give Kozluduy 7 and 
8 at least a one billion euro cost edge over Belene. 
Westinghouse officials are cautiously interested, but only if 
the Belene project is abandoned and Bulgarian government 
financial support is put into Kozluduy.  They want to avoid 
being used simply to create a new sense of urgency to 
jump-start Belene. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment:  There is clearly something amiss at 
Belene.  Asked whether the project was in jeopardy, a senior 
WorleyParsons official privately told us that while the 
project was still likely to go forward, "countries walk away 
from deals like this all the time."  With elections on the 
horizon and 700 million euros in sunk costs, in addition to 
priceless political capital already invested, the government 
is unlikely to abandon the project any time soon.  But it may 
be on a very slow track. 
 
McEldowney