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DE RUEHSN #0164/01 0541905
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P 231905Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0747
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSARSO FT SAM HOUSTON TX PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 000164 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CJCS FOR GENERAL CARTWRIGHT; OSD FOR A/S BENKERT; SOUTHCOM 
FOR LTG SPEARS; CENTCOM FOR LTG ALLEN; U.S. ARMY SOUTH FOR 
MG HUBER; SOCSOUTH FOR BG PAGAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019 
TAGS: ES PM PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO EL SALVADOR FOR THE 
OIF SERVICE RECOGNITION CEREMONY 
 
Classified By: Charge Blau for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) The U.S. Embassy warmly welcomes your visit to El 
Salvador. Your presence here will demonstrate U.S. gratitude 
for Salvadoran support of OIF, as well as reinforce the 
importance the U.S. places on maintaining a close, 
cooperative bilateral relationship with El Salvador. 
 
------------------- 
Political Overview 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) El Salvador's current political landscape is largely 
the result of the 1992 Peace Accords that ended the nation's 
twelve-year civil war.  Under the agreement, the communist 
guerrillas, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front 
(FMLN), laid down their weapons and became a legitimate 
political party.  The government (GOES) in return agreed to 
disband elements of the military and security services 
notorious for human rights violations, to allow the FMLN to 
participate in the political process, to reform the 
judiciary, and to form a new National Civilian Police force 
(PNC) drawn from the ranks of demobilized guerrillas and 
former members of the armed forces.  In the ensuing years, 
the conservative, pro-U.S. National Republican Alliance Party 
(ARENA) has won every Presidential election. Current 
Salvadoran President Elias Antonio "Tony" Saca, of the 
governing ARENA party, assumed office on June 1, 2004, after 
winning a hard-fought presidential race with 57.7 percent of 
votes cast.  President Saca,s term expires May 31. 
 
¶3. (C) You will be visiting El Salvador during a crucial 
period in the electoral calendar.  The country held 
legislative and municipal elections on January 18, with the 
leftist FMLN winning a slim plurality of the seats in the 
Legislative Assembly.  More importantly, El Salvador will 
hold Presidential elections on March 15, with conservative, 
pro-U.S. ARENA party candidate Rodrigo Avila facing off 
against leftist FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes.  According to 
local polls, Funes holds a slight lead over Avila.  (Note: 
Avila twice served as director of the Salvadoran National 
Civilian Police, and was Deputy Minister of Public Security 
and Justice.  He is respected and well-known in U.S. law 
enforcement circles.  End note).  Funes, a former journalist 
who hosted one of El Salvador's most popular television news 
programs, is the first FMLN Presidential candidate who is not 
a former guerrilla leader.  Funes' candidacy, fueled by name 
recognition, voter discontent over high crime, and the 
perceived lack of shared economic benefits under ARENA 
stewardship, offers the FMLN its strongest opportunity yet to 
win the Salvadoran presidency. 
 
¶4. (C) Funes and company have indicated publicly that they 
will continue to cooperate with the U.S. on counter-narcotics 
and transnational crime, and to support ongoing public 
security endeavors such as the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA) and the Comalapa Cooperative Security Location 
(CSL).  At the same time, however, the FMLN senior leadership 
has strong links to Hugo Chavez and the rest of the 
Bolivarian bloc, and appears not to have significantly 
deviated from the Marxist world-view that motivated their 
guerrilla insurgency in the 1980,s.  FMLN Vice Presidential 
candidate Sanchez Ceren is himself a former guerrilla 
commander. 
 
------------------ 
Economic Overview 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) After growing by over four percent each of the last 
two years, the Salvadoran economy now appears to be slowing 
and may head into recession, depending on the extent of the 
financial contagion from the United States.  El Salvador was 
the first Central American country to implement CAFTA-DR, and 
exports, which have continued to increase through September 
2008, remain the bright spot of the economy.  Populist 
policies in the run-up to 2009 elections, including costly 
subsidies for electricity, propane gas, and transportation, 
have led to increasing fiscal indiscipline, and the 
government has recently experienced problems in placing its 
short-term debt.  A number of international businesses have 
recently scaled back or shut down operations in El Salvador 
 
because of worldwide economic conditions.  The security 
situation continues to impose a considerable operational cost 
on businesses and remains a detriment to foreign direct 
investment. 
 
---------------------------- 
Civilian-Military Relations 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) are capable, 
professional, and subordinate to civilian authority.  The 
military consistently receives high approval ratings in 
public opinion polls, due largely to its response to national 
disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and outbreaks 
of infectious diseases such as dengue.  Salvadoran soldiers 
also support police in counter-narcotics efforts, anti-gang 
patrols, rural patrols, customs inspections, and 
reform-school training for juvenile convicts.  On January 1, 
2009 the Minister of Defense, MG Jorge Molina as well as Vice 
MOD, VADM Marco Palacios, retired from active duty, although 
President Saca has retained both in their positions. Also on 
January 1, the former Army Chief of Staff, BG Oswaldo Rubio, 
was promoted to MG and became the Chief of Defense, replacing 
MG Mendoza, who was retired.  Newly promoted BG Joaquin 
Galvez assumed the Vice Chief of Defense position on January 
1st as well. 
 
¶7. (C) The ESAF continues to focus on force modernization in 
a constrained budget environment.  The ESAF currently has 
approximately 12,000 total service members and 2,500 
administrative personnel.  The ESAF's funding level of USD 
115 million has changed very little for several years, 
representing a slightly declining percentage of the national 
budget.  Small increases for the ESAF in recent yearly 
budgets have been obligated to a pay raise, so there is no 
net increase in funds available for operations, training, 
maintenance, and modernization. While El Salvador currently 
receives modest FMF allocations, (2nd highest in AOR most 
years and one of only two allocations in FY08), military 
officials have expressed their desire for considerable 
increases to help address pressing modernization needs.  The 
focus of our FMF expenditures is on developing host nation 
capabilities in disaster relief, peacekeeping, 
counterterrorism, and to counter illicit trafficking. 
 
------------ 
OIF Service 
------------ 
 
¶8. (U) The GOES initially deployed forces to Iraq in August 
¶2003.  Since then, El Salvador has deployed eleven 
contingents to Iraq in support of humanitarian assistance and 
reconstruction missions.  The Salvadorans suffered five KIA 
and over 50 wounded during their participation in coalition 
operations.  One Salvadoran soldier, CPL Platero, has been at 
Brook Army Medical Center in Texas recovering from a severe 
leg injury since October 2006 and is expected to return to El 
Salvador in August 2009. 
 
¶9. (U) The eleven Salvadoran "Cuscatlan" battalions have 
overseen more than 362 humanitarian assistance projects 
valued at more than USD 23 million, including the 
construction of roads, schools, and medical clinics, as well 
as installation of power generators and transformers. 
Salvadoran troops performed admirably during their five and a 
half years in Iraq.  Their performance has been recognized at 
various levels, to include six soldiers being awarded the 
Bronze Star by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for 
saving the life of Najaf's Coalition Provisional Authority 
Provincial Coordinator and five other American Government 
Officials.  In May 2007, President Saca made an unannounced 
visit to Iraq and personally expressed his gratitude and 
pride for their tremendous contributions to the 
reconstruction of Iraq.  Salvadoran soldiers were intimately 
involved in the training and equipping of the Iraqi Civil 
Defense Forces in Najaf, Al Hillah, and Al Kut.  The national 
press has positively portrayed the real impact of ESAF 
efforts and the gratitude of Iraqi provincial leaders. 
Although public opposition to Salvadoran involvement in Iraq 
at times ran as high as 70 percent, the Saca administration 
and the Legislative Assembly nonetheless found a way to 
extend the Salvadoran military presence in Iraq through early 
 
¶2009.  Unfortunately, their departure was a product of 
misunderstandings -- they might otherwise have stayed through 
June, 2009. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Peacekeeping and International Agreements 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) The GOES is interested in peacekeeping opportunities, 
although current ESAF budget constraints make large-scale 
deployments of troops unlikely without significant external 
support.  In August 2008, the ESAF deployed 51 soldiers as 
part of a Spanish-led contingent in support of the UN mission 
in Lebanon.  In February 2009 they deployed another 50-man 
platoon to relieve the original unit.  The ESAF is also 
coordinating with the Spanish armed forces to deploy troops 
to the UN mission in Bosnia. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The UN has certified the ESAF as competent for full 
participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations.  Since 2005 the 
USG has released funding for equipment and training for the 
ESAF to take part in the Global Peacekeeping Operations 
Initiative (GPOI).  This would support a long-term desire of 
the Conference of Central American Armed Forces (CFAC) to 
deploy a combined peacekeeping unit from El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. El Salvador is not a 
signatory to the International Criminal Court, but signed and 
ratified Article 98 provisions to the Rome Statute with the 
U.S. in 2004.  In late 2006 the legislature approved a 505 
Agreement for U.S.-provided assistance; the Assembly has also 
approved an agreement for the protection of classified 
military information and the DOD/DOS preferred global format 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). 
 
¶12. (C) Comment: Depending on the outcome of the March 15 
Presidential election, as well as the level and nature of USG 
engagement, there is a reasonably strong possibility of the 
ESAF agreeing to commit troops to OEF (Afghanistan) within 
the next year.  While the political situation will not 
solidify until after the March 15 elections, it could be a 
worthwhile exercise to plant the seeds for an OEF commitment 
during your visit.  End comment. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Counternarcotics and Transnational Crime 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) El Salvador is a transit country for narcotics, 
mainly cocaine and heroin.  The country's geographic position 
makes it vulnerable to those trafficking drugs, drug proceeds 
(in the form of bulk currency shipments), people, and guns to 
or from the United States.  U.S.-funded training and 
equipment have contributed significantly to improvements in 
the National Civilian Police (PNC) Counternarcotics Division. 
 JIATF-South, with its ability to provide Salvadoran 
authorities with real-time intelligence, is also a great 
asset; however, the ESAF need additional operational 
capabilities to help us take full advantage of JIATF's 
contributions.  Some of these Salvadoran operational 
shortcomings will hopefully be addressed via Merida 
Initiative funds earmarked for communications gear and 
high-speed open ocean interceptors. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Salvadoran government is a valuable partner in 
the war on drugs, and has assumed an important leadership 
role in regional initiatives to improve public security in 
Central America. The GOES hosts the FBI-led Transnational 
Anti-gang Unit (TAG), the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA), and the Comalapa Cooperative Security 
Location (CSL).  The GOES is an ally is efforts to curtail 
transnational street gang activity, to disrupt maritime 
narcotics trafficking routes, and to strengthen the rule of 
law throughout the hemisphere.  The current government of El 
Salvador enthusiastically supports the Merida Initiative, and 
continues to aggressively push the Central American 
Integration System (SICA in Spanish) to implement a 
comprehensive regional plan for improving public security. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Despite their cooperative attitude, the Salvadorans 
are not winning the battle against organized crime. Illegal 
immigration to the U.S., coupled with deportation of illegal 
aliens back to El Salvador, feeds the explosive regional 
 
growth of transnational street gangs.  Salvadoran officials 
frequently infer that the country's spiraling violent crime 
rates are largely the result of the U.S. deporting illegal 
alien gang members back to El Salvador.  But they could do 
more themselves, for example pass wire tap legislation. 
Additionally, enactment of a civil asset forfeiture statue 
would also help to offset the significant budget shortfalls 
faced by the National Civilian Police and the judicial 
sector.  Finally, moving forward on extradition would help to 
ensure that neither the hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans 
residing in the U.S. (legally and otherwise), nor fugitive 
American criminals, find safe haven in El Salvador and avoid 
punishment for crimes they commit. 
 
-------------- 
CSL Extension 
-------------- 
 
¶16. (C) In July 2008, Embassy San Salvador delivered to the 
GOES the U.S. request for an early five-year renewal of the 
current CSL agreement, which expires in August 2010.  On 
December 17, 2008, El Salvador delivered a counterproposal to 
expand the list of allowable activities to include 
humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism operations, and 
training and military exercises as well as authorization for 
U.S. military access to additional Salvadoran bases beyond 
Comalapa; in return, the U.S. would improve the capabilities 
of the Salvadoran military.  This proposal would provide a 
new ten-year agreement.  Such an agreement would have to be 
approved by the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly.  The GOES is 
confident that it has the necessary votes.  President Saca 
has publicly stated his desire to ensure future operations at 
Comalapa before he leaves office May 31.  The USG has not yet 
formally responded to the GOES counterproposal. 
 
--------------------- 
Suggested Take Aways 
--------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) In addition to expressing U.S. gratitude for 
Salvadoran sacrifices in support of OIF, and strengthening 
institutional ties with the ESAF, your visit could also serve 
as a valuable opportunity to move forward on the CSL, both in 
Washington and here in El Salvador.  We suggest that you use 
interactions with high-level GOES officials to seek closure 
on a CSL extension.  You could also raise the potential ESAF 
commitment to OEF, should the political calculus fall into 
place. 
 
¶18. (SBU) At the same time, we must be careful to avoid any 
politicization of your visit, and not impart the impression 
that your attendance at the OIF commemoration ceremony is in 
any way related to the upcoming Presidential elections. 
BLAU