Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09RABAT161, ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09RABAT161.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09RABAT161 2009-02-23 10:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0161/01 0541058
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231058Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9711
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4503
UNCLAS RABAT 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR INL/AAE - AARON ALTON, AF/RSA - 
CHRISTOPHER POMMERER, DS/T/ATA - TONY GONZALEZ, AND 
NEA/MAG 
AID/W FOR DCHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID SNAR ASEC PTER SOCI KJUS KCRM MO
SUBJECT: ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING 
 
REF: A. STATE 005448 (NOTAL) 
     B. RABAT 0151 
 
-------------------------- 
Summary and Action Request 
-------------------------- 
 
1.  (SBU) The Mission has identified three key 
priorities for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) judicial sector and law 
enforcement support to Morocco:  anti-corruption, 
counterterrorism (CT) and general technical support. 
These priorities reflect Government of Morocco (GOM) 
requests, address broader needs and gaps, and 
provide the USG with opportunities to build stronger 
working relationships with governmental and other 
key actors.  To pursue these priorities most 
effectively, the Mission requests the creation of a 
U.S. direct-hire INL Coordinator position; please 
see para. 10.  End Summary and Action Request. 
 
---------------------- 
Key Underlying Threads 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Morocco faces myriad judicial, criminal 
and security challenges, including trafficking in 
persons, increasing petty crime, narcotics 
production and smuggling (as well as other illicit 
goods smuggling), and domestic and regional 
terrorism.  However, rampant corruption, limited 
institutional capacity, and societal frustration 
over failings in the judicial and security sectors 
are the common denominators that hinder the GOM's 
effectiveness in addressing these issues.  Mission 
believes that they are the central threads that the 
USG can "tug on" to reach and improve the broader 
spectrum of Morocco's security and judicial 
services.  Anger and frustration over authorities' 
inability to reduce these crimes, and sometime 
complicity in their commission, has proved an 
effective rallying tool for anti-government 
extremists. 
 
3.  (SBU) Enhanced USG engagement in these fields 
will support Mission Strategic Plan Goal 1: 
Promoting Economic Reform and Growth, Goal 2: 
Countering Terrorism and Goal 4: Enhancing Democracy 
and Governance. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Governmental Capabilities and Obstacles 
--------------------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) Corruption/"Internal Affairs:"  A key 
enabling factor in Morocco's "culture of corruption" 
is a lack of credible investigations of reports of 
official malfeasance.  In a welcome change, in 2008 
and early 2009, the GOM launched a series of high 
profile, if isolated, arrests of civilian and 
security officials for involvement in drug 
trafficking, corruption and malfeasance.  However, 
such activities are still not systemic and are 
sometimes tainted by the whiff of political 
expediency and score settling.  Additionally, 
officially lodged complaints of physical abuse by 
security forces are cursorily investigated, if at 
all, and almost never found to be valid; a key and 
widespread source of complaint at all levels of 
society.  Almost every interlocutor, whether from 
government or civil society, has urged USG support 
for improving the GOM's internal affairs capacity. 
 
5.  (SBU) Internal Affairs Continued:  A variety of 
agencies, bodies and mechanisms have the authority 
to investigate official misconduct.  (Note:  The 
most notable are the Inspectors General, the Cour de 
Comptes -- GAO equivalent, the still new Commission 
to Combat Corruption, the Judicial Police -- FBI 
equivalent, and investigating magistrates.  End 
Note.)  However, there is little coordination among 
them.  Morocco's lack of judicial independence and 
 
its client-based system of personal relationships 
drive corruption.  They are the remnants of the "old 
system" that most hinder modernization.  What now 
Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi labeled "telephone 
justice," in which the outcomes of cases or 
investigations are predetermined by instructions 
delivered to judges and investigators by telephone, 
remains an enduring part of Moroccan jurisprudence. 
 
6.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  Although 
counterterrorism is not an explicit goal of much of 
the training proposed below, the skills being taught 
will have multiple applications, including and 
particularly in the CT field.  Improved 
investigatory capacity, better handling of evidence 
and post blast procedures all have bearing on CT 
cases.  Additionally, improved and more credible 
justice and security services will help alleviate 
frustration towards the government. 
 
7.  (SBU) Technical Skills:  In both the judicial 
and law enforcement sectors, a lack of technical 
skills in almost all fields hampers Moroccan ability 
to address criminal matters.  It also has an effect 
on the GOM's ability to effectively partner with and 
support U.S. law enforcement elements in pursuing 
cases related to cybercrime (a growing issue here), 
and other trans-national issues.  An additional 
constraint to USG training efforts is the fact that 
English language skills are limited albeit growing. 
English is now a required subject at the Ministry of 
Interior's (MOI) Royal Institute for Territorial 
Administration (IRAT), its premier training ground 
for future leaders (Ref B). 
 
8.  (SBU) Managerial:  Security and judicial 
officials at the top-to-middle echelons of the 
Ministries of Justice (MOJ) and Interior have 
expressed a true desire to modernize and 
professionalize their services.  Difficulties in 
translating rhetoric into reality have been, and 
remain, a fundamental obstacle to carrying out 
assistance programs and broader USG/GOM cooperation 
and coordination.  Additionally, overly bureaucratic 
and hierarchical management structures slow 
decision-making processes and hamper reform. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Internal Training and Programming Framework 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) INL assistance, along with any related 
potential assistance from other sources, will 
provide critical support to our MSP goals at both 
the tactical and strategic levels.  We believe that 
technical law enforcement and security-focused 
assistance such as cybercrime and investigatory 
training should be best channeled through ICITAP, 
DS/ATA, LEGAT, DHS and RSO in coordination with OSC. 
Longer-term, reform-focused assistance such as 
 
ethical training for Moroccan legal associations, 
general curriculum development for MOI and MOJ 
training institutions, and other broad-based legal 
reform initiatives can be carried out by USAID and 
non-governmental organizations such as the American 
Bar Association and National Center for State 
Courts.  However, all such external programming 
should be closely coordinated within the Mission 
during the proposal design and approval phases to 
ensure complementarities with existing mission law 
enforcement and counterterrorism goals and 
activities. 
 
10.  (SBU) Action Request:  As a result of INL's 
welcome and expanding support, the size and scope of 
mission's judicial and law enforcement/security 
programming has outgrown our current capacity to 
manage it without detracting from other activities. 
In our 2011 MSP, Mission requested funding for a 
Foreign Service position to serve as INL program 
coordinator to supplement and supervise the current 
LES INL program coordinator position.  This new 
 
position would shepherd all assistance in this 
sector.  Additionally, the GOM has expressed an 
interest in an Intermittent Legal Advisor (ILA) with 
offices in both the MOJ and Embassy to help 
strengthen USG/GOM liaison relationships as well as 
facilitate implementation of assistance programming 
and broader reform.  If FY-10 funding can be 
identified, Mission would like to see the position 
created and advertised in FY-09 and encumbered in 
FY-10.  End Action Request. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Proposed Training and Programming 
--------------------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The below bullets are derived from 
consultations with GOM interlocutors, civil society 
representatives and internal mission discussions. 
 
A.  Ministry of Justice: 
 
-- Multi-level, reciprocal familiarization and 
exchange visits, with a particular focus on how the 
U.S. federal and state judiciaries are organized and 
interact. 
 
-- Multi-level, reciprocal "internships" in which 
MOJ officials might be embedded in the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for a period of up to 
one month or longer and then return here with a DOJ 
counterpart for a similar program. 
 
-- Top-level assistance in designing laws permitting 
alternative sentencing, conditional release and 
probation.  Currently, Moroccan codes do not allow 
for any of the above. 
 
-- Top-level assistance in setting up a national 
probation division. 
 
-- Multi-level training on plea bargaining. 
 
-- Multi-level training on rules of evidence. 
 
-- Multi-level training for judges and prosecutors 
in specialized fields such as implementing 
international conventions; investigating and 
adjudicating complex corruption and governmental 
mismanagement cases; investigating and adjudicating 
trans-national crime cases. 
 
-- The MOJ has requested assistance in designing and 
establishing "neighborhood courts" such as those in 
New York City, to address quality of life crimes and 
tackle petty crime before it becomes major crime. 
This would be top-level initially and multi-level in 
time. 
 
B.  Ministry of Interior: 
 
-- Multi-level continued and expanded fingerprint 
training and programming. 
 
-- The following items are derived from the FBI 
course catalog and DHS offerings and were forwarded 
to INL/AAE via e-mail: 
 
-- 1.  FBI course 4, Bank Robbery, in response to a 
GOM request as a result of a recent increase in bank 
robberies (Multi-level). 
 
-- 2.  FBI course 7, Computer (Cyber) Crimes, with 
additional focused consultations on cyber crime. 
Morocco has some of the world's best hackers, and 
some of the least prepared police forces to address 
the issue.  DS/ATA conducted recent assessments of 
the Moroccan police and Gendarmes' (national or 
rural police's) abilities to conduct cyber 
investigations.  ATA's report is pending but, when 
published, will provide an overview of the GOM's 
current level of cyber investigative capability and 
needs.  ATA will be prepared to provide assistance 
 
(Multi-level). 
 
-- 3.  FBI course 8, Crimes Against Children, to 
address this growing problem in Morocco (Multi- 
level). 
 
-- 4.  FBI course 11, DNA analysis, to provide 
technical training to individuals who will operate 
the automated Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) the 
USG is providing. 
 
-- 5.  FBI course 20, Hostage Negotiation, in 
response to a request from the MOI (Multi-level). 
 
-- 6.  FBI courses 23 and 36, Police Ethics and 
Internal Control/Police Corruption (Multi-level). 
 
-- 7.  Continued multi-level border security and 
interdiction training. 
 
-- 8.  Top-level assistance in creating and managing 
a multi-agency fusion/crisis management center under 
MOI aegis. 
 
-- 9.  Multi-level assistance in designing and 
implementing anti-trafficking programs. 
 
-- 10..  Multi-level assistance to the IRAT in 
response to a request for training assistance (Ref 
B). 
 
-- 10.  DHS Border Security Training (Low-to-middle 
level). 
 
-- 11.  DHS Money Movement, Laundering and Bulk Cash 
Training (Low-to-middle level). 
 
-- 12.  DHS Airport Interdiction Training (Low-to- 
middle level). 
 
-- 13.  DHS Fraudulent Identification/Passport 
Travel Document Training (Low-to-middle level). 
 
-- 14.  DHS TTU (Trade Transparency Unit) Training 
(Low-to-middle level). 
 
-- 15.  DHS Port Security Training Programs (Tangier 
Med and Casablanca) (Low-to-middle level). 
 
-- 16.  DHS Customs Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (CTPAT) Program (Low-to-middle level). 
 
-- 17.  DHS Container Security Programs (Morocco 
beginning direct shipping to the U.S.) (Low-to- 
middle level). 
 
-- C.  General Governmental Assistance: 
 
-- 1.  Top-level and mid-level training for key 
managers in change management, strategic planning, 
and project management and implementation. 
 
-- 2.  Top-level and mid-level assistance to both 
judicial and security agencies in how carry out 
effective internal investigations. 
 
-- D.  Civil Society/Reform: 
 
-- 1.  Programs focused on improving general access 
to justice. 
 
-- 2.  Legal clinics, "street law" programs and 
projects with Moroccan bar associations to promote 
pro-bono work as part of legal training.  This would 
build on previous mission programs implemented by 
the American Bar Association. 
 
-- 3.  Ethics program for judicial experts. 
 
-- 4.  Institution building for bar associations and 
other professional legal associations. 
 
-- 5.  Legal resource centers 
 
------------------------- 
Efforts by Other Partners 
------------------------- 
 
12.  (SBU) While this is not a comprehensive list, 
Mission has made a significant effort to reach out 
to the donor community to coordinate assistance. 
Activities of key partner governments are laid out 
below: 
 
-- The French Embassy is focusing on fraudulent 
documents, drugs, and conducting investigations. 
The French have given extensive basic training to 
the GOM which has not always well received by the 
Moroccans because of its basic nature. 
 
-- The Spanish Embassy, the largest Spanish Embassy 
in the world, is concentrating on fraudulent 
documents and migrant and narcotics interdiction. 
 
-- The British Embassy has explored the creation of 
a national crisis center with the GOM and creation 
of a national closed circuit TV network in large 
cities.  The British are also working on anti-MANPAD 
training and post blast investigative training. 
 
-- The German Embassy has provided training on 
exploitation/analysis of information and 
intelligence and on how to conduct internet 
investigations connected to terrorism.  Germany will 
provide training on chain of custody for the seizure 
of drugs, identification of drugs, the 
transportation of seized drugs and crime scene 
investigation. 
 
-- The Dutch Embassy is involved in a major project 
involving document fraud training.  They are also 
providing extensive equipment to analyze documents. 
 
-- The European Union has invested heavily in 
computerizing the court system as well as in 
building radio and communication systems for 
security forces.  They have also supported several 
drug programs, aviation security programs, and a 
significant immigration security and interdiction 
program. 
 
-- In addition, both France and Belgium have 
Resident Legal Advisors, and Belgium has been 
working on aiding released prisoners to find 
employment. 
 
13.  (SBU) There is no existing non-military 
regional training center in Morocco and none is 
planned, but the GOM is always open to proposals. 
 
14.  (U) Primary Mission Points of Contact are: 
 
-- Embassy PolOff David Brownstein at e-mail: 
brownsteindp@state.gov, tel. +21237668064 (until 
April 14, 2009; 
 
-- Embassy ARSO Joshua Godbois at e-mail: 
godboisjs2@state.gov or tel. +21237668065 
 
-- Embassy LES Suleiman Fenjiro at e-mail: 
FenjiroSO@state.gov or tel.. +21237668296; 
 
-- USAID Democracy and Governance Team Leader Ted 
Lawrence at e-mail:  tlawrence@usaid.gov or tel. 
+21237632001; 
 
-- USAID Development Specialist Idriss Touijer at e- 
mail:  itouijer@usaid.gov or tel. +21237632001; 
 
-- Embassy PolOff Siriana Nair at e-mail: 
nairsk@state.gov or tel. +21237668065 (after April 
14). 
 
========================================= 
 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
========================================= 
 
Jackson