VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNM #0089/01 0481552
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171552Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4844

UNCLAS NIAMEY 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/RSA - C POMMERER, INL/AAE - A ALTON, AND 
DS/T/ATA A GONZALEZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC KCRM PARM PGOV PTER SNAR SOCI NG
SUBJECT: NIGER -- ASSESSING THE NEED FOR INCREASED LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL TRAINING 
 
REF: STATE 5448 
 
¶1.  The following is Post's response to provide input to help 
further define law enforcement and judicial training needs. 
Below are Post's responses to the questions posed: 
 
¶A. What are the key internal or regional challenges the host 
government's non-military security apparatus confronts? 
(i.e., local/regional crime, trafficking of persons, 
narcotics, resource theft, smuggling, illicit small and light 
arms shipments, domestic and regional terrorism, etc.) 
 
In February 2007, the Tuareg rebel group, Movement of 
Nigeriens for Justice (MNJ), launched a series of attacks 
against military and strategic installations in the north. 
These attacks continued throughout 2007 and 2008.  In 
response, the government declared a state of alert on August 
24, 2007, which has remained in effect.  While civilian 
authorities generally maintained effective control of the 
security forces, there were some instances in which elements 
of the security forces acted independently of government 
authority. 
 
The Government of Niger security forces concentrate their 
attention on radical/militant Islamic elements and terrorist 
threats from external groups, such as Al Qaeda in the Lands 
of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).  Internally, the Government of 
Niger security forces are focused on the MNJ in Niger.  The 
borders are very insecure and access across the borders is 
quite easy, especially in remote areas.  Smuggling is an 
issue across all of Niger,s borders, with drugs (opiates and 
hashish) and contraband goods (cigarettes) being of primary 
concern on the border with Nigeria.  Narcotics, illicit small 
arms and light weapons, and land mines are smuggled across 
northern Niger, taking advantage of the old historic trade 
routes across the Sahel and Sahara regions.  Trafficking in 
persons has been reported as an issue in previous Human 
Rights Reports by the U.S. Embassy.  There are no threats 
inside Niger that act beyond its borders.  Since December 
2008 and January 2009, with the kidnappings of UN Special 
Envoy Fowler and his associates, and four European tourists, 
security concerns have increased related to groups outside 
Niger crossing the border with Mali and making incursions 
into Niger for kidnapping raids, particularly in the regions 
immediately to the north and northwest of the capital, Niamey. 
 
¶B. What are the host government's non-military sector's 
capabilities to respond to these challenges?  Where ability 
to address these issues is lacking, please provide details: 
what knowledge, skills/training, equipment, relationships, 
policies and/or procedures are responsible for the lack of 
capacity? 
 
The Armed Forces (FAN), under the Ministry of National 
Defense, is responsible for internal and external security. 
The Gendarmerie, under the same ministry, has primary 
responsibility for rural security.  The National Forces for 
Intervention and Security (FNIS), under the Interior 
Ministry, are responsible for domestic security and 
protection of high-level officials and government buildings. 
The National Police, also under the Interior Ministry, are 
charged with urban law enforcement.  The Directorate of 
Documentation and External Security (DGDSE) is the primary 
body responsible for intelligence gathering. 
 
In many ways Niger is in the infant stages of development of 
full programs.  Organizations and individuals at lower levels 
are fully motivated and ready to accept advice and aid.  It 
does not appear the organizations at the lower level obtain 
full support, however, from the higher levels of government. 
 
The Gendarmerie units are small and have great areas to 
cover.  They are very receptive to advice and willing to 
accept financial aid and training.  They are not funded to 
perform their mission as well as the international community 
would like.  The Gendarmerie is responsible for investigating 
police abuse; however, impunity is a problem. 
 
The DGDSE is headquartered in Niamey and has 10 regional 
offices in major cities and one at the Niamey International 
Airport.  DGDSE officers are professional and well trained, 
but are hampered by a lack of resources and personnel. 
 
The police are largely ineffective due to lack of basic 
supplies such as vehicle fuel, radios, uniforms, handcuffs, 
batons, and badges.  Patrols are sporadic and emergency 
response in Niamey can take almost an hour or more.  Police 
training is minimal and only specialized police units have 
basic weapons-handling skills.  Corruption remains pervasive. 
 
On the whole, security forces do not adequately police the 
border regions.  The Government of Niger lacks capacity to 
control borders.  Additionally, corruption in the form of 
bribes undermines controls in place.  The possibility exists 
for outside groups to use the country as a temporary refuge. 
 
Niger has implemented anti-terrorist and 
anti-money-laundering legislation; however, the level of 
competency and training of law enforcement officials is 
questionable.  In 2003-2004, a unit called CENTIF, made up of 
lawyers, police, and customs officials was created on paper, 
though never stood up. 
 
¶C. Highlight any specific non-military security or judicial 
training requirements (basic, mid-level, specialized, 
institutional) and the intended host government recipient 
agency. 
 
The National Police intend to set up a Counter Terrorist 
unit.  The police received ATA training in 2008 appropriate 
for this purpose (Interdicting Terrorist Activities) as well 
as ATA-funded equipment for tactical operations.  Additional 
training directed at this effort would be greatly welcomed by 
the Director General of the National Police. 
 
¶D. Host government's willingness to accept and be an 
effective partner in the implementation of USG assistance. 
 
The Government of Niger has been receptive to training 
offered through the Regional Security Office for non-military 
units.  Two ATA courses were offered in FY 08, one in 2007, 
and four in 2006.  The training has included, where 
appropriate, elements of the National Police and the 
Gendarmerie.  For example, in 2008, the ATA course Airport 
Security Management included both police and gendarmerie 
officers responsible for airport security in Niamey. 
 
ATA plans to visit Niger from February 22-28, 2009, to 
conduct a Program Country Review.  The host government has 
been extremely cooperative in preparation for this visit, and 
the Regional Security Office anticipates a pQductive visit 
by ATA. 
 
¶E. Other efforts by international partners in providing 
non-military security assistance and/or training to law 
enforcement and judicial institutions of the host government. 
 
The Government of Niger also receives training from France 
(police, military, and intelligence), and has received 
training in the past from Libya and Algeria.  There are 
cooperative agreements with Mali (e.g., right to pursue 
(i.e., "hot pursuit") between the two countries).  The 
European Union has also provided training in the area of 
immigration control. 
 
¶F. Is there any type of existing or planned non-military 
regional training center in your country, operated by either 
an international partner or host country? 
 
Only the military has a regional training center, and this is 
limited to higher-ranking officials.  The National Police 
have one police academy training center located in Niamey. 
The Gendarmerie does partial training with the military 
throughout the country and the remainder of its training in 
Niamey.  The European Union has provided funding for March 
2009 to train police inspectors from the National Police (80 
officers), FNIS (20 officers), and the Gendarmerie (20 
officers), but the Gendarmerie withdrew its participation. 
 
¶2.  The point of contact for this cable is RSO Jeff 
McGallicher or ARSO Brian Caza, both of whom may be reached 
24 hours through Marine Post One at 227-72-26-61, 62, or 63 
ALLEN