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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI364, SOMALIA - Engaging Puntland and Somaliland

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI364 2009-02-25 15:01 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO2220
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0364/01 0561501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251501Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8599
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3086
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2123
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000364 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E 
BRUSSELS FOR ACTING A/S CARTER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID PTER SO
 
SUBJECT:  SOMALIA - Engaging Puntland and Somaliland 
 
REF: A) Nairobi 246 
     B) Nairobi 345 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Following on our cables (reftels) on the way 
forward for Somalia, here we propose ways to engage the Somaliland 
and Puntland regions of northern Somalia.  To assure the north 
maintains its stability in the face of the south's volatility, we 
propose increased education, economic and good governance 
assistance.  To assure Somaliland and Puntland remain a capable 
partner on international terrorism, and to bolster their 
counter-piracy capabilities, we suggest increasing law enforcement, 
legislative and maritime security support.    End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Reftel A outlined the mission's view that a moment of 
opportunity exists in Somalia.  If seized with vigorous U.S. 
diplomatic, security sector, and development assistance, we could 
influence marked improvements in Mogadishu in the short- and 
medium-term, and over larger parts of south central Somalia in the 
long-term.  Reftel B described in more detail the immediate funding 
needed for security and development programs if we want to exploit 
this window of opportunity in southern and central Somalia. 
 
3.  (SBU) This cable suggests ways we can engage and partner with 
Somalia's relatively more peaceful northern regions of Somaliland 
and Puntland.  Somaliland and Puntland have been largely spared the 
violence and chaos of southern Somalia, and therefore, have 
functioning ministries and more effective governments, relative to 
the south.  They stress to us that they sense the encroachment of 
the chaos to their south.  They warn (and we agree) southern Somalia 
may destabilize them, too, unless they can meet their populace's 
expectations for security, government services, and socio-economic 
growth. 
 
4.  (SBU) They also highlight their new status as a front line in 
the war against terror.  Long before the October 29, 2008 bombings 
in Hargeisa and Bossaso, the northern Somali governments detected 
increased al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda-linked activity in their regions. 
Northern Somalia is a way station for jihadists and weapons 
transiting east Africa on the way to their southern Somali safe 
havens.  Our goal is to support and cooperate with northern 
Somalia's governments to disrupt extremists' movements and prevent 
northern Somalia from becoming another safehaven. 
 
5.  (U) Note:  Somaliland is a self-declared autonomous state in the 
northwest part of Somalia.  It has no international diplomatic 
recognition, but operates independently of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in Mogadishu.  Puntland describes itself as 
semi-autonomous, but its government cooperates and coordinates with 
the TFG.  Prime Minster Omar Sharmarke and new Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar hail from Puntland, and Puntlanders 
serve in the TFG parliament and cabinet. United States policy is to 
deal with both areas as integrated regions of Somalia. End Note. 
 
----------------------------- 
Development Assistance: 
More Democracy and Governance 
----------------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Over the past decade, USAID had a fairly modest development 
assistance program in Somaliland and Puntland focused primarily on 
supporting peace building initiatives and improving access to basic 
social services, especially education and water.  Only in the last 
few years has USAID provided funding for good governance initiatives 
in Somaliland where the International Republican Institute 
implements a parliament and political parties strengthening program. 
Somaliland continues to make considerable progress on 
democratization efforts and planning for presidential elections in 
late March/early April 2009 is well underway. 
 
7.  (U) Given the relative peace and stability in Somaliland and 
Puntland, the time is ripe to expand the portfolio of activities. 
Such an increase in USG assistance would reward efforts towards 
peace and stability made by the two regions. If additional funds 
were made available, we would suggest expansion of the following 
activities in both Puntland and Somaliland: 
 
8.  (U) Fostering Peace and Security 
 
NAIROBI 00000364  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- Increase USG funding to UNDP's Rule of Law program to expand 
police and judiciary training initiatives to Puntland and 
Somaliland. Additional USAID funding will increase the number and 
specialized training of police recruits and officers as well as 
enhance legal training facilities and strengthen the judicial 
structures and indigenous conflict resolution capacities at the 
local level. 
 
-- Expand current Somalia Youth and Livelihoods Program to Puntland 
in order to reduce insecurity related to high-risk youth by 
providing employment opportunities and skills training. This 
innovative pilot program, currently implemented only in Somaliland, 
assists education and training providers in developing programs that 
are focused on meeting labor market demand and helping youth find 
and successfully pursue livelihood and work opportunities. 
 
9.  (U) Improving Governance 
 
-- Enhance the democratization process in Somaliland and Puntland 
through increased support to the current Interpeace and Consortium 
for Elections and Political Processes programs. Increased funding 
will go to support for district councils and broad engagement of the 
local constituencies, with a special emphasis on youth and women. 
 
-- Additional support will be provided for the decentralization of 
local governance through a series of regional workshops on revenue 
and land management. Expanded support will include medium and 
short-term capacity building and institutional development of 
government agencies through training of civil servants in a wide 
range of public management skills. 
 
-- Expand the Employment for Peace and Development program through 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) to Somaliland and 
Puntland. The program contributes towards the consolidation of the 
peace processes at district, regional and national levels by 
supporting the creation of medium scale employment opportunities for 
communities through labor-based infrastructure activities to be 
jointly managed by the local district councils. 
 
10.  (U) Investing in People 
 
-- Expand several current programs to increase access to basic 
education in Somaliland and Puntland by rehabilitating community 
primary schools, training additional teachers, especially women, and 
increasing support for non-formal education to reach the large 
number of out-of-school children. Additional resources can be 
provided to tertiary education institutions that are increasingly 
under strain as the number of new students increase yearly. 
Resources could be used to build upon earlier USAID initiatives that 
established a teacher training faculty at the University of 
Hargeisa. 
 
-- Increased resources for current health programs will expand the 
communities in Puntland and Somaliland that benefit from critical 
Maternal and Child Health interventions and the delivery of 
technical expertise in MCH and child survival interventions in 
collaboration with relevant line ministries and local government 
counterparts. 
 
------------------- 
Security Assistance 
------------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) On October 29, 2008 suicide bombers launched 
near-simultaneous, al-Qaeda-inspired attacks against government, 
diplomatic and NGO offices in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Bossaso, 
Puntland.  Both Puntland and Somaliland have since requested 
counter-terror assistance.  The Yemen-Gulf of Aden-northern Somalia 
corridor is a major route through which al-Qaeda affiliates their 
materiel transit east Africa.  We must increase our counter-terror 
and law enforcement assistance and cooperation to the north to 
assist them and improve Somali-U.S. cooperation combating terror and 
piracy. 
 
12.  (SBU) Counter-Terrorism 
 
 
NAIROBI 00000364  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- Puntland's and Somaliland's civilian law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies lack modern anti-terror laws and the most 
basic skills and equipment to track, interdict and prosecute 
terrorists.  For law enforcers, we propose providing courses in 
basic policing, anti-terror investigation, and physical security for 
government buildings.  Somaliland wants to draft improved 
anti-terror legislation; we could assist with an assessment and 
proposals for legislation, then follow up with training for police, 
legislators and prosecutors. 
 
-- Both countries would do well to formulate a national response 
preparedness plan to coordinate prevention, preparedness, response 
and recovery after an attack.  We could sponsor seminars between 
with regional or other officials to discuss lessons learned from 
terror attacks. 
 
-- Somaliland's and Puntland's border control capabilities are in 
their infancy.  They will benefit from basic customs and immigration 
education, as well as airport screening equipment upgrades and 
training.  We should look for opportunities to include Somaliland 
and Puntland officials in regional trainings to build contacts with 
neighboring country counterparts. 
 
-- Northern regions public education systems are weak, and private 
religious schools that may teach extremism are filling the gap. 
Somaliland and Puntland could initiate a new national curriculum and 
set of minimum standards for public and private schools.  Somaliland 
has requested help registering and regulating teachers, and 
initiating a system of work permits for foreign teachers. 
 
13.  (SBU) Anti-Piracy 
 
-- Horn of Africa piracy ballooned in 2008, the result of a lack of 
law enforcement, economic collapse and probably official corruption. 
 Somaliland and Puntland's coasts are vast, yet the two regions have 
very little patrol and interdiction capability.  Somaliland's coast 
guard consists of several small patrol boats; Puntland's coast guard 
is contracted to a private company with fewer than three functioning 
patrol boats.  Both regions need funding, equipment and training for 
their coast guards.  Both Somaliland and Puntland have mounted 
successful counter-piracy interdictions; with additional support 
they could do more. 
 
-- As with regional counter-terror training, Puntland and Somaliland 
officials will benefit from maritime security and anti-piracy 
training with their regional counterparts.  Including Somalis in 
U.S.-funded training at the Kenyan Maritime Center for Excellence in 
Mombasa is one possibility. 
 
-- While various international naval task forces patrol the Gulf of 
Aden and western Indian Ocean, we believe there is very little 
information sharing with Puntland and Somaliland.  Northern Somalis 
have local knowledge of pirate's activities they are willing to 
share.  We should fully exploit this willingness.  In the wake of 
UNHCR 1851 and international efforts to gather better information on 
pirate's land-based activities, the United States would do well to 
formalize our anti-piracy information exchange, especially with the 
Puntlanders. 
 
RANNEBERGER