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Viewing cable 09NAIROBI346, SOMALIA - DOUBLE SUICIDE ATTACK ON AMISOM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NAIROBI346 2009-02-23 14:42 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO9939
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0346 0541442
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231442Z FEB 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8575
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS NAIROBI 000346 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AND ACTING A/S CARTER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - DOUBLE SUICIDE ATTACK ON AMISOM 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On February 22 two suicide bombers struck inside 
AMISOM's Burundian battalion base at the former Somali National 
University (SNU) compound.  Eleven Burundian soldiers were killed 
and 15 wounded.  Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack 
through spokesman Mukhtar Robow.  Though accounts vary, our AU 
contacts told us the two attackers were employees of a Somali 
contracted to supply food and fuel.  They had been working for the 
Burundians for nine months, and gained entry to the camp based on 
this relationship.  The attack casts suspicion on Somali contractors 
on AMISOM bases.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Two Bombers Attack 
Burundian Contingent 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On February 22 two suicide bombers struck inside the 
Burundian AMISOM base at the former SNU compound. Eleven Burundian 
soldiers died and between 15 were wounded.  Al-Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for the attacks.  Our AU contacts explained that two 
employees of Issa Mohammed Jama, a Somali contract supplier of food 
and fuel to the Burundian camp, entered the camp in a vehicle at 
approximately 9:00 a.m.  Based on their months-long relationship 
with the Burundians, the two were apparently admitted without 
inspection.  They parked the vehicle near a building in which troops 
were attending church.  The vehicle passenger dismounted and 
positioned himself in or near a busy cafeteria in the camp. 
Evidently aware of the soldiers' Sunday routine, at approximately 
10:00 a.m., as soldiers departed the church service, the vehicle 
driver detonated his explosives.  Nearly simultaneously the bomber 
on foot detonated his explosive vest in the cafeteria.  There is 
currently no information that contractor Jama knew of the attack. 
According to several accounts, insurgents nearby then launched eight 
mortars in the direction of the camp.  That attack was largely 
ineffective, according to our AU contacts. 
 
3.  Speaking to the media via telephone moments afterward, 
al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Robow "abu-Mansur" revealed many of the 
attack's aforementioned details. He named Ahmed Sheikh Don Sidow 
Wehliye as the bomber who was on foot, and Mursal Abdinur Mohamed 
"Shikshigow" as the vehicle bomber. 
 
------------------------ 
Burundian's Lax Security 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Post contacted TFG Police Commissioner Abdi Hassan 
"Qeybdiid" and Mogadishu Mayor Mohamed Osman "Dagahtu," for comment. 
 They separately told us that they've long considered Burundian 
AMISOM forces as generally more lax in security than the Ugandans, 
and that sadly this attack came as no surprise.  Qeybdiid commented 
that Burundi's two battalions were concentrated in one location and 
had insufficient checkpoints and protective measures to prevent 
committed attackers from gaining entry to the most densely populated 
parts of the camp.  Qeybdiid told us that he once asked their 
general to spread out his troops.  Qeybdiid said the Burundians were 
open and friendly with locals; this openness may have been used 
against them in this case.  AU sources separately told us AMISOM is 
reconsidering its use of local contractors. 
 
5.  (SBU) Comment:  Given that three AMISOM troops were killed in 
all of 2008, this attack is likely the worst against AMISOM since 
its deployment.  Our AU contacts said a lack of intelligence 
hampered their general situational awareness, and was especially 
marked on February 22.  AU sources told us the Burundian defense 
minister reacted with resolve to the attack, saying they would not 
submit to al-Shabaab pressure to withdraw. End Comment.