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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000344 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E/WALSH AND ACTING A/S CARTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID EWWT KE PGOV PHUM PINS PREL SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - ENCOURAGING KENYAN ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: A. 08 NAIROBI 2793 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 209 
     ¶C. NAIROBI 267 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  Kenya is increasingly concerned about 
Somali instability spilling over its border and affecting its 
share of Indian Ocean trade.  The Government of Kenya is 
seeking ways to help stabilize Somalia, cooperate on 
counter-piracy, and improve the plight of Somali refugees in 
Kenya.  We should encourage their regional diplomatic and 
security interventions by increasing our Somali-related 
assistance and training to Kenya, pushing Kenya to actively 
engage with the Somali transitional government on training 
and other exchanges, and by helping them take a regional 
leadership role on maritime security.  We should continue 
pressure on the GOK to cooperate on assistance the Dadaab 
refugee camp. End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
Kenya's Heightened 
Attention to Somalia 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Somalia has resurfaced as a key discussion topic in 
recent meetings with senior Kenyan leaders.  The renewed 
attention is likely largely due to fresh Kenyan concerns 
Somali instability will spill into Kenya's Somali border 
region, or possibly even into Somali immigrant neighborhoods 
in Nairobi.  President Kibaki and Foreign Minister Wetangula 
have raised Somali insecurity directly with the Ambassador, 
and Prime Minister Odinga and Chief of General Staff Kianga 
discussed it with AFRICOM commander General Ward (ref A). 
Kenya has also reengaged diplomatically on Somalia.  In 
October 2008 Kenya hosted an extraordinary Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) meeting to pressure 
then-Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and his prime minister 
to work more cooperatively.  In December 2008 they were the 
first IGAD country to threaten sanctions on Yusuf,s 
short-lived rump government. 
 
¶3.  (U) Kenya's concerns about spillover of Somali insecurity 
are well-justified.  Cross-border raids from Somalia into 
Kenya are becoming more frequent and have included 
carjackings, kidnapping of westerners, and attacks against 
security personnel.  A recent small arms attack against a 
German aid vehicle near Dadaab refugee camp while it was 
under police escort highlights the challenge to Kenya,s 
security forces. 
 
¶4.  (U) Kenya is also concerned about the huge increase in 
piracy in 2008, the economic costs of which Kenya finally 
began to count in terms of diversion of shipping and 
increased transportation costs.  The United States has asked 
Kenya to honor a recently-signed Memorandum of Understanding 
by receiving and prosecuting suspected pirates captured by 
the U.S. Navy. 
 
¶5.  (U) The dramatic increase in Somali refugees, and 
pressure from the diplomatic and international communities on 
Kenyan authorities to address the problem, also appears to be 
bearing fruit (Septel).  Perhaps most importantly, the GOK 
recognizes the new Somali government and renewed hopes for a 
lasting peace present an opportunity for Kenya to exert its 
influence regionally, while associating itself with U.S. 
efforts on Somalia. 
 
------------------------- 
Kenya as a Regional 
Security Training Partner 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Foreign Minister Wetangula has told the Ambassador 
his government wanted to help train Somalia's security 
services.  (Note:  In 2007 Kenya trained about 200 members of 
then-Somali President Yusuf's presidential guard. End Note.) 
In late 2008, the foreign ministry provided post with a plan 
to train 10,000 Somali police, but the proposal's cost was 
excessive. The program was later deemed cost prohibitive. 
 
NAIROBI 00000344  002 OF 003 
 
 
While Kenya remains eager to access U.S. financial support 
for its proposal, there is a recognition that much remains to 
be determined before any training could commence.  We will 
continue our discussions on Somali security training with the 
Kenyans, and recommend Washington identify funds be set aside 
for Kenya to have a role in Somalia's security sector reform. 
 Their participation in training would help maintain Kenya,s 
political engagement (e.g., through IGAD) in Somalia. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) For example, the United States could fund the 
Kenyan's training of Somali officers and non-commissioned 
officers, either in Mogadishu (preferred) or in Kenya. 
AMISOM and Uganda have provided only basic enlisted training 
to Somalia.  Some of Kenya,s active and retired general 
officers have conflict resolution and peacekeeping 
experience, and are respected throughout Africa.  This cadre 
of military officers could be called on to mentor senior 
Somali officers or Defense and Interior officials.  In 
addition, the Nairobi-based United Nations Political Office 
for Somalia has asked for an African general officer to 
manage its Security Sector Office.  The United States could 
lobby for a Kenyan to fill the position.  Kenyan journalists 
could help train their Somali counterparts.  Kenyan 
ministries could host Somali civil servants for training. 
Finally, the Kenyan government itself could do with more 
exposure and training on Somalia. 
 
¶8.  (U) Kenya is also convinced it can better serve the needs 
of the international community for information sharing and 
coordination of land-based support for maritime operations. 
U.S.-Kenyan cooperation on the Center for Maritime Excellence 
in Mombasa offers the possibility for Kenya to be a hub for 
maritime security training.  We recommend Kenya be encouraged 
to host Somaliland and Puntland trainees who would benefit 
from exposure to their regional colleagues during maritime 
security training. 
 
---------------- 
Kenya Engaged on 
Somali Piracy 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Kenya has emerged as a willing regional leader in the 
fight against piracy.  Kenya has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the United States to accept our captured 
suspected pirates, and has a proven capacity to prosecute and 
convict pirates.  A first transfer under the MOU may take 
place shortly.  As Kenya receives more pirates, they will 
need legal capacity building, training, and possibly funds to 
handle suspected pirates, detention.  U.S. support to 
Kenya's criminal justice system will help assure the Kenyans 
remain reliably cooperative on maritime security and piracy. 
 
¶10.  (U) Additionally, Kenya is a charter member of the 
Contact Group on Somali Piracy (CGSP).  We should encourage 
Kenya,s cooperation against piracy and as a regional locus 
for maritime security.  As reported in ref B, President 
Kibaki has expressed strong interest in having an anti-piracy 
coordination center established in Kenya as envisioned by the 
CGSP.  MFA contacts have further elaborated: Kenya envisions 
serving as a "Navigational Coordination Center" for maritime 
operations undertaken by CGSP members against Somali pirates. 
 The Kenyan Maritime Authority would play a key role.  The 
GOK is concerned that France is supporting Djibouti's bid to 
host the same and is seeking U.S. support.  We recommend the 
U.S. encourage and support Kenya as the Center's site. 
 
-------------------------- 
Making Kenya a Better 
Partner on Somali Refugees 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) More than 70,000 Somali refugees have sought shelter 
in the three Dadaab refugee camps since January 2008, 
swelling the total camp population to more than 250,000, and 
straining the international community's ability to provide 
minimally acceptable levels of water and other essential 
humanitarian services.  The severe overcrowding has 
contributed to a rash of security incidents, the outbreak of 
contagious diseases, and the potential for a fire 
catastrophe.  The local Kenyan community blames the refugees 
for degrading the environment and has blocked UNHCR's 
 
NAIROBI 00000344  003 OF 003 
 
 
attempts to establish a fourth camp. The GoK has legitimate 
security concerns about encouraging an increased number of 
Somali refugees, seemingly ignoring the fact that they are 
coming anyway.  The Kenyans may see a proposed fourth camp as 
undermining their efforts to secure the area's porous border. 
 
¶12.  (U) During the visit of UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner 
Craig Johnstone to Kenya in early February, the Kenyan PM and 
other key GOK officials verbally committed the GOK to 
implementing a package of activities to relieve the 
overcrowding in the camps (ref C).  It has agreed to allocate 
land for a fourth camp, to transfer some refugees from Dadaab 
to the Kakuma refugee camp in Northwest Kenya, and to address 
more effectively the needs of the host community around 
Dadaab. We recommend holding the GOK to its pledges, while 
simultaneously providing financial incentives to Kenya, for 
example to help the government overcome host community 
opposition to the fourth camp. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (U) Comment:  Increased instability on its border with 
Somalia, piracy, and the ballooning number of Somalia 
refugees in its Dadaab refugee camp are making Kenya an 
increasingly willing partner with us on regional security, 
especially as it pertains to Somalia.  We should nurture that 
growing interest by considering them for assistance, capacity 
building and cooperation on maritime security and piracy, and 
as a possible source for training for Somalia's security 
forces.  With the commitment from the GOK, we are beginning 
to see progress on resolving the humanitarian emergency in 
Dadaab; however, we and the international community must 
maintain pressure on the GOK to work with the local 
government officials to quickly allocate additional land.  To 
this end, the USG and other donor countries have demarched 
the PM and key GOK officials.  End Comment. 
 
Was this report helpful?  Please send comments and questions 
to SomaliaWatchers@state.sgov.gov. 
RANNEBERGER