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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW471, RUSSIA RESPONSE ON EXTENSION OF RER AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW471 2009-02-26 13:03 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0471/01 0571303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 261303Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2132
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000471 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/NESS METZ AND L/T CANNON 
DOE FOR HS BARRETT FOUNTOS 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/RUS and EUR/ACE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP KSCA KTIA OTRA PARM TRGY EAID RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA RESPONSE ON EXTENSION OF RER AGREEMENT 
 
REF: STATE 2980 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On February 13, representatives of the MFA, 
Rosatom, and Russia's Federal Biomedical Agency (FMBA) told Embassy 
EST and DOE representatives that Russia is willing to sign an 
extension of the Agreement on Cooperation in Research on Radiation 
Effects (RER).  However, most of the amendments proposed by the U.S. 
side are unacceptable -- specifically, those dealing with import and 
export privileges, site access, and data access -- as the proposed 
language is too sweeping, and the issues of site access and data 
access are already covered under previously negotiated agreements 
and Russian regulations.  The only possible exception is the 
proposed text on taxation.  If state tax authorities concur with the 
proposed text on taxation, it can remain.  Based on the categorical 
reaction, we believe the Russian side will not accept most of the 
proposed text.  FMBA officials expressed satisfaction with the 
current practice of resolving implementation issues during meetings 
of the two sides.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) Per reftel, on February 13, EST Counselor, Acting Head of 
DOE Moscow Office, EST Health Officer and EST Health Specialist met 
with First Secretary Aleksey Ivanov of the MFA North America 
Department; Mikhail Kiselev, FMBA Deputy Director; Yevgeniy 
Goloborodko of FMBA's Department of Research Organization; and 
Sergey Mikheyenko of Rosatom to discuss the proposed extension of 
the Agreement on Cooperation in Research on Radiation Effects (RER). 
 Kiselev expressed the Russian position that the agreement should be 
extended.  He noted, however, that the text proposed by the U.S. 
side drastically differs from the draft extension protocol forwarded 
by the Russian side to DOE (Pat Worthington) on December 11, 2008, 
and that most of the additions are a total surprise to him. 
 
TAXATION: WILL CONSIDER, BUT DON'T EXPECT QUICK REPLY 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
3. (SBU) On the issue of taxation (article VIII, point 1), Kiselev 
promised to seek clarification from tax authorities on which taxes 
could be exempted.  He warned us not to expect a reply for at least 
one month.  He also advised that the response may depend upon 
whether the agreement covers technical assistance or cooperation. 
Kiselev said that he understood that the reason for the proposed 
amendment was that the RER agreement is no longer implemented 
through a tax-exempt third-party implementing organization.  Ivanov, 
the MFA representative, seemed surprised that such language was 
included as a draft amendment, querying whether the U.S. will be 
inserting more such specific language in agreements.  We indicated 
that if assistance taxation is not clarified, it is quite likely 
that the U.S. will seek explicit language on tax exemption of 
assistance-funded projects. 
 
IMPORT-EXPORT ON DEMAND: "INAPPROPRIATE" 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) On the issue of import of materials and supplies (article 
VIII, point 2), Kiselev protested that the wording of the proposed 
paragraph is inappropriate because it is too broad.  He commented 
that the words "any materials or supplies" could refer to 
radioactive waste or materials used to commit terrorist acts.  He 
said that import and export of goods must be in accordance with 
Russian law, and that this point must be removed. 
 
SITE AND DATA ACESS: ALREADY COVERED ELSEWHERE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
5. (SBU) On the issue of site access (article IX, point 1), Kiselev 
indicated that this point is superfluous and inappropriate.  Access 
must be granted not "upon request" as the proposed language 
stipulates, but in accordance with established Russian procedure. 
Access requests to closed cities that are under Rosatom purview must 
be submitted three to four months in advance of a proposed visit, 
and visits to closed facilities like Mayak are virtually impossible. 
 In the case of research associated with agreement implementation, 
Kiselev noted that at the Sixth Joint Coordinating Committee meeting 
in October 2008, the United States and Russia signed a joint 
recommendation on planning and organization of visits to Russia's 
secure territories, for which special permission is required for 
visits by foreigners.  The recommendation specifies that Rosatom 
will develop separate guidelines delineating detailed procedures for 
visits of U.S. personnel.  Kiselev recommended that U.S. scientists 
work with their Russian counterparts at the South Urals Institute of 
Biophysics or the Urals Research Institute of Radiation Medicine in 
Chelyabinsk, and that there is no need to access Mayak itself. 
 
6. (SBU) Kiselev said that the proposed text on data access (article 
IX, point 2.a) is redundant.  He reminded us that this issue is 
regulated by a separate Data Access Agreement, which was concluded 
at the Joint Coordinating Committee Meeting in 2000 within the 
framework of the RER Agreement. 
 
TISSUE SAMPLES: SOFTEN LANGUAGE 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Kiselev commented that while Point 2.b on transport of 
human tissue samples may be a legitimate point for discussion, it is 
not acceptable to the Russian side as written.  He emphasized that 
the Russian facility used to store tissue samples was built with 
Russian government funds, not financed under the RER agreement, and 
thus the tissue samples are indisputably Russian property.  He 
advised that for purposes of renewing the agreement at present, the 
issue should be covered with more general language, such as: "The 
sides are working on issues of possible transfer of biological 
materials."  He said that the GOR Ministry of Health and Social 
Development is developing regulations to govern export of biological 
samples, but that export procedures are not yet outlined. 
 
YEARS OF PRODUCTIVE WORK; US SHOULD WITHDRAW AMENDMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
8. (SBU) Kiselev summed up the Russian position by recommending 
that, in the interest of expediency, the U.S. side withdraw all 
proposed amendments.  He also advised that the Emergency Situations 
Ministry (Emercom) will no longer be the implementing agency of the 
agreement, as it does not have active projects, but will continue 
participating in the agreement.  This change was reflected in the 
draft extension protocol provided by the Russian side in December 
2008.  Kiselev characterized the work performed under agreement 
during the past 14 years as very useful and productive and proudly 
noted that it had resulted in 155 publications in leading scientific 
journals.  He noted that even if the agreement were suspended, the 
Russian side would continue the research with its own funding.  He 
also mentioned that Russia is already working with the Europeans on 
similar projects. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: Kiselev made it clear that, with the possible 
exception of the point of taxation, the Russian government will not 
accept the proposed amendments as currently worded.  FMBA believes 
the agreement works well in its current form, and that no 
significant change is necessary.  It appears that we have little 
leverage with which to force the issue.  If there are specific 
aspects of the agreement that from the U.S. perspective have not 
functioned well in practice, it may be more effective to raise those 
specific issues with the Russian side and suggest specific alternate 
language. 
 
BEYRLE