VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0419/01 0501445
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191445Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2040
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000419 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA 
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
USUN FOR POL 
USNATO FOR POL 
USEU FOR POL 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA
NPT 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: NPT BACKGROUND INFO AND RUSSIAN POC 
 
REF: A. STATE 6970 
 ¶B. 08 MOSCOW 1169 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  On February 18 we delivered ref A demarche to MFA 
DVBR Division Head and NPT point of contact Aleksey Karpov, who said 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a major priority for the GOR 
and Russia wanted to see it strengthened.  For the current review 
cycle, he said Russia would focus on multilateral cooperation and 
peaceful uses for nuclear power, and urged the U.S. not to make Iran 
a major focus of the upcoming third PrepCom, or the 2010 Review 
Conference.  He suggested we not seek to get a Joint Statement from 
the PrepCom, but rely on the Statement from the second PrepCom. 
While reiterating that states have the right to enrich and reprocess 
uranium, he noted Russia's desire to strengthen participation in the 
Angarsk Center and international nuclear fuel bank to help prevent 
proliferation of nuclear materials.  Russia saw P-5 consultations as 
the most effective way of setting NPT priorities, and urged a P-5 
meeting prior to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies (CNS) meeting March 13-14 in Annecy, France (near Geneva). 
It would be a positive impetus going into the Review Conference if 
the U.S. signed on to the CTBT, and if the U.S. and Russia were able 
to reach agreement on a post-START Treaty.  Karpov suggested that 
the U.S. and Russia jointly issue the U.S.-drafted paper on 
"Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation," but noted the 
GOR had never received a response to its edits to the document.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------- 
GOR Goals for the NPT 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 18 MFA DVBR Division Head and NPT point of 
contact Aleksey Karpov told us the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) was a major priority for the GOR.  Russia, he said, wanted 
very much to reach an agreement on how to strengthen the treaty. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Karpov said that for this current review process, Russia 
would focus on peaceful uses for nuclear power and multilateral 
cooperation.  Arguing that there was great interest among many 
countries to develop nuclear power, Karpov mentioned the 
international uranium enrichment center (IUEC) in Angarsk, which was 
currently looking to expand uranium enrichment capabilities to 
include customers outside of Russia, and the international nuclear 
fuel bank as evidence of Russia's willingness to cooperate with 
other countries as they safely take advantage of nuclear power.  He 
pointed out that Kazakhstan had signed up to the IUEC, and that 
Ukraine and Armenia may soon join as well.  The international 
nuclear fuel bank, he said, could be located in Russia, but would be 
managed by the IAEA. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Dealing with Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) While acknowledging concern about non-NPT members, Karpov 
urged that Iran not be the main focus of the current review process. 
 He argued that many states have different approaches to Iran, and 
disagreement on this one issue would prevent the parties from 
reaching agreement on a myriad of other issues.  IAEA inspections, 
he argued were the best way to insure Iranian enrichment programs 
were peaceful in nature.  North Korea was being handled in the 
Six-Party talks, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group was an effective 
forum for handling issues concerning India and Pakistan. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
The Prospect of Parties Violating the Treaty 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Karpov told us the prospect of countries violating and then 
withdrawing from the NPT was not an issue the GOR was focused on. 
He said that, during the 2005 session, the GOR circulated a paper, 
but never received a response.  He said that the GOR still 
considered this paper a topic for discussion.  The GOR's positions 
laid out in the paper have not changed, he said.  He said the GOR 
otherwise had no comment on prospect of countries violating and then 
withdrawing from the NPT. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Pursuing Negotiations Relating To Nuclear Disarmament 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Karpov said that the GOR urges countries to sign on to the 
NPT in its bilateral relations with countries.  He reiterated 
Russia's position that sovereign countries have the right to enrich 
and reprocess uranium.  Russia, he said, can offer alternatives, 
such as use of the Angarsk Center or the international nuclear fuel 
bank. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Karpov argued for continued P-5 consultations, and 
suggested a meeting could be held prior to the March 13-14 CNS 
Annecy Workshop.  The possibility of the U.S. signing on to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as if the U.S. and 
Russia could agree on a post-START Treaty, would be an important 
impetus for the Review Conference. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Lack of Safeguards' Universality 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like to see NPT safeguards 
agreements become universal, and agreed it should be discussed soon. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
What the GOR Wants from the U.S. 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like a response to its proposed 
amendments to the U.S. paper "Expanding International Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation" and suggested we consider releasing this paper as a 
joint U.S.-Russia document during the PrepCom (ref B).  He said the 
GOR had no objection if other countries wished to sign on to the 
document as well. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Karpov said the U.S. and Russia could cooperate in many 
areas to promote nonproliferation.  The Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terror, he said, was a success, with 75 countries now signed 
on.  He also suggested the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
as other areas where the U.S. and Russia could eventually 
cooperate. 
 
BEYRLE