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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW307, EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: STATE DESIGNING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW307 2009-02-09 14:59 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0307/01 0401459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 091459Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1837
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0320
UNCLAS MOSCOW 000307 
 
AMEMBASSY KYIV FOR FCS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/D.MUSLU/L.HINES 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
USDOC FOR 532/OEE/MO'BRIEN 
USDOC FOR 532/BIS/OEA/TWILLIS/EHOLLAND/ANALYST 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: STATE DESIGNING 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CIVIL AVIATION, 
KIEV, UKRAINE, LICENSE NO. NLR 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 06973 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12C of the Export Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel 1 requested a Post-shipment verification to determine the 
legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, State Design 
Technological and Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, 
Kiev, Ukraine. The company is listed on BIS license application: NLR 
as the ultimate consignee of twenty (20) monolithic dual variable, 
amplitude transceivers.  ECCN 7A994. Controlled for anti-terrorism 
reasons.  The exporter is Milky Way Technologies, 105H Windy Falls 
Way, Cockeysville, MD  21030. 
 
3. On January 29, 2009, Export Control Attach Peter Liston and LES 
Yuriy Prikhodko conducted the first of two interviews for requested 
post-shipment verification with State Design Technological and 
Scientific Research institute of Civil Aviation in the offices of 
the Foreign Commercial Service in Kiev, Ukraine.  The export control 
team met with Yuriy Filippov, Assistant Director. 
 
4. Yuriy Filippov, Assistant Director, advised the export control 
team that the State Design Technological and Scientific Research 
Institute of Civil Aviation (SDTSRICA) is a government of Ukraine 
owned airport design company.  Filippov stated that they are part of 
the Ministry of Transportation and that most, if not all airport 
design work in Ukraine is done by their company.  Filippov stated 
that they are licensed under the Ministry of Civil Construction to 
do design work in any of the former Soviet Union States.  Filippov 
stated that they have 84 employees on the payroll and sometimes 
employ up to 100 depending on contract work.  Filippov indicated 
that they have a laboratory that conducts geological soil surveys 
and ground density testing for airport development and 
construction. 
 
5. In reference to the commodity in reftel, Filippov indicated that 
SDTSRICA has not received nor ever placed an order for twenty (20) 
monolithic dual variable, amplitude transceivers.  Filippov stated 
that his company has no need nor does it use any such transceivers. 
Filippov stated that he has never heard of the exporter Milky Way 
Technologies, and jokingly made reference to the candy bar. 
Filippov also stated that he contacted Ukrainian customs and the 
State Security Services and asked if such a company imported the 
subject commodity into Ukraine during the time period in question 
and was told no company imported anything under that name.  Filippov 
also stated that SDTSRICA has never done any contract work with 
National Taras Shevchenko University in Kiev, Ukraine, the stated 
end-user in reftel. 
 
6. The export control team asked Filippov if SDTSRICA had done any 
consultations with or airport design work for the government of Iran 
to which Filippov answered no. 
 
7. On January 30, 2009, the export control team met with Viktor 
Boiko, Director of SDTSRICA, at the SAS Radisson Hotel, Kiev, 
Ukraine.  Boiko advised the export control team that SDTSRICA has 
not purchased transceivers from Milky Way Technology on Maryland, 
USA.  Boiko stated that he does not know, and has never heard the 
name Hamid Heidari, a/k/a David Haidari, the POC for Milky Way 
Technology.  Boika was shown a copy of the HOLT I.C., Inc, Customer 
Certification of End Use and Export Compliance form, dated February 
20, 2008, which contains the printed name of Victor Boyko (different 
spelling) in the signature block, as the end user of the reftel 
commodity.  Boiko advised the export control team that he never saw 
the document and that it is not his signature.  Boiko indicated that 
spelling of his last name on the document is the same as that on his 
passport. 
 
8. Boiko also advised the export control team that SDTSRICA has no 
use for the reftel commodity, has never done any work with the 
University in reftel and has never done any work with the government 
of Iran. 
 
9.  Boiko could not explain to the export control team how his name, 
his company name, and contact information was obtained by Hamid 
Heidari, dba Milky Way Technologies.  Nor could Boiko explain how 
Heidari would have the spelling of his last name as indicated only 
on his passport. 
 
10. Recommendations: Post does not/not recommend State Design 
 
 
Technological and Scientific Research Institute of Civil Aviation, 
Kiev, Ukraine as reliable recipients of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. 
(FCS MOSCOW/JMARKS/PLISTON) 
BEYRLE