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Viewing cable 09MOSCOW254, DISSENTERS' DAY EVENTS IN MOSCOW RALLY CROWDS FOR,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MOSCOW254 2009-02-02 15:55 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO0991
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0254/01 0331555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021555Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1744
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000254 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM PHUM RS
SUBJECT: DISSENTERS' DAY EVENTS IN MOSCOW RALLY CROWDS FOR, 
AGAINST GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: VLADIVOSTOK 8 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: January 31 Dissenters' Day rallies in 
Moscow proved a failure for democratic and radical opposition 
groups, which focused more on attracting press coverage than 
domestic support.  Not a single major leader of the liberal 
democratic opposition appeared at the amateurish "flash mob" 
staged by the Solidarity movement and Other Russia, and 
radical writer/performance artist Eduard Limonov was arrested 
as he had planned.  The Communists and the ultra-nationalist 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) staged much larger 
rallies, with the Communists unfurling a litany of 
anti-government rhetoric and calling for widespread 
nationalization of resources.  Approved rallies by non-party 
groups (Union of Soviet Soldiers and TIGR, a radical 
avtomobilisti group protesting automobile tariffs) attracted 
small crowds and little police or media attention.  United 
Russia's well-financed rally attracted 5,000 people to the 
day's largest event, a pro-government rally outside the 
Kremlin walls.  End Summary. 
 
Illegal Rallies Attract Press More Than Protesters 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. (SBU) On the January 31, "Dissenters' Day," approved and 
unapproved rallies took place in Moscow, respectively, for 
and against the ruling government (see reftel for details on 
Vladivostok protests).  Rallies also took place in other 
cities throughout Russia, without significant numbers joining 
the anti-government manifestation.  The democratic opposition 
managed only to organize a small flash mob on Bolshaya 
Polyanka Street in central Moscow, where Other Russia and the 
new Solidarity movement emerged after a circuitous subway 
ride to the starting point.  Approximately 100 protesters (as 
opposed to the 400 members claimed on Garry Kasparov's 
website and elsewhere) marched from Polyanka metro station to 
the Garden Ring Road.  As the march began, approximately six 
youths wearing surgical masks approached the protesters and 
began to pummel them with fists and long metal rods, before 
being pushed back with pepper spray from the marchers.  The 
march then proceeded four blocks to the Garden Ring, waving 
banners for Oborona and Kasparov's United Civil Front. 
Kasparov himself chose to stay home, while police detained at 
least five of his protesters.  No more than 50 passersby even 
witnessed the march down the largely empty street, but one 
Solidarity contact nonetheless boasted to us laughably at the 
time that the march was "a complete success" because "the 
police were unable to prevent it." 
 
3. (SBU) Members of the banned National Bolshevik Party (NBP) 
gathered first at the Vykhino metro station in southeast 
Moscow, where a party member was found beaten to death on 
January 14.  As the Communists' rally on Triumphal Square 
concluded and the crowd dispersed, about a dozen NBP members 
entered the square, lit flares, and chanted, "Russia without 
Putin."  The square had emptied by then, leaving only the 
police, NBP members, and at least two dozen members of the 
press.  The large police presence, which had stood idly 
during the Communist rally, sprang to action and quickly 
carried the NBP activists away to waiting vehicles, while 
press photographers surged forward to take pictures.  Police 
detained NBP leader Eduard Limonov, who was released on 
February 1. 
 
Approved Anti-Government Rallies Proceed Without Problems 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
4. (SBU) On Triumphal Square, the Communist Party attracted 
approximately 1,000 supporters to a government-approved rally 
that lasted one hour.  The crowd of mostly elderly Russians 
waved Soviet flags, photos of Stalin and Lenin, and banners 
that decried the failure of capitalism and the corruption of 
the government and oligarchs.  Long-time Communist Party 
leader Gennadiy Zyuganov delivered a brief speech that called 
for complete nationalization of Russia's natural resources 
and giving money directly to state enterprises to boost 
employment and production.  Interrupted only briefly by a 
provocateur's smoke grenade and later by the low sweeps of a 
police helicopter, Zyuganov decried the government's alleged 
prioritization of oligarchs over "average Russians."  One 
protester told us that he attended the rally because of his 
sense that "Russia is not for Russians any more," adding that 
"the government will return us to (the default of) 1998, and 
before then the homeland should give its wealth to all 
Russians, not to the oligarchs." 
 
5. (SBU) At nearby Pushkin Square, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and 
his ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR) held an approved 45-minute rally that attracted 
approximately 300 supporters.  LDPR acknowledged to media 
 
MOSCOW 00000254  002 OF 002 
 
 
that it had not wanted to hold a rally, but felt compelled to 
since the Communists were holding one.  In a nearby 
pedestrian underpass, about 60 LDPR supporters -- largely 
older men and women - told us they were waiting to collect 
the 230 rubles (less than 7 USD) they had been promised to 
attend the rally.  One man told us that if they would not 
have been there if they had not been paid to show up. 
 
6. (SBU) At the Ulitsa 1905 Square, approximately 50 members 
of the Union of Soviet Officers, a gathering of retired 
military officers, gathered at an approved rally to protest 
the government's proposed military reforms.  Retired General 
Fomin led the rally, which garnered only a nominal police 
presence.  At the Chistiy Prudiy metro, approximately 50-100 
protesters gathered under the flag of the new TIGR movement, 
which held its first-ever public rally in Moscow. 
Previously, TIGR had existed only on-line in Moscow, having 
emerged first in Vladivostok as an offshoot of the radical 
avtomobilisti movement in the aftermath of the December 
protests in Vladivostok.  (Note: In a January 23 meeting, 
Oborona Youth Movement leader Oleg Kozlovskiy told us that 
TIGR had held its first meeting in Moscow that week.  In 
attendance, he reported, were one member from the Solidarity 
movement and ten members of the Movement Against Illegal 
Immigrants (DPNI).  End note.) 
 
7. (SBU) Outside the Kremlin walls, a pro-government rally 
sponsored by United Russia attracted approximately 5,000 
people by police estimates.  Soldiers distributed warm tea 
and biscuits to the crowd as temperatures hovered just below 
zero degrees Fahrenheit.  Speakers called on citizens to 
rally behind the policies of President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Not a single major democratic opposition leader 
participated in the Dissenters' Day events, and Solidarity 
and Other Russia failed to muster more than 100 people to 
Moscow's streets.  If the amateurish flash mob marked the 
meager extent to which non-Duma forces can rally supporters, 
the leaders' collective decision to stay home is not 
surprising.  A key Solidarity leader boasted to us in October 
that Solidarity had the capability to marshal thousands of 
Russians to the streets against the government; in reality, 
however, nothing close to that has happened.  To be sure, 
government restrictions on assembly and media access greatly 
hamper democratic opposition forces; but the poorly organized 
and lightly attended events in Moscow showed a democratic 
opposition focused more on appealing to media in the absence 
of significant support. 
 
9. (SBU) The Communists fared best on Dissenters' Day, having 
conducted a professional rally and attracted a sizable, 
albeit somewhat superannuated, crowd of supporters.  The 
government's willingness to allow the Communists to protest 
demonstrated a move to allow some space for political 
dissent, but only under tightly controlled circumstances. 
Still far from the reins of power, Zyuganov can enjoy 
increased opposition credentials without having to 
contemplate the realities of actually implementing the 
drastic policies he proposes.  There is no indication yet 
that the Communists' platform will attract widespread 
support, but the upcoming March elections may enable them to 
expand their base and influence in some regions.  End Comment. 
BEYRLE